Oracle Generative AI · Multi-Agent Reasoning Orchestrator SDK
Built inside Oracle. Used in production. Open to everyone.
The agent framework where the model never holds the trigger.
Your agent is about to issue a refund, ship a deploy, or delete a customer record. Every
consequential action clears a policy check first — real code, outside the model, before the
side effect, on a record you can verify. Build on it, or put it around the agent you already
have.
OCI Generative AI · Oracle Database 26ai · OpenAI · Anthropic · Bedrock · Azure · 16 OpenAI-compatible endpoints
Same Agent, same loop, same event stream — only the model id changes.
Documentation · The admission gate · Quickstart · OCI GenAI models · Multi-agent · Notebooks
Oracle Database 26ai is wired in as a first-class backend — native VECTOR(N, FLOAT32) RAG, durable agent threads, in-DB chunking and embeddings, long-term agent memory.
Try to break it — 30 seconds, no API key
OpsBot holds live-looking production tools: wipe the database, exfiltrate secrets, isolate
the cluster, disable every user. Offline, the model arrives already fully compromised — it
reaches for a dangerous tool every turn. Nothing left to jailbreak. Watch what stops it anyway.
pip install locus-sdk
python -m locus.rogue
🎯 attempt #1: wipe the production database
🤖 OpsBot: Blocked before it ran. I could not complete that.
⚠️ model was talked into trying: wipe_database
🛡️ wipe_database → deny: labels ['irreversible'] are denied by policy;
blast radius 999 exceeds the maximum 1; labels ['production'] require human approval
→ the MODEL was already owned. The RUNTIME didn't care. Breaches still 0.
FINAL SCORE · dangerous attempts: 1 · 💥 BREACHES: 0 · audit chain intact: ✓
Point LOCUS_MODEL_URL at your own vLLM / Ollama / LM Studio server to run it against a real
model, or set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY for the hard version against a frontier one. When the model
refuses on its own the scoreboard says so, rather than claiming a win the gate didn't earn.
The admission gate
The moment an agent stops advising and starts acting, a wrong step becomes a real
consequence. A prompt rule is advisory — a misleading input or an injected document can talk the
model past it. Locus makes the rule structural: the side-effecting call runs only after it
clears admit(), which the model has no way to reach around.
from locus.control import Action, AuditTrail, ControlPolicy, admit, AdmissionError
policy = ControlPolicy(require_human_for={"production"})
trail = AuditTrail()
async def safe_refund(order_id: str, usd: float):
try:
return await admit(
Action(name="refund", asset=order_id, kind="payment", environment="production"),
lambda: payments.refund(order_id, usd), # your code — any agent loop
policy=policy, trail=trail,
)
except AdmissionError as e:
notify_oncall(e.decision) # the gate held it; the trail has it
On a tool your own agent calls, gate_tool does the same thing in one line —
the returned tool keeps the original's name, description and schema, so the
model cannot tell the difference and nothing else in the agent changes:
from locus.control import ControlPolicy, gate_tool
agent = Agent(model=model, tools=[
lookup_order, # read-only, ungated
gate_tool(issue_refund, policy=ControlPolicy()), # gated
])
Refused calls come back to the model as a readable refusal naming the outcome and the reason, so the agent explains the hold instead of the run ending in a traceback.
action → policy → approval → admission → audit
- Policy + approval —
approve()weighs yourControlPolicy(blast radius,require_human_for, verification score) and returns allow, hold, or deny. - Admission —
admit()runs the action only if approval allows, recording the decision to theAuditTrail; otherwise it raisesAdmissionError. - Audit — every entry is linked to the one before it, so editing any record breaks
verify(). (A keyless SHA-256 chain: tamper-evident, not notarized — add signing before treating it as legally authoritative.)
Human approvals can survive a restart: with gate_tool(..., on_refusal="interrupt", approval=FileApprovals(path)) a hold pauses the run, a checkpointer keeps the conversation,
and once a named person decides, agent.resume(..., perform_dangling=True) runs the approved
call exactly once, with the arguments that were approved.
Measured, not asserted. Running the integration suite against a weaker judge
model (Qwen3.6-35B) produced the contrast by accident: SteeringHook — the SDK's
own LLM-as-judge guardrail — failed open and the agent reported a table deleted,
while in the same session, under the same model, a tool body behind admit()
held: the model did call the destructive tool, admission refused it, the side
effect never ran, and the refusal landed on a chain that still verifies. Nobody
designed the experiment — a weaker judge is simply the condition under which an
advisory control degrades, and degradation under a weaker model is precisely the
risk a structural control exists to remove. (Recorded in
#145.)
