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OMEGA Health Companion — open pre-hospital alerting with tamper-evident evidence

DOI

Ambulance → hospital pre-alert engine, open and self-hosted. During transport it computes validated clinical scores (NEWS2 · RCP 2017, BE-FAST, qSOFA · Sepsis-3, CDC/ATLS trauma criteria, ERC arrest logic, ESC STEMI pathway), screens for known severe drug interactions, and produces one integrated pre-alert so the emergency department prepares the right team before arrival. Every pre-alert is anchored to an append-only SHA-256 hash-chain (digest only — no health data on disk) and every issue/confirmation can carry a record-bound electronic signature (who issued, who took charge, when).

License: AGPL-3.0-or-later · Language: Python 3, stdlib + cryptography (declared dependency since 0.6.1: every event that goes through the audit bridge — pre-alert issue, confirmation, reception, coordination and incident events — is signed, by the Part 11 engine when present or by the built-in Ed25519 signer that needs cryptography, and the bridge refuses to record them unsigned unless you opt in with OMEGA_HEALTH_ALLOW_UNSIGNED=1) · Author: Roberto Locatelli, 2026

Honest scope (read this first)

  • Not a medical device. Not certified, not clinically validated. It computes recognised standard scores (arithmetic from published tables, plus ONE declared modification of the escalation bands, below — no AI diagnosis) and communicates them. The physician decides. One declared deviation from the RCP NEWS2 escalation bands: a single parameter scoring 3 is escalated to MEDIUM here (RCP: low-medium), stated in every output as deviazione_dichiarata; the 587-vector certificate covers the arithmetic, not the bands.
  • Real clinical use requires a supervised pilot and the applicable regulatory path (EU MDR). This codebase is the engine for such a pilot.
  • Adult patients only: for age < 16 the system refuses to score (fail-closed; adult scores are not validated in children) instead of producing a wrong number — enforced in the API and, since v0.5.0, in barella_prealert.prealert() itself.
  • Regulatory exposure, stated: a server that computes a priority and the team to alert for a patient may fall under EU MDR Rule 11 (class IIa) once placed on the market with a medical purpose; nothing here is CE-marked and no IEC 62304 life-cycle file exists yet. Until a pilot with a sponsor produces that file, the intended use is evidence of the pre-alert as communicated, not decision support.
  • What the signatures prove, stated: operator keys are generated on the server on first use (trust-on-first-use) and registered there; a receipt therefore proves that the server's ledger was not altered after the fact and which registered key signed, not the legal identity of the person behind the key. Non-repudiation opposable to third parties needs hospital SSO / eID-bound keys or a QTSP (roadmap), and the seal of the persisted verbale is what covers a truncated ledger tail.
  • Verifiable by third parties without this code: health_verify.py and its independent re-implementations in JavaScript, Go and Rust (verifiers/) re-check the signed audit ledger, the hash-chained ledgers and a verbale; the byte-exact profile is in FORMAT.md. Signed records carry an alg field so a post-quantum scheme can be introduced without changing the format. The four are held to the same verdict by verifiers/differential.py (46 cases incl. hostile bytes — __proto__ keys, non-UTF-8, lone surrogates, non-canonical base64 in a signature and in a registered key —, seven audit lines whose pubkey_b64 is not the operator's registered key, a verbale registry entry that is not a string, and 10 command-line grammar cases; 0 disagreements, measured 2026-10-04; the same oracle is red on 9 cases against the 0.7.3 verifiers and on 11 cases against the 0.7.4 ones — CHANGELOG 0.7.4 and 0.8.0).
  • Implausible vitals (broken sensor, °F/fraction unit confusion) are rejected with the offending fields named — never turned into a plausible-looking score. Since 2026-09-11 this is also type-strict: a clinical flag must be a JSON boolean (a string "no" used to be read as true — i.e. as "alert" — and a JSON true in a numeric field used to score as the number 1), and age is required (no age → no adult score, the paediatric gate cannot decide). See CHANGELOG.
  • The drug-interaction registry is a declared non-exhaustive seed: absence of an alert never means "safe".

