MedHarness
AI coding harness for teams shipping software under design control.
AI can write the code. It cannot tell you which requirement the change serves, which risk it touches, or whether the traceability still holds — and under IEC 62304 those are the parts that decide whether the work counts.
MedHarness closes that gap. It reads the design behind a change request, drives the implementation from it, then checks the result against the design again with ordinary code — no model is asked whether the work is done.
What only it can tell you
Your issue tracker manages one item well. It cannot take every item together and ask whether the V-model still holds — whether each requirement gives rise to the next, whether a chain closes back on itself, which risks a change touches. That analysis is what MedHarness is for, and it reads items as data, so it works whether they live in YAML here or in Jira.
$ medharness --dhf DHF verify dhf
FAIL [cycle] SRS-014 → SYS-006 → SRS-014
Fix: the V-model is directed. Remove whichever link reverses the chain so each item has an origin.
FAIL [required] SRS-022: SRS derives_from → SYS (count=0, need ≥1)
WARN [coverage] RISK→RCM: 3/4 covered
Fix: dhfkit --dhf DHF item list --type RCM to find uncovered items, then add dhf_links to their YAML.
Advisory only — pass --fail-on-uncovered to block the build on this.
Error: DHF validation failed.
A cycle means two items each derive from the other, so neither has an origin and the matrix loses the direction that makes it a matrix. A missing required link means a requirement traces to nothing above it. Both are structural — they block.
Incomplete design (WARN) blocks only under --fail-on-uncovered, because it is
design still to be written. Conflating the two is what makes traceability checks
something teams learn to ignore.
Storage-level checks — schema, and links whose target does not exist — come from
dhfkit and run in the same pass. A backend that enforces referential integrity
of its own makes them redundant; the analysis above it does not go away.
How a change moves
Every change is a Change Request on a fixed path. AI drafts, humans approve, deterministic gates decide whether it can close.
flowchart LR
CR["CR-042<br/>opened"] --> PLAN
PLAN["change plan<br/><br/>AI drafts DHF items<br/>and impact analysis"] --> REV{"Human<br/>review"}
REV -.->|rejected| PLAN
REV -->|"/approve"| IMPL["change implement<br/><br/>AI writes code<br/>and tests"]
IMPL --> GATES["Verification gates<br/><br/>verify dhf<br/>verify tests<br/>verify soup<br/>verify completion"]
GATES -.->|any gate fails| IMPL
GATES ==>|all pass| MERGE["Merge to main<br/><br/>evidence bundle<br/>release baseline"]
style PLAN fill:#4c6ef5,color:#fff,stroke:#364fc7
style IMPL fill:#4c6ef5,color:#fff,stroke:#364fc7
style REV fill:#f59f00,color:#fff,stroke:#e67700
style GATES fill:#f1f3f5,color:#212529,stroke:#868e96
style MERGE fill:#2f9e44,color:#fff,stroke:#2b8a3e
Only the blue steps call a model. Everything in the verification band is ordinary code. See docs/ai-security.md for the boundary in detail — including how to run with no AI at all.
Install
mkdir my-device && cd my-device
python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
pip install medharness
medharness init
medharness init scaffolds DHF/ (config, items, documents), AI-harness/,
and prompt templates. Extras: medharness[ai] for the AI workflow,
medharness[docs] for PDF export, medharness[full] for both.
Check the environment at any point:
medharness doctor
Before enabling the AI stages
change plan and change implement need a model CLI or API key, which pip
cannot install:
npm install -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code # default path, provides the `claude` CLI
Read docs/ai-security.md first. These stages run an agentic loop with an unrestricted shell tool and are designed for an ephemeral CI runner, not a workstation holding your credentials.
Everything else — traceability, validation, gates, evidence bundles — is deterministic and needs no model access.
First change request
git init && git add -A && git commit -m "feat: initialize DHF"
# Edit DHF/items/07_cr/CR-001.yaml, then:
medharness --dhf DHF change plan --cr CR-001 # AI drafts DHF items + impact analysis
# review and approve the design PR, then:
medharness --dhf DHF change implement --cr CR-001 # AI writes code and tests
medharness --dhf DHF verify dhf # gates decide whether it can close
Deploy to CI
MedHarness does not install a CI workflow — it would reference your branch
names, runners, and secrets, and medharness upgrade will never overwrite it.