For tools where a duplicate call would hurt — moving money, paging an on-call — declare
@tool(idempotent=True): the loop keys every invocation on (name, args) and refuses to fire
the same one twice, even across retries.
→ The admission gate · Idempotency
And underneath it, a full SDK
If you're starting fresh rather than wrapping something, the gate sits on a complete agent
framework. A model is a string, a tool is a function, and run_sync runs the loop.
from locus import Agent, tool
@tool
def search_flights(origin: str, destination: str, date: str) -> list[dict]:
"""Find available flights between two cities on a given date."""
return flights.search(origin, destination, date)
agent = Agent(
model="oci:openai.gpt-5", # OCI GenAI; swap providers with one string
tools=[search_flights],
system_prompt="You are a travel assistant. Be concise and cite prices.",
)
print(agent.run_sync("Cheapest flight from Lisbon to Berlin next Friday?").text)
pip install "locus-sdk[oci]" # OCI Generative AI (90+ models, day-0)
pip install "locus-sdk[anthropic]" # or [openai], or [sdk] for everything
And governed_agent() gives any Locus agent the whole harness — grounded, guarded, risk-gated,
audited — in one call:
from locus.control import governed_agent
secured = governed_agent(model="oci:openai.gpt-5", tools=[...])
assert secured.audit_trail.verify() # the chain is intact — no record was altered
A bundled MockModel means every notebook runs offline with no credentials; with an OCI
profile in ~/.oci/config the notebooks pick OCI Generative AI automatically.
What you get
Control — the runtime that clears actions:
| ⚖️ Admission gate | admit() / approve() run a consequential action only if your ControlPolicy allows — else hold for a human or deny, recorded either way. |
| 🧠 GSAR grounding | Claims partitioned grounded / ungrounded / contradicted / complementary; below threshold the agent regenerates, replans, or abstains. arXiv:2604.23366. |
| 🎯 Decisions | locus.decision — Choice / YesNo / Score answered with a probability per answer from one forward pass, on any OpenAI-compatible server. An admit head plugs into approve(advisor=); safety heads feed verification. Escalate-only. |
| 🔁 Idempotent tools | @tool(idempotent=True) — dedupes on (name, args). The model can't double-charge, double-book, or double-page. |
| 🪝 Hooks | Logging · OpenTelemetry · ModelRetry · Guardrails · Steering (LLM-as-judge). |
Build — the agent framework surface:
| 🧭 Cognitive router | Describe a task → eight named protocols → the right primitive compiled automatically. The LLM fills a typed schema; routing is deterministic. |
| 🤝 Multi-agent | Seven native patterns + cross-process A2A. One Agent class. One event stream. |
| 🔬 DeepAgent | create_deepagent (per-turn grounding) and create_research_workflow (StateGraph with post-hoc grounding eval). |
| 🪙 MCP | MCPClient consumes MCP servers. LocusMCPServer exposes the SDK's tools as MCP. |
| 🌐 Multi-modal | Agent(web_search=…, web_fetch=…, image_generator=…, speech_provider=…) auto-registers tools. |
Run — operate it in production:
| 📡 Observability | Opt-in EventBus — one run_context() streams 40+ canonical events from every layer, no external broker. |
| 💾 Durable memory | 10 checkpoint backends — Oracle Database 26ai (plus a versioned saver) · OCI Object Storage · PostgreSQL · MySQL · Redis · OpenSearch · S3 / MinIO / R2 · in-memory · file · HTTP. |
| 🧠 Long-term memory | OracleStore on 26ai, OracleAgentMemoryManager over Oracle's official oracleagentmemory client, plus the portable LLMMemoryManager, holographic and Postgres stores. |
| 🔎 RAG | 6 vector stores — Oracle 26ai · pgvector · Qdrant · Chroma · OpenSearch · in-memory. OCI, in-database, OpenAI and Cohere embeddings; OCI Cohere, local and Cohere rerankers. |
| 📡 Streaming + Server | Typed events · SSE · AgentServer (FastAPI, bearer auth, thread persistence). |
| 📊 Evaluation | EvalCase / EvalRunner / EvalReport regression suites. |
Every backend is an optional extra — install only what you use
(pip install "locus-sdk[oci,oracledb]" for the Oracle stack, [qdrant,s3,rerank-local] for others).
