OMX: Hyperliquid execution for AI agents (MCP)
OMX is a non-custodial execution engine for Hyperliquid perpetuals. It runs on your own machine, turns an order intent (market, limit, TWAP, POV, chase) into child orders, checks every child against a pre-trade policy you configure, and writes every decision to a hash-chained audit log. A command line and an MCP server let a human or an AI agent drive it inside those limits.
OMX makes no claim about trading performance or profit. It is execution plumbing with guard rails.
Try it now: no key, no account
One click installs the MCP server in demo mode (a simulated venue in its own process; nothing real can be traded):
Or one line:
claude mcp add omx -- uvx omx-hyperliquid # Claude Code
codex mcp add omx -- uvx omx-hyperliquid # OpenAI Codex CLI
gemini mcp add omx uvx omx-hyperliquid # Gemini CLI
- Claude Code plugin:
/plugin marketplace add Lumen-Founder/omx, then/plugin install omx@omx. - Gemini CLI extension:
gemini extensions install https://github.com/Lumen-Founder/omx. - Any other MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cline, Windsurf, Zed, JetBrains, ...):
{"mcpServers": {"omx": {"command": "uvx", "args": ["omx-hyperliquid"]}}}. - No
uv? Windows:powershell -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -c "irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 | iex"; macOS / Linux:curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh; then open a new terminal. Orpip install omx-hyperliquidand useomx-hyperliquidas the command.
With no --config, no OMX_CONFIG and no ./omx.toml, omx-hyperliquid runs
the demo (--demo forces it). The engine, policy checks, approval threshold,
agent budget, kill switch and audit log are the real code; prices are a
random-walk model, not Hyperliquid data. Every answer carries "demo": true.
State lives in a temporary directory that is deleted on exit. A config that is
named but missing is an error, never a silent demo.
Then ask the agent to quote ETH, preview a small TWAP and submit it (for
example buy 0.1 ETH over 10 s in 5 slices), and poll order_status until it
is done. An intent above 1,000 USD returns an approval_id and waits for a
human; the demo has no approval step, so it stays pending and expires. After
kill_switch every new order is refused until the server restarts.
To trade with your own account, follow Quick start and
give the same server your config: set OMX_CONFIG to its path in the client's
server settings, or add --config <path>.
Agent frameworks: omx-integrations has copy-and-run examples for the OpenAI Agents SDK, LangChain, the Claude Agent SDK, PydanticAI and CrewAI, each checked against this server with the framework's own MCP client (demo mode by default).
Status (v0.1.4): pre-1.0. The full path (agent intent -> policy -> signed order with a builder code -> fill -> kill switch -> audit verify) has been run end to end on Hyperliquid testnet. OMX has not had an external security audit. Start on testnet, then mainnet with small size. MIT licensed, no warranty.
Eligibility
OMX is not available to persons or entities residing, located, incorporated or
with a registered office in the United States, Ontario (Canada) or sanctioned
territories, nor to citizens of sanctioned territories, per the Hyperliquid
Terms of Use. Using a VPN or proxy, or a false residency statement, to get
around this is a breach; OMX offers no way around a block. OMX does not offer
outcome markets. omx eligibility asks these questions and refuses to trade
when the answer is blocked; it stores only country/region codes and yes/no
answers.
Non-custodial model
- Your funds stay in your own Hyperliquid account. OMX has no withdrawal or transfer code path.
- You create an API / agent wallet in your own account. It can place and cancel orders but cannot withdraw. OMX signs with that key only.
- OMX never asks for your MAIN wallet key or seed phrase. The builder-fee approval (if any) is signed by you in your own wallet.
- The config holds the agent key's file PATH or env var NAME, never the key. A config containing anything shaped like a private key is rejected, and so is a command-line argument shaped like one.
Install
pip install omx-hyperliquid # PyPI; gives the `omx`, `omx-mcp` and `omx-hyperliquid` commands
From a checkout (development, tests):
python -m venv .venv
.venv/Scripts/python -m pip install -e ".[test]" # Windows; .venv/bin/python elsewhere
.venv/Scripts/python -m pytest -q tests
The commands below also work as python -m omx.cli ... from a checkout.
