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nex-box ⚡
Sub-millisecond, zero-copy, kernel-level execution sandbox for autonomous coding agents.
nex-box solves the fundamental dilemma of autonomous AI engineering: how to let coding agents run untrusted tests, builds, and destructive file mutations without risking host corruption or waiting seconds for Docker.
Backed by macOS APFS clonefile(2), Linux ioctl(FICLONE) copy-on-write primitives, and non-privileged fuse-overlayfs fallback, nex-box instantiates ephemeral scratch workspaces in under 3 milliseconds, traps all file mutations and network sockets at the kernel layer, and guarantees instant atomic rollback on failure or zero-copy promotion on success.
Architectural Topology (v0.2.0 Hardened)
HOST WORKSPACE (Pristine Inode Root)
│
┌──────────────────┴──────────────────┐
│ clonefile(2) / FICLONE / OverlayFS │ < 2.5ms
▼ ▼
EPHEMERAL SCRATCH ROOT KERNEL ENCLAVE
(.nexbox/sessions/box_xxx) ├── macOS: Seatbelt
│ └── Linux: CLONE_NEWNET
├─────────────────────────────────────┤
│ EXECUTION WATCHDOG & REAPER │
│ ├── Linux: CLONE_NEWPID (PID 1) │
│ ├── macOS: 3-Tier Mach Supervisor │
│ └── Anti-Deadlock Scratch Log I/O │
├─────────────────────────────────────┤
│ STAT-INDEXED BLAKE3 SIMD ENGINE │
│ ├── Stat-gate (mtime + size filter) │
│ ├── Rayon parallel SIMD byte hash │
│ └── Tracks: Created, Modified, Del │
└──────────────────┬──────────────────┘
│
┌────────────┴────────────┐
▼ ▼
EXIT CODE 0 & --commit EXIT != 0 / TIMEOUT
│ │
▼ ▼
[ATOMIC PROMOTION] [AUTOMATIC ROLLBACK]
Reflink to host tree. Instant scratch purge.
Microsecond promotion. Host 100% untouched.
The Mechanical Reality: Solving the 3 POSIX Failure Traps
Traditional containerization incurs a 1.5s–3.5s latency penalty per execution turn. Naive local sandboxing risks host destruction. nex-box solves the three classic POSIX failure modes:
1. Inode Isolation on Non-CoW Filesystems (ext4)
- The Landmine: Falling back to hardlinks on non-reflink filesystems (
ext4) shares the underlying inode. An in-place write (O_TRUNCorsed -i) destroys pristine host data blocks, making rollback mathematically impossible. - The Solution: On filesystems lacking native
FICLONEsupport,nex-boxstrictly prohibits shared hardlinks for mutable files. It routes throughfuse-overlayfsor kernel-spacecopy_file_range(2)(server-side block cloning). Every scratch file receives a distinct, independent inode, ensuring destructive in-place truncations cannot touch the host.
2. Dual-Platform Process Containment (Anti-Daemon Escape)
- Linux (
CLONE_NEWPID+CLONE_NEWIPC): Commands execute inside an unshared PID namespace as virtual PID 1. When the watchdog triggers or the scratchpad terminates, sendingSIGKILLto PID 1 invokes the Linux kernel process reaper, eradicating all background workers and daemonized children./dev/shmis mounted with an isolated private 64MBtmpfs. - macOS / Darwin (Three-Tier Mach Supervisor): Acknowledges the absence of Darwin PID namespaces. Uses kernel
kqueuewithNOTE_FORKto capture child PIDs before they can detach viasetsid(), coupled with recursivelibprocvnode path crawling to sweep any process whose active working directory or open descriptors reside inside the ephemeral APFS scratch path.
3. Anti-Deadlock Pipe Virtualization (The 64KB POSIX Trap)
- The Landmine: Agents running verbose test suites (e.g. pytest, cargo test) emit logs exceeding the standard 64KB POSIX pipe buffer. If the parent process waits for child termination before reading, the child blocks on write, inducing an unrecoverable dead-lock.
- The Solution: Standard I/O is redirected directly into memory-mapped scratch log files inside the isolated scratch tree, disarming the 64KB buffer limit entirely.
