mcp-xray
One field instrument for MCP server reviews. Point it at a client's MCP
server (or an offline tools/list dump) and walk away with one graded
report that answers three questions:
- What does this surface cost? Per-turn context tax, per tool, before any work.
- Does the surface confuse the model? Wrong-tool selection, spurious firing on off-domain tasks.
- Can the surface be smaller? Which tools merge, which should be MCP resources, and whether the real fix is consolidation or just-in-time loading.
Many sensors, one voice: wrapped tools contribute measurements only; the grading engine owns all interpretation.
See real output: example reports - full mcp-xray
audits of two production MCP servers (OrionBelt Semantic Layer & Analytics),
rendered exactly as the tool emits them.
Built by RALFORION d.o.o. - the team behind the OrionBelt Semantic Layer. See Professional review & commercial use.
Install
pip install -e . # core (offline static + consolidation half)
pip install -e ".[api]" # + authoritative token counting & LLM behavioral probes
pip install -e ".[live]" # + stdio / http / sse transports
pip install -e ".[dev]" # everything + pytest
Note on naming. The
-e .commands above install from a local clone (rungit clonefirst). On PyPI the distribution is published asmcp-xray-audit(the baremcp-xrayname belongs to an unrelated Jira Xray project). The import package (mcp_xray) and the CLI command (mcp-xray) are unchanged.
The static + consolidation half runs keyless and offline from a tools/list
dump - no API key, no live server.
Quick start
# Offline: static hygiene + consolidation, rendered as the client artifact
mcp-xray analyze --tools-json dump.json
# Authoritative token numbers (must match the client's production model)
mcp-xray analyze --tools-json dump.json --token-backend api --model claude-sonnet-4-6
# Live server, full audit including behavioral probe
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=... mcp-xray analyze --stdio "gmail-mcp serve" --llm --model claude-sonnet-4-6
# Authed HTTP/SSE server -> pass a bearer token (repeatable --header). Prefer the
# MCP_XRAY_HTTP_HEADER env var so the token stays out of ps/shell history.
mcp-xray analyze --http https://server.example/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# With the client's labeled golden queries -> labeled selection accuracy
mcp-xray analyze --stdio "gmail-mcp serve" --llm --model claude-sonnet-4-6 --queries golden.yaml
# Phase-swapped surface (tool list changes by journey phase) -> per-phase audit
mcp-xray analyze --phases phases.yaml
# Just the capability-reduction analysis
mcp-xray consolidate --tools-json dump.json
# Validate a proposed merge: tokens + selection accuracy, before vs after
mcp-xray validate --before base.json --after merged.json --queries golden.yaml --model claude-sonnet-4-6
# Persist a run, re-render markdown later (fingerprinted for drift)
mcp-xray analyze --tools-json dump.json --out runs/2026-05-31/
mcp-xray report --run runs/2026-05-31/
Each run folder is self-contained and replayable: alongside report.json/
report.md, analyze writes the run's input under <run>/dumps/ (a phased
run's phases.yaml + per-phase tools-json, or a flat run's tools.json). So
you can re-grade or re-probe a past version offline - no live server, no
re-capture - e.g. mcp-xray analyze --phases runs/<version>/dumps/phases.yaml.
What it measures
Per-probe deep-dives live in docs/.
| Probe | Owned? | Needs | Emits |
|---|---|---|---|
static_hygiene |
owned (authoritative) | inventory | per-tool token cost (leave-one-out), hidden injectors, schema smells - see docs/static-hygiene-probe.md |
consolidate |
owned | inventory | merge candidates, resource candidates, JIT framing - see docs/consolidation-probe.md & merge-candidates.md |
noise |
owned | LLM + key | selection accuracy / confusability proxy / distraction - see docs/behavioral-probe.md |
mcp_checkup, token_analyzer |
wrapped (v0.2) | external bin + config | token cost, duplicates - measurements only |
Skipped probes drop their weight and are reported "not measured," never
scored zero. The authoritative per-tool token figure is computed in-house via
the Anthropic count_tokens endpoint; the offline backend is a flagged
ESTIMATE and never the headline number.
Wrapped sensors (
mcp_checkup,token_analyzer) run when you pass--client-config <path>and their binary is installed; otherwise they're reported "not measured." They contribute measurements only - never grades.