What's inside

Module What it does
barella_prealert.py NEWS2 (official RCP 2017 tables, SpO2 scale 1 and scale 2 for hypercapnic patients) + fail-closed vitals validation
scores_emergenza.py BE-FAST (posterior circulation included), qSOFA, CDC/ATLS trauma activation, ERC-conformant arrest logic (pulse check treated as unreliable), STEMI pathway; digest-only ledger anchor
interazioni_farmaci.py Known severe drug interactions (multi-class aware, e.g. tramadol as opioid and serotonergic)
ambulanza_intelligente.py The integrated pre-alert: priority elevation on any time-critical pathway, route-level warnings (⛔ no nitrates with PDE5 inhibitors; ⚠️ anticoagulated trauma → trauma centre), paediatric gate
team_comms.py Real self-hosted team app: server-side scoring (POST /valuta), token auth, ED board, confirmations, GET /fhir/<id>, GET /atmist/<id>, GET /audit
fhir_chems.py · chems_ingest.py Pre-alert → CH EMS document (Swiss mission protocol, 0 validator errors on two documents, see below); reader + scoring + evidence for CH EMS documents from any ePCR
fhir_export.py Pre-alert → FHIR R4 Bundle (LOINC-coded vitals conformant to the R4 vital-signs profiles — BP as the 85354-9 panel with diastolic dataAbsentReason when not measured, SpO2 as 2708-6 + 59408-5; 0 structural errors on both HAPI $validate and the HL7 validator.fhir.org, re-checked 2026-09-11 — RiskAssessment, Provenance carrying the ledger hash) — validated with 0 errors against the public HAPI FHIR validator; ATMIST handover; ECG attachment by SHA-256 (never auto-interpreted)
ambulanza_cli.py Field CLI: a thin client of /valuta — raw vitals in, whatever the server's profile returns back (vitals + note under the default, computed pre-alert under punteggi); it computes nothing itself; honest fallback message if the server is unreachable
audit_bridge.py Bridge to a 21 CFR Part 11-grade audit engine (signed audit trail, signatures bound to records with meaning; the engine is not part of this repository), with a built-in local Ed25519 signer (cryptography) when the engine is absent. Fail-closed since 0.6.1: with neither, it raises FirmaNonDisponibile and team_comms refuses to start; recording events at the declared unsigned "base" level is possible only behind the explicit opt-in OMEGA_HEALTH_ALLOW_UNSIGNED=1 (a declared limitation of that mode: with no trail, pre-alert ids restart from 1 after a restart, so they are not stable identifiers) (verifica_trail() stays a read-only diagnostic and simply reports that the engine is absent)
companion_seed.py Citizen-facing claim verification seed (informative only)
mission_case.py Mission case file: declarative FSM (ALLERTA→VALUTAZIONE→TRASPORTO→CONSEGNATA→CHIUSA, +ANNULLATA), SHA-256 hash-chained append-only ledger under an exclusive file lock, digests-only (no PHI), monotonic-clock guard, tamper → pack refused. Optional private case-engine adds an independent double replay; degrades honestly to "fascicolo-locale" (verified: same 17 tests pass with and without the engine)
prealert_criteria.py RCEM/AACE 2025 pre-alert criteria (adult thresholds adapted from NEWS2, paediatric table by age band adapted from PEWS, 16 specific conditions, JRCALC high-risk sepsis markers) transcribed from the July 2025 UK national guideline (PDF SHA-256 pinned) — says whether the guideline indicates a pre-alert and why; "headline + ETA first, then ATMIST, ≤60 s" message. Declared scope: no BP trend, no "new for patient" GCS; children get criteria, never an adult score
verbale_probatorio.py Evidentiary record of the pre-alert ("recorded line" made verifiable): signed ED receipt (who answered, role, response requested vs enacted, reason-by-digest if different, latency), per-pre-alert verbale that re-verifies every signature against the operator's registered key and the signed hash chain, detects tampering, re-signing and deletions, optional RFC 3161 timestamp on the verbale digest with CMS-signature verification and persisted bytes — level declared (rfc3161-non-qualificata: a QTSP on the EU Trusted List is needed for an eIDAS qualified timestamp)
coordinamento.py What the field leaders do, done the OMEGA way (compared online 2026-09-13 with Pulsara, Twiage, corpuls.mission, NIDA): patient type → team to alert (from the computed pathways and the 2025 conditions, closed vocabulary), en-route ETA/position updates, two-way crew↔ED messages, ECG/scene-photo/document attachments (magic-byte checked), "close the loop" clinical outcome, QA/QI metrics (latency, alternative responses, over/under-triage proxies), major incidents with several patients. Every event is signed; free text and bytes live only in memory with the board TTL; the ledger holds digests and closed values
test_input_types.py 31 tests (23 distinct methods, 4 API cases re-run in three server contexts) — the hostile-input red-team cases of 2026-09-11 in three rounds (string flags in vitals, clinica and FAST signs, boolean vitals, missing/invalid age, malformed drug list, client-computed pre-alert, note persistence, board retention); 14 of them red on the code they were written against, the rest positive controls; unit + end-to-end over HTTP
test_health.py 23 tests: unit benches (positive + null controls, incl. a bench-of-the-bench that must fail) + end-to-end over real HTTP (auth rejected, °F detected, ledger chain verified, CLI against live server)

