mirra-sdk

One wrapper call gives any agent a persistent recognized identity, tamper-evident portable memory of its relationships, behavior that adapts per relationship, and execution that only happens when verified.

▶ Try the live playground (recognize a person, sign a memory, tamper it and watch verification fail — real HMAC-SHA256 in your browser): https://sdvegas21.github.io/mirra-sdk/

Zero-config — one line, it just works:

import mirra

agent = mirra.guard()                       # stable identity + signed memory + enforcement
agent.remember("alice", "prefers direct feedback")
safe = agent.protect(run_shell)             # hostile input blocked out of the box

Or the full explicit surface:

import mirra

wrapped = mirra.wrap(my_agent, principal="team-key-1", profile="dev_balanced")

wrapped.identity                     # recognized across sessions, not met fresh
wrapped.remember("alice", "…")       # signed scroll — verify-on-read, fail-closed
wrapped.recall("alice")              # only cryptographically verified memories
wrapped.interact("alice", "hi")      # context built from alice's own history
wrapped.execute("shell.exec", "…")   # deterministic, signed decision record

This is Edge 1 (the SDK) of the MIRRA platform's one-core/three-edges architecture. The SDK speaks only the frozen v1 core contract (mirra-core-contract); the enforcement engine (MVAR via ClawZero) and the signed memory store (ClawSeal) plug in beneath it, and optional capability providers can be injected at runtime for identity enrichment and epistemic verification.

The four pillars

Profiles: build against dev_balanced (safe actions allow, hostile ones block, risky ones step up). The default is prod_locked — the fail-closed production posture where every action is refused unless the caller supplies risk context or step-up approval. If you omit profile and everything blocks, that is the lockdown working as designed.

Recognizing a person across devices

subject_id alone is a per-app string. A Person ties a human's handles together so the car, the phone, and the robot know it's the same person — carrying one portable, signed relationship history:

from mirra import PersonRegistry

reg = PersonRegistry(home="~/.mirra")
mom = reg.create_person(display_name="Mom")
reg.claim_handle(mom.person_id, "car:driver-1")
reg.claim_handle(mom.person_id, "robot:mom")

agent = mirra.wrap(my_agent, principal="family-hub", persons=reg)
agent.remember("car:driver-1", "running late to school drop-off")
agent.recall("robot:mom")        # <- recalls it: same human, any device

# cross-device: export a signed claim, recognize her on a second device
claim = reg.export_claim(mom.person_id)          # signed, portable
other_device.import_claim(claim)                 # verify-on-import, fail-closed

Recognition and continuity are cryptographic (Ed25519-signed claims, verified on import); binding a real human (voiceprint/login) to a person key is your enrollment step.

Framework adapters (whole-agent)

Existing security adapters wrap individual tools. These wrap the whole agent — identity, signed per-person memory, and enforcement — in each framework's own idioms. All import-guarded (importing never requires the framework) and verified against the real libraries.

Each also exposes wrap_agent(...) and protect_tool(...).

LangChain (whole-agent, not just tools)

Existing security adapters wrap individual tools. This wraps the whole agent — identity, signed memory, per-user context, and enforcement — in LangChain's own idioms:

pip install "mirra-sdk[langchain]" mvar-security clawzero clawseal

from mirra.adapters.langchain import wrap_agent, MirraChatMessageHistory

# per-user signed chat history (verify-on-read), for RunnableWithMessageHistory
history = MirraChatMessageHistory(principal="acme", subject_id="alice")

# or bind a whole chain: each .invoke resolves that subject's verified history,
# hands it to the chain, and records the exchange as a new signed scroll
bound = wrap_agent(my_chain, principal="acme")
bound.invoke("what did we discuss?", subject_id="alice")
safe_tool = bound.protect_tool(shell_tool, sink="shell.exec")   # reuses ClawZero

MirraChatMessageHistory is a real BaseChatMessageHistory, so it drops into RunnableWithMessageHistory (and anywhere a chat-history store is accepted). The adapter never imports LangChain at module load — only when you use it.

Fail-closed by design

• No enforcement engine → every action is blocked, never silently allowed.
• No memory backend → wrap() raises, never runs with unsigned memory.
• Damaged identity keystore → raises, never silently mints a new identity.
• Tampered scroll or forged decision record → fails verification.

Demo

Installed (pip):

mirra-demo                   # live 5-check report; run twice — the second run proves recognition

From a checkout:

python3 demo/demo_sdk.py     # narrative version of the same proof

See DEMO.md for the five-minute walkthrough.

Tests

python3 -m pytest tests/ -q

The suite is organized by acceptance criterion: test_recognition.py, test_signed_memory.py, test_differentiated_behavior.py, test_permissioned_execution.py, test_boundary.py (public/private leak gate).