mcp-issuer-check
See which OAuth server your MCP servers send your login to, verify it isn't being impersonated, and get alerted if it changes.
When you connect Claude, Cursor, VS Code or another client to a remote MCP server, the server tells the client which authorization server to log you in with. The client then sends your authorization code, PKCE verifier, client secret or refresh token there.
mcp-issuer-check reads your MCP client configs, finds each remote server's login server the same way a client does, and:
- verifies the metadata: the RFC 8414
issuermust match the authorization server URL, the RFC 9728resourcemust match the server you configured, and everything must use HTTPS; - pins the login servers you've approved (trust on first use) and flags any later change (
PIN-CHANGED); - guards against SSRF: it won't follow an authorization server that points at a private or internal address.
It sends no credentials and reads no secrets from your configs, only server names and URLs.
Why this exists
In 2026 the official MCP SDKs shipped fixes for OAuth clients that sent credentials to whichever authorization server the MCP server named (GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h, GHSA-qx49-fqc8-xw99). A malicious or compromised MCP server could name its own authorization server. Or it could publish no metadata and serve some that presents your real provider as the issuer.
The SDK fixes bind stored credentials to an issuer. Everything else rests on the client trusting what the server advertises the first time. The Cloud Security Alliance's November 2026 note recommends keeping an allowlist that maps each MCP server to the authorization servers it may name. No tool did that, so this one does, from your existing client configs.
Install
pipx install mcp-issuer-check
Python 3.11+, no third-party dependencies.
Usage
mcp-issuer-check # discover servers in your client configs and check them
mcp-issuer-check list # just show which remote MCP servers were found, and where
mcp-issuer-check pin # approve the current login servers (refuses servers with bad metadata)
mcp-issuer-check --url https://mcp.example.com/mcp # check specific servers
mcp-issuer-check --project path/to/repo # include .mcp.json / .cursor / .vscode configs there
mcp-issuer-check -f json # machine-readable
mcp-issuer-check --fail-on high # exit 1 only on high (default: medium)
Typical flow: run it once, review the login via lines, run pin, then run it again whenever you like (or on a schedule). A change is reported as PIN-CHANGED: don't sign in until the provider confirms it.
Exit codes: 0 nothing at or above --fail-on, 1 findings (or pin refused a server).
Configs it reads
| Client | Files |
|---|---|
| Claude Code | ~/.claude.json (user and per-project), ~/.claude/settings.json, .mcp.json |
| Claude Desktop | claude_desktop_config.json (Windows, macOS, Linux paths) |
| Cursor | ~/.cursor/mcp.json, .cursor/mcp.json |
| VS Code | user mcp.json and settings.json (JSONC), .vscode/mcp.json |
| Windsurf | ~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.json |
| Gemini CLI | ~/.gemini/settings.json, .gemini/settings.json |
| Codex | ~/.codex/config.toml |
Local (stdio) servers are skipped because they don't use OAuth discovery.
Findings
| Code | Severity | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
ISSUER-MISMATCH |
high | Authorization server metadata claims a different issuer than its URL (RFC 8414 §3.3). This is the impersonation shape. |
PIN-CHANGED / ISSUER-CHANGED |
high | Login server differs from the one you pinned. |
INSECURE-TRANSPORT |
high | Server, metadata or endpoint over plain HTTP (allowed only on loopback). |
AS-PRIVATE-ADDRESS |
high | Authorization server on a private/internal address; not fetched. |
RESOURCE-MISMATCH |
medium | Metadata describes a different resource than the configured URL (RFC 9728 §3.3). |
PRM-CROSS-ORIGIN |
medium | The 401 points to resource metadata on another origin. |
NO-METADATA |
medium | Requires auth but publishes no RFC 9728 metadata, so clients fall back to legacy discovery. |
ENDPOINT-GONE |
medium | Configured URL returns 404/410. |
AS-NO-METADATA |
medium | No RFC 8414/OIDC metadata for a listed authorization server. |
ENDPOINT-OTHER-HOST |
low | Token/authorization/registration endpoint on a different host than the issuer. Usually fine; confirm it. |
NOT-PINNED, PIN-UNVERIFIED, UNREACHABLE |
low | Review or retry. |
AS-OTHER-HOST, NO-OAUTH |
info | Login is hosted elsewhere (common: GitHub, Stripe), or the server is public. |
GitHub Action: alert when a provider changes its login server
name: mcp-issuer-check
on:
schedule: [{cron: "23 7 * * *"}]
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
check:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v7
- uses: garag0l/mcp-issuer-check@v0.1.1
with:
urls: |
https://mcp.notion.com/mcp
https://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp/
pins: .github/mcp-pins.json # create with: mcp-issuer-check pin --url ... --pins .github/mcp-pins.json
fail-on: high
TLS errors
If a server works in your browser but shows TLS verification failed, your Python CA store is probably missing a root. Some Windows setups lack the newer Let's Encrypt roots, for example. Use --ca-bundle /path/to/cacert.pem (e.g. from certifi) or set SSL_CERT_FILE. Verification is never turned off.
How it discovers (same order as the MCP spec)
- Unauthenticated
initializePOST, readWWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="…". - RFC 9728 metadata: the URL from step 1, then
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/<path>, then the root. - For each
authorization_serversentry: RFC 8414/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/<path>, then the OpenID Connect variants.
Redirects are not followed. Responses are capped at 512 KB.
Tested against 20 public MCP server endpoints from 19 providers (Notion, Linear, Sentry, GitHub, Atlassian, Stripe, Asana, Cloudflare, PayPal, Square, Intercom, Vercel, Supabase, Hugging Face, Context7, DeepWiki, monday.com, HubSpot, Webflow) and a mock server covering every finding.
Scope and responsible use
This is a defensive tool for checking the MCP servers you use or are authorized to assess. It only fetches public discovery metadata, the same requests any MCP client makes before you sign in.
Contributing
Issues and PRs are welcome, especially config locations for more clients, and real-world metadata quirks (with the server URL).
python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest && ruff check . && ruff format --check .
License
Metadata
Release files for mcp-issuer-check 0.1.1
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Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| mcp_issuer_check-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for mcp_issuer_check-0.1.1-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 38.4 kB
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