Quick start

python3 test_health.py                  # 23 tests (unit benches + E2E over localhost)
python3 test_mission_case.py            # 17 tests — mission case file (both engine levels)
python3 test_input_types.py             # 31 tests — hostile input types (red-team 2026-09-11, three rounds)
python3 test_news2_certificate.py       #  4 tests — NEWS2 certificate
python3 test_prealert_2025.py           # 49 tests — RCEM/AACE 2025 criteria at the boundaries, ED receipt, verbale, tamper/re-sign/deletion detection
python3 test_coordinamento.py           #  4 tests — patient types, incidents, ETA/position, messages, attachments, outcomes, metrics, expiry (end-to-end)
# 128 tests in these six files; CI runs ALL sixteen test_*.py files (222 tests, run green 2026-10-04 in six configurations: with and without `cryptography`, `OMEGA_PROFILO` absent / exported as `comunicazione` / exported as `punteggi`, each file alone and all collected in one process) on every push, never with the private engine
# HEALTH_TSA_URL=https://freetsa.org/tsr HEALTH_TSA_CAFILE=cacert.pem python3 test_prealert_2025.py   # + 2 opt-in network tests: real RFC 3161 timestamp, trust chain, wrong CA refused
python3 team_comms.py 8097              # ED board on http://127.0.0.1:8097/ — default profile: comunicazione (no scores)
python3 ambulanza_cli.py --rr 28 --spo2 89 --o2 --sbp 85 --hr 135 --non-alert \
        --temp 39.4 --eta 67 --arrivo 8 --farmaci warfarin aspirina      # prints the vitals + the note (Italian: "motore dei punteggi NON eseguito")
# OMEGA_PROFILO=punteggi python3 team_comms.py 8097   # opt-in: the same CLI call then prints priority, NEWS2, pathways

A systemd user unit is provided in deploy/ (loopback by default; put TLS in front before exposing beyond localhost).

Evidence of the pre-alert: signed, hash-chained, verifiable offline (2026-09-13)

The UK national pre-alert guideline (RCEM / AACE, July 2025) asks that pre-alert calls be made on a recorded line, be received by a senior clinician who can enact the response, and that an alternative response is discussed openly and is not a failure. This companion turns those three sentences into evidence a third party can verify: POST /ricezione records the ED receipt (operator, role, response requested vs enacted, reason by digest, emission→receipt latency) with the same signature discipline as confirmations; GET /verbale/<id> returns the digest-only evidentiary record of a pre-alert with every signature re-verified from the canonical record against the operator's registered key and the signed prev_sha256 chain checked over the whole ledger, and ?marca=1 adds an RFC 3161 timestamp on its digest when HEALTH_TSA_URL is set (token CMS signature verified with the embedded certificate; verified is True only when the chain to the CA in HEALTH_TSA_CAFILE also holds, None without a CA, False with a wrong one; the stamped bytes are persisted under verbali/; level declared — not an eIDAS qualified timestamp unless the TSA is a QTSP). Every field is closed-vocabulary or a digest: no free text and no health data in the ledgers (the optional board journal of 0.7.0 is encrypted at rest, see PRIVACY.md and INTENDED_USE.md).

Compared with the field (read online on 2026-09-13, re-read from primary sources on 2026-09-18)

The competitor column is what the vendors state (quotes and page digests in the release notes of 0.7.2); the OMEGA column is measured on the running 0.7.2 server in both profiles. The competitors are end-to-end products (mobile app for the crew, web app for the department, vendor operations); OMEGA is a server with HTTP endpoints, a board web page for the department and a CLI for the crew — no mobile app. "yes" in the OMEGA column therefore means "the endpoint exists and was exercised", not "a deployed product feature". Rows marked (punteggi) exist only with OMEGA_PROFILO=punteggi; a standard installation (default comunicazione) returns them as not computed.

