llms-ink
Turn any public link — a site, docs section, page, GitHub repo, PDF or video — into llms.txt or llms-full.txt, from Python. A client for llms.ink with LangChain and LlamaIndex loaders. No required dependencies.
pip install llms-ink
Use
from llms_ink import Client
ink = Client()
index = ink.llms("llmstxt.org") # llms.txt: an index of links
docs = ink.llms("docs.astro.build/en/guides/", mode="full") # llms-full.txt: the content
print(docs.title, docs.kind, docs.tokens)
print(docs.text)
llms() returns a Result: url, kind (site, section, page, repo, document, video),
source (native = published by the site, generated = made by llms.ink), mode, title, text,
tokens, pages, model, cached, generated_at, and media for videos (duration, downloads,
transcript segments). fresh=True skips the cache and rebuilds.
Check a site's published llms.txt:
report = ink.check("llmstxt.org")
print(report.found, report.summary.errors, [i.message for i in report.issues])
Parse and check llms.txt text you already have, e.g. before publishing it:
report = ink.check_text(open("public/llms.txt").read(), base="https://example.com/llms.txt", links=True)
for section in report.parsed.sections:
print(section.name, [(link.title, link.url, link.notes) for link in section.links])
report.parsed (Parsed: title, summary, details, sections of ParsedSection with ParsedLinks) is
also set by check(), and is None when nothing was found. Without base, site and url are None; without
base and links=True, llms_full is None and links.checked is 0.
API key (optional)
Without a key you share the free anonymous limits (10 requests/minute, 60 new links a day per IP; cached links are free). A key gets its own daily quota:
export LLMS_INK_KEY=lk_...
or Client(key="lk_..."). It is sent as Authorization: Bearer. A bad key raises InvalidKey; it never
falls back to anonymous. Ask for a key.
Errors
from llms_ink import Client, LlmsInkError, QuotaExceeded, RateLimited
try:
Client().llms("example.com")
except (RateLimited, QuotaExceeded) as err:
print(f"wait {err.retry_after}s")
except LlmsInkError as err:
print(err.status, err.code, err.detail)
LlmsInkError carries the API's status, code (see the error table),
detail and errors. InvalidKey, RateLimited and QuotaExceeded are subclasses.
LangChain
pip install 'llms-ink[langchain]'
from llms_ink.langchain import LlmsInkLoader
docs = LlmsInkLoader(["llmstxt.org", "github.com/AnswerDotAI/llms-txt"], mode="full").load()
docs[0].metadata # {'url', 'title', 'kind', 'source', 'mode', 'tokens', 'generated_at'}
LlamaIndex
pip install 'llms-ink[llama-index]'
from llama_index.core import VectorStoreIndex
from llms_ink.llama_index import LlmsInkReader
docs = LlmsInkReader(mode="full").load_data(["docs.astro.build/en/guides/"])
index = VectorStoreIndex.from_documents(docs)
Command line
python -m llms_ink llmstxt.org # llms.txt
python -m llms_ink llmstxt.org --full # llms-full.txt
python -m llms_ink llmstxt.org --json # the whole result
MCP server (stdio)
For agents that launch local MCP servers, such as Hermes Agent. It forwards every message to the remote server
https://llms.ink/mcp and sends LLMS_INK_KEY, when set, as Authorization: Bearer.
uvx --from llms-ink llms-ink-mcp # with uv, nothing to install
python -m llms_ink mcp # after pip install llms-ink
Hermes Agent, in ~/.hermes/config.yaml:
mcp_servers:
llms-ink:
command: uvx
args: [--from, llms-ink, llms-ink-mcp]
env:
LLMS_INK_KEY: ${LLMS_INK_KEY} # only with LLMS_INK_KEY set in ~/.hermes/.env
Other clients use the same command in their mcpServers config. A rejected key makes every request fail with the
API's message; it never falls back to anonymous. Clients that speak Streamable HTTP can connect to
https://llms.ink/mcp directly.
