NomosGuard
LLM produces evidence. Deterministic machinery decides.
NomosGuard is a deterministic security reasoning core: an append-only evidence ledger, a rule engine that derives threat/access paths from that evidence, and a fail-closed policy gate. Language models may read events and write structured claims with cited evidence, and may later explain decisions in human language — but a model never crosses the decision boundary. Every claim without reproducible evidence is discarded; every decision is hash-chained; the gate defaults to deny.
The name: nomos (νόμος) — Greek for rational law, order derived from reason rather than brute force (physis) — plus guard, the fail-closed gate that enforces it. Together: reasoning that decides, evidence that must prove itself.
Why deterministic core + probabilistic edge
A language model's confidence is not evidence — it is an assertion. This project treats it as such:
- The LLM edge (top): reads raw events, configuration, CVE records, logs; emits structured claims (entities, relations, vulnerabilities, tool calls), each citing the exact evidence fragment (log line hash, config path, CVE ID) that supports it.
- The deterministic core: an append-only, SHA-256 hash-chained ledger stores every claim; a rule engine derives attack/access paths (MulVAL-style logical inference — pure logic, no randomness, no model); a policy gate decides ALLOW / ALERT / BLOCK, fail-closed.
- The LLM edge (bottom): explains the decision, drafts remediation suggestions, and proposes next analysis steps. It narrates; it never decides. If the explanation contradicts the evidence chain, the chain wins.
This is the same separation that makes a court work: a lawyer (the model) presents evidence, but the verdict comes from the rules of law (the core), and the transcript is tamper-evident.
Status
Early development — see VISION.md for the architecture, scope, and first-release boundary. The core (evidence ledger, rule engine, policy gate) is implemented with 51 passing tests and a reproducible demo scenario, real log ingestion, and a measured benchmark corpus.
Components
| Module | What it does |
|---|---|
nomosguard.ledger |
Append-only SHA-256 hash-chained evidence ledger; rejects unevidenced claims; persistent (atomic save, full-chain-verify load) |
nomosguard.rules |
Forward-chaining rule engine with unification; tool-call / CVE / policy extractors |
nomosguard.gate |
Fail-closed policy gate: ALLOW / ALERT / BLOCK with full derivation chains |
nomosguard.ingest.toolcall_jsonl |
Real tool-call JSONL ingestion: each claim cites sha256 of the raw source line |
nomosguard.mcp_server |
MCP session layer: 5 tools (evidence_ingest, assert_claim, derive_paths, decide, explain) |
nomosguard.mcp_stdio |
JSON-RPC stdio server (python -m nomosguard.mcp_stdio) |
nomosguard.benchmark |
Attack-scenario corpus with measured recall / false-positive / fail-closed results |
nomosguard.facts_security |
Host/network/user/service/privilege facts (MulVAL vocabulary) |
nomosguard.rules_security |
MulVAL-style rules: exploit, lateral movement, privilege escalation |
nomosguard.policy_security |
Containment decisions: ISOLATE_HOST, REVOKE_ACCESS, ESCALATE |
nomosguard.temporal |
Time-window correlation: brute force, port scan, exfil bursts (deterministic) |
nomosguard.temporal_bridge |
Temporal findings -> ledger claims -> rule engine -> gate: the time dimension is part of the attack graph |
nomosguard.containment |
Gate decisions as operator-reviewable action plans (dry-run) |
nomosguard.signatures |
Sigma-style deterministic signature matching: 30 built-in detections, opt-in field-scoped (field:NAME) matching (no model) |
nomosguard.signature_bridge |
Signature matches -> ledger claims -> engine facts |
nomosguard.vuln_db |
Real CVE data from the NVD (cached with 7-day TTL; CVSS severity) |
nomosguard.service_cve_map |
Offline service/port -> candidate CVE ids |
nomosguard.ledger_wal |
Write-ahead log: crash recovery, checkpointing |
nomosguard.ledger_lock |
Multi-writer locking (append_locked; fcntl/msvcrt) |
nomosguard.log_normalize |
Deterministic adapters: syslog / CEF / JSON / GELF / XML / key=value / pipe -> canonical shape |
SKILL.md |
Agent behavioral contract: when to invoke the deterministic chain vs. narrate |
Actionable containment (dry-run)
The gate decides; something else acts. nomosguard.containment translates
decisions into operator-reviewable action plans — and executes nothing
unless explicitly enabled:
from nomosguard.containment import render_plan, Executor
plan = render_plan(gate_result)
# plan.commands — argv arrays, each traced to its decision + chain
# plan.dry_run — always True until an executor is configured
# execution is opt-in and allowlist-gated:
executor = Executor(allowlist=("iptables", "revoke-session"), enabled=True)
result = executor.execute(plan.commands[0]) # rejects anything unlisted
Commands render as argv arrays, not shell strings, so they can be
audited and rejected before anything runs. Reversible decisions
(ISOLATE_HOST) carry their undo; irreversible ones (ESCALATE) do not.