Grading
Five weighted dimensions roll to a 0–100 score and letter grade:
context efficiency (30%), selection robustness (25%), surface redundancy (15%),
schema hygiene (15%), description quality (15%). Full roll-up math in
docs/grading.md.
Input formats
tools-json accepts a full MCP result ({"tools": [...], "instructions": "..."}),
a bare list, or a {"result": {"tools": [...]}} envelope.
golden queries (--queries):
queries:
- query: "create a new label called Work"
expected_tools: [create_label]
- query: "find emails from my boss"
expected_tools: [search_threads]
call-manifest (--call-manifest, safe result-size probing - operator
asserts these are read-only/sandbox calls). On a live, non-phased run
(--stdio/--http/--sse) each listed tool is called once and its result size
(chars + bytes) is measured and reported, since tool outputs cost context
too. Offline or phased runs warn and skip (no server to call). mcp-xray never
calls a tool without a manifest - see docs/safe-calls.md:
calls:
- tool: list_labels
args: {}
Phase-swapped (bucketed) surfaces
Some servers don't expose one static toolset - they swap the tool list by
journey phase (e.g. a "design" phase before a model is loaded, a "run" phase
after). A single tools/list snapshot can't see a swap, so point mcp-xray at a
phases manifest - one tools-json dump per phase:
# phases.yaml
phases:
design: design.json # tools visible before a model is loaded
run: run.json # tools visible once a model is loaded
mcp-xray analyze --phases phases.yaml
The phased report:
- Headline tax = the worst phase, not the union - the model only ever carries one phase at a time, so it's not charged for tools it never co-loads.
- Per-phase surface table + carried tools (those visible in more than one phase = the cross-phase cost).
- Union analysis - every distinct tool still gets schema-hygiene + consolidation review.
- Progressive loading is credited, not flagged - ≥2 distinct phases means the server already does the JIT pattern the tool would otherwise recommend.
Capture the per-phase dumps with mcp-xray dump while the server is in each
phase - or automate the walk with capture-phases, which drives the journey in
a single session:
# capture.yaml - first phase captured before any call; later phases issue their
# 'advance' tool calls (the ONLY calls made - never inferred), then re-list.
phases:
- name: design
- name: run
advance:
- tool: load_model
args: { model_id: "<id>" }
mcp-xray capture-phases --stdio "my-server --multi-model" \
--capture capture.yaml --out-dir dumps/phases
mcp-xray analyze --phases dumps/phases/phases.yaml
Per-server profiles
The tool (src/) is generic. Anything specific to a particular MCP server
you're reviewing - captured dumps, phase manifests, golden queries, run outputs -
lives under profiles/<server>/, one directory per server. profiles/ is
git-ignored: engagement data stays local and is never committed. Suggested
per-server layout:
profiles/<server>/
dumps/ # captured tools/list snapshots (mcp-xray dump)
phases.yaml # phase manifest (for phase-swapped surfaces)
golden.yaml # labeled selection queries (--queries)
call-manifest.yaml # operator-confirmed safe calls (--call-manifest)
runs/ # report.json + report.md per audit (fingerprinted)
Generic, server-neutral example fixtures live in tests/fixtures/ (e.g. the
synthetic "Acme Catalog" phased server) - those are part of the product and are
committed.
Development
pytest # static + consolidation paths are fully testable offline
tests/contracts/ pins one frozen-fixture test per wrapped adapter so a silent
upstream format change fails in CI, not in front of a client.
Every GitHub Action in .github/workflows is pinned to a 40-character commit
SHA rather than a tag, because a tag such as v7 is a movable label whose owner
can repoint it at any time. That is why the workflows are full of hex. Each pin
carries a # vX.Y.Z comment naming the exact patch release the SHA was cut
from, and scripts/check-action-pins.sh (run by the pins job in CI) resolves
that tag upstream and fails if the commit it names is not the one pinned. Patch
tags never move, so the check stays quiet until something is actually wrong.
Without it a pull request could swap in a hash from a fork, leave the comment
saying # v7.0.1, and the diff would look like a routine Dependabot bump.
./scripts/check-action-pins.sh # full check, resolves tags upstream
./scripts/check-action-pins.sh --offline # SHA and comment format only, no network
The script also holds an ALLOWED_OWNERS allowlist (currently just actions),
since a SHA matching its own tag says nothing about whether the action belongs
here at all. Adding an owner is a deliberate decision. Note what the check does
not do: it does not judge whether an action is safe, does not stop a downgrade
to a real but ancient release, and actions/checkout necessarily runs before it
(nothing can be verified before the tree exists).
