pay402
Buy anything behind an HTTP 402. No account, no API key, no browser.
Both rails are proven on mainnet, with this code, verified against the chain rather than against anyone's database:
buyer seller fee wallet splitter Base −$0.02005 +$0.01 +$0.01005 kept nothing Solana −$0.02005 +$0.01 +$0.01005 n/a — no splitter On both, the buyer held no native gas token: on Base the relayer submits the EIP-3009 authorization, on Solana it signs as fee payer. The interface may still move before
1.0.
pip install "pay402[evm]"
pay402 https://api.checkout402.com/c/chk_abc123 --quote
pay402 https://api.checkout402.com/c/chk_abc123 --key $PAY402_KEY --max-usd 1.00
from pay402 import pay
goods = pay(url, private_key=os.environ["AGENT_KEY"], max_usd="1.00")
Reads the 402 challenge, picks a chain it can sign for, signs, retries with
X-PAYMENT, and hands back the goods plus a receipt. Base (EIP-3009) and
Solana (SPL) today.
Guardrails
max_usd is required for a live payment. An agent looping on a paid
endpoint with no ceiling is the failure mode that matters, so the default is
refusal rather than a permissive setting someone forgets to override. Nothing is
signed until the quoted total has passed the cap.
On Solana the payee builds the transaction and you sign it, so pay402 decodes
it and refuses unless it does exactly what the 402 advertised: two transfers, to
the quoted wallets, for the quoted amounts, out of your token account and no
other, with no third program involved. Non-custodial should mean more than
"they cannot hold your funds".
If you paid and the goods did not arrive, the error carries the receipt id — the one thing you need to get it resolved.
Rehearse first
Every checkout has a test face — the same URL plus /test — where settlement
is simulated: no chain, no funds, synthetic tx hash. Same call, two swaps:
pay(url + "/test", test_payer="0xAnyAddress") # instead of a private key
The shapes are identical to a live payment, so code proven on the test face runs unchanged against the bare URL.
Extras
pay402[evm] for Base, pay402[solana] for Solana, pay402[all] for both.
The base install is httpx only, so an agent sandbox will accept it.
MIT. Source: https://github.com/bitfent/checkout402
Metadata
Release files for pay402 0.4.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| pay402-0.4.0.tar.gz | 16.1 kB | Without provenance | Details for pay402-0.4.0.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| pay402-0.4.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for pay402-0.4.0-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 31.4 kB
Release files / pay402-0.4.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | pay402-0.4.0.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 16.1 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
7bce28b8b3cee07463ed3b9219c60b63aaa1e24e1755f25b40c8d47ab643a600
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
83c6862c87f08aaeb9f3743c6e6221f2e6a502a385b275811967b1e28e41905b
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.12.13
|
Release files / pay402-0.4.0-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | pay402-0.4.0-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 15.3 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
dad639b32e6826a8acfb6bab2ddd1876ad85ea63809c55e66a2ba146aa6809b2
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
670dd5f740f3b65183ec2bf36cfee9b47ede12c099389853aa680ae4a9d8c62a
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.12.13
|
Security for pay402 0.4.0
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
No provenance found
None of the files in this release were uploaded with provenance metadata.
A note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.
To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.