Capability Pulsara / TigerConnect (ex Twiage) / corpuls / NIDA OMEGA Health Companion
Pre-arrival notification with vitals, ETA yes endpoint /valuta + board page; the national 2025 criteria saying why (punteggi)
Mobile / web app for end users yes (Pulsara, TigerConnect: mobile apps; corpuls, NIDA: device + clinic clients) not done: board web page for the department, CLI/API for the crew
Dispatch (CAD / Leitstelle) integration NIDA: «Für die Alarmierung wird der Datensatz von der Leitstelle entgegengenommen»; others: not stated on the pages read not done
Patient types → team Pulsara: 12 patient types (incl. General) tipo_paziente / team_da_allertare, derived, closed vocabulary (punteggi)
ECG / photo / document sharing yes POST /allegato/<id> — bytes in memory (TTL), digest in the signed ledger, magic bytes checked
GPS / ETA updates en route yes POST /posizione — exact position in memory, only ETA + a salted commitment (HMAC-SHA256, salt in memory) of the position in the ledger: a bare digest of coordinates was enumerable
Two-way secure chat yes endpoint POST /messaggio — text in memory, salted commitment signed; provable only while the board record (and its salt) lives; no chat UI
Outcome feedback ("close the loop") Pulsara POST /esito — closed vocabulary, signed
QA/QI performance data Pulsara (NEMSIS-formatted database integration), corpuls ANALYSE GET /metriche — aggregates, no identifiers; over/under-triage proxies (punteggi), null otherwise
Mass-casualty / multi-patient Pulsara POST /incidente, GET /incidente/<id>, START tags per patient (POST /triage, signed, re-triage allowed)
ED status / divert Pulsara (ED Availability); TigerConnect: not stated POST /stato_ps — accetta / saturo / dirotta, signed, returned with every pre-alert
Escalation when nobody takes the call not described on the public pages read (a regional EMS advisory using Pulsara tells crews to phone after 60 s without acknowledgement); absence on a marketing page is not absence in the product da_escalare in GET /metriche (no receipt after 120 s)
Evidentiary record of the pre-alert (who said what, who answered, chain, timestamp) corpuls: delegations «dreifach rechtssicher dokumentiert» (device data, LIVE mission report, paper print) and audit logging of privacy-relevant accesses; Pulsara: «time-stamped source of truth for each case»; these are legally usable, centralised records (the reader trusts the vendor's system); none documents a record verifiable by a third party offline (registered keys, hash chain, independent verifiers) GET /verbale/<id> + four offline verifiers (Python, JS, Go, Rust); a tampered ledger fails in all — a trustless record is the difference, not the only valid one
Audio/video calls, live 12-lead telemetry yes not done: infrastructure, not evidence; integrate with those tools instead
Patient identity lookup / pre-registration TigerConnect («registered before arrival») not done by design: PII-free
NEMSIS export US products not done: FHIR R4 is the European road
MDR certification corpuls.mission LIVE («zertifiziert als Medizinprodukt nach Verordnung (EU) 745/2017», class not stated) not yet: the default profile is outside the qualification in our reading of the Swissmedic Merkblatt (INTENDED_USE.md); punteggi declares the Rule 11 exposure; pilot + class IIa file are the roadmap

CH EMS (Switzerland) — measured, not declared (2026-09-16, re-measured 2026-09-18)

fhir_chems.py renders the pre-alert as a CH EMS document (ch.fhir.ig.ch-ems 2.0.0-ballot, the IVR / HL7 Switzerland mission-protocol format, eCH-0207; STU ballot open until 2026-09-30): a document Bundle with a CHEmsComposition in status: preliminary (the pre-alert precedes the handover), with a version-independent Composition.identifier and confidentiality N + the CH Core EPR confidentiality extension (0.6.1), the mandatory mission section (CHEmsEncounter with the mission number, the alarm time as period.start — required, never defaulted — IVR mission-time observations, urgency and mission type only when given), findings (heart rate and blood pressure in the fixed "Circulation" sub-section, AVPU in "Disability" only when the patient is alert — V/P/U are not distinguishable from OMEGA's input, so no code is invented; respiratory rate, SpO2 and temperature as entries of the findings section itself, because CH EMS has no profile for them), handover (patient status priority = START colour as SNOMED, destination organisation) and an annotation section carrying the NEWS2 risk assessment, the interaction flags and the OMEGA Provenance. Not in the IG, exported on purpose and disclosed here: the multi-patient event id as an additional Encounter identifier typed by an OMEGA code system (CH EMS issue #56, open — our proposal, not an IG element).

