OPC UA MCP Server
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that provides seamless integration with OPC UA servers. This server enables AI assistants and other MCP clients to interact with industrial automation systems through standardized OPC UA communication protocols.
There is a Node runtime exposing the same tools from the same contract — pick whichever stack you already run.
Overview
This MCP server acts as a bridge between AI assistants and OPC UA servers, allowing for:
- Reading sensor data and system variables, with the engineering unit and range
the node publishes, so a
51.75arrives labelled °C rather than bare - Writing control values to actuators and systems, bounded by the range the equipment itself declared
- Browsing OPC UA node hierarchies, with each node's type definition
- Calling OPC UA methods for system operations
- Subscribing to data changes, so a node can be watched rather than polled, with an optional deadband so jitter is discarded at the server
- Collecting events, listing the alarms a server retains, and acknowledging, confirming, annotating or shelving them
- Reading history — values, raw or summarised by a server-side aggregate, and events the server stored for a range that has already passed
- Reporting connection and server health, including the OPC UA server's own diagnostics counters, and reconnecting by itself when the server is restarted
One OPC UA endpoint per process: OPCUA_SERVER_URL is read once, every tool
targets it, and each MCP client opens its own OPC UA session.
Tools
Fifteen tools, defined once in contract/tools.json and shared with the Node runtime so the two cannot drift apart.
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
read_opcua_nodes |
Read one or more nodes — value, data type, status, timestamps, engineering unit and range |
browse_opcua_nodes |
List children, walk a subtree, resolve a browse path, search by name |
write_opcua_nodes |
Write to one or more nodes |
call_opcua_method |
Invoke a method on an object node |
get_server_status |
Connection state, server health, the namespace array and the server's own diagnostics |
subscribe_opcua_nodes |
Watch nodes for data changes instead of polling them, with an optional deadband |
list_subscriptions |
The active subscriptions, each with its buffered changes |
unsubscribe_opcua_nodes |
Cancel subscriptions |
subscribe_events |
Start collecting events from a notifier node |
read_events |
Read the events collected since the last read |
list_active_alarms |
The alarms the server is currently retaining |
acknowledge_alarm |
Acknowledge one of them, with a comment |
act_on_alarm |
Confirm, annotate or shelve an alarm — the rest of the operator workflow |
read_opcua_history † |
Historical values, raw or summarised by a server-side aggregate |
read_event_history † |
Events the server stored, for a range that has already passed |
† Capability-gated. read_opcua_history appears only when the connected
server advertises historical access (AccessHistoryDataCapability) or aggregates
(a non-empty AggregateFunctions folder). read_event_history is gated
separately on AccessHistoryEventsCapability — keeping values and keeping events
are different features and a server commonly does one without the other. What a
server cannot do is not on the menu, rather than failing at call time.
One tool per operation, not one per arity. Reading one node and reading fifty is the same request with a longer list, so it is one tool and one code path.
See the central per-tool reference in docs/examples.md for full tool signatures, parameters and return formats.
Resources
One resource, opcua://subscriptions: the active data-change subscriptions and the values each has buffered, as JSON. It is the same set of records list_subscriptions returns, re-readable without spending a tool call. See Subscriptions for the shape and the worked example.
Features
Key Capabilities
- Automatic Connection Management: Handles OPC UA client lifecycle with proper connection setup and teardown, and rebuilds a dead session rather than staying down until restart
- Type-Safe Operations: Automatic type conversion based on existing node data types, with values checked against the node's published range and any policy bounds before the write is sent
- Tool Profiles and Audit: An observe-only default, an allowlist for control, and every control call recorded with its targets, outcome, endpoint and session
- Error Handling: Comprehensive error reporting for debugging and monitoring; a failure never comes back as an empty message
- Async Support: Built on the
mcpSDK'sMCPServerfor efficient asynchronous operations - Data-Change Subscriptions: Monitored items buffered as they arrive, re-created on a new session after a reconnect
- Configurable: Environment-based endpoint, security policy, credentials and authorization policy
Installation
Prerequisites
- Python 3.10 or higher
- Access to an OPC UA server (local or remote)
- UV package manager (recommended) or pip
From PyPI (recommended)
uvx opcua-mcp-server # run without installing
uv tool install opcua-mcp-server # or install permanently
pip install opcua-mcp-server # or with pip
Point it at your OPC UA endpoint:
export OPCUA_SERVER_URL="opc.tcp://localhost:4840"
Registering with Claude Desktop
Rather than editing claude_desktop_config.json by hand, let the server write it:
opcua-mcp-server --install claude-desktop --url opc.tcp://192.168.0.10:4840
It merges into the existing config, backs the old one up, and records absolute
paths — Claude Desktop is launched from the GUI and does not inherit a login
shell's PATH, so a bare "command": "uvx" often works in a terminal and fails
in the app. Add --dry-run to see the result first, --force to replace an
existing opcua entry.
