notarize

Canonical trace format and verifier for agent execution attestation.

Quick Start · How It Works · CLI Reference · GitHub Action · vs. Alternatives · Contributing

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Why

AI agents produce execution traces. Those traces are the primary audit artifact for regulatory compliance, forensic analysis, and debugging. The problem: no canonical format, no tamper detection, no PII scrubbing pipeline.

When an agent's trace is submitted for an EU AI Act audit, how do you know it hasn't been modified? How do you ensure personal data was redacted before storage? How do you verify the step sequence is internally consistent?

notarize solves this by treating agent traces like signed commits: every step is content-addressed, steps are hash-chained, and a Merkle root seals the whole trace. Tamper any step and the verifier catches it.

notarize verify trace.json   # exits 1 if tampered
notarize scrub trace.json    # removes PII before storage

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How It Works

flowchart LR
    A[Agent records TraceStep\naction · observation · result] --> B[SHA-256 ID\ncontent-addressed]
    B --> C[Hash Chain\nparent_id links]
    C --> D[Merkle Root\nover all step IDs]
    D --> E[AgentTrace\ntrace_id · agent · task]
    E --> F{ConsistencyVerifier}
    F --> G[VerificationResult\nverified / tampered / invalid]
    F --> H[PrivacyScrubber\nremoves PII]
    H --> I[ScrubResult\nclean trace]

Core primitives:

• TraceStep — a single agent action with SHA-256[:16] ID derived from step_index, action, observation, and result.
• AgentTrace — a hash-chained sequence of TraceSteps with a Merkle root sealing the whole trace.
• ConsistencyVerifier — checks hash chain integrity, Merkle root, step indices, and trace ID.
• PrivacyScrubber — structure-preserving PII redaction (email, phone, credit card, SSN, IP).

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Features

Feature	Details
Content-addressed steps	Same step content always produces the same ID
Hash chain	Each step's parent_id links to the previous step's ID
Merkle root	Seals the full trace — tamper any step and it breaks
5 verification checks	Chain integrity, Merkle root, monotonic indices, no duplicates, trace ID
PII scrubbing	Removes email, phone, credit card, SSN, IP addresses
SQLite store	Local-first, no server required
CLI	verify, scrub, log, status subcommands
FastAPI REST server	/verify, /scrub, /traces, /trace/{id} endpoints
MCP server	Model Context Protocol integration for Claude and other agents
165+ tests	Comprehensive test suite, 85%+ branch coverage

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Quick Start

pip install notarize

Debian/Ubuntu users: if you see ensurepip is not available when creating a virtualenv, first run sudo apt install python3-venv and then re-create the virtualenv.

from notarize import AgentTrace, TraceStep, ConsistencyVerifier, PrivacyScrubber

# Build a trace
steps = [
    TraceStep(0, "tool_call:search", "Found 5 results", "success", tool_name="search"),
    TraceStep(1, "tool_call:read",   "Read file content", "success", tool_name="read"),
    TraceStep(2, "tool_call:write",  "Wrote output", "success", tool_name="write"),
]
trace = AgentTrace(
    trace_id="audit-2024-001",
    agent_name="compliance-agent",
    task="Review contract documents",
    steps=steps,
)

# Verify internal consistency
verifier = ConsistencyVerifier()
result = verifier.verify(trace)
print(result.verdict)  # "verified"

# Scrub PII before storing
scrubber = PrivacyScrubber()
scrub = scrubber.scrub(trace)
print(scrub.replacements_count)  # 0 (no PII in this trace)

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CLI Reference

notarize [--db PATH] COMMAND [OPTIONS]

Command	Description	Key options
verify FILE	Verify a JSON trace file for consistency	--format {rich,json}, --save
scrub FILE	Scrub PII from a trace file	-o OUTPUT
log	List all stored traces	—
status	Show store info (trace/result counts)	—
audit FILE	Print a human-readable audit summary (step count, tool breakdown, risk flags)	—

Global options:

Option	Default	Env var
--db PATH	.notarize/traces.db	NOTARIZE_DB

Examples:

# Verify a trace
notarize verify trace.json

# Verify and save to the database
notarize verify trace.json --save

# Scrub PII and output to stdout
notarize scrub trace.json

# Scrub PII and save to file
notarize scrub trace.json -o scrubbed.json

# List stored traces
notarize log

# Show store statistics
notarize status

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Advanced API

These functions and classes are part of the public API (exported from notarize) but are not shown in the Quick Start example.

