mcpaudit
Security scanner for MCP server Python code. Finds vulnerabilities before they reach production.
pip install mcp-vulnscan
mcp-vulnscan ./my-mcp-server
What it finds
| Rule | CWE | Severity |
|---|---|---|
Shell injection — user input to subprocess/os.system without sanitization |
CWE-78 | high |
Code injection — user input to eval()/exec() |
CWE-95 | high |
SQL injection — user input in raw cursor.execute() queries |
CWE-89 | high |
| Path traversal — file operations without path boundary validation | CWE-22 | high/medium |
SSRF — user input as HTTP request URL (including Session().get()) |
CWE-918 | high/medium |
| Hardcoded secrets — API keys and credentials in source code | CWE-798 | high |
| Prompt injection — user-fetched content returned to the LLM | CWE-020 | medium |
Unsafe deserialization — user input to pickle.loads, yaml.load |
CWE-502 | high/medium |
Template injection — user input to jinja2.Template() or env.from_string() |
CWE-94 | high/medium |
XML injection (XXE) — user input to ET.fromstring() or lxml.etree.fromstring() |
CWE-611 | high/medium |
| LDAP injection — user input in LDAP search filters without escaping | CWE-90 | high/medium |
| Log injection — user input as the log message (enables log forging) | CWE-117 | high/medium |
Severity is high for confirmed MCP tool handlers (@mcp.tool), medium for unknown context.
Usage
# Scan a directory
mcp-vulnscan ./path/to/server
# Output as JSON for CI/CD
mcp-vulnscan ./path/to/server --format json
# Output as SARIF for GitHub Code Scanning
mcp-vulnscan ./path/to/server --format sarif --output-file results.sarif
# Only show high and critical findings
mcp-vulnscan ./path/to/server --min-severity high
# Run only specific rules
mcp-vulnscan ./path/to/server --rules shell_injection,path_traversal
# Exit code 0 even when findings exist (for reporting without blocking)
mcp-vulnscan ./path/to/server --no-exit-code
# Include test files (excluded by default)
mcp-vulnscan ./path/to/server --no-default-excludes
# Exclude generated code
mcp-vulnscan ./path/to/server --exclude '**/generated/**'
# Write output to a file
mcp-vulnscan ./path/to/server --format json --output-file findings.json
Baseline mode (CI onboarding)
Establish a baseline from an existing codebase so CI only fails on new findings:
# First run: saves current findings as baseline, exits 0
mcp-vulnscan ./src --baseline baseline.json
# Subsequent runs: only reports findings NOT in baseline
mcp-vulnscan ./src --baseline baseline.json
Commit baseline.json to your repo. From that point on, the scanner blocks only regressions.
Config file
Generate a project config:
mcp-vulnscan init
This creates .mcpaudit.toml in the current directory:
[mcpaudit]
min_severity = "low"
format = "text"
exclude = [
"**/generated/**",
"**/vendor/**",
]
rules = [] # empty = all rules
CLI flags always override the config file.
Suppressing findings
Add a comment to suppress a finding on a specific line:
result = eval(expr) # mcpaudit: ignore
result = eval(expr) # mcpaudit: ignore[CWE-95]
cursor.execute(query) # mcpaudit: ignore[CWE-89]
CWE-specific suppression only silences that CWE on that line; other rules still apply.
GitHub Actions
Run tests in CI
- name: Run mcpaudit
run: mcp-vulnscan ./src --format sarif --output-file mcpaudit.sarif --no-exit-code
- name: Upload to GitHub Code Scanning
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
with:
sarif_file: mcpaudit.sarif
Block PRs on new findings
- name: mcpaudit (baseline diff)
run: mcp-vulnscan ./src --baseline baseline.json
How it works
mcpaudit parses Python source with the ast module and traces data flow from MCP tool
parameters to dangerous sinks. It classifies each function as:
- tool — decorated with
@mcp.toolor@server.call_tool→ findings reported as high - unknown — no classifier signal → findings reported as medium
- safe — CLI code,
@classmethod, utils directories, test functions → not flagged
Import aliases are tracked — import subprocess as sp; sp.run(cmd, shell=True) is detected.
Session-based HTTP calls are tracked — requests.Session().get(url) is detected.
No external API calls. Runs fully offline.
License
MIT
Metadata
Release files for mcp-vulnscan 0.2.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| mcp_vulnscan-0.2.1.tar.gz | 46.1 kB | Without provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| mcp_vulnscan-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 88.7 kB
Release files / mcp_vulnscan-0.2.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | mcp_vulnscan-0.2.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 46.1 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.2.0 CPython/3.10.20
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Release files / mcp_vulnscan-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | mcp_vulnscan-0.2.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 42.6 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.2.0 CPython/3.10.20
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Security for mcp-vulnscan 0.2.1
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