There is also a downloadable .mcpb bundle for Claude Desktop and
single-file executables that need no Python at all — see
docs/install.md.
In an MCP client:
{
"mcpServers": {
"opcua": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["opcua-mcp-server"],
"env": { "OPCUA_SERVER_URL": "opc.tcp://localhost:4840" }
}
}
}
From source (development)
-
Install dependencies for the whole workspace (run from the repo root):
uv sync --all-packages
-
Configure the OPC UA server URL:
export OPCUA_SERVER_URL="opc.tcp://localhost:4840"
Configuration
The server is configured entirely through environment variables:
| Variable | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
OPCUA_SERVER_URL |
opc.tcp://localhost:4840 |
OPC UA endpoint to connect to |
OPCUA_SECURITY_POLICY |
None |
None, Basic128Rsa15, Basic256 or Basic256Sha256 (the AES suites are Node-only) |
OPCUA_SECURITY_MODE |
SignAndEncrypt once a policy is set, otherwise None |
None, Sign or SignAndEncrypt |
OPCUA_CLIENT_CERT |
— | Client certificate (PEM/DER). Required for any policy other than None |
OPCUA_CLIENT_KEY |
— | Private key for OPCUA_CLIENT_CERT |
OPCUA_APPLICATION_URI |
the subjectAltName URI of OPCUA_CLIENT_CERT |
Application URI announced to the server. Set it only for a certificate that carries no URI of its own |
OPCUA_SERVER_CERT |
— | The OPC UA server's certificate, pinned. Without it, encryption protects against eavesdropping but not against an impostor endpoint. Requires a policy other than None |
OPCUA_USERNAME |
— | Username identity; the session is anonymous when unset |
OPCUA_PASSWORD |
— | Password for OPCUA_USERNAME |
OPCUA_USER_CERT |
— | Certificate identifying the user, for X.509 authentication. A different key pair from OPCUA_CLIENT_CERT, which secures the channel. Cannot be combined with OPCUA_USERNAME |
OPCUA_USER_KEY |
— | Private key for OPCUA_USER_CERT. Signs the server's challenge; never sent |
OPCUA_PROFILE |
observe |
observe, operator, or full tool profile (read-only is an alias for observe) |
OPCUA_POLICY_FILE |
— | Optional version-1 JSON policy file; environment variables override it |
OPCUA_ALLOWED_TOOLS |
— | Comma-separated allowlist that can only narrow the selected profile |
OPCUA_ALLOWED_WRITE_NODES |
— | Comma-separated node IDs writable by the operator profile. ns=2;i=5 or, preferably, nsu=<namespace-uri>;i=5 |
OPCUA_ALLOWED_METHODS |
— | Comma-separated object_node_id|method_node_id pairs callable by operator |
OPCUA_ALLOW_ACKNOWLEDGE_ALARMS |
false |
Allow operator to act on alarms — acknowledge_alarm and every act_on_alarm action |
OPCUA_ALLOW_INSECURE_CONTROL |
false |
Lab-only override permitting control tools without OPC UA channel security |
OPCUA_ALLOW_OUT_OF_RANGE_WRITES |
false |
Allow a write outside the EURange the OPC UA server itself published for that node |
OPCUA_AUDIT_FILE |
— | Append-only file for the control audit trail, one JSON object per line, written beside stderr. A file that cannot be opened stops the server rather than falling back |
OPCUA_OPERATOR_ID |
— | Label stamped on every audit record, so a shipped log says which deployment a control call came from |
OPCUA_RECONNECT_INITIAL_DELAY_MS |
1000 |
Delay before the first reconnection attempt; doubles each attempt |
OPCUA_RECONNECT_MAX_DELAY_MS |
8000 |
Ceiling for that doubling |
OPCUA_RECONNECT_MAX_RETRY |
3 |
Retries after the first attempt. 0 disables retrying, -1 retries forever |
OPCUA_SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS |
60000 |
Session timeout asked of the OPC UA server; also sets the keep-alive period |
Names are case-insensitive, and a policy on its own implies SignAndEncrypt.
