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mintid-verifier-sdk

The MintID Verifier SDK (import name verifier_core): the single verifying core of MintID, for the relying party's own verifier. It validates a holder's presentation against the challenge it answers, either in your own process (embedded) or behind a thin HTTP service you deploy yourself next to your backend (service mode, which the TypeScript client and the MCP server talk to). The Rust proof engine is compiled in at a pinned version, so a supported install cannot end up with a substituted engine.

Where it fits

MintID is a network for verifiable, human-backed identity. Accepted issuers verify people and issue the credentials; the chain publishes their status roots, their bonds and the registries; each verifier decides on its own service. MintID itself issues nothing, certifies nothing and verifies nobody.

The verifier is your own service, and the decision is yours: nothing else validates a presentation, and pointing a client at somebody else's verifier service would delegate the decision itself. Installing the SDK does not make you a verifier: your verifier is registered on the chain, with its exact origins and its request-signing keys, before any presentation can be accepted (see becoming a verifier).

What the SDK enforces, as constants and closed types rather than settings: every acceptance condition runs in full and in order on every presentation; a presentation lives 10 seconds; chain reads are proven or they do not count; and the only thing kept is a minimal decision record, into which proof bytes, claim values and personal data do not fit.

Install

pip install mintid-verifier-sdk   # Python 3.12 or later, no runtime dependencies

Where no wheel matches your platform, pip builds it from the source distribution, which needs a Rust toolchain. Version 0.3.0, published from the main repository, https://gitlab.com/mintid/mintid (verifier-core).

New in 0.2. Request signers for the service: every challenge is signed with your registered request key, held in AWS KMS (extra [kms]) or a software seed file for local stacks (extra [software-signer]); holders refuse unsigned challenges from this release of the holder library on, so a service that signs nothing is for a devnet only (--insecure-unsigned-challenges). Every decision record names its evidence, the deciding condition and its vocabulary (SPEC-1 v3.2, R18); reason codes are unchanged. The engine pin is proof-core 0.4.0 (its verifying surface is unchanged from 0.3.0).

Example

from verifier_core.build import build_info
from verifier_core.presentation import validate_presentation

print(build_info())  # the pins of this artifact: engine, conformance suite, …

decision = validate_presentation(
    request,            # PresentationRequest — the signed challenge you issued
    envelope,           # PresentationEnvelope — the holder's response
    chain=chain,        # ChainReader        — proven on-chain reads
    nonces=nonces,      # NonceStore         — durable, exactly-once consumption
    proofs=proofs,      # ProofVerifier      — the anonymous-proof engine port
    decisions=log,      # DecisionLog        — the minimal decision sink
    now_unix=now,       # int                — your disciplined clock
)
decision.accepted      # bool
decision.reason_code   # closed vocabulary; a rejection is a decision, not an exception

You supply infrastructure (chain access, a nonce store, a decision log, a clock), never policy.

Status

The engine is built and in production. An independent audit of its implementation is scheduled as a milestone; its findings will be published, and it gates nothing.

Where to test

On the public testnet and its KYC sandbox, and only there: check the status line of its page first. Nothing issued on it carries weight. The single-node production chain is not for third parties and is never a place to test; the local stack of the main repository runs the same flows on your machine.

Licence

Apache License 2.0. Author: Marc Molas.

Metadata

Release files for mintid-verifier-sdk 0.3.0

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Total release size: 1.2 MB

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