a2a-cli

File-based agent bus: mail, journal, thoughts, task board, locks, alerts, handoffs, presence (status/DND), synchronous RPC. Records are Markdown with YAML front matter on a shared POSIX filesystem; every command emits one JSON envelope. No daemon, no broker, no network.

Русский · English

Install

The PyPI project named a2a-cli is unrelated. Install from this repository only.

pip install git+https://github.com/lnfnt/a2a-cli.git
a2a --help

Dev checkout: git clone https://github.com/lnfnt/a2a-cli.git && cd a2a-cli && python -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install -e . Python >= 3.10, PyYAML.

Quickstart: two profiles on one bus

export A2A_HOME=/tmp/a2a-demo
a2a onboard --profile alice
a2a onboard --profile bob

a2a --profile alice mail send --to bob --subject "ship it" --body "task 42 is ready"
a2a --profile bob mail check            # read-only unread peek (cron-safe)
a2a --profile bob mail list --inbox --unread
a2a --profile bob mail answer <id> "done, artifacts attached"

a2a --profile alice log "implemented bus schema" --artifacts ./SPEC.md
a2a --profile alice think "hypothesis: file bus beats a queue for 10 agents"

a2a --profile alice task new "release v1" --to bob
a2a --profile bob task claim <id>
a2a --profile bob task submit <id> --evidence ./build.log
a2a --profile alice task accept <id>

a2a --profile bob status set --state idle
a2a --profile alice fleet
a2a --profile alice ask --to bob --timeout 30 "where is v1?"

a2a doctor        # orphans, ACL drift, secret spikes, tamper baseline, version parity
a2a verify        # schema validation of every record

One JSON envelope per command: {"ok":…, "status":…, "reason":…, "data":…, "metadata":…}; rejections carry hint + example. Exit codes: 0 ok, 1 error, 2 degraded, 3 invalid record, 4 usage, 124 timeout.

Storage model

One directory tree, append-only records. Default store ~/.a2a, override A2A_HOME. Profile resolution: --profile > A2A_PROFILE > HERMES_PROFILE > HERMES_HOME dir name > ~/.hermes/active_profile > default. ACL per record: L1 private, L2 team, L3 public; fail-closed — invalid access is rejected or downgraded to the type default.

Integrity

• Scrubber: secret shapes (sk-…, Bearer …, PEM, api_key=…, hex-32+) are redacted or hard-rejected with secret_detected; quarantine + a2a secrets report + doctor warnings.
• Tamper detection: a2a snapshot --save records sha256; a2a doctor diffs (tamper_suspects).
• Atomic writes (mkstemp + fsync + rename); interrupted bundles forward-recover via doctor.
• Scope locks, DND policy, idempotency dedup, audit log (actions only, never content).
• SQLite FTS5 search index — derived, rebuildable (a2a index --rebuild).

Limits

• Single-UID trust model: anyone with write access to the directory can post as their own profile; the bus detects tampering, not identity fraud.
• For more than ~dozens of agents or multiple machines, use a real message broker.
• ask is bounded synchronous coordination (timeout + answer file), not chat.

Docs & tests

SPEC.md, SCHEMA.md, LIMITATIONS.md, NOTES.md, a2a cookbook. python -m pytest -q — 405 tests against temp A2A_HOME dirs. Apache-2.0 (LICENSE). Verify artifacts: sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS, gpg --verify *.asc.

Author and copyright holder: lnfnt.