mlx-guard
External runtime safety supervision for MLX workloads on Apple Silicon.
A runaway MLX run does not fail politely. Unified memory lets one training or generation process
push the whole machine into a paging storm, and a limit set inside the process shares the fate of
the process it is supposed to stop. mlx-guard supervises from outside: a small native parent
launches your command, samples the OS-accounted memory footprint of the process group it owns,
optionally requests a cooperative checkpoint, escalates TERM and KILL against an explicit limit you
chose, and writes a crash-resilient JSON report of what happened. The enforcement loop never runs
inside Python or the MLX process.
Version 0.2 is an alpha release. The stability table says which surfaces may still change before 1.0.
Installation
pip install mlx-guard
The CLI also works without a Python project: uvx mlx-guard … runs it on demand, and
pipx install mlx-guard keeps it on your PATH.
Wheels are built for Apple Silicon with Python 3.10 through 3.14 and contain the precompiled
supervisor, so installing needs no Rust toolchain. Their macosx_11_0_arm64 tag is the build's
deployment target, not a runtime claim: the hardware and macOS builds with measured evidence are
in the compatibility matrix.
Building from source needs Rust 1.93 and maturin.
Quick start
Every run writes a report into an existing owner-only directory. Create one once:
mkdir -m 700 reports
Measure before enforcing. Observe mode samples footprint and never intervenes:
mlx-guard observe --report reports/observe-1.json -- python train.py --epochs 1
Choose a limit from the observed peaks plus workload-specific headroom, not from total machine memory; enforcement authorizes about 10 % above the number you set (the emergency KILL band), so the ceiling is a little higher than the limit itself. The calibration guide explains the procedure. Then enforce it:
mlx-guard run --max-footprint 24GiB --wall-time 2h \
--report reports/train.json -- python train.py --epochs 10
When no intervention occurs the exit code is the child's own. A policy intervention exits 75, and
the typed report distinguishes the outcomes. Use a unique report name for each run: the owner-only
journal is retained as recovery evidence and must be archived or removed deliberately before a
report path is reused.
The same run from Python:
from pathlib import Path
import mlx_guard
result = mlx_guard.run(
mlx_guard.RunConfig(
command=("python", "train.py"),
report=Path("reports/train.json"),
max_footprint_bytes=24 * 1024**3,
wall_time_ms=2 * 60 * 60 * 1000,
)
)
print(result.returncode, result.report.outcome.kind)
Commands are literal argument tuples and never pass through a shell. The
Python API guide covers
incremental runs, cancellation, output capture, and the dependency-free CheckpointWorker helper
that lets a worker save state when the supervisor asks.
Safety boundary
The control domain is the process group created for one trusted same-user command. Sampling is
periodic, tree totals are not atomic, and a descendant can leave the group. mlx-guard reduces risk;
it cannot promise a hard memory boundary, immediate Metal-driver reclamation, or protection during a
kernel or system-wide failure. It never chooses a destructive limit automatically. One kernel
failure has a name: the IOGPU driver bug that panics macOS 26.4 and later under Metal workloads
(unfixed as of late August 2026), which can fire with the process footprint well inside any limit
and which no external supervisor can reach; the
compatibility matrix carries
its signature.
An interactive terminal on standard input and shell job control are outside the supported scope, along with sandboxed execution and Mac App Store distribution. Direct CLI and Python-wheel distribution are the target.
MetalGuard and mlx-guard
Both projects exist because a runaway MLX process can take the whole Mac down. They defend different rings.
| MetalGuard | mlx-guard | |
|---|---|---|
| Where it runs | Inside your Python process, around MLX code you write | Outside, as a separate native parent of any command |
| What it measures | mx.metal.get_active_memory(), with vm_stat system totals as fallback |
OS-accounted phys_footprint of the owned process group |
| What it needs from you | Import it and route MLX work through its runner and gates | Nothing inside the workload: a command line and a byte limit |
| When things go wrong | Load and unload checks, allocator-aware recovery, crash-burst and kernel-panic cooldowns, panic postmortems, a registry of known-panic models | An optional cooperative checkpoint request, then TERM and KILL against the explicit limit, plus a redacted JSON report |
| Fits | MLX apps that want recovery without a supervisor process | Trainers, servers, benches, shell scripts, anything you can launch |
Running both is reasonable: MetalGuard keeps the workload healthy from the inside, and mlx-guard is the outer ring for the case where the process itself can no longer be trusted (a limit set inside a process shares that process's fate). An outside, OS-accounted number also cross-checks the in-process counters, which MetalGuard's maintainer notes may not see every allocation. He reviewed this boundary and called the projects complementary, with no overlapping code (metal-guard #7).
