mcplock 1.0.1

Pin, diff, and lint MCP tool definitions — npm audit / SRI for MCP tools.

mcplock

npm audit / Subresource Integrity, but for MCP tool descriptions.

mcplock pins what an agent is allowed to trust about a tool, detects silent drift in tool definitions, and flags ambiguous or unscoped tools before an agent misuses them.

Status: pre-v0.1, under active development. snapshot, check, lint, and the GitHub Action are implemented.

Usage

mcplock snapshot "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem ./data"
mcplock check "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem ./data"
mcplock lint "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem ./data"

Baselines are stored as flat JSON under ~/.mcplock/snapshots/ (override the root with MCPLOCK_HOME).

check exit codes — 0 clean, 1 drift at or above --fail-on (default high), 2 could not check. A missing baseline is exit 2, not 0: exiting clean for an unpinned server would silently green-light it in CI.

Servers needing credentials take --env KEY=VALUE (repeatable). The MCP SDK inherits only a small safe allowlist when spawning a stdio server, so anything else must be named explicitly. --env values are never written to the snapshot, and are not part of the server identity.

lint exits 0 even with findings unless --strict. These are judgment calls needing human review, not the binary facts check deals in — failing a build on a heuristic is how a linter gets switched off.

Linting

Ambiguity — "could an agent pick the wrong one of these two?" Description similarity alone does not answer that: on the 14 real tools of the official filesystem server, TF-IDF cosine at the 85% threshold flags 0 of 91 pairs, and the confusable and distinct pairs are not separable by any single cosine threshold. So the check is gated on schema substitutability — can one set of arguments satisfy both tools? — then scored on name affinity and description similarity, with a veto on opposing verbs (read/write, create/delete).

On that server the gate removes 63 of 91 pairs before scoring, and 4 are flagged: the three-way read_file/read_text_file/read_media_file cluster and list_directory/list_directory_with_sizes. The threshold sits in a 0.33–0.50 gap between the two classes.

Scope — two checks. A destructive verb with no boundary language anywhere (strengthened by unbounded words like "arbitrary" or "any file on the host"), and a convention departure: a tool omitting a boundary statement the rest of its own server makes. Neither inspects behaviour, so both are documentation gaps, never vulnerabilities.

Severity

Severity	Meaning
critical	a behavioural annotation flipped (destructiveHint, …)
high	content changed in a way that widens what the tool can do
medium	a pinned tool is gone
informational	cosmetic rewording, benign new tools, non-behavioural keys

Four bands rather than the brief's two: with two, an annotation flip and a reworded sentence land in the same bucket.

The high heuristic stays deliberately simple — trigger vocabulary (execute, delete, send, all, admin) entering or leaving a description, plus two schema widenings (a required parameter becoming optional, a new parameter with destructive vocabulary). Keyword scanning ignores Unicode format characters, so de<ZWSP>lete cannot slip past it; hashing keeps them, so the edit still registers as drift.

Hash model

A tool is pinned by four hashes:

Hash	Covers	Purpose
content_hash	description + inputSchema	did the meaning of this tool change
description_hash	description	name which side moved
schema_hash	inputSchema	name which side moved
annotations_hash	annotations	behavioural promises, tracked separately

annotations_hash is deliberately not folded into content_hash. destructiveHint and readOnlyHint are assertions an agent may gate its behaviour on, so a flip is its own critical finding — folding it in would make it indistinguishable from a typo fix.

title, outputSchema, and execution are not hashed in v0.1; there is no concrete drift scenario for them yet.

CI

mcplock provides a reusable composite GitHub Action to gate pull requests against tool-definition drift in CI.

Add .github/workflows/mcplock.yml to your repository:

name: Check MCP Tool Definitions

on:
  pull_request:
    branches: [ main ]

jobs:
  check-drift:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Verify MCP Server Baseline
        uses: yash161004/mcplock/.github/actions/mcp-lock-action@master
        with:
          server: 'npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem ./data'
          fail-on: 'high'

Demo

A real CI run against @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem:

• ✓ Green run — baseline captured and verified clean
• ✗ Broken run — injected description drift detected at HIGH severity, build fails

Action Inputs

Input	Description	Default
server	Server command or streamable-HTTP URL	Required
transport	stdio | http | auto	auto
fail-on	Lowest severity threshold to fail build (critical | high | medium | informational)	high
json-report	Optional path to write machine-readable JSON report	""
env	Space-separated KEY=VALUE environment variables for stdio server	""
python-version	Python version for setup-python	3.11
mcplock-version	PyPI version specifier for mcplock	mcplock

Development

python -m venv .venv && .venv/Scripts/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest

Responsible disclosure

mcplock reads tool definitions that servers publish through tools/list. When it surfaces something real in someone else's server, we handle it like this:

1. Private report first — to the project's security contact, SECURITY.md, or a private advisory, with the exact observed text, the date observed, and a reproduction.
2. 90 days by default — shorter if it is fixed sooner, longer only if the maintainer is engaged and asks. Silence is not a reason to extend.
3. Nothing public before then — not the server, not the finding.
4. Honest credit — the maintainer's response is recorded as it happened, including disagreement.

We report on names, descriptions, and input schemas only. We do not test authentication, access anyone's data, or exploit anything beyond confirming what we saw.

Note what these checks are and are not: they read descriptions, not behaviour. A tool whose description omits a boundary may still enforce one perfectly. Those findings are documentation gaps, and reporting them as vulnerabilities would be wrong.

To report an issue in mcplock itself, contact the maintainer privately. The same 90-day standard applies to us.