Mandata
The mandate toolkit for agent-initiated payments.
When AI agents hold spending authority, someone must answer: what exactly are they allowed to do — and can you prove it afterward? Mandata is a reference implementation of the bounded-autonomy mandate chain:
principal → agent → credential → transaction → evidence
The problem
Agentic payment protocols (AP2, x402, card-network agent programs) let AI agents initiate real financial transactions. But production systems lack a standard way to:
- Express mandates — bounded permissions: amounts, payees, time windows, velocity limits
- Bind credentials — cryptographic proof a transaction was made within mandate
- Enforce at the gate — deterministic checks before settlement, not logs after
- Produce evidence — an auditable chain showing every agent action against its mandate
Mandata formalizes all four as a small, dependency-light library.
Quickstart
pip install mandata
from mandata import Mandate, Bounds, enforce, claim, settle, to_minor
# A principal grants a bounded mandate to an agent (amounts in minor units)
mandate = Mandate(
principal="user:alice",
agent="agent:shopping-bot",
bounds=Bounds(
max_amount=to_minor("500.00", "GBP"), # 50000 pence per transaction
currency="GBP",
allowed_payees=["store.example"],
expires_in_days=30,
velocity_limit=3, # max authorizations per day
),
)
# At transaction time: deterministic enforcement BEFORE settlement.
# tx_id makes retries idempotent and links the authorization to settlement.
decision = enforce(mandate, payee="store.example", amount=4999, currency="GBP", tx_id="order-1")
assert decision.allowed # → True (status AUTHORIZED, amount reserved)
print(decision.check) # → "WITHIN" (normative MMF check ID)
# Claim takes the single dispatch slot and verifies the rail instruction binds
# to the approval — only then submit, and only once.
claim(mandate, "order-1", "store.example", 4999, "GBP")
... # rail.pay(..., idempotency_key="order-1")
settle(mandate, "order-1") # or void(mandate, "order-1") if it failed
Architecture
principal issues mandate ──► credential binds mandate to agent
│ │
▼ ▼
agent proposes transaction ──► mandate gate (enforce())
│ │
▼ ▼
allowed? ──► yes: execute no: reject
│ │
└───────► evidence record appended (hash-chained audit log)
See docs/architecture.md for the full model, docs/mandate-model.md for the schema, and docs/diagrams.md for the system design diagrams.
Roadmap
- v0.1 — Mandate model, bounds enforcement, evidence chain (Python)
- Credential signing (Ed25519) + verification API
- Revocation registry (mandate kill-switch at transaction speed)
- AP2 / x402 / LangChain adapter layer
- Multi-hop delegation (agent → sub-agent mandate weakening)
- v0.3 — MMF-v0.2: credential-bound gate, chain-wide delegation enforcement, fail-closed registry, canonical evidence hashing, 43 conformance vectors
- v0.4 — MMF-v0.3: integer minor-unit amounts,
tx_ididempotency, authorize/settle/void lifecycle, payee binding in adapters, gate-signed evidence, cross-process serializable SQLite store, 58 conformance vectors - v0.4.1 — MMF-v0.3.1: mandatory transaction currency,
INVALID_CHAINfor unresolvable/cyclic chains, chain-wide credential verification,claim()/unclaim()single-dispatch lifecycle (AUTHORIZED→CLAIMED→SETTLED), atomic durable evidence in the state transaction, byte-level canonical serialization, 64 conformance vectors - TypeScript implementation (core gate scaffold only — not yet MMF-v0.3.1 conformant)
Research
This project is the open-source implementation arm of the survey:
Agentic AI in Payments and Financial Transactions: A Survey of Architectures, Safeguards and Open Problems — S.C. Aji, 2026. doi:10.13140/RG.2.2.13674.89288
Contributing
We welcome contributors — see CONTRIBUTING.md. Good entry points are labelled good first issue.
License
Apache-2.0 — see LICENSE.
Demo app
examples/demo_app.py runs a full simulated deployment over real HTTP — a
revocation-registry service, a mock payment rail, and an agent whose every
proposed payment goes through the gate: signed credentials, sub-agent
delegation, x402 intake, compromise attempts, remote revocation, then a full
evidence-chain audit. python examples/demo_app.py — stdlib only.
For a shorter single-process walkthrough see examples/end_to_end.py.
Metadata
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