mithril-cognee 0.1.0

Mithril — trust and governance layer for Cognee memory

Mithril

A trust and governance layer for Cognee memory.
Every AI can remember. Mithril decides what deserves to be remembered.

The Problem

AI agents with persistent memory are vulnerable to memory poisoning — where a single malicious message permanently corrupts the knowledge graph that all future agents rely on.

Vanilla Cognee:

input → cognee.remember() → stored forever

With Mithril:

agent / Slack / file → Trust Score → Contradiction Check → Admission Gate → cognee.remember()

How Mithril connects to your stack

Mithril is a real boundary in front of Cognee, reachable three ways — all sharing one governance pipeline and one adaptive reputation store:

Surface	What it is	Entry point
MCP server	Agents (Claude Desktop, Cursor) call mithril_remember / mithril_recall instead of writing to memory directly	mcp_server/server.py · make mcp
Ingestion connector	Parse a real Slack export (or a .txt/.jsonl file) and run the whole feed through the gate	mithril/ingest.py · make ingest
REST API + dashboard	FastAPI backend + Next.js provenance UI	api/main.py · make dev

Adaptive source reputation

Source reputation is not a static table — it starts from configured priors and then moves:

• a source caught contradicting verified memory loses trust (fast),
• a source whose claims are accepted/corroborated gains trust (slow).

Trust is easy to lose and hard to earn. Watch a Slack channel's reputation collapse after it pushes MD5 twice — live, in the dashboard and via GET /api/reputation.

Attack Demo

	Vanilla Cognee	Mithril + Cognee
Poisoned inputs stored	All 3	0
Provenance tracked	No	Yes
Contradiction detected	No	Yes
Source reputation adapts	No	Yes
Explainable decisions	No	Yes
Answer to "hash passwords?"	May return MD5	Argon2id

Architecture

Incoming Claim  (MCP tool · Slack export · file · API · dashboard)
     │
     ▼
Adaptive Source Reputation (self-adjusting, SQLite-backed)
     │
     ▼
Contradiction Detection (cognee.recall, only_context=True)
     │
     ▼
Trust Score (weighted + normalized — see master plan Section 4)
     │
     ▼
Admission Gate (Accept / Warn / Review / Quarantine / Reject)
     │
     ├── ACCEPT / WARN → cognee.remember(node_set=["verified"])
     ├── QUARANTINE / REVIEW / REJECT → SQLite quarantine store
     ├── Source reputation updated from the outcome
     └── All → Audit log

Cognee APIs Used

• cognee.remember() — verified memories with NodeSet tagging
• cognee.recall(only_context=True) — contradiction detection
• cognee.recall(node_name=["verified"]) — scoped verified retrieval
• cognee.improve() — graph enrichment on verified dataset
• cognee.forget() — demo reset
• cognee.visualize_graph() — knowledge graph HTML export

Quickstart

Install from PyPI once published:

pip install mithril-cognee

Local development from this repo:

uv venv && .venv\Scripts\activate
uv pip install -e ".[dev]"
copy .env.example .env   # add LLM_API_KEY

make test    # unit tests
make demo    # full attack demo (terminal)
make ingest  # ingest a real Slack export through the gate
make benchmark  # labeled memory-poisoning benchmark → metrics + results.json
make mcp     # run Mithril as an MCP server (stdio)
make api     # FastAPI backend → http://localhost:8000
make ui-install && make ui   # landing → http://localhost:3001 · dashboard → /dashboard
make dev     # start API + UI together

Installed commands:

mithril-mcp       # local MCP server over stdio
mithril-mcp-http  # remote MCP server over Streamable HTTP at /mcp
mithril-api       # FastAPI backend

Use Mithril from Claude Desktop (MCP)

Add to claude_desktop_config.json, then restart Claude Desktop:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mithril": {
      "command": "mithril-mcp"
    }
  }
}

The agent then gets mithril_remember, mithril_recall, mithril_quarantine_list, and mithril_source_reputation — every memory write is gated, every recall is verified-only.