Comparing two traces

from notarize import compare_traces, TraceComparison

comparison: TraceComparison = compare_traces(trace_a, trace_b)
print(comparison.added_steps)    # steps in trace_b but not trace_a
print(comparison.removed_steps)  # steps in trace_a but not trace_b
print(comparison.changed_steps)  # StepComparison objects for differing steps
print(comparison.is_equivalent)  # True if no structural differences

Audit summaries

from notarize import summarize, AuditSummary

summary: AuditSummary = summarize(trace)
print(summary.step_count)       # total number of steps
print(summary.tool_breakdown)   # dict[tool_name, call_count]
print(summary.risk_flags)       # list of flagged issues

Export formats

from notarize import to_timeline_json, to_csv, to_compliance_report

# JSON timeline suitable for visualisation tools
json_str: str = to_timeline_json(trace)

# CSV export for spreadsheet analysis
csv_str: str = to_csv(trace)

# Markdown compliance report (EU AI Act / SOC 2 style)
md_str: str = to_compliance_report(trace)

---

GitHub Action

Add notarize verification to your CI pipeline:

# .github/workflows/notarize.yml
name: Verify agent traces
on: [push, pull_request]

jobs:
  verify:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: sandeep-alluru/notarize@main
        with:
          trace-file: traces/latest.json
          fail-on-tampered: "true"

The action installs notarize and runs notarize verify on the specified trace file. See docs/github-action.md for full documentation.

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vs. Alternatives

	notarize	LangSmith	Arize Phoenix	Weave (W&B)	OpenTelemetry
Hash-chained steps	Yes — tamper-evident	No	No	No	No
Merkle root attestation	Yes	No	No	No	No
EU AI Act / audit focus	Yes	No	No	No	No
PII scrubbing built-in	Yes	No	Partial	No	No
Offline / local-first	Yes — single SQLite	No (cloud)	Partial	No (cloud)	Partial
Content-addressed steps	Yes	No	No	No	No
Open source	MIT	Closed	MIT	Apache 2.0	Apache 2.0
Primary purpose	Trace attestation	Observability	ML monitoring	Experiment tracking	Distributed tracing

notarize is purpose-built for compliance audit use cases where tamper-evidence and PII handling are first-class requirements.

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Claude / MCP integration

notarize ships a Model Context Protocol server that lets Claude and other MCP-compatible agents verify and scrub traces directly:

# Start the MCP server
notarize-mcp

# In your Claude Code project's .claude/settings.json:
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "notarize": {
      "command": "notarize-mcp"
    }
  }
}

Once connected, Claude can call verify_trace, scrub_trace, and list_traces as tools. See docs/mcp.md for the full tool schema.

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OpenAI integration

notarize exposes a FastAPI REST server compatible with OpenAI's function-calling format. The tool definitions are in tools/openai-tools.json and the full API spec is in openapi.yaml.

# Start the REST server
uvicorn notarize.api:app --reload

# Pass to Codex CLI or any OpenAI-compatible agent
codex --tools tools/openai-tools.json "Verify the latest agent trace"

Endpoints: GET /health, POST /verify, POST /scrub, GET /traces, GET /trace/{id}. See docs/openai.md for details.