An unusable combination — a mode without a policy, a policy without a
certificate, a username without a password — is refused at startup with a
message naming the variable. With no security configured the connection is
unencrypted and unauthenticated, and the server says so on stderr; see
SECURITY.md.
Making a client certificate and getting it trusted:
docs/certificates.md.
On the Python runtime, certificate and key files are parsed as PEM only when
they are named *.pem and as DER otherwise (a python-opcua rule), so a PEM key
called client.key fails to load — name it client_key.pem. The Node runtime
sniffs the contents and accepts either name.
export OPCUA_SERVER_URL="opc.tcp://plc.example.internal:4840"
export OPCUA_SECURITY_POLICY="Basic256Sha256" # implies SignAndEncrypt
export OPCUA_CLIENT_CERT="/etc/opcua/client.pem"
export OPCUA_CLIENT_KEY="/etc/opcua/client_key.pem"
export OPCUA_SERVER_CERT="/etc/opcua/plc_server.pem"
export OPCUA_USERNAME="mcp-operator"
export OPCUA_PASSWORD="…"
Deciding what the agent may do
Three profiles, and the default is the restrictive one:
OPCUA_PROFILE |
What it offers |
|---|---|
observe (default) |
Read, browse, history and monitoring. No writes, no methods |
operator |
The above, plus only the write targets and methods you allowlist |
full |
Every tool |
operator is the one worth understanding. A write to a node outside
OPCUA_ALLOWED_WRITE_NODES is refused before anything reaches OPC UA, and one
forbidden target rejects an entire batch rather than letting part of it through.
Both operator and full also require a secured OPC UA channel unless
OPCUA_ALLOW_INSECURE_CONTROL=true says otherwise in as many words.
The policy is enforced again on every call, not only when tools are listed — an MCP client may hold a stale catalogue, and a hidden tool is a usability feature rather than a security boundary.
A writable_nodes entry in a policy file may also bound the value, not only
the node: min, max, enum and max_change narrow what an allowlisted node
will accept, so a model that picks the right node and hallucinates 9999
instead of 99.9 is refused. The node's own published EURange applies on top,
which is the only value bound that exists with no policy file at all. See
Bounding the value, not only the node.
Every control call is recorded — its targets, its outcome, the endpoint it went
to, the session it rode on and the attempt number — to stderr and, with
OPCUA_AUDIT_FILE set, to an append-only JSON-lines file beside it.
Staying connected
The connection is re-established by itself: a dropped or refused session is
retried with exponential backoff, and the read and write paths rebuild a dead
session rather than failing until the process is restarted. python-opcua has no
reconnection of its own, so this server owns the whole of it — including building
a fresh client per attempt, because a restarted server may present a new
certificate. Data-change subscriptions are re-created on the new session, so the
IDs keep working and the values already buffered are still there to be read. Tune
it with OPCUA_RECONNECT_INITIAL_DELAY_MS, OPCUA_RECONNECT_MAX_DELAY_MS,
OPCUA_RECONNECT_MAX_RETRY and OPCUA_SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS above.
Concurrent callers during an outage share one rebuild rather than each running their own backoff, and a caller arriving mid-rebuild takes that attempt's answer.
get_server_status reports whether the connection is up and what the OPC UA
server says about itself; it is the one tool that answers while the connection is
down, and calling it is also what brings a dropped one back. See
Staying connected.
