optio-codex 0.1.0

Run OpenAI Codex as an optio task; local subprocess; ttyd-served TUI iframe.

optio-codex

Run OpenAI Codex as an optio task — either as the interactive TUI embedded in the optio dashboard via an iframe widget served by ttyd, or in conversation mode (codex app-server over stdio) rendered by the optio-conversation-ui widget. Local or remote (SSH) workers.

Install

pip install optio-codex

Requires Python 3.11+. Pulls optio-core, optio-host, optio-agents, asyncssh, and aiohttp.

What it does

optio-codex launches codex inside a detached tmux session, serves the TUI over ttyd, and coordinates with the host harness through the optio.log keyword channel (STATUS / DELIVERABLE / DONE / ERROR). The agent reads its task from an AGENTS.md file planted in the workdir. The tmux+ttyd machinery follows the optio-claudecode pattern, including browser handling: redirect — codex login opens the loopback OAuth URL via xdg-open, which the redirect shim captures as a BROWSER: marker so the harness surfaces it to the operator (who completes the sign-in), instead of silently swallowing it.

Isolation

Each task runs under an isolated HOME (<workdir>/home, created at prepare time) with CODEX_HOME pointing at <workdir>/home/.codex, so the operator's real ~/.codex identity and config do not leak into the session. The codex binary is launched via a per-task path (<workdir>/home/.local/bin/codex), so teardown only ever kills this task's process.

Filesystem sandbox

Beyond the per-task HOME, every codex tool subprocess is confined by codex's own native sandbox — kernel-enforced (bundled bubblewrap primary, Landlock+seccomp fallback on Linux), covering all shell/tool commands the agent runs. optio-codex does not vendor claustrum for this; it renders one resolved sandbox posture (fs_allowlist.py SSOT) onto every launch surface: the interactive TUI argv, the codex exec probe flags, and the codex app-server command line (-c sandbox_workspace_write.* overrides; the sandbox mode is selected out-of-band via thread/start's sandbox enum — the 0.142.5 app-server schema has no thread/start.sandboxPolicy object).

fs_isolation=True (the default) selects codex workspace-write: writes are confined to the task workdir, /tmp, and any rw grants; reads are not restricted. That read-open behaviour is a deliberate divergence from optio-grok/optio-claudecode (whose sandboxes also deny reads) — so AllowedDir("…", "ro") is a documented no-op on codex (an additive grant that is already trivially satisfied), kept only for cross-wrapper config portability. Only AllowedDir("…", "rw") changes behaviour, becoming a sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots entry (~/ expands against the real host home at launch). Network access is OFF by default (stricter than the other wrappers, whose fs sandboxes never touch the network); network_access=True relaxes it. fs_isolation=False runs codex unconfined (danger-full-access).

Extra grants and the mode are cross-validated at config time — e.g. fs_isolation=True with sandbox="danger-full-access", or an rw grant under an explicit read-only mode, raise ValueError rather than silently mis-configuring the sandbox.

No optio-side enforcement guard is needed. codex fails closed: on a host with no working sandbox mechanism (bubblewrap or Landlock), codex errors or panics and the model's command never runs — it never falls back to running unconfined (the only unconfined path is the explicit --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox opt-out, which optio-codex never emits). This was verified empirically against codex-cli 0.142.5 (see the Stage-8 probe verdict in docs/2026-07-02-optio-codex-design.md), so optio-codex relies on that fail-closed guarantee instead of a launch-time probe. As a free hardening bonus, .codex/ and .git/ under a writable root stay read-only to the agent's shell, so the sandboxed agent cannot rewrite its own per-task auth.json even though CODEX_HOME lives inside the workdir.

Authentication

The primary mechanism is seeds: log in once, reuse the identity for every later task. Run the setup task and log into codex interactively in the embedded terminal (codex login --device-auth, or codex login --with-api-key); on teardown the session's home/.codex (auth.json + config.toml) is captured as a reusable seed and surfaced through the on_seed_saved callback. A later task started with CodexTaskConfig(seed_id=…) merges that stored identity into its fresh workdir before launch, so codex starts already logged-in — and the new workdir is pre-trusted automatically ([projects."<workdir>"] trust_level = "trusted" appended to config.toml), so codex never prompts about an untrusted directory. seed_id also accepts a SeedProvider callable that leases a seed from a pool (the task's process_id is the lease holder).

Store-binding CRUD helpers (list_seeds / delete_seed / purge_seed) operate over the {prefix}_codex_seeds collection.