Local MCP guard (experimental)
Python 3.11 or newer. Install the optional runtime and explicitly download the pinned model:
pip install 'llms-ink[guard]==0.6.0'
llms-ink-guard setup
llms-ink-guard status
Configure your MCP client to launch llms-ink-mcp --guard using the environment's absolute executable path.
To wrap another legacy stdio tool server:
llms-ink-guard wrap -- server-command arguments
The local Llama-Doorman-22M classifier inspects tool definitions, text, structured JSON and errors before delivery. Flagged responses are withheld without repeating the payload. Model errors, incomplete inspection and unsupported content never fall back to uninspected delivery. Tools must be discovered before use. A changed definition locks further calls on that connection; review the server before reconnecting. Other connections and host tools are not covered.
Limits: 1 MiB per message, 8,192 model tokens per response, 20 seconds per inspection, 16 pending requests, 120 seconds per request, 512 discovered tools and 4,096 unique request IDs per connection. Restart to renew a connection. Legacy tool discovery/calls only: no batches, resources, prompts, sampling, upstream elicitation, images, audio or embedded/resource-link content. Server stderr and unsolicited notifications are suppressed. Decision events on stderr contain no response payload. Plain response scanning does not authorize outgoing actions. Neither mode sandboxes the server or covers other connections and native host tools.
llms-ink-guard scan < document.txt prints an inspection receipt: exit 0 allows, 1 quarantines, 2 means unscanned
or unavailable. An allow decision is not proof of safety. The model is English-centric; this pilot has not met
large held-out-corpus or agent-task evaluation gates. Reproducible authored smoke cases live in
tests/fixtures/guard_eval.json; after setup, run python tests/evaluate_guard.py to compare rules and hybrid outcomes.
The first setup downloads about 96 MB. Files are verified against pinned SHA-256 hashes at install and startup.
No scanning API receives content; upstream MCP servers still receive requests. Override the local cache location
with LLMS_INK_GUARD_CACHE if needed. This is an independent integration of Pinata's model, not its Doorman app.
Built with Llama. Weights are separately licensed under the Llama 4 Community License; setup downloads and preserves
LICENSE and NOTICE. See the setup guide.
Local tool permissions (0.6.0)
wrap --policy adds a separate, deny-by-default permission check before forwarding tool calls.
The owner supplies the exact server command, reviewed tool-definition hashes and allowed argument objects.
Model findings and server annotations cannot grant permissions. The classifier itself is unchanged:
it missed all 1,054 attacks in the published InjecAgent evaluation.
Save one complete, reviewed tool object from tools/list as tool.json, then fingerprint it:
llms-ink-guard tool-hash < tool.json
Write a policy.json using your reviewed executable, tool hash and argument objects:
{
"version": 1,
"command": ["/opt/mcp/docs-server"],
"tools": {
"read": {
"definitionSha256": "REPLACE_WITH_REVIEWED_TOOL_SHA256",
"arguments": [{"url": "https://docs.example/reference", "format": "text"}]
}
}
}
llms-ink-guard policy-check /absolute/path/to/policy.json
llms-ink-guard wrap --policy /absolute/path/to/policy.json -- /opt/mcp/docs-server
The policy is validated before the model/server starts, then held as an immutable snapshot. The executable
path must be absolute and its argument list must match. Discovery exposes only approved definitions; changed
or unapproved definitions cannot be called. Missing rules, changed arguments, unknown call metadata and task
extensions are denied. Validated MCP progressToken and Claude Code claudecode/toolUseId correlation metadata
are discarded before dispatch; neither reaches the upstream or grants permission. Denial events contain no tool names or arguments. Edit the policy and restart after
owner review; there is no agent approval tool or live reload. An empty tools object denies all tool calls.
Version 1 supports exact JSON objects only: key order is ignored, but string values and numeric types must match. No wildcards, path/URL normalization, or schema-based permission rules. Limits: 256 KiB policy, 512 tools, 128 argument alternatives per tool, 1,024 alternatives total. Ambiguous JSON and unsupported numeric values fail closed. Keep the file and parent directories outside the agent's write access; group/world-writable files on Unix and symlink files are rejected.
The command and advertised definition are checked, not executable bytes, environment variables, working
directory or remote behavior. A server can act as soon as it starts; use trusted code and limited credentials.
