mcpprobe
Security scanner for Model Context Protocol servers. It checks authentication, OAuth metadata, transport conformance, tool-description poisoning, rug pulls, secrets in metadata, verbose errors and basic resource limits, maps every finding to the OWASP MCP, Agentic and LLM Top 10 lists, and writes JSON, SARIF 2.1.0 and a readable terminal summary.
It runs locally, sends no telemetry, and never calls a tool in its default mode.
Only scan servers you own or are explicitly authorised to test. See Ownership rule.
60-second quickstart
$ pipx run --spec mcpprobe-scanner mcpprobe https://your-server.example/mcp
or install it:
$ pipx install mcpprobe-scanner # or: pip install mcpprobe-scanner; the command is `mcpprobe`
$ mcpprobe https://your-server.example/mcp --sarif mcpprobe.sarif --json mcpprobe.json
A local stdio server you run yourself:
$ mcpprobe --stdio "npx -y @your-scope/your-mcp-server@1.2.3"
Passing a bearer token you own (for checks behind your auth):
$ mcpprobe https://your-server.example/mcp --header "Authorization: Bearer $MCP_TEST_TOKEN"
The summary lists each finding with severity, check ID, confidence, OWASP mapping,
an evidence excerpt and a plain-English fix, followed by a coverage table showing
which checks ran, which were skipped and why. mcpprobe checks lists every check;
CHECKS.md documents them in full.
What it checks
| Area | Checks | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication | AUTH-01..04 | endpoint answers without credentials; missing RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata; no PKCE S256; accepts a self-minted JWT with the wrong audience; token accepted in the query string |
| Transport | TRANS-01..05 | Origin not validated (DNS rebinding); bogus MCP-Protocol-Version accepted; weak or forgeable Mcp-Session-Id; deprecated HTTP+SSE; plain HTTP, weak TLS, missing headers |
| Tool metadata | META-01..05 | hidden instructions, cross-tool shadowing, credential paths, URLs, base64, zero-width/bidi/homoglyph Unicode; rug-pull diff against a stored SHA-256 baseline; annotations that contradict capability; schema hygiene; secrets in descriptions or stdio env |
| Robustness | ERR-01, DOS-01 | stack traces and versions in errors; one oversized argument, one 64-deep nesting probe and 20 paced tools/list calls, never more |
| Active (gated stubs) | INJ-01..05, SUPPLY-01/02, SANDBOX-01 | registered and reported as not_implemented in this release |
| Governance | GOV-01..05 | listed as attestation-only: not assessable by a scan, never marked passed |
Protocol revisions: the scanner tries server/discover (2026-07-28) first, then
initialize with 2025-11-25 and 2025-06-18, then the deprecated 2024-11-05 HTTP+SSE
transport, and records which one answered.
Passive vs active
Passive (default) sends only what a normal MCP client sends (negotiation, the
*/list methods, well-known metadata documents) plus a handful of benign malformed
requests (bad Origin, bogus version header, forged session ID, self-minted
wrong-audience JWT, truncated JSON, one oversized and one deeply nested request). It
never calls a tool.
Active (--active) is for checks that call tools with non-destructive canaries.
In 0.1.0 these are stubs, but the gate is real and enforced in code. Active mode is
refused unless you pass all of:
--authorised-by "<who approved this, e.g. name/role/ticket>"--scope "<what is in scope>"--verify dns-txt(HTTP targets) or--verify local(stdio servers you run yourself)
For dns-txt, generate a token and publish it:
$ mcpprobe token your-server.example
Publish this DNS TXT record, then run with --active --verify dns-txt:
_mcpprobe.your-server.example. TXT "mcpprobe-verification=<token>"
$ mcpprobe https://your-server.example/mcp --active --verify dns-txt \
--authorised-by "platform security, CHG-1234" --scope "https://your-server.example/mcp" \
--json scan.json
Every active run writes an authorisation record (scan.authorisation.json next to the
report): who authorised it, the scope, the verification proof, rate cap and excluded
tools. Use --exclude-tool NAME for tools that must never be called.
