percolate-core
The processes that sit in front of the database. The database itself (the
Percolate Postgres extension), and the specs all of this is built against, live
in Percolation-Labs/percolate, under extension/ and specs/; nothing
here is required to use it.
pip install percolate-core # the worker -- asyncpg, httpx, typer
pip install 'percolate-core[content]' # + Content Server (boto3, fastapi)
pip install 'percolate-core[agent]' # + Agent Runtime (pydantic-ai, mcp)
pip install 'percolate-core[all]'
percolate worker --queue http # claim and execute tasks
percolate content serve # uploads, scraping, ingestion
percolate agent serve # agents, streaming, delegation
percolate agent --help # the runtime's own operator commands
Output too large to store
workflow.tasks.output is capped (workflow.max_payload_bytes, 64KB by
default), and an oversized result used to fail the task terminally. The worker
now stores it and completes:
{"status": 200, "$artifact": "9f3c…-uuid"}
The ref is a sibling of result, not a value inside it — the engine's size
check reads top-level keys while every step nests its payload under result,
so a ref inside result is invisible to the check and a ref at the top breaks
every {{steps.<id>.result}} reading it. And there is no result left: a value
too large to carry is not a value, so the next step reads
{{steps.<id>.$artifact}}, or resolves it in-database with
sql: {function: artifact, args: ['{{steps.<id>.$artifact}}']}.
It is a resource id, not an s3:// URI — a row in content.resources, so
the artifact is RLS-scoped, checksum-deduped, servable and visible to
content.check_drift. Needs percolate-core[content] for object storage; the
image installs [all], so the shipped worker always has it, and a minimal
install fails with the one command that fixes it. Asserted end to end by
dev/offload.py.
docs-sample.md is the one to read next: a real REST call to
the Agent Runtime, the events it streams back, the rows it leaves behind, and
every header and option a caller can send — captured output, not illustration.
Layout
| Module | Extra | What it is |
|---|---|---|
percolate_core.core |
— | connecting as the caller, configuration, credential resolution |
percolate_core.worker |
— | the step loop, the @handler registry, and artifact offload |
percolate_core.content |
content |
the Content Server |
percolate_core.ingest |
ingest |
parsing, chunking and batched embedding for uploaded files |
percolate_core.agentic |
agent |
the Agent Runtime |
The import package matches the distribution name exactly, so there is no mapping
to remember. (p8 was taken on PyPI.)
One distribution rather than three. Three packages means a version matrix
(percolate-content 0.3 requiring percolate-core >=0.2,<0.3) resolved forever, for services
that release together and are written by the same people. Splitting later is
mechanical; merging two that have drifted is not.
The base install stays small on purpose. The common case is someone writing
their own worker, and they should not pull boto3 and pydantic-ai to do it. The
root CLI mounts each subpackage's own command group and tolerates its absence,
so percolate worker runs with neither installed and percolate content says
which extra to install — naming the module that was actually missing, rather
than guessing.
percolate_core.ingest — an uploaded file becomes answerable
pip install 'percolate-core[ingest]' # + [tabular] for CSV/Parquet
percolate ingest serve --queue ingest
The ingestion workflow the Content Server starts has two steps and this runs both: parse (bytes to markdown to chunks) and embed (every chunk of a document in one batched call). One library per format and none of them carries a model:
| reader | ||
|---|---|---|
pymupdf4llm |
the PDF's own structure, no OCR | |
| docx | python-docx |
headings, lists and tables, in document order |
| html | stdlib | tags out, block structure kept |
| audio | any OpenAI-shaped /audio/transcriptions |
including a local one |
| csv / xlsx / parquet | pyarrow |
to Parquet in object storage, never chunked |
| everything else | — | registered, retrievable, not pretended to be text |
Chunking is semchunk with a 700-token default — generous on purpose,
because a chunk here is retrieved, shown to a model and cited, and a 250-token
chunk keeps the sentence that matched and loses the one that explains it.
Embedding batches, and it is why that step is work rather than a
declarative matrix: of embed: children. A step's output is capped at
workflow.max_payload_bytes (64KB) and one 1536-dimension vector is ~31KB of
JSON, so two vectors do not fit in one task output: any design that carries
corpus vectors through the engine is limited to batches of one. This writes
them itself (aiq.record_embeddings) and returns a receipt — measured, an
eight-chunk document went from eight requests to one.
Defaults live here; overrides live in the database, as a channel's or an
upload's ingest_policy, validated by a strict pydantic model so a misspelled
key is refused rather than ignored. To see what a policy does to a file without
a database, a stack or a key:
percolate ingest file ./notice.pdf --policy '{"chunking":{"target_tokens":300}}'
The tables and functions it writes to are specs/world-model-ingestion/ in
Percolation-Labs/percolate.
percolate_core.core — the one that matters
It decides whose RLS applies, and it exists because that logic was previously written three times on two different database drivers.
from percolate_core.core import as_caller
async with as_caller(claims) as conn: # claims = the VERIFIED JWT payload
rows = await conn.fetch("select * from content.resources")
Every service connects as a low-privilege role — set explicitly by as_caller,
not inherited from whatever the connection string happens to log in as — and
sets the caller's claims per transaction, exactly as PostgREST does. A service that queried as
itself would bypass every policy in the collection — not by exploiting
anything, just by never presenting an identity for the policies to filter on.
Transaction-local (set_config(..., true)) is not a detail: an unregistered
GUC left at session scope survives into the next transaction on a pooled
connection, so the following request would inherit the previous caller's
identity.
as_service() exists for work with genuinely no user behind it — a scheduled
poll, a reconciliation sweep. Deliberately a separate function rather than
as_caller(None), so "this query has no user" is something someone wrote down.
