nashopt 1.1.2

NashOpt - A Python Library for Computing Generalized Nash Equilibria and Solving Game-Design and Game-Theoretic Control Problems.

NashOpt

A Python library for computing generalized Nash equilibria and solving game-design and game-theoretic control problems

This repository includes a library for solving different classes of nonlinear Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs). The decision variables and Lagrange multipliers that jointly satisfy the KKT conditions for all agents are determined by solving a nonlinear least-squares problem. If a zero residual is obtained, this corresponds to a potential generalized Nash equilibrium, a property that can be verified by evaluating the individual best responses. For the special case of Linear-Quadratic Games, one or more equilibria are obtained by solving mixed-integer linear programming problems. The package can also solve game-design problems by optimizing the parameters of a multiparametric GNEP by box-constrained nonlinear optimization, as well as game-theoretic control problems, such as Linear Quadratic Regulation and Model Predictive Control problems.

For more details about the mathematical formulations implemented in the library, see the arXiv preprint 2512.23636.

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Installation

pip install nashopt

Overview

Consider a game with $N$ agents. Each agent $i$ solves the following problem

$$ x_i^\star \in \arg\min_{x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}} f_i(x) $$

subject to the following shared and local constraints

$$ g(x) \leq 0, \qquad A_{\textrm eq}x = b_{\textrm eq}, \qquad h(x)=0, \qquad \ell_i \leq x_i \leq u_i $$

where:

• $f_i$ is the objective of agent $i$, specified as a JAX function;
• $x = (x_1^\top \dots x_N^\top)^\top \in \mathbb{R}^n$ are the decision variables, $x_i\in\mathbb{R}^{n_i}$;
• $g : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^{n_g}$ encodes shared inequality constraints (JAX function);
• $A_{\textrm eq}, b_{\textrm eq}$ define linear shared equality constraints;
• $h : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^{n_h}$ encodes shared nonlinear equality constraints (JAX function);
• $\ell, u$ are local box constraints.

A generalized Nash equilibrium $x^\star$ is a vector such that no agent can reduce their cost given the others' strategies and feasibility constraints, i.e.,

$$f_i(x^\star_{i}, x^\star_{-i})\leq f_i(x_i, x^\star_{-i})$$

for all feasible $x=(x_i,x_{-i}^\star)$, or equivalently, in terms of best responses:

$$ \begin{aligned} x_i^\star \in \arg\min_{\ell_{i}\leq x_{i}\leq u_{i}} &f_i(x)\ \textrm{s.t.} \quad &g(x) \leq 0 \ &A_{\textrm eq}x = b_{\textrm eq}\ &h(x) = 0\ &x_{-i}=x_{-i}^\star. \end{aligned} $$

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KKT Conditions

For each agent $i$, the necessary KKT conditions are:

1. Stationarity

$$ \nabla_{x_i} f_i(x) + \nabla_{x_i} g(x)^\top \lambda_i + [A_i^\top\ \nabla_{x_i} h(x)^\top] \mu_i - v_i + y_i = 0 $$

2. Primal Feasibility

$$ g(x) \leq 0, \qquad Ax = b, \qquad h(x) = 0, \qquad \ell \le x \le u $$

3. Dual Feasibility

$$ \lambda_i \ge 0, \qquad v_i\geq 0, \qquad y_i\geq 0 $$

4. Complementary Slackness

$$ \lambda_{i,j} , g_j(x) = 0 $$

$$ v_{i,k} , (x_{i,k} - \ell_{i,k}) = 0 $$

$$ y_{i,k} , (u_{i,k} - x_{i,k}) = 0 $$

For general nonlinear problems, in nashopt primal feasibility (with respect to inequalities), dual feasibility, and complementary slackness conditions, which can be summarized as complementarity pairs $0\leq a\perp b\geq 0$, are enforced by using the nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) Fischer–Burmeister function [1]

$$ \phi(a, b) = \sqrt{a^2 + b^2} - a - b $$

which has the property

$$ \phi(a,b) = 0 ;\Longleftrightarrow; a \ge 0,; b \ge 0,; ab = 0. $$

Therefore, the above KKT conditions can be rewritten as the nonlinear system of equalities

$$R(z)=0$$

where $z = (x, {\lambda_i}, {\mu_i}, {v_i}, {y_i})$. To find a solution, we solve the nonlinear least-squares problem

$$ \min_z \frac{1}{2}|R(z)|_2^2 $$

using scipy's nonlinear least squares methods in least_squares, exploiting JAX's automatic differentiation capabilities.