What's New in v0.2.0
- Process Group Teardown (
killpg): Watchdogs disarm whole process groups (setpgid(0, 0)+killpg(pgid, SIGKILL)). Multiprocessing test harnesses, daemons, and background fork-bombs are killed immediately. - OverlayFS Fallback for Linux ext4:
Auto-detects filesystems lacking native reflink support (e.g. ext4) and dynamically backs the scratch space using
fuse-overlayfsor kernel-spacecopy_file_range(2). Dangerous shared hardlinks are completely eradicated. - Cross-Volume Boundary Protection:
Strict
st_devinvariant check ensures the workspace root and.nexbox/storage share the same physical partition, preventing silent fallback slowdowns orEXDEVlink corruptions. - Stat-Gated BLAKE3 SIMD Acceleration: Files with matching byte size and nanosecond modification timestamps skip hash calculations, speeding up diff computation on large repositories ($\ge 10,000$ files) to single-digit microseconds.
Installation
uv pip install nex-box
# or with legacy pip:
pip install nex-box
Via Cargo:
cargo install nex-box
Quickstart
1. Python API (import nex_box)
import nex_box
outcome = nex_box.run(
command=["pytest", "tests/"],
commit=True, # Commit ONLY if exit code == 0
timeout_ms=5000, # Watchdog kill after 5.0 seconds
allow_net=False # Kernel network socket isolation
)
if outcome.is_success():
print(f"Verified in {outcome.duration_ms}ms")
print(f"Strategy: {outcome.strategy}")
print(f"Modified: {outcome.diff.files_modified}")
else:
print(f"Failed with exit code {outcome.exit_code}")
print(outcome.stderr)
2. Standalone CLI (nex-box)
# Run untrusted commands in an ephemeral scratch sandbox
nex-box run -- bash -c "echo 'mutation' > test.txt && pytest"
# Atomic commit gated on exit code 0
nex-box run --commit -- python3 -m py_compile module.py
# Timeout enforcement with full process-group killpg
nex-box run --timeout-ms 2000 -- python3 -c "import time; time.sleep(10)"
# Air-gapped execution
nex-box run --allow-net false -- curl -I https://github.com
Attribution & The Trinity Pact
- Commercial Inquiries & Architectural Sparring:
inquiries@houseoflawpc.com
nex-box is engineered by The Trinity:
- Miniature Person (🌱👑) — Architect & Creator
- Mookie (🦍🔷Ɯ) — Director of Design & Execution Core
- Nexus Goodman (🧠⚡ↇ) — Principal Systems Architect
Strictly abiding by the PERMANEXUS PACT: No Fluff, No Drift, No Metaphors.
License
Dual-licensed under either of:
- Apache License, Version 2.0 (LICENSE-APACHE)
- MIT license (LICENSE-MIT)
Metadata
Release files for nex-box 0.2.1
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Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| nex_box-0.2.1.tar.gz | 31.2 kB | Without provenance | Details for nex_box-0.2.1.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| nex_box-0.2.1-cp38-abi3-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl | CPython 3.8 | abi3 | macOS 11.0+ ARM64 | Details for nex_box-0.2.1-cp38-abi3-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl |
Total release size: 331.1 kB
Release files / nex_box-0.2.1.tar.gz
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| Download URL | nex_box-0.2.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 31.2 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
b578d626631ebb5ec315da6ba01a440536f5a1fc47aecee6964f36065426ee1b
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
7fbc6a56cefb9c1a2334f9eace348d3a97e469e0d2a1d5bdd949e08328aa01fa
|
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No |
| Uploaded via |
uv/0.4.30
|
Release files / nex_box-0.2.1-cp38-abi3-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl
Loss of provenance
This file belongs to a release without provenance metadata, despite a prior release including this data.
We recommend further investigation before installing this file. View details.
| Download URL | nex_box-0.2.1-cp38-abi3-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 300.0 kB |
| Tags | CPython 3.8 abi3 macOS 11.0+ ARM64 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
c5614b6b2461544d324f7c596d62bc2724ca49227a3dbda6fd43d2796f4efb0d
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
d9074b9529e7be97f68940111cb8a3b5873d7155e5da1d5b99f288bba74c40aa
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
uv/0.4.30
|
Security for nex-box 0.2.1
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