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litellm-check

Did the compromised LiteLLM v1.107.0 release touch your code, your images, or your Python environments? litellm-check scans a source tree and/or local Python environments for the exposure surface of the 2026-10-21 LiteLLM supply-chain incident and writes an evidence report (Markdown or JSON).

Every detection rule is derived from LiteLLM's official incident announcement — “Contained: Oct 21, 2026 LiteLLM release v1.107.0 Compromised” (last updated 2026-10-21 20:30 UTC). No third-party IOC lists are used. The tool collects evidence only; it never certifies an environment as safe — the announcement itself warns that not finding an indicator does not prove an environment is clean.

Zero third-party dependencies. Python 3.11+. It reads files only and never executes Python (or pip) inside a scanned environment — which matters, because the announcement warns that any Python start in an affected environment re-runs the implant.

Install

pip install litellm-check        # or from a checkout:
pip install .

Usage

# Scan a project checkout
litellm-check scan ~/src/my-service

# Scan where your virtualenvs live (this is how you check installed envs)
litellm-check scan ~/projects --format json --out report.json

# CI gate: fail the job if any critical indicator is present
litellm-check scan . --fail-on critical

# Equivalent without installing
python -m litellm_check scan <path>

Exit codes: 0 = scan completed (findings are reported, not gated), 1 = a finding met the --fail-on threshold, 2 = usage error.

What it scans

Surface Files What is evaluated
Dependency manifests requirements*.txt, pyproject.toml (PEP 621 deps, optional-deps, PEP 735 dependency-groups, Poetry), Pipfile, setup.py, setup.cfg, conda environment.yml The version spec is evaluated, not grepped: does it pin exactly 1.107.0 (critical), admit it — unpinned, >=, ~=, Poetry ^/~, wildcards (high) — or exclude it (info)
Lockfiles poetry.lock, uv.lock, Pipfile.lock The resolved litellm version: 1.107.0 = critical
Container definitions Dockerfile*, docker-compose*.yml Image tags v1.107.0 (critical) and latest / main-latest / main-stable / untagged (high, they pointed at the bad image during the window); the compromised image digest anywhere in any text file (critical); GHCR digests — the announcement publishes them truncated, so those are prefix-matched and labelled as such
Installed environments any litellm-*.dist-info in the tree (e.g. under .venv/, env/, system site-packages you point it at) This is the announcement's pip show litellm check, done by reading metadata: version 1.107.0 = critical, other versions = info
Implant & marker files anywhere in the tree litellm-1.107.0.dist-info, cook.pth, cook.py, sitecustomize.py, __pycache__ implant bytecode, remote_code_loader.lock — the exact filenames the announcement tells you to search for and delete. Critical when inside a site-packages directory

Rule IDs LL-001 … LL-013 with the incident basis and remediation for each live in rules/litellm.rules.json and are printed in full in every report.

What it does not scan / cannot prove

  • A clean report is not a clean bill of health. Environments rebuilt or deleted after exposure, images pulled without any definition file in the tree, and anything recorded only in CI logs / shell history / registry audit logs leave nothing for this tool to find.
  • “Admits” findings (LL-003, LL-007) mark exposure surface, not proof of installation: whether an unpinned spec actually resolved to 1.107.0 depends on whether an install ran inside the announced windows (PyPI 2026-10-21 11:39:51–13:23 UTC; Docker 11:46:56–14:20 UTC; GHCR until 13:51 UTC). Pair the scan with install timestamps.
  • It does not inspect running processes, network/egress logs, image layers, or host state outside the directory you point it at (e.g. point it at /tmp too if you want the daemon lock-file check to cover the real /tmp).
  • It does not hash installed files: the announcement publishes no wheel hashes, so no rule is built on hashes.
  • Enterprise customers on LiteLLM's private registry were not impacted (per the announcement); this tool checks the public artifacts only.

How to read the report

  • Summary by severity — counts first. critical = an artifact the vendor says to treat as compromised is present. high = exposure that depends on install/pull timing, or an implant-named file outside site-packages. info = litellm present but pinned/resolved/installed at a version that excludes 1.107.0 (kept in the report so reviewers can see coverage, per the announcement that all pre-1.107.0 versions are safe).
  • Findings — each with file:line evidence, the exact spec/tag/file matched, the incident basis (what the announcement says about it), and a remediation.
  • Vendor response steps — condensed from the announcement's “What to do if you are affected”: do not start with pip install (it re-executes the implant); delete the implant files from the shell; kill the daemon holding /tmp/remote_code_loader.lock; rebuild pinned to litellm==1.106.2; rotate every secret the host could reach; check CloudTrail.
  • Detection limits — the full statement above, printed in every report.

Demo

examples/demo-project/ is a deliberately exposed sample project (affected pin, floating tag, digest-pinned compose service, a fake .venv with inert stand-ins for the implant files). Its generated report is committed:

litellm-check scan examples/demo-project
# 16 findings: 10 critical, 4 high, 2 info — see examples/sample-report.md

Development

pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest -q          # 58 tests
ruff check src tests

Layout mirrors the rules-as-data design: rule metadata in rules/litellm.rules.json (a byte-identical copy is bundled in the package; a test keeps them in sync), incident facts in src/litellm_check/incident.py, spec evaluation in specs.py, detectors in scanner.py.

License

Apache-2.0. Not affiliated with BerriAI/LiteLLM; “LiteLLM” is used only to name the incident this tool audits.

Metadata

Release files for litellm-check 0.1.0

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