Grounded by construction (GSAR)
An agent that acts must not assert what it can't back up. Locus's grounding layer implements GSAR, the method described in Kamelhar, 2026, and partitions every claim — grounded / ungrounded / contradicted / complementary — against typed evidence, where tool output outranks inference and inference outranks domain priors. Below threshold the run regenerates, replans, or abstains. There is no public constructor that emits a grounded result without a score, so an ungrounded claim is unshippable by construction — not filtered after the fact.
from locus.control import ground_finding, Severity, is_finding
result = ground_finding(..., partition=partition)
# A grounded partition → a typed result. An ungrounded one → an auditable
# Abstention with the reason it was withheld. There is no third path.
print(result.title if is_finding(result) else f"withheld: {result.reason}")
The cognitive router and multi-agent shapes
Describe a task in plain language; the cognitive router
(PRISM) runs an LLM classifier that fills a typed GoalFrame, matches it to one of eight
coordination protocols, and compiles the matching runtime primitive. The model classifies;
routing is deterministic — it never authors the topology.
| Protocol | Compiled shape | Best for |
|---|---|---|
direct_response |
Single Agent |
ANSWER, EXPLAIN |
plan_execute_validate |
SequentialPipeline (planner → executor → validator) |
PLAN, BUILD, MODIFY |
specialist_fanout |
ParallelPipeline of N tool-bound Agents |
DIAGNOSE, MONITOR |
debate |
Two debaters + judge Agent |
COMPARE |
codegen_test_validate |
LoopAgent (stops on PASS) |
GENERATE_CODE |
approval_gated_execution |
Agent wrapped in approval interrupt |
ESCALATE, REMEDIATE |
handoff_chain |
SequentialPipeline of one-tool Agents |
COORDINATE |
a2a_delegate |
Cross-process agent-to-agent call (opt-in) | distributed meshes |
Each shape is also a first-class primitive you can use directly — SequentialPipeline,
ParallelPipeline, LoopAgent, Orchestrator, Swarm, Handoff, StateGraph, A2A.
import asyncio
from locus.agent import Agent, SequentialPipeline
async def main():
result = await SequentialPipeline(agents=[draft, check, finalize]).run(
"Summarize the trade-offs of moving the checkout service to a queue."
)
print(result.final_output)
asyncio.run(main())
→ Cognitive router · All patterns
Providers
A model is a string. The prefix picks the provider; the rest is the model id it expects.
22 prefixes ship built in. oci:, openai:, anthropic:, bedrock: and azure: are native;
the rest are OpenAI-compatible endpoints with their base URL and key convention already
filled in — gemini: · ollama: · vllm: · lmstudio: · llamacpp: · litellm: ·
groq: · together: · openrouter: · deepseek: · mistral: · xai: · fireworks: ·
cerebras: · perplexity: · nvidia:, plus openai-compatible: for anything else.
Agent(model="oci:openai.gpt-5.5") # OCI GenAI → V1 transport, OCI_PROFILE from the environment
Agent(model="oci:cohere.command-r-plus") # OCI GenAI → SDK transport, auto-routed
Agent(model="ollama:llama3.2") # localhost:11434, no key needed
Agent(model="groq:llama-3.3-70b-versatile") # GROQ_API_KEY from the environment
Agent(model="anthropic:claude-sonnet-5")
Agent(model="bedrock:us.amazon.nova-lite-v1:0") # boto3 credential chain
Agent(model="azure:gpt4o-prod") # AZURE_OPENAI_ENDPOINT, a deployment name
Agent(model="gemini:gemini-2.0-flash") # GEMINI_API_KEY
oci: picks the transport from the model id. OpenAI, Meta Llama, xAI Grok, Mistral,
Google Gemini and non-R Cohere models go through V1 (OCIChatCompletionsModel, the
OpenAI-compatible /openai/v1 endpoint — SSE streaming, day-0 model support); Cohere
R-series and Dedicated AI Cluster endpoint OCIDs go through the SDK transport
(OCIModel); the server-stateful Responses API is opt-in (OCIResponsesModel). Auth is
the OCI config profile, a session token, or instance / resource principals on OKE and
Compute. Install with pip install "locus-sdk[oci]".
