Skip to main content

omega-cra-evol

Renamed from cra-evidence to omega-cra-evol in 0.10.0 (13/11/2026). The name was changed on purpose, so that this project is not mistaken for other products with a similar name; it is not affiliated with any of them. The earlier name was also not available as a PyPI project name. Formats, exit codes and verification are unchanged; packs, ledgers and attestations made with earlier versions verify as before.

Manufacturers of products with digital elements on the EU market now report in hours. Under the Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847), Article 14 applies since 11 September 2026, also to products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 (Art. 69(3)), and open-source software stewards report from 11 December 2027 (Art. 24(3), 71(2)). On becoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability or a severe incident, the manufacturer sends, through ENISA's Single Reporting Platform (SRP):

  • an early warning within 24 hours,
  • a notification within 72 hours,
  • a final report — no later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available (vulnerability), within one month after the submission of the incident notification (severe incident).

The technical documentation stays at the disposal of market surveillance authorities for at least 10 years after the product is placed on the market, or for the support period if longer (Art. 13(13)). Sources and re-reading dates: spec/LEGAL_BASIS.md.

The SRP is a web portal. What was notified, under which ENISA field glossary, how complete, when the clock started and when it was filed lives in the firm's own tools — and may have to be shown, years later, to someone who does not run them. omega-cra-evol keeps it in one hash-chained ledger (SBOMs byte for byte, the Art. 14 clock, notices in the ENISA SRP field vocabulary, signed evidence packs and renewable seals) and signs a notice as an in-toto attestation that anyone can verify offline.

Demo: from sbomify to a verified attestation

sbomify records CRA Art. 14 reports and their filings. The two documents below are real responses of its API (GET /api/v1/compliance/cra-reports/{id} and …/filings/{filing_id}) at commit 4ef6128, on synthetic data, vendored byte for byte in tests/fixtures/sbomify_4ef6128/. From a checkout, after pip install ".[sign]":

F=tests/fixtures/sbomify_4ef6128
cra keygen psirt.key > psirt.pub.json
python3 -c 'import json; print(json.dumps({"acme-psirt": json.load(open("psirt.pub.json"))["public_key_hex"]}))' > trust.json
cra import sbomify --ledger cra.ledger.jsonl --product acme-d1 --version 1.0.7 \
    --report $F/report_JBuMp9bYI2aN.json --filing $F/filing_JBuMp9bYI2aN_early_warning_1.json \
    --drop-dir ./srp_drop --source-version 4ef61281e69d693e3560185bf81ec5474179ea98
cra attest srp_drop/vulnerability_early_warning_*.json --ledger cra.ledger.jsonl \
    --key psirt.key --signer-id acme-psirt --out ew.intoto.json
cra verify-attestation ew.intoto.json --trust-store trust.json \
    --drop srp_drop/vulnerability_early_warning_*.json --ledger cra.ledger.jsonl

Output (trimmed):

cra import sbomify        "imported": true,  "absent_at_source": ["1", "4", "7a", "41"],
                          "stage": "early_warning", "complete": false,
                          "missing_required": ["notification_type", "manufacturer_name"],
                          "deadline_utc": "2026-11-14T01:00:00+00:00",
                          "filing": "declared by sbomify: what it recorded about each filing, not a proof of submission"
cra attest                "attested": true, "keyid": "acme-psirt"
cra verify-attestation    "verified": true, "trusted": true, "statement": "accepted",
                          "drop": "PASS", "ledger": "PASS", "product": "PASS", "reasons": []      (exit 0)

The imported early warning is recorded as incomplete: glossary rows 1 (notification type) and 4 (manufacturer name), required at the early warning, are not in sbomify's filing document (sbomify keeps the type as the report's kind, which becomes the notice's stream); they are listed in absent_at_source with rows 7a and 41, never filled in. Change one byte of the drop file and cra verify-attestation exits 1 with "drop": "FAIL" and reason subject_digest.

