oprindo

Python SDK for Oprindo — C2PA signing identity and implementation evidence for generative-AI providers.

Your content stays local

With the c2pa extra installed, mark() assembles and embeds the C2PA manifest on your machine — only the claim (kilobytes of metadata and hashes) is sent to Oprindo. Your media bytes never leave your process in this mode.

Without the extra, mark() refuses to run unless you explicitly pass allow_full_service=True, which transmits the asset to the hosted marking endpoint. The choice is always yours and always explicit.

Install

pip install oprindo[c2pa]     # content-local marking (recommended)
pip install oprindo           # stdlib-only: hosted verify + evidence

Mark

from oprindo import Oprindo

client = Oprindo(api_key=os.environ["OPRINDO_API_KEY"])

with open("generated.jpg", "rb") as f:
    result = client.mark(f.read(), "image/jpeg", generator={"name": "YourProduct", "version": "1.0.0"})

with open("generated.marked.jpg", "wb") as f:
    f.write(result.asset)

print(result.trust_state, result.evidence_id)

Every signature carries an explicit trust state (sandbox, pre_conformance, or trusted) — never blurred. Test-key signatures carry a visible sandbox marker.

Provenance actions

Omit actions and the SDK inspects the asset and picks the correct inception action:

This matters for conformance. C2PA requires the inception action to reflect origin: asserting c2pa.created over content that arrived with a manifest claims an origin you cannot vouch for. Accordingly:

• c2pa.created on an asset that already carries provenance is refused.
• c2pa.opened must not carry a digitalSourceType — the origin of content you opened is the parent manifest's to state — and is refused if there is nothing to open.
• An asset whose existing provenance cannot be read is refused rather than marked, because "unreadable" is not "absent".

Verify

report = client.verify(asset_bytes, "image/jpeg")

Local when the c2pa extra is installed; hosted otherwise. The C2PA Conformance Program CA and TSA trust lists ship with the package and are loaded on the local path, so a credential chaining to a listed root reads as trusted and certificate validity is judged at the trusted timestamp rather than at "now".

Conformance

Output conforms to the requirements the C2PA Conformance Program assessed Oprindo against (record 019fa058-c512-7f87-a214-4d8cfbda73ce, Generator Product, Assurance Level 1):

• every assertion in the claim's created_assertions, with gathered_assertions empty;
• the actions assertion first in created_assertions;
• CA and TSA trust lists loaded on the validation and ingredient-ingestion paths;
• an inception action that reflects origin.

The second is not reachable through c2pa-rs configuration — it assembles claims in a fixed order that never puts actions first when a claim thumbnail or ingredient is present. The SDK therefore permutes the claim inside the bytes handed to the signer, so the signature covers the permuted claim, then rewrites the manifest store to match. The permutation moves raw CBOR byte slices, so the claim keeps its exact length and JUMBF box lengths stay valid. See oprindo/_claim_order.py.

Evidence

records = client.evidence(from_ts="2026-08-01")

Append-only, hash-chained implementation-evidence records, mapped to EU Transparency Code Section 1 measures.

Scope

This SDK helps you implement and evidence Article 50 marking measures. Compliance depends on your complete implementation and circumstances. Nothing here is legal advice.

License

Apache-2.0