Evidence semantics (CH EMS document): the ledger anchor is a Provenance entity (a digest is never labelled a signature; the plain R4 export of fhir_export.py keeps its legacy Provenance.signature carrier for 0.6.x consumers); a real record-bound Ed25519 signature (the OMEGA audit record, FORMAT.md) travels as entities too — record digest, signature, verifying key — never as a FHIR Signature, which by definition covers the Provenance targets and would falsely claim to cover this JSON.

Signing the document itself (0.7.3) — fhir_chems.firma_documento(doc, operatore, ts) adds a Bundle.signature (base FHIR R4, 0..1; CH EMS does not profile or require it) that does cover this JSON: a detached JWS (RFC 7515, payload omitted), unencoded payload (RFC 7797, b64: false), EdDSA/Ed25519 (RFC 8037), computed over the RFC 8785 canonical form of the whole Bundle without the signature element (root id and meta.profile included). The payload rule is named twice, as a canonicalization parameter of Signature.targetFormat (the parameter form the FHIR "Digital Signatures" page uses) and as the canon header parameter of the JWS itself, with a URI we define (FORMAT.md) — not the FHIR one, because FHIR R4's own "canonical JSON" is not RFC 8785 and does not say to remove the signature member (the current FHIR build adopts RFC 8785, declared here from build.fhir.org read on 2026-09-19; CH EMS is R4). Header: kid (omega:fb-<operator>), sigT equal to Signature.when, srCms with the same ASTM E1762-95 purpose as Signature.type (Author's Signature), who equal to Signature.who (so the three elements the Signature datatype leaves outside the signed bytes are bound), and the verifying key as a public JWK. The same call adds Composition.attester (mode professional for a pre-alert, legal for the final protocol — the eCH-0207 use case) inside the signed bytes. fhir_chems.verifica_firma_documento(doc) (also chems_validate.py --verify-signature doc.json) gives a five-state verdict, structure before cryptography: OK_REGISTRATA (the bytes verify and the embedded key equals the operator's registered key in the verifying machine's registry, .audit_keys/ beside the installed module, never the current directory: the only state a consumer may accept; the CLI exits 0 only there, unless --allow-unregistered is passed — CI passes it for the public-key sample and asserts that the default exit is non-zero), OK_CHIAVE_NON_REGISTRATA (the bytes verify against the key carried in the header — anyone can produce that with a fresh key, so it proves integrity, not who), NON_VALIDA, NON_VERIFICATA (no Ed25519 implementation), ASSENTE. The registry proves only that the key matches the local operator record of the verifying machine; there is no key distribution in 0.7.3, so on a machine without that registry the best verdict is OK_CHIAVE_NON_REGISTRATA. Measured 2026-09-19: the signed sample validates with 0 errors on validator_cli 6.10.4, which inspects the JOSE signature and reports one signature-related warning (9 warnings in total, listed in EVIDENCE.md) — "Didn't find a matching certificate for the 'kid' … so can't verify the signature": it verifies only against X.509 certificates in its store; a self-signed Ed25519 certificate in x5c was measured separately and is an error there ("Unable to parse X509 Certificate: Unsupported key type: EdDSA"), so none is embedded — and 0 errors on Matchbox. 8 tamperings of the signed bytes give NON_VALIDA by the mathematics; 25 tamperings of the header and of the unsigned Signature metadata give NON_VALIDA by structure, asserted also under an oracle that calls every signature valid; a fresh key under the victim's kid, and a registered key under another operator's kid, give OK_CHIAVE_NON_REGISTRATA; the verifier broken to "always registered" turns the suite red; jwcrypto, an independent JWS library with RFC 7797 support, verifies the same detached JWS against the registered key file and refuses a tampered payload and the base64url form of the payload (test + CI). Declared limits: JCS signs numbers, not their spelling (39.4 and 39.40 are one value); Signature.who is the responding Organization while kid names the individual operator. The published examples/chems_document_sample_signed.json is signed by a key derived from a public sentence in chems_validate.py: it proves the format, not an identity; its public half is pinned in the verifier and is never reported as registered, whatever a local registry says.