Releasing
A release is a pushed tag. .github/workflows/release.yml builds the sdist and
wheel from the tagged commit, checks that the tag names the version in
pyproject.toml, runs the suite, smoke-installs the wheel into an empty venv,
and uploads to PyPI with trusted publishing. No PyPI token is stored anywhere.
# bump `version` in pyproject.toml and `__version__` in src/mcp_xray/__init__.py,
# refresh uv.lock, merge, then:
git tag -a vX.Y.Z -m "vX.Y.Z" && git push origin vX.Y.Z
gh release create vX.Y.Z --title "vX.Y.Z" --verify-tag --notes "..."
The GitHub release is written by hand because its notes are. The pypi
environment the job runs in can carry required reviewers, which turns a pushed
tag into a pending approval rather than an immediate upload.
One-time setup, in the PyPI project's publishing settings: add a trusted
publisher for owner ralforion, repository mcp-xray, workflow
release.yml, environment pypi. Until that exists the publish step fails
with an OIDC error and nothing is uploaded.
Status
v1.6.0 - production instrument. Everything through the behavioral harness is shipped. 1.6.0 runs the behavioral probe on models that reject forced tool choice (Claude Opus 5.5, Sonnet 5.5, Fable 5.1), and reports Selection Robustness as "not measured" when no selection sample succeeded instead of scoring it 100:
- Offline core - static hygiene (authoritative tokens + smells), consolidation
(merge/resource candidates, JIT framing), grading, and rendered report. Keyless,
runs from a
tools/listdump. - Wrapped sensors -
mcp_checkup+token_analyzeradapters with pinned versions and contract tests; measurements only, reconciled against the authoritative count. - Behavioral -
noiseprobe (selection accuracy / confusability / distraction), resumable (--resume); before/aftervalidateloop; safe result-size probing via call-manifest. - Phased surfaces - phase-swapped (bucketed) toolsets,
capture-phasesautomation, worst-phase headline tax. - Replayable runs - self-contained, fingerprinted run folders you can re-grade or re-probe offline.
Remaining roadmap: trace co-occurrence (signal from client call logs + composite-tool proposals).
Professional review & commercial use
mcp-xray gives you the grade. Acting on it - prioritising the findings,
remodelling a confusing surface, wiring the validate gate into CI so a
regression can't merge - is what RALFORION does for a
living.
- MCP surface review - we run the full audit against your live servers and hand back a prioritised remediation plan (not just a score). Good first step if your tool surface is large, phase-swapped, or quietly burning context.
- Commercial / embedded use - the BUSL-1.1 license lets you use mcp-xray for any internal purpose, including production. Embedding it in a commercial product, or offering it as part of a paid service, needs a commercial license - reach us via ralforion.com.
License
Copyright 2026 RALFORION d.o.o.
Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1. The Licensed Work will convert to Apache License 2.0 on 2030-03-16, the Change Date in LICENSE.
By contributing to this project, you agree to the Contributor License Agreement.
Third-party dependencies
The runtime dependency is PyYAML; the api, openai and live extras add the
Anthropic, OpenAI and MCP client libraries and their own dependencies. Across
that closure everything is permissive — MIT, BSD, Apache-2.0, ISC, PSF-2.0 —
with two MPL-2.0 exceptions, certifi and tqdm, both reached through the
extras.
There is no THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md here, and that is deliberate rather than an
omission. The attribution clauses in those licences attach when you distribute
the software, and mcp-xray distributes none of it: it publishes a wheel, and a
wheel that declares a dependency hands over no copy of it — pip fetches each one
from PyPI onto your machine, under terms between you and its authors. A notice
file would be several thousand lines of licence text nobody is owed, rewritten
on every dependency bump.
What is kept is the check behind it. scripts/third_party_notices.py --check
runs in CI and fails when any dependency's licence is neither permissive nor
written up with the reason it was accepted, so a copyleft dependency has to be a
decision somebody records rather than something that arrives with a Dependabot
bump. Run it without --check to write the full picture out locally; the result
is gitignored.
If mcp-xray ever ships a container image, this stops being true — set
PUBLISHES_IMAGE and COMMIT_NOTICE in that script and the same code produces
the notice that would then be owed.
For commercial licensing inquiries, contact: licensing@ralforion.com
Metadata
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