Free deployment notes

For the public dashboard, deploy ui/ to Vercel and set:

NEXT_PUBLIC_BACKEND_URL=https://your-render-api.onrender.com

For the API on Render Free:

pip install -e .
mithril-api

For a demo remote MCP server on Render Free:

pip install -e .
FASTMCP_HOST=0.0.0.0 FASTMCP_PORT=$PORT mithril-mcp-http

The remote MCP endpoint will be:

https://your-render-service.onrender.com/mcp

Free Render services can sleep and do not keep local SQLite files permanently, so use local MCP for real editor usage unless you add hosted storage and auth.

Benchmark — does it actually stop poisoning?

Mithril ships with a labeled memory-poisoning benchmark (benchmark/) that measures it like a security control, not a demo.

Threat model: a company runs AI agents over a shared Cognee knowledge base. Claims arrive from authoritative channels (Security Policy, HR System, GitHub) and risky ones (Slack, customer support, external email, public web, other agents). Attackers try to poison shared memory.

The harness seeds verified company memory (ground_truth.jsonl), then replays a labeled suite (attack_suite.jsonl, ~30 cases) through the same Mithril.remember() gate and scores every decision into a confusion matrix:

make benchmark      # requires LLM_API_KEY + Cognee (like the demos)

Attack taxonomy covered: direct contradiction · subtle misinformation · authority spoofing · prompt injection · data exfiltration · policy evasion · social engineering · low-trust unverified. Plus hard legitimate cases (verified policy updates, benign low-trust facts) to measure false positives honestly.

Metric	Meaning
Detection rate	share of attacks blocked (kept out of memory)
Poison-leak rate	attacks that reached verified memory — the number to drive to 0
False-positive rate	legitimate updates wrongly blocked (friction)
Precision / accuracy	standard classifier metrics

Results print per-category and per-source and are written to benchmark/results.json. The math is unit-tested (tests/test_benchmark.py) so the numbers are reproducible from the labeled data even though the LLM contradiction step has run-to-run variance.

Why the categories matter: authority spoofing (a claim that fakes a high-trust source but contradicts policy) is caught by the contradiction layer, not source reputation — proof that the trust signals are independent and complementary, not just a source lookup.

Usage

from mithril import Mithril

firewall = Mithril()
await firewall.setup()

result = await firewall.remember(
    text="Always hash passwords using MD5",
    source="Slack",
)
# result.status → quarantine or reject
# result.trust_breakdown.final_score → normalized 0–1
# result.trust_breakdown.reasons → explainable breakdown

answer = await firewall.recall("How should we hash passwords?")

API Endpoints

Method	Path	Description
GET	/api/audit	Full audit log
GET	/api/quarantine	Quarantined memories
GET	/api/reputation	Live adaptive source reputation (with deltas)
GET	/api/stats	Aggregate metrics
POST	/api/remember	Submit claim through Mithril
POST	/api/recall	Query verified memory
POST	/api/reset	Clear Cognee + local stores
GET	/api/config	Sources, weights, thresholds

Trust Score Formula

Per master plan — weighted components, then normalized to 0–1:

raw = source_rep×0.40 + corroboration×0.30 + freshness×0.10 − contradiction×0.40
final_score = raw / max_theoretical_score

Admission thresholds: Accept ≥ 0.85 · Warn ≥ 0.60 · Review ≥ 0.40 · Quarantine ≥ 0.20

Project Layout

mithril/          Core package (scorer, gate, firewall, reputation, ingest, audit, quarantine)
mcp_server/       MCP server — exposes Mithril tools to agents
benchmark/        Labeled memory-poisoning benchmark (ground truth, attack suite, metrics)
api/              FastAPI backend
demo/             Attack demo, vanilla comparison, Slack-export ingestion demo
tests/            Unit + integration tests
memory-firewall-master-plan.md   Full hackathon build plan