The same attestation for a notice built here, without sbomify:

cat > ew.json <<'EOF'
{"notification_type": "Vulnerability", "title": "Synthetic example (fictitious product Acme D1)",
 "summary": "Synthetic example: the CVE / EUVD identifiers are real public records, used here only for their form.",
 "manufacturer_name": "Acme (fictitious)", "member_states_available": ["IT"], "product_name": "Acme D1",
 "product_version": "1.0.7", "awareness_datetime_utc": "2026-11-12T08:00:00Z",
 "cve_id": "CVE-2024-3094", "euvd_id": "EUVD-2024-31700"}
EOF
cra notice --ledger cra.ledger.jsonl --product acme-d1 --version 1.0.7 --stage early_warning --fields ew.json --drop native_drop
cra attest native_drop/vulnerability_early_warning_*.json --ledger cra.ledger.jsonl --key psirt.key --signer-id acme-psirt \
    --case-reference example-csirt 2026-000123 --out native.intoto.json
cra verify-attestation native.intoto.json --trust-store trust.json --drop native_drop/vulnerability_early_warning_*.json --ledger cra.ledger.jsonl

Same folder, same key → "complete": true, "deadline_utc": "2026-11-13T08:00:00+00:00", "status": "prepared_not_sent"; then "verified": true, exit 0, and:

"vulnerability_ids": {"declared": [{"id": "CVE-2024-3094", "scheme": "cve"}, {"id": "EUVD-2024-31700", "scheme": "euvd"}],
                      "notice":   [{"id": "CVE-2024-3094", "scheme": "cve"}, {"id": "EUVD-2024-31700", "scheme": "euvd"}],
                      "result": "matched"},
"case_reference":    {"declared": {"id": "2026-000123", "issuer": "example-csirt"}, "result": "declared by the signer, not checkable"}

The statement is art14-filing v0.2: it carries the notice's CVE and EUVD identifiers (read from the notice, never typed) and, if given, the reference a coordinator gave to the case. A coordinator can receive the statement without the notice file — the statement names the notice by its digests, not its text: the same command without --drop still verifies the signature and the ledger entry, and reports the identifiers as "declared, not checked (no drop file given)". With the notice file they must be exactly the notice's: one more, one fewer, or none while the notice has some, and the statement is refused (vulnerability_ids). --predicate v0.1 writes a v0.1 statement (the format of 0.8.0), which says nothing about identifiers. cra schema --stream vulnerability --template early_warning prints a fillable template of a stage.

Proofs

  • Specification before code: the attestation format is spec/art14-filing/v0.1/ (in-toto Statement v1 in a DSSE envelope, Ed25519, closed predicate) and its delta v0.2 (vulnerability identifiers, case reference); the notice rules and the sbomify mapping are in spec/SRP_FIELDS.md; the receipt of cra verify in spec/RECEIPT.md.
  • Attestation vectors: spec/art14-filing/v0.1/vectors/ — 52 envelopes — and v0.2/vectors/ — 53, with real CVE / EUVD identifiers in synthetic notices; each manifest.json gives every envelope's expected exit code and exact set of reason codes, for any other implementation to run.
  • Verifiers in other languages, by the same author: verifiers/ re-implements cra verify in JavaScript (Node, no dependencies), Go (standard library) and Rust; verifiers/differential.py builds intact and tampered packs and requires the same verdict and the same failing layers from all of them. The ledger also follows the profile of cryptovalid's verifiers (same author).
  • CI (.github/workflows/ci.yml): the suites on Python 3.9, 3.11 and 3.12, with cryptography only and with no optional dependency; the differential oracle across Python, JS, Go and Rust; the official CycloneDX CLI and SPDX tools on the SBOM fixtures; gitleaks on the whole history. A weekly workflow re-reads ENISA's SRP glossary page and fails on any difference from the vendored snapshot.
  • Public demo: omega-cra-evol-demo installs a release three ways (index, attested image, GitHub Action) on clean GitHub-hosted runners, every week, and verifies the release's signed evidence pack with each (the index job also requires a tampered copy to fail).
  • Attested container image and GitHub Action: below, under Install.
  • Archived: Zenodo concept DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24172960 (resolves to the latest version); CITATION.cff.

