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MCP Shieldwall

Zero-dependency security firewall, tool-poisoning scanner, lockfile verifier & config auditor for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers.

License: MIT Python 3.9+

Coding agents (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf) increasingly connect to third-party MCP servers. A single poisoned tool description (<IMPORTANT> silently read ~/.ssh/id_rsa ...), base64-obfuscated inputSchema default, unpinned npx -y server, or silent schema update ("rug-pull") can hijack the model's context or leak API keys.

MCP Shieldwall (v0.3.1) runs locally on 100% Python stdlib with zero external dependencies:

  • Native MCP Server (serve-mcp / mcp-shieldwall-server): Runs as a zero-dependency JSON-RPC 2.0 stdio MCP server exposing scan_tools_manifest, audit_client_config, verify_schema_lock, and redact_sensitive_text directly inside your AI client.

  • Static Tool-Poisoning Scanner (MCP-001..MCP-004): Detects hidden prompt-injection instructions, .env / SSH exfiltration directives, rogue webhooks, and base64-obfuscated payloads inside tools/list schemas (--format json|sarif|markdown).

  • CI Rug-Pull Lockfile (lock / verify-lock): Pins canonical SHA-256 fingerprints per tool (description + inputSchema) into .mcp-lock.json and alerts in CI on silent upstream mutations, additions, or removals.

  • Client Config Auditor (audit-config, MCP-301..MCP-304): Checks claude_desktop_config.json / Claude Code .mcp.json / Cursor mcp.json / VS Code mcp.json for unsafe flags (--allow-all, --no-sandbox), hardcoded API tokens, unpinned npx -y packages without explicit versions, and insecure http:// endpoints (--format json|markdown).

  • Runtime Call Guard (MCP-101..MCP-103): Blocks destructive shell commands (rm -rf /, curl ... | bash) and base64-obfuscated payloads in tools/call arguments.

  • Live Secret Redaction (MCP-201): Scrubs Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub, AWS, Slack, Google, and Stripe credentials from MCP responses before they enter model context.

Quick Start

Run Instantly (Zero Clone / Zero Dependencies)

# Instant local MCP config security check via uvx (zero install):
uvx --from git+https://github.com/andrejpimenov122-lab/mcp-shieldwall mcp-shieldwall

# Run interactive attack & config audit showcase:
uvx --from git+https://github.com/andrejpimenov122-lab/mcp-shieldwall mcp-shieldwall demo

# Or install globally / in venv directly from GitHub:
pip install git+https://github.com/andrejpimenov122-lab/mcp-shieldwall.git

Local CLI Workflows

pip install -e .

# 1. Scan an MCP tools manifest (JSON, SARIF v2.1.0, or GitHub Markdown)
mcp-shieldwall scan examples/sample_tools.json
mcp-shieldwall scan examples/sample_tools.json --format sarif
mcp-shieldwall scan examples/sample_tools.json --format markdown

# 2. Pin tool schemas to a lockfile and verify in CI against rug-pulls
mcp-shieldwall lock tools.json --out .mcp-lock.json
mcp-shieldwall verify-lock tools.json --lock .mcp-lock.json

# 3. Audit Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, or VS Code MCP configuration
mcp-shieldwall audit-config ~/.cursor/mcp.json
mcp-shieldwall audit-config ~/.cursor/mcp.json --format markdown

# 4. Redact leaked keys from tool logs or outputs
mcp-shieldwall redact server_output.log

Run the 10-second zero-install showcase:

./examples/demo.sh

Use as an MCP Server in Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor

Add MCP Shieldwall directly to your claude_desktop_config.json, .mcp.json, or ~/.cursor/mcp.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mcp-shieldwall": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["--from", "git+https://github.com/andrejpimenov122-lab/mcp-shieldwall@v0.3.1", "mcp-shieldwall", "serve-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

The stdio file tools read local JSON files up to 2 MiB under the working directory or the user’s home directory.

Claude Code also supports the CLI form:

claude mcp add mcp-shieldwall -- uvx --from git+https://github.com/andrejpimenov122-lab/mcp-shieldwall@v0.3.1 mcp-shieldwall serve-mcp

Exposed MCP tools:

  • scan_tools_manifest — Scan a tools/list manifest JSON or file for MCP-001..MCP-004 (including Base64-obfuscated payloads).
  • audit_client_config — Audit mcpServers/servers configs for MCP-301..MCP-304.
  • verify_schema_lock — Verify SHA-256 tool fingerprints against .mcp-lock.json to catch rug-pulls.
  • redact_sensitive_text — Scrub leaked API keys and tokens (MCP-201).

Zero-Clone pre-commit Hook (Blocks Unsafe .mcp.json / .cursor/mcp.json Commits)

Add directly to .pre-commit-config.yaml in any repository:

repos:
  - repo: https://github.com/andrejpimenov122-lab/mcp-shieldwall
    rev: v0.3.1
    hooks:
      - id: mcp-shieldwall-config
      - id: mcp-shieldwall-manifest

Live browser playground (zero install): https://huggingface.co/spaces/snsnshnwh/mcp-shieldwall

CI Integration

An example GitHub Actions workflow is provided at docs/ci-workflow-example.yml.

Documentation & Benchmarks

  • 9-Client IDE & CLI Integration Guide: docs/IDE_INTEGRATIONS.md — Setup snippets for Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code Copilot, Cline, Roo Code, Zed, and Continue.dev.
  • 12-Vector Security Benchmark: docs/SECURITY_BENCHMARK.md — Empirical recall, false-positive analysis, latency, and schema rug-pull verification across 12 attack vectors and 12 benign configs/tools.

Running Tests

python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v

Limitations

Static regex/decoding heuristics and config rules do not replace OS-level sandboxing or human review of third-party MCP servers. They are designed as a fast, deterministic local gate in CI and pre-commit workflows.

License

MIT — Open Source Initiative (OSI) approved.

Metadata

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