Requires Python 3.11+ (tomllib; developed on 3.12). The MCP server uses the
official mcp Python SDK 2.x. The live Hyperliquid venue also needs
eth_account for signing.
Quick start (testnet)
OMX runs as one long-lived process, omx daemon, which owns the engine (the
only thing that talks to Hyperliquid and holds the agent key), the audit-log
writer and the approval executor. The CLI and the MCP server are thin clients
that talk to it through files in state_dir/ipc/.
- Create an agent wallet at app.hyperliquid-testnet.xyz (API page) and save
its key in a file only your user can read, e.g.
secrets/hl_agent_testnet.key. - Write the config and answer the eligibility questions:
python -m omx.cli --config omx.toml init --account 0xYOUR_MAIN_ADDRESS --key-path secrets/hl_agent_testnet.keyconfig.example.tomlshows every field. Eligibility must be renewed everyeligibility_ttl_days(default and maximum 30):omx eligibility. - Start the daemon in its own terminal and leave it running while you trade:
It steps every working intent every 200 ms (TWAP/POV/chase slices are sent only while it runs). Only one daemon can run perpython -m omx.cli --config omx.toml daemonstate_dir, and only one per account (a per-account lock in%LOCALAPPDATA%\omx\locks, orlock_dirin the config). It refuses to start without a valid eligibility attestation; there is no bypass for trading. It re-checks eligibility every 10 minutes and turns cancel-only when the check fails.daemon --cancel-onlystarts without the check and only cancels resting OMX orders (for an expired or blocked user). Approvals,unkill,eligibilityandaudit repairsent to the daemon are shown in its terminal with what they would do and the request id the CLI printed; they run only after you type theconfirm <code>line it prints there. Keep that terminal interactive (a real console, not< NULor a pipe; seedocs/SECURITY.md). - In another terminal, dry run, then send:
python -m omx.cli --config omx.toml preview ETH buy 0.05 --algo twap --duration-s 300 --slices 5 python -m omx.cli --config omx.toml submit ETH buy 0.05 --algo twap --duration-s 300 --slices 5 python -m omx.cli --config omx.toml status <intent_id>preview,submit,status,cancelandapprovals approveneed the daemon; without it (heartbeat older than 5 s) they stop with a message telling you to startomx daemon. After a daemon restartstatusof an older intent answersunknown(check the audit log and the venue), neverrejected. - Stop everything at once:
python -m omx.cli --config omx.toml kill --reason "...". It always writes thestate_dir/KILLfile first (no new orders from any OMX process), then cancels resting OMX orders through the daemon, or, if no daemon is running, through a one-shot cancel-only engine it builds for this (no eligibility check). Either way it exits with code 3 and aWARNINGif the sweep failed or an order could not be cancelled.--allcancels every open order on the account, not only OMX ones; the scope is stored in the KILL file and honoured by the next daemon. Clearing it (unkill) asks you to typeI UNDERSTAND.submitprints the intent id; after a timeout check it withstatus <id>and retry with--intent-id <id>(the daemon refuses an id it already took). - AI agents:
python -m omx.cli --config omx.toml mcp(usually started by your MCP client, seedocs/AGENTS.md). It holds no key and no engine and needs the daemon running.
Stopping the daemon (Ctrl+C) does not set the kill switch and cancels
nothing: resting OMX orders stay on the venue and sliced intents stop sending.
On the next start the engine cancels orphan OMX orders from the previous run.
To cancel immediately, use omx kill.
Other commands: cancel, approvals list|approve|reject, audit verify,
audit repair, fees, mcp, eligibility, approve-builder, doctor. audit verify tells a torn last
line from a crash (TRUNCATED_TAIL, exit 4) apart from tampering (BROKEN,
exit 3); audit repair moves only a torn tail aside, after you type
REPAIR AUDIT.