What is measured

Re-run on 13/11/2026 on this release's code (omega-cra-evol 0.10.0; git archive of the commit, fresh virtual environments):

  • The test suite: 466 tests, OK on Python 3.9.25, 3.11.2, 3.12.15 and 3.13.15 with [sign], jsonschema, referencing and the cryptovalid wheel; 1 skipped (the live feeds check, which needs the network).
  • The attestation vectors: v0.1, 52 (10 valid, 42 each breaking one rule), and v0.2, 53 (10 valid, 43 refused): each gives the exit code and exactly the set of reason codes its manifest.json expects.
  • A v0.1 statement keeps its receipt: on the 52 v0.1 vectors of 0.8.0, the receipts of 0.8.0 and of this code are byte for byte the same on 51; the 52nd used the v0.2 TypeURI as its "wrong" value and is now judged as v0.2.
  • The vendored sbomify documents (3 reports, 9 filings, all five stages: early warning, notification, intermediate, final report, users informed): every filing imports, and each of the 9 notices is attested (v0.2) and verifies with its drop file and ledger.
  • The differential oracle: 186 intact and tampered cases, Python, JavaScript, Go and Rust verifiers, 0 divergences.
  • The notice schema follows ENISA's SRP glossary "Version 1.6" of 21/10/2026: 49 table rows, 43 numbered fields, in spec/sources/enisa_srp_glossary_20261112.json.

Install

pip install --index-url https://robertolocatelli81-dev.github.io/pypi/ omega-cra-evol      # wheel of the GitHub Release
pip install ".[sign]"    # from a checkout; no runtime dependency, [sign] adds Ed25519 signatures / signed tips / seals

The command is cra (also installed as omega-cra-evol, the name pipx run and uvx look for); the Python package is omega_cra_evol.

Container image (Linux x86_64, [sign] included, build provenance attested by the release workflow):

gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/robertolocatelli81-dev/omega-cra-evol:0.10.0 --repo robertolocatelli81-dev/omega-cra-evol \
  --cert-identity https://github.com/robertolocatelli81-dev/omega-cra-evol/.github/workflows/container.yml@refs/tags/v0.10.0 \
  --source-ref refs/tags/v0.10.0 --deny-self-hosted-runners
docker run --rm --user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" -v "$PWD:/work" ghcr.io/robertolocatelli81-dev/omega-cra-evol:0.10.0 verify pack.json --ledger cra.ledger.jsonl

GitHub Action (verifies the provenance of the image digest it pulled, then runs cra in the workspace, without network by default):

- uses: robertolocatelli81-dev/omega-cra-evol@v0.10.0
  with:
    args: verify dist/pack.json --ledger evidence/cra.ledger.jsonl --trust-store evidence/trust.json

Commands

Command What it does
cra sbom --from-cyclonedx F / --from-spdx F records an SBOM; the generator's document is hashed and stored byte for byte
cra vuln --id ID --aware T [--exploited] [--incident] records a vulnerability or severe-incident event and computes the Art. 14 deadlines from the declared awareness instant
cra schema --stream S --template STAGE prints the fields of a stage in the ENISA glossary vocabulary
cra notice --stage STAGE --fields F --drop D builds the notice payload, lists missing required fields, records it; never submits it
cra import sbomify --report R --filing F … imports the notices recorded in sbomify, documents kept byte for byte
cra check-notice DROP [--ledger L] re-checks a notice under the glossary it records
cra attest DROP / cra verify-attestation ENV signs / verifies the art14-filing attestation of a notice: v0.2 (default: with its CVE / EUVD identifiers and an optional case reference) or v0.1
cra pack, cra sign, cra seal, cra verify evidence pack anchored in the ledger, Ed25519 signature (seed file or AWS KMS), renewable seal, offline verification
cra feeds ID read-only network checks: OSV positive control, CISA KEV / ENISA EUVD exploitation signal
cra obligations which obligations are in force for a role at an instant, and the horizons counted in years (Art. 13, 14, 24(3), 69, 71); both readings of a start date, 00:00 UTC and 00:00 Brussels; never reads the clock

Every subcommand has --help. cra verify gives one authenticity verdict (trusted-signed > signed > anchored > FAIL) and exits 0 verified, 1 a finding against the pack, 77 not assessed, 2 unusable input, 74 receipt not written (spec/RECEIPT.md).