Pin the version and call the gates:
name: DHF
on:
pull_request:
paths: ['DHF/**']
jobs:
dhf-validate:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-python@v5
with:
python-version: '3.11'
- run: pip install medharness==0.24.0
- run: medharness --dhf DHF verify dhf --fail-on-uncovered
Drop --fail-on-uncovered while backfilling an existing DHF: coverage gaps then
report as WARN, and only schema, required links, and dangling links block.
medharness gates lists every gate with what it requires and whether it blocks.
docs/interface.md is the contract to build against — result
shape, exit codes, and what may change.
docs/adopting.md carries the full workflow
with evidence bundles and release baselines.
Commands
dhfkit owns DHF data — storage and retrieval. medharness owns the
process around it, including all analysis over the item set. A team whose
DHF already lives in Jira or Azure DevOps keeps that and still needs the
analysis.
Every dhfkit command needs the DHF path — pass --dhf DHF, or set
COMPLIANTFLOW_DHF=DHF once. medharness takes --dhf DHF and reads no
environment variable.
dhfkit item list --type SYS |
list items; item get, item create, item update for one |
dhfkit validate schema |
schema conformance |
medharness verify dhf |
do the links resolve — storage integrity |
dhfkit doc generate SYS |
build a specification from the items |
dhfkit doc export SYS |
self-contained HTML, or PDF with [docs] |
medharness analyse soup-drift --manifest <file> |
sync SOUP items from a dependency manifest |
dhfkit sbom |
CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM from the SOUP register |
medharness release baseline --version 1.0.0 |
frozen release record |
medharness change plan --cr CR-034 |
AI drafts DHF items and impact analysis |
medharness change implement --cr CR-034 |
AI writes code and tests (--pr 42 to revise from feedback) |
medharness verify dhf |
coverage, cycles, dangling links, required traceability |
medharness verify tests --junit-dir test-results |
requirement-to-test coverage from JUnit |
medharness verify soup |
CVE scan against the OSV database |
medharness verify completion |
CR closure gate |
medharness verify branch --cr CR-034 |
the branch carries the items the CR proposed |
medharness verify classification |
IEC 62304 §4.3 safety class and the §5.1 plans it requires |
medharness verify verification |
every requirement has a declared verification method |
medharness evidence bundle --out-dir artifacts |
runtime evidence for a release |
medharness upgrade |
update the scaffold without touching your content |
medharness gates and --help on any subcommand carry the full surface.
Model configuration. Each stage falls back to the Anthropic Claude CLI
unless you set MEDHARNESS_{DESIGN,DESIGN_REVIEW,DEVELOP,CODE_REVIEW}_MODEL to
a provider:model value — anthropic, openai (OPENAI_API_KEY), or
deepseek (DEEPSEEK_API_KEY). MEDHARNESS_{STAGE}_BASE_URL points a stage at
Azure, Ollama, or vLLM. GH_TOKEN is required for --pr.
Seeing it run
ContourLab is a browser-based
contouring workspace for radiation oncology, maintained end-to-end with
MedHarness. Its DHF/ holds the real design inputs and traceability, every
change goes through the CR path above, and CI runs the gates on every PR. If you
want to read a production adoption before committing to one, start there.
Documentation
| docs/adopting.md | starting fresh, migrating an existing DHF, incremental adoption |
| docs/interface.md | the machine interface — result envelope, exit codes, stability |
| docs/ai-security.md | what the AI stages can do, isolation, audit trail, no-AI operation |
| docs/architecture.md | package boundaries, CR topology, scaffold layout |
| docs/adr/ · CHANGELOG.md | decision records; version history |
| CONTRIBUTING.md | contributor setup and local development |
dhfkit has no dependency on medharness, so the DHF engine can be adopted
standalone.
License
MIT. See LICENSE.
1 maintainer
Metadata
1 maintainer
Release files for medharness 0.24.0
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