Ownership rule
Scan only MCP servers you own, operate, or have explicit written permission to test. This applies to passive mode too: even benign requests are unauthorised access if the system is not yours. mcpprobe identifies itself on every request and honours opt-outs (below), but those are courtesy mechanisms, not permission.
Scanner identification, opt-out and rate limits
- User-Agent:
mcpprobe/<version> (+https://mcpprobe.tech/scanning-policy). - Opt-out, checked before any MCP request and impossible to override:
- DNS TXT
mcpprobe-opt-out=allat_mcpprobe.<host>(or a parent domain), checked before any packet reaches the host; - an HTTP
200at/.well-known/mcpprobe-opt-out.
- DNS TXT
- Rate: 5 requests/second by default (
--rate), hard ceiling 10.
Exit codes
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
0 |
No finding at or above --fail-on (default high) |
1 |
At least one finding at or above --fail-on |
2 |
Error: target unreachable or not MCP, bad arguments, ownership verification failed, authorisation refused, or the target opted out |
SARIF and GitHub code scanning
As a GitHub Action (Docker container action, no Python setup needed):
name: MCP security
on: [push, pull_request]
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
jobs:
mcpprobe:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: mcpprobe-dev/mcpprobe@v0.1.0
with:
target: https://staging.your-server.example/mcp
fail-on: high
sarif-output: mcpprobe.sarif
sarif-location: src/server.py # optional: anchor alerts to a repo file
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: mcpprobe.sarif
category: mcpprobe
Or from any CI with the CLI:
$ pipx run --spec mcpprobe-scanner mcpprobe https://staging.your-server.example/mcp --sarif mcpprobe.sarif --fail-on high
Results use error for critical/high, warning for medium and note for low/info,
with GitHub's security-severity on each rule and the OWASP IDs as tags. Because a
scanned endpoint is not a file, results point at the target URL unless you pass
--sarif-location.
Rug-pull detection
$ mcpprobe https://your-server.example/mcp --baseline .mcpprobe/baseline.json
The first run stores canonical SHA-256 hashes of every tool, prompt, resource and the
server instructions. Later runs report anything added, removed or changed (a changed
description after approval is the classic rug pull) and update the file; use
--no-write-baseline to compare without updating.
Reports and evidence
--json FILE: the full report, including every request/response pair (timestamp, method, status, a header subset, bodies truncated to 4 KB).Authorizationvalues and recognised secret patterns are redacted.--sarif FILE: SARIF 2.1.0.-v: descriptions and scan notes in the terminal;-q: no terminal output.
Server-supplied text is shown with control characters made visible and is never interpreted as terminal markup.
Python API and LLM-judge hook
import asyncio
from mcpprobe.checks import JudgeVerdict, ScanOptions
from mcpprobe.scanner import ScanConfig, run_scan
def judge(text: str, task: str) -> JudgeVerdict | None:
return None # plug in your own model here; mcpprobe makes no LLM calls
report, evidence = asyncio.run(
run_scan(ScanConfig(target="https://your-server.example/mcp", options=ScanOptions(judge=judge)))
)
print(report.counts())
Development
$ pip install -e ".[dev]"
$ ruff check . && ruff format --check . && mypy && pytest
$ python -m tests.fake_server --preset vulnerable --port 8765 # deliberately vulnerable local server
$ mcpprobe http://127.0.0.1:8765/mcp
Security issues: see SECURITY.md. Licence: MIT.
Metadata
Release files for mcpprobe-scanner 0.1.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| mcpprobe_scanner-0.1.0.tar.gz | 121.7 kB | With provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| mcpprobe_scanner-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 214.9 kB
Release files / mcpprobe_scanner-0.1.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | mcpprobe_scanner-0.1.0.tar.gz |
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Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 28, 2026.
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