The Executor is disabled by default and refuses any command outside its
allowlist — the last line of defence between a decision and a real
system change.
This is not an IPS. It is a translator from deterministic decisions to action plans a human reviews.
Benchmark (measured, not asserted)
Run with python -m nomosguard.benchmark.run_suite_main --output DIR. The
corpus is committed and deterministic; the expected outcomes are
hand-derived from the facts, not produced by the engine. Latest run:
| metric | value |
|---|---|
| scenarios | 7 |
| recall | 2/2 = 100% |
| false positives | 0 |
| fail-closed on incomplete evidence | OK |
| all scenarios passed | yes |
What the corpus does NOT cover (stated honestly): real-world logs, evidence tampering inside the ledger (that is the ledger's own test suite's job), and any scenario requiring an LLM to judge.
Ingestion (three evidence types, one discipline)
Three adapters, each with the same contract: every claim cites
sha256:<hex> of the raw source line; malformed records are rejected with
line number and reason (fail-closed); duplicate lines are counted, never
re-appended.
| Adapter | Input (JSONL) | Claim kind |
|---|---|---|
ingest.toolcall_jsonl |
{"agent", "tool", "target", "args"?} |
tool_call |
ingest.vuln_jsonl |
{"component", "cve": "CVE-YYYY-NNNN", "severity", "description"?} |
vulnerability |
ingest.policy_jsonl |
{"subject", "action", "resource", "effect": "allow|deny"} |
policy_rule |
Committed samples: examples/sample_toolcalls.jsonl,
examples/sample_cves.jsonl, examples/sample_policies.jsonl.
| Module | What it does |
|---|---|
nomosguard.ledger |
Append-only SHA-256 hash-chained evidence ledger; rejects unevidenced claims |
nomosguard.rules |
Forward-chaining rule engine (MulVAL-style) with tool-call / CVE / policy extractors |
nomosguard.gate |
Fail-closed policy gate: ALLOW / ALERT / BLOCK with full derivation chains |
nomosguard.mcp_server |
MCP session layer: 5 tools (evidence_ingest, assert_claim, derive_paths, decide, explain) |
nomosguard.mcp_stdio |
JSON-RPC stdio server (python -m nomosguard.mcp_stdio) |
SKILL.md |
Agent behavioral contract: when to invoke the deterministic chain vs. narrate |
Run it
pip install -e .
python -m nomosguard.demo # committed scenario: derivation + BLOCK
pytest tests/ # 107 tests incl. security suite
python -m nomosguard.benchmark.run_suite_main # tool-call corpus (11 scenarios)
python -m nomosguard.benchmark.security_main # security corpus (5 scenarios)
Use it from an MCP client
{"command": "python", "args": ["-m", "nomosguard.mcp_stdio"]}
The server never calls a model. Agents load SKILL.md for the behavioral
contract: assert claims with evidence, derive paths, read the gate
decision, explain it — never decide it.
License
Apache-2.0
Metadata
Release files for nomosguard 0.7.0
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