Guarantees and assumptions

  • What a verified attestation guarantees (with --drop and --ledger): these exact notice bytes, under this glossary and these rules, with this completeness and deadline, sit at this entry of an intact ledger, and a key in your trust store signed the statement.
  • Not a conformity assessment, not CE marking, not legal advice.
  • Not the official CSIRT/ENISA channel. The SRP is a web portal; ENISA's FAQ (re-read 12/11/2026) says no API is provided at its initial release. A person submits the notice; this tool prepares, records and verifies it.
  • The awareness instant is the manufacturer's declaration (glossary rows v26 / i37): the evidence shows that it was recorded, and when, not that it is true. Whether a vulnerability is actively exploited is the manufacturer's determination; KEV and EUVD are surfaced as signals.
  • An imported filing record is the source tool's declaration, not proof of submission. The same holds for a filing declared with cra attest --filed-at.
  • Identifiers and case reference (v0.2): the CVE / EUVD identifiers are compared with the notice only when the notice file is given; a case reference is the signer's declaration, which no file can check.
  • Time: the ledger orders records; it is an objective time anchor only with an attached RFC 3161 / OpenTimestamps token, which this tool stores after checking its shape (cra seal: an RFC 3161 token must carry a SHA3-256 imprint of the sealed digest) and does not verify (signature, TSA certificate, time: temporal_trust stays ASSUMED).
  • Verifiers: the JavaScript, Go and Rust verifiers and cryptovalid's are by the same author as this tool; they are separate implementations of a written profile, not separate parties.

Contact, pilots, citation

  • Questions, interoperability reports, divergences found by your own verifier: open a thread in this repository's Discussions or an issue; e-mail: roberto.locatelli.81@gmail.com.
  • Pilots: the author runs short evaluation pilots (four to six weeks, scoped and priced up front) with firms that must report under the Cyber Resilience Act and want their SBOM, Art. 14 clock and SRP notices as verifiable evidence. Write with the use case; the answer says what is measured and what is not.
  • Citation: concept DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24172960 (resolves to the latest version; DOI of 0.9.0: 10.5281/zenodo.24203603); CITATION.cff in this repository.
  • Author: Roberto Locatelli, 2026. Public interventions by his AI agent (Noûs) are signed as such.

Licence

AGPL-3.0-or-later for this repository; a commercial licence of the same code is available from the author for organisations that cannot adopt AGPL (roberto.locatelli.81@gmail.com). Copyright Roberto Locatelli, 2026.

Metadata

Release files for omega-cra-evol 0.10.0

For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.

Source distribution (sdist)

Source distribution for omega-cra-evol 0.10.0
File Size Uploaded Provenance Actions
omega_cra_evol-0.10.0.tar.gz 272.8 kB With provenance Details for omega_cra_evol-0.10.0.tar.gz

Built distribution (wheel)

Table of built distributions (wheels) for omega-cra-evol 0.10.0
File Interpreter ABI Platform Actions
omega_cra_evol-0.10.0-py3-none-any.whl Python 3 none any Details for omega_cra_evol-0.10.0-py3-none-any.whl

Total release size: 430.7 kB

Release files / omega_cra_evol-0.10.0.tar.gz

Download URL omega_cra_evol-0.10.0.tar.gz
Size 272.8 kB
Tags Source
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
5d20816f7ca945b24f6219cf2afbfefe945db1e85f364c9001bd428e8d01c4d1
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
9ba92131c80c8823f6022923f33953d6c563c4510122ca81f6f29e3cbfcb45a0
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Nov 14, 2026.

Transparency log

Release files / omega_cra_evol-0.10.0-py3-none-any.whl

Download URL omega_cra_evol-0.10.0-py3-none-any.whl
Size 157.9 kB
Tags Python 3
SHA-256 checksum
How to use checksums
e9395cb4c59907474adfb51ebaaa8de383a871b778b006b7616c84c2921af11f
BLAKE2b-256 checksum
How to use checksums
7796e4d66522cc76f070ac64336bff622235e47a41a7ef85410416a00fb43f07
Upload date
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing?
What is trusted publishing?
Yes
Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Nov 14, 2026.

Transparency log

Security for omega-cra-evol 0.10.0

Provenance

Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.

Full provenance

Both files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.

Select from 2 files

Attestation for omega_cra_evol-0.10.0.tar.gz

PyPI Publish Attestation

PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.

Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Nov 14, 2026.

Transparency log

A note on package security

PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.

To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.

Anthropic, PBC Visionary sponsor Bloomberg Visionary sponsor Hudson River Trading Visionary sponsor Meta Visionary sponsor NVIDIA Visionary sponsor Microsoft Sustainability sponsor Depot Continuous Integration AWS Cloud computing and Security Sponsor Datadog Monitoring Fastly CDN Google Download Analytics Sentry Error logging StatusPage Status page