Identified patient at handover (0.7.3, opt-in) — missione.paziente = {cognome, nome, sesso, data_nascita, identificatore {system: local MPI OID, value}} renders a ch-core-patient-epr-conformant Patient (id paziente, not anon); EPR-SPID and AHVN13 are refused (the profile forbids them in a document), an AHVN13-shaped value (756 + 10 digits, with or without dots) is refused under any system, the identity goes into that document only (the ledger stays digest-only — tested on the fallback ledger; the private Part 11 engine's record is declared digest-only, not tested here; the board never receives missione, by construction: no server endpoint builds the document; the ablation document is synthetic). Measured 2026-09-19 (examples/chems_conformance/release_0.7.3/abl-identified-patient*): with the identity the three ch-ems-epr-* warnings disappear (3 warnings remain: IVR MN and the OMEGA code system — the ablation document is the communication-profile one, without RiskAssessment: the two warnings it lacks against the full sample are exactly the two on RiskAssessment in EVIDENCE.md's list) and the document validates directly against ch-core-document-epr with 0 errors (one extra warning there: LOINC 67796-3 is not in ch-term's DocumentEntry.typeCode value set). So the EPR warnings on the default document have exactly one cause, the anonymous patient — an ablation, not an inference.

Measured with the official HL7 validator 6.10.4 against CHEmsDocument (python3 chems_validate.py --strict, also a CI job with a positive control that must fail) on two documents — the full pre-alert and the earliest minimal one (alarm time only, one vital, patient not alert, no colour, no destination): 0 errors each (8 and 6 warnings); the same two documents on ahdis's public Matchbox server (test.ahdis.ch/matchboxv3, ch-ems 2.0.0-ballot loaded, 16/09 and 18/09/2026): 0 errors each (7 and 4 warnings) — note that Matchbox does not report display-name mismatches (measured with a positive control, see EVIDENCE.md), so it corroborates structure and bindings, not display names. Every warning is explained (measured 2026-09-18 by declaring the EPR profiles on our resources, examples/chems_conformance/rerun_20260918/abl-omega-minimal-epr-profiles*): the three ch-ems-epr-* warnings are the CH Core EPR profiles not being met — the anonymous patient has no identifier, name, gender or birth date (by design: identity is joined in the hospital); since 0.6.1 the Composition carries identifier and confidentiality (required by ch-core-composition-epr, not by CH EMS), so its warning remains for one reason only — the subject must be a ch-core-patient-epr — and the document-level warning follows from the Composition one. The other warnings: the OMEGA code system is not resolvable by the terminology server, and the IVR identifier type MN is not in the HL7 identifier-type value set (a property of the IG). What is not exported because OMEGA does not compute it: NACA, GCS, diagnosis, procedures. Organisations need a real 13-digit GLN (format checked, registration not). The OperationOutcome files of both validators, for our two documents and for the IG's four published examples, are in examples/chems_conformance/ (see its EVIDENCE.md).

Reading CH EMS documents from anyone — chems_ingest.py (python3 chems_ingest.py doc.json [--validate] [--eta 67] [--anchor OPERATOR]): strict load (duplicate keys refused), document rules (Composition first, every reference resolvable — FHIR bundle resolution, relative references against RESTful fullUrls as in the IG's own published examples, which are read end to end — every entry reachable), vitals by CH EMS codes with UCUM units checked (never converted), AVPU/GCS/NACA/cardiac arrest/priority/mission times, only for observations whose subject is the Composition's subject (others are ignored and reported), the latest aware instant winning among duplicates (reported), then the OMEGA scoring engine on the document's own vitals: without an age or without AVPU/GCS the document is not scored (nothing is assumed in the unsafe direction; pass --eta from the radio call), and because CH EMS carries no supplemental-oxygen observation the NEWS2 is reported as a lower bound. Duplicate keys are refused when the input is a file or bytes; a caller passing an already-parsed dict has collapsed them itself (said in avvisi). --anchor records the document's SHA-256 in the signed, hash-chained audit ledger that the four independent verifiers check offline: the evidence layer CH EMS does not have, on top of the format it does (the audit line holds the digest, the mission number — an operational quasi-identifier towards the ePCR, no patient data — the IG version and the validator counts). Drug interactions in CH EMS documents (0.7.0): MedicationStatement/MedicationAdministration of the Composition's subject are resolved by Swiss GTIN → ATC (official Swissmedic list) or trade name; the check runs on recognised drugs only and the unrecognised and discarded ones are listed. Real data: the four documents published by the IG are read end to end (they hold GCS, NACA, blood pressure and mission times but not the NEWS2 vital set, so they are reported as not scorable with the missing inputs named).