After solving the nonlinear least-squares problem, if the residual $R(z^\star)=0$, we can check if indeed $x^\star$ is a GNE by computing the best responses of each agent

$$ \min_{\ell_i\leq x_i\leq u_i} f_i(x_i, x^\star_{-i}) $$

$$ \textrm{s.t.} \qquad g_i(x), \qquad Ax=b, \qquad h(x)=0$$

In nashopt, the best response of agent $i$ is computed by solving the following box-constrained nonlinear programming problem with scipy's L-BFGS-B method via the jaxopt interface:

$$ \min_{x_i} f_i(x_i, x_{-i}) + \rho \left(\left(\sum_j \max(g_i(x), 0)^2\right) + |A x - b|_2^2 + |h(x)|_2^2\right) $$

$$ \textrm{s.t.} \qquad \ell_i \leq x_i \leq u_i$$

with $x_{-i}=x^\star_{-i}$, where $\rho\gg 1$ is a large penalty on the violation of shared constraints.

Variational GNEs can be obtained by making the Lagrange multipliers associated with the shared constraints the same for all players, i.e., by replacing ${\lambda_i}$ with a single vector $\lambda$ and ${\mu_i}$ with a single vector $\mu$, which further reduces the dimension of the zero-finding problem.

Example

We want to solve a simple GNEP with 3 agents, $x_1\in\mathbb{R}^2$, $x_2\in\mathbb{R}$, $x_3\in\mathbb{R}$, defined as follows:

import numpy as np
import jax
import jax.numpy as jnp
from nashopt import GNEP

sizes = [2, 1, 1]      # [n1, n2, n3]

# Agent 1 objective:
@jax.jit
def f1(x):
    return jnp.sum((x[0:2] - jnp.array([1.0, -0.5]))**2)

# Agent 2 objective:
@jax.jit
def f2(x):
    return (x[2] + 0.3)**2

# Agent 3 objective:
@jax.jit
def f3(x):
    return (x[3] - 0.5*(x[0] + x[2]))**2

# Shared constraint:
def g(x): 
    return jnp.array([x[3] + x[0] + x[2] - 2.0])

lb=np.zeros(4) # lower bounds
ub=np.ones(4) # upper bounds

gnep = GNEP(sizes, f=[f1,f2,f3], g=g, ng=1, lb=lb, ub=ub)

We call solve() to solve the problem defined above:

sol = gnep.solve()
x_star = sol.x

which gives the following solution:

x* = [ 1.  0.  0.   0.5]

We can check if the KKT conditions are satisfied by looking at the residual norm $||R(x)||_2$:

residual = sol.res
print(np.linalg.norm(residual))

1.223145e-16

We can also inspect the vector of Lagrange multipliers and other statistics about the solution process:

lam_star = sol.lam
stats = sol.stats

After solving the problem, we can check if indeed $x^\star$ is an equilibrium by evaluating the agents' individual best responses:

for i in range(gnep.N):
    sol = gnep.best_response(i, x_star)
    print(sol.x)

[ 1.   0.  -0.   0.5]
[ 1.  -0.   0.   0.5]
[ 1.  -0.  -0.   0.5]

or by calling

gnep.check_equilibrium(x_star)

to have a report of best-response and value function deviations.

To add linear equality constraints, use the following:

Aeq = np.array([[1,1,1,1]])
beq = np.array([2.0])

gnep = GNEP(sizes, f=[f1,f2,f3], g=g, ng=1, lb=lb, ub=ub, Aeq=Aeq, beq=beq)

while for general nonlinear equality constraints:

gnep = GNEP(sizes, f=[f1,f2,f3], g=g, ng=1, lb=lb, ub=ub, h=h, nh=nh)

where h is a vector function returning a jax array of length nh.

You can also specify an initial guess $x_0$ to the GNEP solver as follows:

sol = gnep.solve(x0)

To compute a variational GNE solution, set flag variational = True:

gnep = GNEP( ... , variational=True)

To decide the nonlinear least-squares solver used to compute the GNEP, use the following call:

sol = gnep.solve(x0, solver = "trf")

or

sol = gnep.solve(x0, solver = "lm")

where trf calls a trust-region reflective algorithm, while lm a Levenberg-Marquardt method.