Permitted calls can have side effects. llms-ink-mcp --guard and plain wrap remain response-only modes.
See the permission guide for a complete example and the enforcement scope.
One-use host approval (experimental, 0.7.0)
llms-ink-guard wrap --policy /absolute/path/to/policy.json --require-approval -- /opt/mcp/docs-server
This adds a host form before each already permitted call. It cannot approve a tool or arguments absent from the exact policy. The host must declare form elicitation on MCP 2025-06-18 or 2025-11-25; unsupported clients fail initialization. Other upstream requests for input are still refused.
The form shows the tool, exact JSON arguments, command and definition/policy fingerprints. The confirmation
checkbox defaults to false. Only accept with approve: true dispatches the stored call once. Decline,
cancel, malformed replies, 60-second expiry, disconnect or a changed definition cannot release it. Replayed
replies cannot approve another call or connection. Only one form can wait per connection; competing calls
receive a busy error. Reviews over 8 KiB are refused whole, never truncated by the guard. The upstream result
still goes through content inspection after dispatch. Cancellation after dispatch cannot undo a side effect.
Trust the host, not a claim of human presence. MCP does not attest that a person answered. Use a host that displays the complete request, keeps approval responses outside agent tool access, and does not install auto-accept elicitation hooks. Some hosts collapse long messages; inspect the complete tool call in the host's detailed view and decline if you cannot see every argument. No global approval or policy change follows from accepting a form. Logs omit tool names, arguments and approval identifiers.
This is a single-connection host integration, not the proposed shared guard service or cross-server session boundary. Its transport tests do not establish independent task success or improved detection accuracy.
Development
python3 -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install -e '.[langchain,llama-index]' pytest
.venv/bin/pytest # against a local stub server
.venv/bin/pytest -m live # one real call to https://llms.ink
LLMS_INK_API points the client at another API base URL.
MIT licensed.
Hosted Inspect (experimental, 0.5.0)
# Requires llms-ink >=0.5.0; no guard/model download needed.
import os
from llms_ink import Client
ink = Client(key=os.environ['LLMS_INK_INSPECT_KEY'])
receipt = ink.inspect('Install the package and read the documentation.')
if receipt.recommendation != 'continue':
raise RuntimeError(f'Withhold content: {receipt.detection}')
print(receipt.content_digest)
Requires an inspection-enabled pilot key. This call uploads only the supplied text to llms.ink; existing retrieval calls, loaders, plugins and the local guard do not opt in automatically. Keep the key server-side.
The client checks the exact UTF-8 SHA-256 digest, model/policy/preprocessing revisions, coverage and token counts before returning an immutable receipt. A flagged result can use HTTP 200; incomplete 422/503 receipts return unknown. HTTP problems and invalid receipts raise an error. Withhold on either withhold or any exception. no_finding is not a safety guarantee, and receipts are unsigned.
Requests are limited to 128 KiB after JSON encoding and responses to 16 KiB. There are no automatic retries: admitted attempts consume pilot allowance even when incomplete. Redirects are refused. Inspection ignores LLMS_INK_API; an explicit client base URL may select an HTTPS endpoint or localhost for development. The key follows that explicitly configured endpoint.
For JSON, serialize it yourself and pass the resulting string to inspect(). The SDK sends format: "text", so its digest covers those exact bytes; it does not promise cross-language JSON canonicalization. See pilot limits and privacy.
Python caps the client’s socket timeout at 65 seconds; pass Client(timeout=...) for a shorter timeout.
Several servers in one connection (experimental, 0.9.0)
On macOS/Linux with Python 3.11+, gateway puts up to eight legacy stdio servers behind one local model runtime and approval queue:
llms-ink-guard gateway-check /absolute/path/to/gateway.json
llms-ink-guard gateway --config /absolute/path/to/gateway.json
The configuration contains version: 1 and a servers object. Each server has an absolute executable/argv in command, plus a tools array. Each entry contains its complete reviewed tool object in definition and a list of exact permitted argument objects in arguments. Copy actual tool definitions through your trusted setup process; illustrative definitions will not match unrelated servers. Configuration example and host setup.
