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macp-mcp

An MCP server that lets any MCP client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor and others) run or join a MACP Decision session.

The first proof that MACP governs MCP tool use. MCP decides which tools a model can call. MACP decides who may use them and when, and records what was decided. The model drives every step through ordinary MCP tool calls. The MACP runtime enforces who may propose, vote and commit, ends the session in one binding Commitment, and gives that outcome an RFC-MACP-0013 hash that anyone can recompute. examples/decision-via-mcp.md is a recorded run: two MCP clients drive a session to RESOLVED. The runtime refuses the non-initiator's commit call, and the commitment hash verifies.

MCP client (model) ──stdio──▶ macp-mcp ──gRPC──▶ MACP runtime
   tool calls                 one MACP agent     enforces membership, order,
                              (macp-sdk-python)  identity; records the Commitment

Install

pip install macp-mcp        # or: uvx macp-mcp

Python 3.11 or newer. It needs a MACP runtime to talk to. For local development:

docker run -p 50051:50051 -e MACP_ALLOW_INSECURE=1 -e MACP_MEMORY_ONLY=1 \
  ghcr.io/multiagentcoordinationprotocol/macp-runtime:0.9.0

One macp-mcp process is one MACP agent. To have several agents take part in a session, run one server per agent (for example, one per MCP client), each with its own MACP_AGENT_ID.

Configure your MCP client

Claude Desktop

Add the server to claude_desktop_config.json (Settings → Developer → Edit Config):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "macp": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["macp-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "MACP_RUNTIME_TARGET": "127.0.0.1:50051",
        "MACP_AGENT_ID": "coordinator",
        "MACP_ALLOW_INSECURE": "1"
      }
    }
  }
}

If you installed with pip, use "command": "macp-mcp" and drop args.

Claude Code

claude mcp add macp \
  --env MACP_RUNTIME_TARGET=127.0.0.1:50051 \
  --env MACP_AGENT_ID=coordinator \
  --env MACP_ALLOW_INSECURE=1 \
  -- uvx macp-mcp

Or check it into a project's .mcp.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "macp": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["macp-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "MACP_RUNTIME_TARGET": "127.0.0.1:50051",
        "MACP_AGENT_ID": "alice",
        "MACP_ALLOW_INSECURE": "1"
      }
    }
  }
}

Then ask the model something like: "Start a MACP decision with alice on which deployment plan to use, propose a canary rollout, and vote for it."

Against a production runtime

Drop MACP_ALLOW_INSECURE and pass the bearer token the runtime issued for this agent:

"env": {
  "MACP_RUNTIME_TARGET": "macp.example.com:443",
  "MACP_AGENT_ID": "coordinator",
  "MACP_AUTH_TOKEN": "<token issued for coordinator>"
}

Environment variables

Variable Default Meaning
MACP_RUNTIME_TARGET 127.0.0.1:50051 Runtime gRPC address (host:port).
MACP_AGENT_ID mcp-agent The MACP agent this server acts as. With dev-agent auth it is also the bearer token. With MACP_AUTH_TOKEN it is the identity the runtime must bind the token to.
MACP_AUTH_TOKEN unset Bearer token issued by the runtime. When unset, dev-agent auth is used, which needs a runtime started with MACP_ALLOW_INSECURE=1.
MACP_ALLOW_INSECURE off 1 uses plaintext gRPC. For a local runtime only.
MACP_TLS_CA_FILE system trust PEM bundle for a private CA. Cannot be combined with MACP_ALLOW_INSECURE.
MACP_DEFAULT_TTL_MS 300000 Session TTL used when start_session is called without ttl_ms.
MACP_REPLAY_IDLE_MS 1000 How long a history read waits for the next envelope before treating the replay as complete.

The server logs to stderr only, because stdout carries the MCP protocol. A bad configuration exits with status 2 and a one-line message.

Tools

Tool Kind What it does
start_session write Start a Decision session with this agent as initiator. Takes intent, participants and optional ttl_ms and context_id. Returns the session_id to share.
propose write Put an option (proposal_id, option, rationale) up for decision.
vote write Cast this agent's APPROVE / REJECT / ABSTAIN vote on a proposal.
get_commitment read The resolved session's binding Commitment, the exact payload bytes (payload_b64) and its RFC-MACP-0013 commitment_hash.
verify read Recompute a commitment hash with the SDK verifier, either from the runtime's recorded history (session_id) or from bytes you hold (payload_b64). Returns match, mismatch or cannot_verify.
evaluate write Record a scored assessment (APPROVE / REVIEW / BLOCK / REJECT, confidence 0..1) before voting.
commit write Resolve the session with a binding Commitment (action, authority_scope, reason). Under the default policy only the initiator can commit.
get_session read The session's state, participants, proposals, evaluations, votes, approve totals and majority winner.