Documentation
Start with the examples. Each contract below defines one subsystem.
| Guide | Defines |
|---|---|
| CLI contract | Unit grammar, exit codes, signal rules, the noninteractive terminal boundary |
| Policy contract | Thresholds, measurement quality, checkpoint evidence, escalation timelines |
| Reports and privacy | Schema v1 and default redaction |
| Process control | The owned group, direct exec, signal targets |
| Identity and containment | PID reuse, descendant discovery, escape evidence, cleanup limits |
| Footprint sampling | Measurement windows, freshness, partial results, sleep/wake behavior |
| Observe and calibration | Advisory system metrics, pre-launch warnings, choosing a limit |
| Checkpoint protocol | FD-only readiness, nonce-bound frames, deadlines, redacted acknowledgements |
| Intervention execution | Action targets, policy-owned deadlines, typed failures, post-action observation |
| Python API | Typed configuration, incremental runs, cancellation, report loading, worker checkpoints |
| Python packaging | Wheel support, native-binary discovery, editable installs, sdist policy |
| Wrap a command | Supervising a command-line workload with no adapter, from bare to a forced intervention |
| Python adapter pattern | Supervising a workload your own library launches, with a cooperative checkpoint and a resume key |
| mlx-train-perf integration | Optional external supervision for its runner, keeping the direct-launch fallback |
| Stability | What may still change before 1.0, how, and what freezes |
| Support matrix | Supported platforms and release boundaries |
| Compatibility matrix | Which hardware setups have measured evidence, which are untested, and how to fill a cell |
| Threat model | Trust boundaries and supported failures |
| Security policy | Vulnerability reporting |
| M1 Max 32 GB evidence | Raw 0.2 accuracy, timing, endurance, lifecycle, false-intervention, and escalation-envelope measurements |
Research notes
Two write-ups cover the reasoning behind this design in more depth than a README can, including
the limits the tool cannot clear. They are published at ineshin.space
alongside the rest of my Apple Silicon work, and the source Markdown lives under docs/papers/.
- Why the memory limit must live outside the process — why an in-process cap or watchdog shares the fate of the process it guards, why the counter a workload reads is not the charge the OS applies, what macOS gives a supervisor in place of cgroups, and what external supervision still cannot promise, with the measured overhead and gaps from the committed v0.1 evidence.
- Measuring a macOS process tree honestly — the measurement half of the same argument: which OS signal a supervisor can act on, why a PID is not an identity, why tree discovery is a race the tool can only record, the rule that keeps a partial aggregate from triggering a limit, and the observations in the v0.1 evidence that support less than they appear to, including the pages a released Metal buffer does not give back within the window watched.
Development
Rust 1.93 is pinned in rust-toolchain.toml. The workspace contains the native supervisor, the core
platform and policy library, and hard-bounded real-process fixtures. Full local verification needs
cargo-audit; artifact and Metal scripts use the baseline macOS command-line tools. The release
workflow installs its locked cargo-audit version.
./scripts/test-fast.sh # formatting, Clippy, and all Rust tests
./scripts/test-full.sh # fast suite plus RustSec and dependency policy
./scripts/test-metal-fixture.sh # 4 KiB Metal worker on macOS
./scripts/test-wheel.sh # macOS arm64 wheel across Python 3.10 through 3.14
./scripts/build-release.sh dist # wheel, sdist, SBOM, and SHA-256 manifest
The main suite runs on macOS and Linux. The Metal test compiles Objective-C with warnings denied and uses a 4 KiB shared buffer for no more than five seconds. Synthetic allocation fixtures reject more than 128 MiB or ten seconds before doing work. The Metal fixture also arms a six-second process alarm so device setup or a wedged command wait cannot hang the test indefinitely.
Release changes are recorded in the changelog.
Related projects
More MLX tooling for Apple Silicon by the same author:
- mlx-train-perf — fused, logit-free linear-cross-entropy loss, RAM-fit planner, and benchmark harness for MLX fine-tuning; the first integration target for external supervision (guide above).
- mlx-model-doctor — validate an MLX / Hugging Face model repository before you load it.
- mlx-quant-fidelity — measure what quantization costs: KL divergence, perplexity, and top-token agreement for KV cache and weights.
- mlx-teacache — TeaCache step-skipping for FLUX, Qwen-Image, and Z-Image diffusion in pure MLX.
- mlx-taef — tiny autoencoders (TAESD family) for live previews and low-memory latent decode for FLUX and SD models.
Independent community project; not affiliated with or endorsed by Apple.
Licence
Apache License 2.0. The licence permits commercial use without royalties or mandatory payment. Commercial opportunities, if the project earns adoption, are support, integration, hosted observability, and enterprise services around the open-source core. Bundled dependency terms are listed in THIRD_PARTY_LICENSES.md.
Release files for mlx-guard 0.2.0
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| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| mlx_guard-0.2.0-py3-none-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl | Python 3 | none | macOS 11.0+ ARM64 | Details |
Release files / mlx_guard-0.2.0-py3-none-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl
| Download URL | mlx_guard-0.2.0-py3-none-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 706.5 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 macOS 11.0+ ARM64 |
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