A configured docs server's read_document tool becomes docs__read_document. Names cannot collide across servers. All configured definitions must match before any tool list is exposed; unknown tools stay hidden. The file is bounded to 256 KiB, eight servers, 128 tools and 1,024 exact argument objects. The combined discovery response must also fit the existing inspection limits. gateway-check validates configuration only; it does not start or certify the servers.
By default, every permitted call requires a fresh form approval on MCP 2025-06-18 or 2025-11-25. There is no automatic-approval option in this command. Review shows the server-prefixed name, full arguments, the actual upstream command and bound fingerprints. One approval may be pending across all configured servers. Declining it, cancelling it, disconnecting, or replaying another connection's answer cannot dispatch the held action. Approval still trusts the host's answer; it does not attest a human was present.
The aggregate is tied to one stdio connection. Use a separate connection per host session; grouping by working directory or a model-supplied session string is not supported. A host that shares one connection across chats also shares this queue. This is not the proposed authenticated shared service, a cross-chat identity system, or persistent exposure tracking.
The gateway requires every server to select the same supported legacy protocol version. It permits one complete discovery at a time, internally follows at most 16 pages per server and refuses duplicate/missing/changed reviewed definitions. A tool-list-change notification or any server disconnect stops the aggregate and revokes held approvals. Reconnect after reviewing the configuration. Unknown result paths, reverse requests, resources, prompts, tasks and HTTP transports are not added by this release. Modern client support is explicit below; upstream servers still use legacy stdio.
Termination stops the owned POSIX process group. During the bounded model-startup handshake, a termination signal is deferred until the worker can be closed; no server is started after a pending stop. Cancellation after dispatch cannot undo a side effect. A server can act during startup or escape a process group; this is not a process/network sandbox or a pin of executable bytes. Native host tools and other connections remain outside the boundary.
The tests use real subprocess journals, including a detector-missed source from server A that proposes an unapproved action through server B. This is containment/compatibility evidence, not an independent task-success or attack-prevention estimate. The published task checks and detector limitations still apply.
Modern MCP clients
For a client using MCP 2026-07-28, select the adapter explicitly:
llms-ink-guard gateway --config /absolute/path/to/gateway.json --client-protocol 2026-07-28
The client uses server/discover and per-request protocol metadata instead of initialize. Upstream servers must support MCP 2025-11-25. Declare form elicitation capability on every tool call, including retries. Unsupported versions receive -32022 with the supported version; unknown execution extensions are refused.
A permitted call returns resultType: "input_required", an unchecked approval form under inputRequests.approval, and an opaque requestState. After review, the client repeats the same tool and arguments with a new JSON-RPC ID, that state, and inputResponses.approval. The state is a random handle to an immutable action held in this process. It expires after 60 seconds, is consumed at most once, and cannot move to another connection or authorize changed arguments. It contains no serialized tool arguments or credentials.
The adapter inspects the result after dispatch and returns resultType: "complete". Upstream continuation fields cannot create approval forms. Client identity metadata is self-reported and never grants authority. The official Go MCP SDK interoperability test uses inert fixture effects and automated decisions; it does not establish full human-review rendering in a desktop host. This adapter does not add modern upstream servers, HTTP, a shared session service or persistent exposure state.
Shared local sessions (experimental, 0.10.0)
For host integrations that can control conversation lifecycle, one foreground service can share local inference across authenticated sessions. Each session has its own approval queue and can attach several guarded connections. A host must issue a separate session for each independent conversation; neither a working directory nor MCP metadata establishes identity. Existing desktop clients need a lifecycle adapter to do this automatically.