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Case Studies

See how teams are using notarize in production:

• HIPAA-Compliant Audit Trails for Clinical AI Agents
• Rapid Forensics for an Erroneous Autonomous Trading Agent

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Repository structure

notarize/
├── src/
│   └── notarize/
│       ├── trace.py          # TraceStep, AgentTrace dataclasses + hash chain
│       ├── verifier.py       # ConsistencyVerifier, VerificationResult
│       ├── scrubber.py       # PrivacyScrubber, ScrubResult + PII patterns
│       ├── store.py          # SQLite-backed TraceStore
│       ├── report.py         # print_result(), print_trace(), to_json(), to_markdown()
│       ├── cli.py            # Click CLI (verify, scrub, log, status)
│       ├── api.py            # FastAPI REST server
│       └── mcp_server.py     # MCP server
├── tests/
│   ├── test_trace.py         # TraceStep, AgentTrace, hash chain, merkle root
│   ├── test_verifier.py      # ConsistencyVerifier with valid/tampered/invalid traces
│   ├── test_scrubber.py      # PII patterns, replacement, ScrubResult
│   ├── test_store.py         # TraceStore save/get/list
│   ├── test_report.py        # Formatters
│   ├── test_cli_runner.py    # Click CliRunner tests
│   └── test_api.py           # FastAPI TestClient tests
├── examples/
│   └── demo.py               # Standalone demo script
├── docs/                     # MkDocs documentation
├── tools/
│   └── openai-tools.json     # OpenAI function-calling tool definitions
├── assets/
│   ├── hero.png              # README hero image
│   └── logo.png              # Project logo
├── action.yml                # GitHub Action
├── openapi.yaml              # OpenAPI 3.1 spec
├── pyproject.toml            # Package metadata + dependencies
└── CONTRIBUTING.md           # Contribution guide

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Real-World Scenario

Regulatory: Proving Agent Decisions Weren't Tampered With (EU AI Act)

A compliance auditor requests trace records for 3 loan decisions. Before submission, a bad actor modifies step 1 to hide a biased "approved" decision. notarize's Merkle-chained trace catches the tamper immediately:

import json
from notarize import AgentTrace, TraceStep, ConsistencyVerifier

# --- 1. Build the original loan-decision trace ---
steps = [
    TraceStep(0, "risk_model:score",    "Credit score: 720, DTI: 0.28",  "approved", tool_name="risk_model"),
    TraceStep(1, "policy_check:verify", "All policy gates passed",        "approved", tool_name="policy_check"),
    TraceStep(2, "decision:record",     "Decision logged to ledger",      "approved", tool_name="decision"),
]
trace = AgentTrace(
    trace_id="loan-audit-2025-EU-0042",
    agent_name="loan-decision-agent",
    task="Evaluate loan application #LN-98231 for EUR 45,000",
    steps=steps,
)

# --- 2. Serialize to JSON (as would be stored/submitted for audit) ---
trace_json = json.dumps(trace.to_dict(), indent=2)
print("Original trace serialized. Merkle root:", trace.merkle_root)

# --- 3. Bad actor tampers with step 1 — changes "approved" to "denied"
#         to make it look like the agent correctly rejected the application ---
tampered_dict = json.loads(trace_json)
tampered_dict["steps"][1]["result"] = "denied"   # cover up the biased approval
print("\nTampered: step 1 result changed from 'approved' -> 'denied'")

# --- 4. Rebuild an AgentTrace from the tampered dict ---
tampered_trace = AgentTrace.from_dict(tampered_dict)

# --- 5. Run ConsistencyVerifier against the tampered trace ---
result = ConsistencyVerifier().verify(tampered_trace)

# --- 6. Verification fails — tamper is caught ---
print("\nVerdict      :", result.verdict)           # "tampered"
print("Checks failed:", result.checks_failed)
# Example output:
#   Verdict      : tampered
#   Checks failed: ['hash_chain_integrity', 'tamper_detected', 'merkle_root_valid', 'trace_id_valid']

assert result.verdict == "tampered", "Expected tamper to be caught!"
assert "tamper_detected" in result.checks_failed
print("\nAudit outcome: trace REJECTED — modification detected before regulatory submission.")

What this proves: Without notarize, audit traces are just JSON files anyone can edit. With hash-chained Merkle roots, any modification — even changing a single character — breaks the verification and is immediately detectable.

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GitHub Topics

Suggested topics for discoverability:

ai-agents trace-verification attestation eu-ai-act compliance audit hash-chain merkle-tree pii-scrubbing sqlite mcp openai llm-tools llmops python

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