Controls
Every child order passes all of these before it can leave your machine:
- Coin allowlist
- Liquidity floor (24 h traded notional) and resting depth near mid
- Price band vs mid, intent limit price, per-intent slippage cap
- Per-coin worst-case notional (position plus all same-side resting orders)
- Account-wide worst-case notional
- Worst-case leverage vs equity
- Daily loss limit (deposits and withdrawals kept out of P&L)
- Market-data freshness
- Kill switch (a file in
state_dir; any process can trip it;omx killalso cancels resting OMX orders) - Hash-chained audit log (
omx audit verify)
Plus a per-child notional cap, reduce-only checks, and for AI agents: an
on/off switch, an agent coin subset, a per-intent human-approval threshold, a
daily agent notional budget, approvals that expire, and no ability to unkill
or change limits. See docs/SECURITY.md, docs/FEES.md, docs/AGENTS.md.
Builder fee
OMX is free software; the maintainers are paid through a Hyperliquid builder
code. When omx/config.py names a default builder for the network
(DEFAULT_BUILDER), omx init sets it at 1 bp (0.01 % of filled notional).
--no-builder sends no builder code, --fee-tenths-bps sets a lower fee, and
--builder-address uses your own. Nothing is charged until you approve the
fee from your own wallet (omx approve-builder), and you can revoke it at any
time. omx fees shows the exact rate and the exact max rate you would
approve, before you approve anything. Details in docs/FEES.md.
Enforcement. With [builder] address and fee_tenths_bps > 0 set, the
engine itself attaches {"b": address, "f": fee} to every order it sends.
Intents (CLI, MCP, approvals) have no builder field, so no caller can set or
remove it; a child order carrying any other builder is refused. The builder
address must differ from the account and from the agent wallet. The daemon
reads maxBuilderFee for (account, builder) at start and every 10 minutes
(every 60 s while blocked). While the approved maximum is below the configured
fee it is in BUILDER_NOT_APPROVED: new intents are refused with that reason
and the hint omx approve-builder; working intents finish or can be
cancelled; omx kill always works.
Approve in your browser, no key in OMX:
python -m omx.cli --config omx.toml approve-builder # approves the configured fee
python -m omx.cli --config omx.toml approve-builder --max-fee-rate 0.02% # a higher maximum
python -m omx.cli --config omx.toml approve-builder --revoke # maxFeeRate 0%
It serves one page on 127.0.0.1 (random port and path) and opens your
browser (--no-browser only prints the URL; --timeout-s stops it, default
900). The page uses your browser wallet (window.ethereum): it checks that the
selected account is account_address, asks the wallet to sign
HyperliquidTransaction:ApproveBuilderFee, sends the signed approval from the
browser straight to Hyperliquid's /exchange and re-reads maxBuilderFee.
OMX's Python process never receives a key or the signature.
Check the setup: python -m omx.cli --config omx.toml doctor prints
OK / FAIL (with the fix) / SKIP for: config, key file, agent address (never the
key), endpoint, account exists, account mode, account value, agent approved for
the account, builder approval vs configured fee, builder account value >= 100
USDC, builder account mode, eligibility, daemon running. It only reads /info,
and only when you run it.
Account modes: OMX reads the account's Hyperliquid userAbstraction at
start and every 10 minutes. Standard accounts (disabled / default) use the
perp account value as equity. Unified accounts (unifiedAccount, the default
for users) keep one USDC balance in the spot clearinghouse, so OMX takes equity
from the spot USDC total. The docs do not say whether total already holds
the open positions' unrealized P&L; a testnet measurement (2026-11-05, 9 of 9
intervals: total moved with the unrealized P&L to 1e-6) shows it does, so the
equity is total itself. Positions always come from the
perp clearinghouse state. portfolioMargin, dexAbstraction or an unreadable
mode refuse new intents with ACCOUNT_MODE_UNSUPPORTED (kill and cancels still
work). Switching to Manual / Standard is optional; builder addresses must be
standard to accrue fees. python tools/measure_account_mode.py --config omx.toml --samples 10 --interval 30 (read-only, no key) prints both candidate equities
and, with an open position whose P&L moves, which one the venue uses.
Test wallets: python tools/new_test_wallet.py --out secrets/testnet_builder.key
creates a new throwaway key (never overwrites a file, restricts it to your
user) and prints only its address. Use it for test wallets only (a testnet
builder, a Base Sepolia payer), never for real funds.
Metadata
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