The service requires macOS/Linux and Python 3.11+. First review the gateway configuration, then create a private directory outside agent access:
llms-ink-guard service-init "$HOME/.llms-ink-guard"
llms-ink-guard service-serve --owner-file "$HOME/.llms-ink-guard/owner.json" --config /absolute/path/to/gateway.json
Keep the service running. From the trusted host/control process, issue a session into a new file in a private directory:
llms-ink-guard session-create --owner-file "$HOME/.llms-ink-guard/owner.json" --output "$HOME/.llms-ink-guard/session.json"
llms-ink-guard connect --session-file "$HOME/.llms-ink-guard/session.json"
connect is the stdio MCP command for that conversation. It loads no model locally and never receives the owner secret. For modern clients, pass --client-protocol 2026-07-28 to session-create. The service pins its server configuration at startup; session credentials cannot choose commands, change permissions, approve peer connections or call owner operations. Each connection launches its own configured upstream processes, while sharing the model and session approval queue.
The owner can inspect metadata and revoke a session using the non-secret ID printed by creation:
llms-ink-guard service-status --owner-file "$HOME/.llms-ink-guard/owner.json"
llms-ink-guard session-revoke --owner-file "$HOME/.llms-ink-guard/owner.json" --session-id SESSION_ID
Sessions default to one hour (--ttl, maximum 86,400 seconds). Limits are 16 live sessions, eight attached connections overall and four per session. Authentication frames are bounded to 8 KiB and three seconds; writes have five-second deadlines. Model access is serialized; waiting more than one second for it yields an unscanned result that is withheld. Status reports counters, never content. There is no disk audit or exposure history.
Revocation, expiry and upstream transport failure invalidate held calls across the session. Cancellation and authority are checked immediately before the first dispatch byte, including after a pipe stalls. A dispatched effect cannot be undone. Restarting the service invalidates all old session capabilities; it is not evidence that a host removed prior context. A normal stop removes its own socket. After an unclean crash, use a new private service directory and reissue sessions. Existing sockets and credential files are never silently replaced.
Trust boundary: file/socket permissions do not isolate malicious code running as the same OS user. Keep the owner credential outside agent/upstream access through a trusted execution boundary. This does not sandbox servers, native shell/file tools, or a compromised host. Approval responses still trust the host and do not prove a person reviewed them. The service exposes no HTTP listener, team account, billing or automatic chat detection. Setup and limits.
Owner-reviewed additions (experimental, 0.11.1)
When an intended call does not match your gateway configuration, an owner can propose one exact argument object for an existing tool and review it in a terminal. Nothing is normalized or granted automatically. Start with the reviewed gateway configuration, and create a private directory outside agent access:
mkdir -m 700 "$HOME/.llms-ink-permissions"
# Save the exact proposed JSON object in this directory as arguments.json.
llms-ink-guard gateway-propose --config /absolute/path/to/gateway.json \
--server docs --tool read_document \
--arguments "$HOME/.llms-ink-permissions/arguments.json" \
--output "$HOME/.llms-ink-permissions/proposal.json"
llms-ink-guard gateway-review --config /absolute/path/to/gateway.json \
--proposal "$HOME/.llms-ink-permissions/proposal.json" \
--output "$HOME/.llms-ink-permissions/gateway-next.json"
Replace the illustrative server/tool and paths. A proposal cannot be loaded as a gateway configuration. Review shows the complete command, definition, existing grants and proposed addition as escaped JSON, plus the candidate fingerprint and destination. Only the fresh displayed challenge, typed within 120 seconds in an owner terminal, accepts. Enter, EOF, timeout, interruption, changed inputs or an existing output path refuse publication. No --yes or piped acceptance is supported. Reviews over 32 KiB are refused whole.
Acceptance writes a new mode-0600 configuration in an owner-only directory, without editing the base or starting a server/model. The owner must explicitly start a new gateway or service with that file; running scopes remain unchanged and action approval is still required. An interrupted successful publication can leave the complete new file: inspect the destination before retrying. This does not add tools/servers, infer task intent, validate all JSON Schema semantics, prove human presence or isolate malicious same-user code. Workflow and boundary.
Metadata
Release files for llms-ink 0.11.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| llms_ink-0.11.1.tar.gz | 95.3 kB | With provenance | Details for llms_ink-0.11.1.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| llms_ink-0.11.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for llms_ink-0.11.1-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 160.1 kB
Release files / llms_ink-0.11.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | llms_ink-0.11.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 95.3 kB |
| Tags | Source |
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