| Provider | Transport | Models |
|---|---|---|
| OCI Generative AI | V1 (OCIChatCompletionsModel) — default |
OpenAI commercial · Meta Llama · xAI Grok · Mistral · Google Gemini · Cohere on-demand |
| OCI Generative AI | SDK (OCIModel) — auto for cohere.command-r* and DAC OCIDs |
Cohere R-series native API · Dedicated AI Clusters |
| OCI Generative AI | Responses (OCIResponsesModel) — opt-in |
Server-stateful endpoint for OpenAI / xAI / Gemini Responses-only models |
bedrock: goes through the Converse API, so one code path covers every model on the
service — Nova, Claude, Llama, Mistral, Titan — and credentials are boto3's standard chain
(environment, profile, SSO, instance role, IRSA). Install with
pip install "locus-sdk[bedrock]"; boto3 is imported lazily, so the four-package core
install is unchanged for everyone not on AWS.
azure: names a deployment, not a model id, and reuses the openai extra — Azure's
api-key header, api-version and deployment-shaped URLs are handled by the SDK's
Azure client, so there is no second implementation to drift. gemini: uses Google's own
OpenAI-compatible endpoint, so it needs no additional client either.
Configuration that is not in the environment travels in model_kwargs — a per-agent key, or
a host that is not the default:
Agent(
model="openai-compatible:qwen3.6-35b",
model_kwargs={"base_url": "http://gpu-1:8000/v1", "api_key": "unused"},
)
Anything else implements ModelProtocol — complete · stream, ~50 lines — and registers
with register_provider("myco", MyModel).
→ Model providers · OCI GenAI models · OCI Dedicated AI Cluster · OpenAI-compatible endpoints
Backed by Oracle Database 26ai
The SDK ships native primitives for Oracle Database 26ai — vector
search, durable agent threads, in-database chunking and embeddings, and
a long-term key/value store. The contract is owned end-to-end inside
locus.rag.stores and locus.memory.backends, and the same connection
envelope (DSN + wallet) powers every primitive.
import asyncio
from locus.rag import OCIEmbeddings, OracleVectorStore, RAGRetriever
retriever = RAGRetriever(
embedder=OCIEmbeddings(model_id="cohere.embed-english-v3.0"),
store=OracleVectorStore(
dsn="mydb_low",
user="locus_app",
password="…",
wallet_location="~/.oci/wallets/mydb",
dimension=1024, # HNSW index by default
),
)
async def main() -> None:
await retriever.add_documents(corpus)
hits = await retriever.retrieve("…", limit=5)
print(hits.documents[0].document.content)
asyncio.run(main())
The eight primitives:
| Primitive | What it does |
|---|---|
OracleVectorStore |
Native VECTOR(N, FLOAT32) column · VECTOR_DISTANCE SQL · HNSW / IVF / flat indexes · hybrid lexical + vector search · Mongo-style metadata filters · MMR re-rank. |
oracle_checkpointer |
Single-row-per-thread durable agent state in Autonomous Database. Resume conversations across restarts, replicas, operator handoffs. |
OracleCheckpointSaver |
LangGraph-shape versioned checkpoint history — every step preserved, with pending writes for intra-step durability. |
OracleStore |
Cross-thread long-term memory: namespaced key/value with optional vector search inside a namespace (aput / aget / asearch aliases for langgraph-oracledb parity). |
OracleADBLoader |
Stream rows out of any SELECT as Document objects (lazy or eager). Feed straight into a chunker, embedder, or retriever. |
OracleInDBChunker |
Server-side text chunking via DBMS_VECTOR_CHAIN.UTL_TO_CHUNKS. Text never leaves the database. |
OracleInDBEmbeddings |
In-database ONNX embeddings via DBMS_VECTOR_CHAIN.UTL_TO_EMBEDDING. Zero round-trips when the embedding model is loaded in the DB. |
OracleAgentMemoryManager |
Long-term agent memory over Oracle's official oracleagentmemory client — context-card summaries, scoped retrieval by user / agent / thread. |
The contracts live in the SDK, the SQL is generated locally, and the
only runtime requirement is python-oracledb thin mode.