A control call whose session died before its response arrived is not silently re-sent. OPC UA lets a Write partially succeed and defines no operation order, so a dead session never proves the write did not land: the server rebuilds the connection and then says plainly that the request may or may not have reached the plant, naming what it was aimed at.
Usage
Running the Server
After uv sync --all-packages from the repo root:
uv run --no-sync opcua-mcp-server
Or run it directly against this package from anywhere in the repo:
uv --directory packages/server-python run opcua-mcp-server
Integration with MCP Clients
Add to your MCP client configuration (e.g., config.json):
{
"mcpServers": {
"opcua-mcp": {
"command": "/path/to/uv",
"args": [
"--directory",
"/path/to/packages/server-python",
"run",
"opcua-mcp-server"
],
"env": {
"OPCUA_SERVER_URL": "opc.tcp://localhost:4840"
}
}
}
}
Example Usage in Conversation
Once configured, you can ask Claude to perform real-world OPC UA operations:
Reading Sensor Values
- "What is the current temperature reading from the reactor vessel?"
- "Check the pressure level in Tank A"
- "Read all temperature sensors in the cooling system"
- "Get the current flow rate on production line B"
Controlling Equipment
- "Turn on the conveyor motor"
- "Set the mixer speed to 80 RPM"
- "Open valve V-101 to 75% position"
- "Start the circulation pump"
- "Set the heating element to 150°C"
Alarms
- "What alarms are active right now?"
- "Acknowledge the high-temperature alarm with a note about the cause"
- "Shelve that chattering level alarm for thirty minutes"
- "What fired overnight on the packaging line?"
System Monitoring
- "Read all sensor values from the water treatment plant"
- "Check the status of all pumps and motors"
- "Is the plant server refusing our connections, or just slow?"
- "Watch the reactor temperature and ignore changes under 0.5°C"
- "What variables are available on this OPC UA server?"
Real Example Scenarios
User: "What's the temperature in reactor R-101?"
Assistant: I'll read the temperature sensor for reactor R-101.
Tool call: read_opcua_nodes with node_ids ["ns=2;i=11"]
Result: "Reactor R-101 temperature: 87.3 °C (range 0–150 °C)"
User: "Turn on the main conveyor motor"
Assistant: I'll start the main conveyor motor for you.
Tool call: write_opcua_nodes with nodes [{node_id: "ns=2;i=12", value: true}]
Result: "Main conveyor motor started successfully"
User: "Set the pump speed to 65%"
Assistant: I'll adjust the pump speed to 65%.
Tool call: write_opcua_nodes with nodes [{node_id: "ns=2;i=13", value: 65}]
Result: "Pump speed set to 65%"
User: "What variables are available on this OPC UA server?"
Assistant: I'll browse the OPC UA server's address space.
Tool call: browse_opcua_nodes
Result: Found 5 variables:
- Temperature (ns=2;i=2): 25.3 °C - AnalogItemType
- Pressure (ns=2;i=3): 5.0 bar - AnalogItemType
- MotorSpeed (ns=2;i=4): 1500 RPM - AnalogItemType
- MotorState (ns=2;i=5): True - Motor ON/OFF state
- ValvePosition (ns=2;i=6): False - Valve OPEN/CLOSED position
Security
The connection defaults to no security (SecurityPolicy.None) and the tool
profile defaults to observe-only. For anything beyond local development,
configure both channel security and an operator allowlist, and pin the endpoint
with OPCUA_SERVER_CERT. Control tools are blocked on an insecure channel unless
the explicit lab override is set.
The MCP policy is defense in depth, not a replacement for OPC UA authorization.
Scope the OPC UA account to the same nodes and methods; use a separate read-only
account for observe deployments.
See SECURITY.md for the full posture, what the servers do and do not verify, and how to report a vulnerability.
API Reference
See the central per-tool reference in docs/examples.md for full tool signatures, parameters, and return formats. The shared tool surface is defined in contract/tools.json.
Metadata
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For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
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