Game Design

By leveraging the above characterization of GNEs, we consider the multiparametric Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (mpGNEP) with $N$ agents, in which each agent $i$ solves:

$$ \begin{aligned} \min_{x_i} \quad & f_i(x,p)\ \textrm{s.t.} \quad & g(x,p) \leq 0\ & A_{\textrm{eq}} x = b_{\textrm{eq}} + S_{\textrm{eq}} p\ & h(x,p) = 0\ & \ell \leq x \leq u \end{aligned} $$

where $p\in\mathbb{R}^{n_p}$ is a vector of parameters defining the game. Our goal is to design the game-parameter vector $p$ to achieve a desired GNE, according to the following nested optimization problem:

$$ \begin{aligned} \min_{x^\star,p}\quad & J(x^\star,p) \ \text{s.t.} \quad & x_i^\star\in\arg\min_{x_i \in \mathbb{R}^{n_i}}\quad && f_i(x,p)\ &\text{s.t. } \quad && g(x,p) \leq 0\ &&&Ax = b+Sp\ &&&h(x,p) = 0\ &&&\ell \leq x\leq u\ &&&x_{-i} = x_{-i}^\star,\qquad i = 1, \ldots, N \end{aligned} $$

where $J$ is the objective function of the designer used to shape the resulting GNE. For example, given an observed agents' equilibrium $x_{\textrm des}$, we can solve the inverse-game theoretical problem of finding a vector $p$ (if one exists) such that $x^\star\approx x_{\textrm des}$, by setting

$$J(x^\star,p)=|x^\star-x_{\rm des}|_2^2.$$

We solve the game-design problem as

$$ \begin{aligned} \min_{z,p}\quad & J(x,p) + \frac{\rho}{2}|R(z,p)|_2^2\ \text{s.t. }\quad & \ell_p\leq p\leq u_p \end{aligned} $$

via L-BFGS-B, where $R(z,p)$ is the parametric version of the KKT residual defined above and $\ell_p$, $u_p$ define the range of admissible $p$, $\ell_{pj}\in\mathbb{R}\cup {-\infty}$, $u_{pj}\in\mathbb{R}\cup {+\infty}$, $j=1,\ldots,n_p$.

Smooth and nonsmooth regularization terms $\alpha_1|x|_1 + \alpha_2|x|_2^2$ can be explicitly added to $J(x,p)$.

Example

To solve a game-design problem with objective $J$, use the following structure:

from nashopt import ParametricGNEP

pgnep = ParametricGNEP(sizes, npar=2, f=f, g=g, ng=1, lb=lb, ub=ub, Aeq=Aeq, beq=beq, h=h, nh=nh, Seq=Seq)

sol = pgnep.solve(J, pmin, pmax)

where now the functions listed in f, g, h, and J take $x$ and $p$ as input arguments, and pmin, pmax define the admissible range of the parameter-vector $p$ (infinite bounds are allowed).

Regularization terms

$$ \alpha_1|x|_1 + \alpha_2|x|_2^2 $$

where $\alpha_1,\alpha_2\geq 0$ can be added on the cost function $J$ as follows:

sol = pgnep.solve(J, pmin, pmax, alpha1=alpha1, alpha2=alpha2)

You can specify two further flags: gne_warm_start, to warm-start the optimization by computing first a GNE, and refine_gne, to try getting a GNE after solving the problem by refining the solution $x$ for the optimal parameter $p$ found.

Linear-Quadratic Games

When the agents' cost functions are quadratic and convex with respect to $x_i$ and all the constraints are linear, i.e.,

$$ \begin{array}{rrl} \min_{p, x^\star} \quad & J(x^\star,p)\ \text{s.t. } & x^\star_i\in \arg\min_{x_i} &f_i(x,p)=\frac{1}{2} x^\top Q^i x + (c^i + F^i p)^\top x \ & \text{s.t. } & A x \leq b + S p\ &&A_{\mathrm{eq}} x = b_{\mathrm{eq}} + S_{\mathrm{eq}} p \ &&\ell_i \leq x \leq u_i\ &&x_{-i} = x^\star_{-i}\ && i=1,\dots,N \end{array} $$

the equilibrium conditions can be expressed as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) using a "big-M" approach. nashopt support both the open-source solver HiGHS and Gurobi to solve the MILP.

To solve a single LQ game with $N$ agents, minimizing $\frac{1}{2}x'Q[i]x+c[i]'x$ under the shared constraints $Ax\leq b$ and local constraints $lb\leq x\leq ub$, use:

from nashopt import GNEP_LQ

gnep = GNEP_LQ(sizes, Q, c, lb=lb, ub=ub, A=A, b=b, M=1e4, solver='highs')
sol = gnep.solve()
x = sol.x

To get a variational GNE, add the flag variational=True when defining the game via GNEP_LQ, which forces equal Lagrange multipliers associated with shared constraints for all agents.

