llama-index-tools-enigmagent
Last week I asked a LlamaIndex agent to push a fix to a private GitHub repo. To do that, the agent needed my personal access token. I had three options, and all three were terrible: paste the token into the prompt (and into the provider's logs forever), give the agent a long-lived token it could reuse on its own at 3 a.m., or give up and do it by hand.
llama-index-tools-enigmagent is option four.
Your LlamaIndex agent emits {{GITHUB_TOKEN}}. The placeholder leaves the model and travels through the prompt, the QueryPipeline, the tool inputs, the trace — and only at the moment your tool actually needs the credential does EnigmAgent intercept the call, decrypt the real token locally with AES-256-GCM, and inject it. The plaintext exists for one event-loop tick. The model never sees it. The provider never sees it. Your trace never sees it.
pip install llama-index-tools-enigmagent
In another terminal, next to your app:
npx enigmagent-mcp --mode rest --port 3737
That's the entire install. The Python package talks to the local EnigmAgent REST server over loopback; secrets stay in the encrypted vault on disk.
Star the main project if you've ever pasted a token you regretted.
The problem (in LlamaIndex terms)
When you build a LlamaIndex agent that needs to authenticate against a real API — GitHub, OpenAI, Stripe, your own backend — you face the same impossible choice every framework faces:
| Option | What happens |
|---|---|
| Put the secret into the prompt | It lands in the trace, in the model's context, possibly in provider logs |
| Bake the token into the tool at construction time | The model can call the tool with arbitrary inputs and exfiltrate the secret indirectly |
| Use a separate HSM / vault per tool | Works but every tool has to be rewritten |
llama-index-tools-enigmagent is option D. Your prompt, your QueryPipeline, your trace all carry only {{PLACEHOLDER}} strings. The real value is resolved at the boundary, by a process the model cannot see, against a vault on the user's machine.
How it works
+------------------+ emits {{GITHUB_TOKEN}} +---------------------+
| LlamaIndex agent | -----------------------> | Tool input / call |
| (any LLM) | | (github.com / ...) |
+------------------+ +----------+----------+
| before invoke (intercepted)
v
+-------------------------+
| EnigmAgent |
| detects placeholder, |
| checks origin match, |
| decrypts -> ghp_xxx |
+----------+--------------+
| real value
v
+-------------------------+
| HTTP request to the |
| upstream API |
+-------------------------+
The model emits a placeholder. The placeholder lives in the prompt, the pipeline, and the trace. A BaseToolSpec (or FnComponent) in your pipeline sees the placeholder right before the request leaves your process and asks the local EnigmAgent REST server to swap it for the real value — but only if the request's origin matches the domain that secret was bound to. Wrong domain → the resolver refuses.
Three usage patterns
1. EnigmAgentToolSpec — agent-callable tools (recommended)
Expose vault operations as first-class LlamaIndex tools the agent can call:
from llama_index.core.agent import ReActAgent
from llama_index.llms.openai import OpenAI
from llama_index.tools.enigmagent import EnigmAgentClient, EnigmAgentToolSpec
spec = EnigmAgentToolSpec(
client=EnigmAgentClient(),
default_origin="https://api.github.com",
)
agent = ReActAgent.from_tools(
spec.to_tool_list(),
llm=OpenAI(model="gpt-4o-mini"),
verbose=True,
)
# The agent emits {{GITHUB_TOKEN}}. The tool resolves it at call time.
# The model NEVER sees the value.
agent.chat("Use the GitHub API with header Authorization: Bearer {{GITHUB_TOKEN}} to list my repos")
EnigmAgentToolSpec exposes three operations:
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
resolve_placeholder(name, origin) |
Decrypt one secret |
substitute_placeholders(text, origin) |
Walk a string, swap every {{NAME}} |
list_placeholders(text) |
Extract placeholder names without resolving (useful for dry-runs) |
2. enigma_substitute — QueryPipeline transformer
Drop into a QueryPipeline so every value flowing through gets {{PLACEHOLDER}} resolved before the LLM stage:
from llama_index.core.query_pipeline import QueryPipeline, FnComponent
from llama_index.llms.openai import OpenAI
from llama_index.tools.enigmagent import EnigmAgentClient, enigma_substitute
sub = FnComponent(
fn=enigma_substitute(EnigmAgentClient(), origin="https://api.openai.com"),
)
pipe = QueryPipeline(chain=[sub, OpenAI(model="gpt-4o-mini")])
# {{OPENAI_KEY}} is resolved right before OpenAI is invoked.
pipe.run(input="Bearer {{OPENAI_KEY}}")
3. enigma_secret — drop-in SecretStr replacement
For LlamaIndex components that take an API key directly, resolve once at construction time:
from llama_index.llms.openai import OpenAI
from llama_index.tools.enigmagent import enigma_secret
api_key = enigma_secret("OPENAI_KEY", origin="https://api.openai.com")
llm = OpenAI(api_key=api_key.get_secret_value())
The plaintext lives only inside the SecretStr and only inside the OpenAI instance — never in your source, never in your env, never in the prompt.
Configuration
EnigmAgentClient defaults to http://localhost:3737. Override:
client = EnigmAgentClient(
base_url="http://127.0.0.1:9999", # custom port
timeout=5.0, # in seconds
shared_secret="my-loopback-token", # sent as X-EnigmAgent-Auth header
)
To run the EnigmAgent REST server with a shared secret:
npx enigmagent-mcp --mode rest --port 3737 --auth my-loopback-token
The vault
This package is a thin client. The real work — Argon2id key derivation, AES-256-GCM encryption, origin binding, audit logging — lives in EnigmAgent, the npm package that backs it. To create or edit your vault, see the main README. A typical workflow:
# Create a vault interactively (one-time)
npx enigmagent-mcp --new-vault ./my.vault.json
# Add a secret bound to a domain
npx enigmagent-mcp --vault ./my.vault.json --add GITHUB_TOKEN ghp_xxx --origin https://api.github.com
# Run as REST server next to your LlamaIndex app
npx enigmagent-mcp --mode rest --port 3737 --vault ./my.vault.json
Security model
- Loopback only. The REST server binds to
127.0.0.1. Only processes on the same machine can reach it. - Origin binding. Every secret is bound to one or more origins (e.g.
https://api.github.com). Resolving a secret for a different origin is refused. - Argon2id + AES-256-GCM. The vault file is encrypted at rest with a passphrase-derived key.
- No plaintext in logs. Resolved values exist only in the memory of the process making the upstream HTTP call, for the duration of that call.
- Optional shared secret. Pass
--authto require anX-EnigmAgent-Authheader on every REST call, so unauthorised local processes can't query the vault.
Full threat model: EnigmAgent THREAT_MODEL.md
Compatibility
- Python: 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13
llama-index-core >= 0.11pydantic >= 2- Any LLM provider (OpenAI, Anthropic, Mistral, local), any tool
Roadmap
- Auto-rewrite tool inputs in the agent middleware (currently the agent must explicitly call
substitute_placeholdersor wrap calls inenigma_substitute) - Workflow event helper for the new LlamaIndex
WorkflowAPI - Sister package for LlamaIndex
Settings(vault-backed default LLM keys) - Upstream proposal to LlamaHub once this package has real users
PRs welcome.
See also
- LangChain integration:
langchain-enigmagent— same idea, LangChain-native (Runnable,Callback)
License
MIT (c) 2026 Francisco Angulo de Lafuente
Links
- Main project: github.com/Agnuxo1/EnigmAgent
- npm package: enigmagent-mcp
- Issues: github.com/Agnuxo1/llama-index-tools-enigmagent/issues
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