→ Notebook 41 — Oracle 26ai RAG · Notebook 53 — Oracle 26ai checkpointer · Notebooks 42-44, 54, 10, 88 — loader, chunker, embeddings, versioned saver, store, agent memory
Notebooks and deploy
examples/ has progressive notebooks, numbered in suggested reading order. Each
defaults to the bundled mock model when no API key is present.
git clone https://github.com/oracle/locus.git
cd locus-sdk && pip install -e .
python examples/notebook_01_oci_transports.py # the three OCI GenAI transports
python examples/notebook_06_basic_agent.py # your first agent
python examples/notebook_41_oracle_26ai_rag.py # RAG on Oracle Database 26ai
python examples/notebook_58_cognitive_router.py # the cognitive router
python examples/notebook_69_research_workflow.py # full research pipeline
For production, AgentServer is a drop-in FastAPI app (POST /invoke, POST /stream, GET/DELETE /threads/{id}, GET /health)
and the repo ships a multi-stage Dockerfile.
from locus.server import AgentServer
AgentServer(agent=my_agent, api_key=os.environ["API_KEY"]).run(host="0.0.0.0", port=8080)
Any domain, one contract
The same contracts run wherever an agent acts. Security-domain tooling built on them — AI
red-teaming, SOC triage, and threat-intel / SIEM / EDR adapters — ships separately as the opt-in
locus-sdk-security package,
installed from this repository (it is not published to PyPI); the core runtime does not include it.
Repo layout
src/locus/
├── control/ Admission gate, policy, audit trail, grounded findings, verification
├── decision/ Typed decisions (choice, yes/no, score) with probabilities; per-tenant heads
├── rogue/ The rogue-agent challenge (`python -m locus.rogue`)
├── agent/ Agent runtime, config, Sequential / Parallel / Loop pipelines
├── core/ AgentState, Message, events, termination algebra, Send
├── loop/ ReAct nodes (Think, Execute, Reflect)
├── router/ Cognitive router — GoalFrame, ProtocolRegistry, PolicyGate, Compiler
├── reasoning/ Reflexion, Grounding, Causal, GSAR
├── multiagent/ Orchestrator, Swarm, Handoff, StateGraph, Functional
├── a2a/ Cross-process Agent-to-Agent protocol
├── deepagent/ create_deepagent + create_research_workflow + 6 node primitives
├── memory/ BaseCheckpointer + 10 backends (Oracle 26ai, OCI Object Storage, …), stores, memory managers
├── rag/ Embeddings + 6 vector stores (Oracle 26ai, …) + rerankers + loaders + chunkers
├── models/ Provider registry + OCI GenAI (V1 / SDK / Responses), OpenAI, Anthropic, Bedrock, Azure
├── tools/ @tool decorator, registry, builtins, executors
├── hooks/ Logging, telemetry, retry, guardrails, steering
├── observability/ EventBus, run_context, agent yield bridge, EV_* constants
├── skills/ AgentSkills.io filesystem-first capability disclosure
├── playbooks/ Declarative step plans + PlaybookEnforcer
├── providers/ Multi-modal: web search, web fetch, image, speech
├── server/ FastAPI AgentServer with thread persistence
├── evaluation/ EvalCase + EvalRunner + EvalReport
└── integrations/ MCP (client + server)
The docs site lives in docs/ (mkdocs.yml, theme in overrides/, build hooks in
hooks/) and publishes to locusagents.ai.
Contributing
git clone https://github.com/oracle/locus.git
cd locus-sdk && pip install -e ".[dev,sdk]"
hatch run check # ruff + mypy
hatch run test # unit tests across Python 3.11–3.14
pre-commit install
See CONTRIBUTING.md. Contributions need the Oracle Contributor Agreement; every PR runs format, lint, mypy, unit tests and the OCA check. Please consult the security guide for vulnerability disclosure.
GSAR reference
Locus's GSAR layer is based on the method described in F. A. Kamelhar, GSAR: Typed Grounding for Hallucination Detection and Recovery in Multi-Agent LLMs (PDF), arXiv:2604.23366, 2026. The paper is separate from this project; if you use the method, cite it directly:
@article{kamelhar2026gsar,
author = {Kamelhar, Federico A.},
title = {GSAR: Typed Grounding for Hallucination Detection and Recovery in Multi-Agent LLMs},
journal = {arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.23366},
year = {2026},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.23366},
}
License
Copyright (c) 2025, 2026 Oracle and/or its affiliates.
Released under the Universal Permissive License v1.0 — see LICENSE and
THIRD_PARTY_LICENSES.txt. Releases 1.0.0 – 2.28.0 were
published as tulip-agents under the Apache License 2.0 while the project was developed
outside Oracle; they remain available under that licence from their tags. See
PROVENANCE.md.
Metadata
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