For defining parametric LQ games, add the related input arguments (F, S, pmin, pmax):

from nashopt import GNEP_LQ

gnep = GNEP_LQ(sizes, Q, c, F, lb=lb, ub=ub, pmin=pmin,
               pmax=pmax, A=A, b=b, S=S, M=1e4, variational=variational, solver='highs')
sol = gnep.solve()
x = sol.x

In the case pmin=pmax, this corresponds to a single LQ-GNE with linear costs c[i] + F[i] @ pmin and right-hand-side b + S @ pmin of the shared constraints.

We can also extract multiple solutions, if any exist, that correspond to different combinations of active constraints at optimality. For example, to get a list of the first 10 solutions:

sol = gnep.solve(max_solutions=10)

In addition, a game objective $J$ can be given as the (sum of) convex piecewise affine function(s)

$$ J(x,p) = \sum_{j=1}^{n_J}\max_{k=1,\dots,n_j} D^{PWA}{jk} x + E^{PWA}{jk} p + h^{PWA}_{jk} $$

    gnep_lq = GNEP_LQ(sizes, ... D_pwa=D_pwa, E_pwa=E_pwa, h_pwa=h_pwa, ...)

and the optimal parameters $p$ are also determined by MILP, or as the convex quadratic function

$$ f(x,p) = \frac{1}{2} [x^T\ p^T] Q_J \begin{bmatrix}x \ p\end{bmatrix} + c_J^T \begin{bmatrix}x \ p\end{bmatrix} $$

    gnep_lq = GNEP_LQ(sizes, ... Q_J=Q_J, c_J=c_J, ...)

or the sum of both, where in this case the optimal parameters $p$ are determined by MIQP (only Gurobi supported).

For the special case of variational GNEs and fixed parameter $p$, by treating the vector of slack variables for the shared and local inequality constraints appearing in the game as a further player, the problem can be also solved by the proximal ADMM method of [2] by passing the argument solver='prox-admm'.

[2] E. Börgens and C. Kanzow, "ADMM-type methods for generalized Nash equilibrium problems in Hilbert spaces," SIAM Journal on Optimization, vol. 31, n.1, pp. 377-403, 2021.

Game-Theoretic Control

We consider non-cooperative multi-agent control problems where each agent only controls a subset of the input vector $u$ of a discrete-time linear dynamical system

$$ \begin{aligned} x(t+1) &= A x(t) + B u(t)\ y(t) &= C x(t) \end{aligned} $$

where $u(t)$ stacks the agents' decision vectors $u_1(t),\ldots,u_N(t)$.

Game-Theoretic LQR

For solving non-cooperative linear quadratic regulation (LQR) games, you can use the NashLQR class:

from nashopt import NashLQR

nash_lqr = NashLQR(sizes, A, B, Q, R, dare_iters=50)
sol = nash_lqr.solve()
sol.K_Nash=K_Nash

where sizes contains the input sizes $[n_1,\ldots,n_N]$, $Q=[Q_1,\ldots,Q_N]$ are the full-state weight matrices, and $R=[R_1,\ldots,R_N]$ the input weight matrices used by agent $i$ to weight $u_i$. The number dare_iters is the number of fixed-point iterations used to find an approximate solution of the discrete algebraic Riccati equation for each agent given the other agents' gains.

You can retrieve extra information after solving the Nash equilibrium problem, such as the KKT residual sol.residual, useful to verify whether an equilibrium was found, the centralized LQR gain sol.K_centralized (for comparison), and other statistics sol.stats=stats.

By default, the Nash equilibrium is found by letting agent $i$ minimize the difference between $K_i$ and the LQR gain for the dynamics $(A -B_{-i}K_{-i}, B_i)$.

By calling instead

nash_lqr = NashLQR(sizes, A, B, Q, R, dare_iters=50)
sol = nash_lqr.solve(method='riccati', riccati_iters=100, stop_tol=1e-5)

with method='riccati', the coupled discrete-time algebraic Riccati equations is solved instead by using riccati_iters Riccati-based iterations (best responses) as described in [3, Section III.B], until convergence within stop_tol.