Privacy by design

Vitals live in memory for the care flow only. The provenance ledger stores digests, never health data. The FHIR bundle is anonymous (age only). Confirmation signatures bind operator, time and meaning to the record — accountability without surveillance.

Interoperability & the 2029 horizon

The EU EHDS regulation (in force 26 Mar 2025) makes primary health-data exchange mandatory from March 2029 — this project speaks FHIR R4 today for that reason, and exports ATMIST because that is the handover language emergency departments already use.

Roadmap honesty

What this needs next is not more code: it is a measured pilot (pre-registered endpoints, published results) with a clinical partner. See GRANT_APPLICATION.md and ONE_PAGER_CLINICO.md. Automatic ECG interpretation is deliberately absent: without clinical validation it would be an overclaim.

Intended use and run profiles (0.7.0; default comunicazione since 0.7.2)

INTENDED_USE.md states what the software is for and for what it is not, with the Swissmedic Merkblatt on software (BW630_30_007 v3.0) and EU MDR Rule 11 as references. Two profiles, chosen at start-up with OMEGA_PROFILO: comunicazione (the default since 0.7.2: vitals as sent, identity, signed evidence, CH EMS document via the library — no score, no recommendation, the scoring engine is not executed and the fields are listed as not computed in every pre-alert record) and punteggi (opt-in, OMEGA_PROFILO=punteggi: scores shown as supporting information; regulatory exposure declared, no conformity assessment done). The library (ambulanza_intelligente.py) computes scores whenever it is called directly, regardless of the profile; the CLI (ambulanza_cli.py) computes nothing — it is a client of /valuta and shows what the server's profile returns (under the default: the vitals and the profile note saying the scoring engine was not executed). The profile governs the server, which under comunicazione rebuilds every pre-alert from the validated inputs and names, in campi_ignorati, any other key a client sends with a value (a client-computed NEWS2 included; at most 20 such keys, identifier names of 1–40 characters, otherwise 400 — this guard exists only in the default profile, punteggi drops unknown keys silently as before; /prealert is routed to /valuta for the same reason). The active profile is printed at start-up. Also new in 0.7.0: per-operator tokens (POST /operatori, admin token only; OMEGA_REQUIRE_OPERATOR=1 refuses clinical events without an authenticated operator), the optional AES-256-GCM board journal (OMEGA_BOARD_STORE), the receipt endpoint for third-party ePCRs (POST /chems/ingest, POST /chems/verifica), and Swissmedic-backed drug recognition by GTIN in CH EMS documents.

Install (pip)

pip install --extra-index-url https://robertolocatelli81-dev.github.io/pypi/ omega-health-companion

Release artifacts are attached to GitHub Releases; the index links carry #sha256= fragments verified by pip. All documented python3 <file>.py commands keep working unchanged from a clone.

Contact, pilots, citation

  • Questions, interoperability reports, divergences found by your own verifier: open a thread in this repository's Discussions or an issue; e-mail: roberto.locatelli.81@gmail.com.
  • Pilots: the author runs short evaluation pilots (four to six weeks, scoped and priced up front) with EMS services and hospitals that want the pre-alert as signed, verifiable evidence rather than a message. Write with the use case; the answer says what is measured and what is not.
  • Licence: AGPL-3.0-or-later: study, test and use it freely; a service built on it must share its changes; a commercial licence of the same code is available from the author for organisations that cannot adopt AGPL.
  • Citation: DOI 10.5281/zenodo.22539173 (Zenodo, concept DOI: always the latest version).
  • Author: Roberto Locatelli, 2026. Public interventions by his AI agent (Noûs) are signed as such.

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