Credential rotation (why a seeded session does more than merge-once): codex's ChatGPT-mode auth.json carries a single-use rotating refresh token (openai/codex#15410) — codex proactively refreshes it after 8 days and on any 401, rewriting auth.json in place, and a used refresh token invalidates every other copy. So a seeded session runs an in-session credential watcher that saves the rotated auth.json back into the seed (plus a final teardown backstop); pooled seeds take a lease (one live lineage per seed — the watcher renews it and aborts the session on lease loss); and verify_and_refresh_seed refreshes idle pooled seeds host-free — a direct OpenAI OIDC refresh_token grant (no codex process, no model turn, non-billable) that persists a fresh token before the 8-day cliff, falling back to a headless codex exec probe only when OIDC discovery is unreachable.

Fallbacks without a seed: pass an API key into the session env (CodexTaskConfig(env={"OPENAI_API_KEY": …})) or log in interactively (codex login) inside the embedded terminal.

Binary provisioning

The codex binary is resolved through an optio-owned, evictable cache on the worker — OPTIO_CODEX_CACHE_DIR, else ${XDG_CACHE_HOME:-~/.cache}/optio-codex/bin — resolved host-side, so it is correct on a remote SSH worker and never lives under a task workdir or the operator's ~/.codex. On a cache miss the cache is seeded from a host codex on PATH (cp -L deref → a stable copy), or, when none exists, the pinned release is auto-downloaded (rust-v0.142.5, static musl, {x86_64,aarch64}-unknown-linux-musl). The per-task launch symlink (<workdir>/home/.local/bin/codex) is preserved and points into the cache, so task-scoped teardown stays unaffected.

Status — Stages 0–8 (feature-complete against the Appendix-A parity bar)

Verified against docs/writing-agent-wrappers.md Appendix A — 28 of 29 items green (see docs/2026-07-02-optio-codex-parity-audit.md for per-item file:line evidence). Suite: 188 passed, 4 skipped (the skips are the opt-in real-binary tests, env-gated, never in the default suite).

Shipped:

• Two run modes — iframe/ttyd interactive TUI and conversation mode (codex app-server over stdio) with a conversation-ui widget (optio-conversation-ui, widgetData.protocol = "codex" → CodexView)
• optio.log keyword-protocol coordination + exit-status DONE/ERROR channel
• per-task HOME / CODEX_HOME isolation (tree provisioned at prepare)
• filesystem isolation via codex's native sandbox — default-ON fs_isolation (workspace-write), extra_allowed_dirs (rw grants → writable_roots), network_access (OFF by default); fail-closed, no optio-side guard needed (see the Filesystem sandbox section above)
• task-scoped teardown (per-task codex path; orphan-ttyd reap = crash-orphan rescue)
• create_codex_task, run_codex_session, CodexTaskConfig
• remote SSH workers (ssh=SSHConfig(...) routes to RemoteHost; verified end-to-end against a docker-sshd harness)
• resume / workdir snapshots: session-id-keyed relaunch (codex resume <id>, never resume --last), Mongo snapshot store (retention 5, single workdir GridFS blob carrying home/.codex/sessions), resume.log + AGENTS.md resume section synced to the snapshot exclude list (workdir_exclude; defaults drop home/.codex/packages, *.sqlite*, caches — never home/.codex/sessions); auto-resume-on-restart via optio-core (supports_resume=True)
• seeds: log-in-once capture (on_seed_saved) + seed_id consume with automatic workdir pre-trust; store-binding CRUD (list_seeds / delete_seed / purge_seed) over {prefix}_codex_seeds
• pool leases + in-session credential save-back (single-use rotating refresh token) with a teardown backstop; lease loss aborts the session
• host-free verify_and_refresh_seed — primary path is a direct OpenAI OIDC refresh_token grant (non-billable, no codex process) with rotated-token write-back and pool-status stamping; falls back to a headless codex exec probe (stdout-only verdict) only when OIDC discovery is unreachable
• optio-owned evictable binary cache (OPTIO_CODEX_CACHE_DIR), seeded from a host binary (cp -L) or real GitHub-release auto-download (pinned rust-v0.142.5, musl); per-task launch symlink preserved
• conversation-ui surface: permission gate, inline model switching, file upload/download (optio-file:), tool verbosity
• demo trio: seed-setup + seed-pinned iframe + seed-pinned conversation tasks (auto-appear via fw.resync())

Remaining opt gaps (deliberate — see the parity audit):

• session restore / rebase (scripted transcript reconstruction): not shipped. codex's resume story is snapshot + codex resume <id> (shipped above); claudecode's scripted transcript.py rebase is engine-specific and has no codex analogue. optio-grok and optio-opencode also omit it — parity, not a regression.
• at-rest encryption of the session blob: the encrypt/decrypt seam is plumbed through but not activated (sessions pass encrypt=None) — identical posture to every other optio wrapper.

Not yet published to PyPI (first release is a separate, user-approved step).