[3] B. Nortman, A. Monti, M. Sassano, T. Mylvaganam, "Nash Equilibria for Linear Quadratic Discrete-Time Dynamic Games via Iterative and Data-Driven Algorithms," IEEE Trans. Autom. Contr., vol. 69, no. 10, October 2024.

Game-Theoretic Model Predictive Control

We now want to make the output vector $y(t)$ of the system track a given setpoint $r(t)$. Each agent optimizes a sequence of input increments $\Delta u_{i,k}$, $k=0,\ldots,T-1$, over a prediction horizon of $T$ steps, where $\Delta u_k=u_k-u_{k-1}$, by minimizing

$$ q_{\epsilon,i}^\top \epsilon_i + \sum_{k=0}^{T-1} (y_{k+1}-r(t))^\top Q_{y,i} (y_{k+1}-r(t)) + \Delta u_{i,k}^\top Q_{\Delta u,i}\Delta u_{i,k} $$

$$ \begin{array}{rll} \text{s.t. } & x_{k+1} = A x_k + B u_k& y_{k+1} = C x_{k+1}\ & u_{k,i} = u_{k-1,i} + \Delta u_{k,i}& u_{-1} = u(t-1)\ &\Delta u_{\rm min} \leq \Delta u_k \leq \Delta u_{\rm max} & u_{\rm min} \leq u_k \leq u_{\rm max}\ & y_{\min} - \sum_{i=1}^N \epsilon_i \leq y_{k+1} \leq y_{\max} + \sum_{i=1}^N \epsilon_i& \epsilon_i \geq 0\ & i=1,\ldots,N,\ k=0,\ldots,T-1. \end{array} $$

where $Q_{y,i}\succeq 0$, $Q_{\Delta u,i}\succeq 0$ and $\epsilon_i\geq 0$ is a slack variable used to soften shared output constraints (with linear penalty $q_{\epsilon,i}\geq 0$). Each agent's MPC problem can be simplified by imposing the constraints only on a shorter constraint horizon of $T_c<T$ steps.

You can use the NashLinearMPC class to define the game-theoretic MPC problem:

from nashopt import NashLinearMPC

nash_mpc = NashLinearMPC(sizes, A, B, C, Qy, Qdu, T, ymin=ymin, ymax=ymax, umin=umin, umax=umax, dumin=dumin, dumax=dumax, Qeps=Qeps, Tc=Tc)

and then evaluate the GNE control move u = $u(t)$ at each step $t$:

sol = nash_mpc.solve(x, u1, r)
u = sol.u

where r = $r(t)$ is the current output reference signal, x = $x(t)$ the current state, and u1 = $u(t-1)$ the previous input.

To compute a variational GNE solution, use

sol = nash_mpc.solve(x, u1, r, variational=True)
u = sol.u

For comparison, you can compute instead the centralized MPC move, where the cost function is the sum of all agents' costs, via standard quadratic programming:

sol = nash_mpc.solve(x, u1, r, centralized=True)
u = sol.u

To specify the MILP solver to use to compute the game-theoretic MPC law, use the following:

sol = nash_mpc.solve(x0, u1, ref, ..., solver='highs')

or

sol = nash_mpc.solve(x0, u1, ref, ..., solver='gurobi')

Additional hard linear shared constraint of the form

$$A_{cx} x(t)+A_{cu} u(t) + A_{cdu} \Delta u(t)\leq b_c$$

can be imposed at the initial prediction step $k=0$ at each time $t$ as follows:

nash_mpc = NashLinearMPC(..., Acx = Acx, Acu = Acu, Acdu = Acdu, bc = bc)

The right-hand-side $b_c$ of the constraint can be updated at run time when calling the solver:

sol = nash_mpc.solve(..., bc = bc)

References

[1] Alexander Fischer. A special Newton-type optimization method. Optimization, 24(3–4):269–284, 1992.

Citation

@article{NashOpt,
    author={A. Bemporad},
    title={{NashOpt}: A {Python} Library for Computing Generalized {Nash} Equilibria and Game Design},
    journal = {arXiv preprint 2512.23636},
    note = {\url{https://github.com/bemporad/nashopt}},
    year=2025
}

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Related packages

nash-mpqp a solver for solving linear-quadratic multi-parametric generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in explicit form.

gnep-learn a Python package for solving generalized Nash equilibrium problems by active learning of best-response models.

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License

Apache 2.0

(C) 2025 A. Bemporad

Acknowledgement

This work was funded by the European Union (ERC Advanced Research Grant COMPACT, No. 101141351). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.