The first five are the core loop: start, propose, vote, read the outcome and check it. The other three are the minimum needed to make that loop usable from MCP:

  • commit: a Decision session only resolves, and only produces a Commitment for get_commitment and verify to read, when someone commits. Without this tool an MCP client could never finish a session it started.
  • get_session: MCP is request/response, and the runtime's GetSession returns metadata only. Without this tool a model joining a session has no way to see what was proposed or how the votes stand. It rebuilds the session view from the runtime's replayable history.
  • evaluate: the Decision mode's assessment step. It lets an agent record a reasoned, scored opinion (including a BLOCK) that other participants and later auditors can see, separately from the bare vote.

Objections, cancellation, signals and other modes are deliberately left out. They belong to orchestrators built on macp-sdk-python.

Errors the model can act on, such as a runtime rejection or a bad argument, come back as tool errors with the text "<CODE>: <message>", for example FORBIDDEN: Forbidden when a non-initiator tries to commit. The code is the MACP error code (the Ack failure code, then the macp-error-code trailer, then the gRPC status name).

The server is stateless. Every read replays the session from the runtime, so a restart loses nothing, and several servers (agents) can share one session.

Gate an MCP server's tool calls (macp-mcp gate)

macp-mcp gate is an MCP proxy. Put it in front of any stdio MCP server, and the tool calls you name in a policy file run only after a MACP session approves them:

macp-mcp gate --policy gate.json --upstream npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /srv

Everything after --upstream is the upstream's command line. Your MCP client spawns the gate instead of the upstream. The gate lists the upstream's tools unchanged.

{
  "version": 1,
  "server": "filesystem",
  "rules": [
    { "tool": "write_file", "mode": "macp.mode.quorum.v1",
      "participants": ["alice", "bob", "carol"], "threshold": 2, "ttl_ms": 120000 },
    { "tool": "move_*", "mode": "macp.mode.decision.v1",
      "participants": ["alice", "bob"], "ttl_ms": 60000 }
  ]
}

A tools/call that matches no rule is forwarded as-is. The first rule that matches (* and ? are wildcards) makes the gate, acting as MACP agent MACP_AGENT_ID, do this:

  1. Open a Quorum or Decision session with the rule's participants as approvers. Its context_id is sha256: plus the hex SHA-256 of the RFC 8785 canonical JSON of {arguments, server, tool}, which binds the session to this exact call. The approvers find it by that context_id (ListSessions / WatchSessions) and vote with any MACP client.

  2. Commit as soon as the outcome is settled: approve once threshold approvers (default: a strict majority) have approved, deny once that can no longer happen. Each approver's first ballot counts.

  3. Approved: forward the call. The upstream's result comes back with the Commitment attached, next to any _meta the upstream set:

    "_meta": { "io.multiagentcoordinationprotocol/commitment": {
      "session_id": "…", "mode": "macp.mode.quorum.v1", "outcome": "approve",
      "commitment_hash": "sha256:…" } }
    

    commitment_hash is the RFC-MACP-0013 hash. Check it with the verify tool or any MACP SDK.

  4. Refused: return a tool error and never call the upstream. The error starts with POLICY_DENIED (the approvers denied it, or a runtime policy refused the commitment) or SESSION_NOT_OPEN (the session expired or was cancelled first). An argument holding an integer outside ±(2^53−1) is refused with INVALID_ARGUMENT before any session opens, because it has no canonical form to bind.

The gate passes its environment on to the upstream, minus MACP_AUTH_TOKEN. examples/gated-tool-call.md is a recorded run against the pinned runtime: one passthrough, one approved write, one rejected write and one expired delete. contract/gate/ pins the policy schema, the CLI, the session shape, the refusal texts and the context_id vectors. The TypeScript twin uses a byte-identical copy.

Tool contract

contract/tools.json pins the tool names, descriptions, annotations, input schemas and output schemas. It is fully inlined JSON Schema 2020-12. The TypeScript twin (macp-mcp-typescript) exposes the identical surface and tests against a byte-identical copy of this file. Any change to the tool surface changes the manifest (make contract) and needs the matching change in the TypeScript twin.

Development

make setup                    # pip install -e ".[dev]"
make lint typecheck test      # ruff, mypy strict, unit tests + 85% coverage gate
make verify-contract          # advertised tools == contract/tools.json; gate contract checks
make test-integration-docker  # CI's integration gate: pinned runtime image + stdio MCP clients
make transcript               # re-record examples/*.md transcripts (runtime on :50051)

Releases follow macp-sdk-python: release-please opens the release PR, and merging it tags vX.Y.Z, which publishes to PyPI through trusted publishing.

License

Apache-2.0

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