One pool per process, with explicit ownership. A service's lifespan owns it
(open_pool/close_pool, reference-counted); every short-lived helper borrows
it (pool()). Several mounted services in one process share it, and the last
one out closes it — without that, one service's shutdown closes the pool another
is still streaming through.
Workflow-generated claim assertions can carry durable execution receipts with extension 0.2.15. The worker
signs the verified task, lease holder and attempt into its existing caller token. The runtime records measured
usage through claims.record_execution_result, using P8_WORKER_DSN when its caller login cannot assume the
worker role. Receipt rows survive operational workflow pruning; reads continue to check the current caller's
access. Provider versions remain unknown unless supplied, and missing evaluation content stays unavailable.
On an older extension the adapter skips receipt recording before requesting a worker connection.
tests/claims_receipts_db.py exercises this path against a disposable database specified by
CLAIMS_RECEIPTS_TEST_DSN: worker token, caller RLS, claim reading, usage snapshot, pruning and private-reader
refusal. It uses a provider fixture and makes no external model call. The receipt describes recorded model
runs within a task attempt; it does not attribute every assertion to every model in that list.
Writing your own worker
Most steps need no worker from you:
| kind | who runs it |
|---|---|
sql / p8ql |
nobody — executes inside Postgres |
http_call |
the built-in handler |
timer / signal / decision / sub_workflow |
the engine |
work |
you |
When you do need one, it is this loop with a handler registered — not a different program:
from percolate_core.worker import handler, run
@handler("transcode")
async def transcode(spec, ctx):
return {"duration": await ffmpeg(ctx["run_input"]["file_key"])}
run(queue="media")
ctx comes from workflow.get_task_context(): run_input, the accumulated
context (so a later step reads an earlier step's output), task_input,
step_key, and trace_id/span_id.
The worker holds no table grants. Every interaction is a SECURITY DEFINER
function call — claim_task, get_task_context, complete_task, fail_task
— which is why "bring your own worker" is safe to offer: a compromised worker
can claim and complete tasks, and nothing else.
Raise TerminalError for what will not get better. A bad argument, a
missing credential, a 404. Anything else is retried with backoff. The worker is
the only thing that knows what a failure means, so it decides and the engine
honours the verdict.
Configuration
Browser UI and agent origins
percolate ui serve serves files only. Set P8_UI_REST_URL to PostgREST and
P8_UI_CORE_URL to the Agent Runtime (not the Content Server). Both backends
must use the same JWT identity/secret and database. Provider keys belong only
in the runtime environment: an openai: agent reads OPENAI_API_KEY, not
the worker's LLM_API_KEY. A model stored on an agent overrides the default.
In this working tree, the standalone runtime accepts a comma-separated
P8_CORS_ORIGINS allowlist, e.g. http://localhost:8082. It defaults to no
cross-origin access and rejects wildcards; bearer verification and RLS are
unchanged. Hosts mounting the router own their CORS policy.
Never expose a dev signing secret or provider key in production UI configuration.
Service variables
Environment only. Credentials by reference, never by value:
credential_ref: "LLM_API_KEY" on a task names a variable this process
resolves, so workflow.tasks stays inspectable and replayable.
A credential is sent only to an origin the operator bound it to. The row that names a credential does not choose where it goes: an upload's ingest policy names a transcription endpoint, and any signed-in user writes that. Every sender (http_call, embedding, transcription, API ingestion, the lake catalog) refuses, before any request, a credential with no binding for the destination:
P8_CREDENTIAL_ORIGINS='{"LLM_API_KEY": ["https://api.openai.com"], "P8_API_KEY": "http://agent:8080"}'
{{env.X}} in a workflow reads only P8_AGENT_URL, LLM_URL and the names in
P8_TEMPLATE_ENV, and never a bound credential: a template chooses where to
send, and a secret goes by credential_ref.
| Used by | |
|---|---|
P8_DSN |
all |
P8_JWT_SECRET |
services verifying bearer tokens (same secret PostgREST uses) |
P8_QUEUE, P8_WORKER_ID, P8_POLL_SECONDS |
worker |
P8_S3_ENDPOINT, P8_S3_KEY, P8_S3_SECRET, P8_BUCKET |
content |
P8_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES |
content: the largest body POST /files accepts (default 100000000); past it, 413 |
P8_CREDENTIAL_ORIGINS |
worker, ingest, lake: JSON map, credential name to origin(s). P8_INGEST_CREDENTIAL_ORIGINS (same shape) is still read and merged |
P8_TEMPLATE_ENV |
worker: comma-separated extra variables {{env.X}} may read |
P8_WORKER_DSN |
agent runtime and gateway: a login that is a member of worker (the workers' own), used only to complete or fail the task a scheduled run was dispatched by. Required where P8_DSN logs in as authenticator, which cannot become worker; without it /internal/run answers 503 |
Tracing — OpenTelemetry, off unless pointed somewhere
pip install 'percolate-core[agent,otel]', then set the variable every other
OTel-aware process in the deployment already reads:
export OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://localhost:4318
export OTEL_SERVICE_NAME=percolate-agent-runtime
That is the whole switch — no P8_OTEL=1 of our own, because a second flag is a
second thing to forget and the failure it causes (tracing silently off) is the
expensive one. Unset, nothing is installed and nothing is sent.
pydantic-ai supplies the GenAI semantic
conventions for every model
request and tool call. This package adds one span per turn carrying the ids that
join a trace to a row — percolate.run.id, .session_id, .parent_run_id,
.depth, and percolate.usage.*. A delegated turn is a child span of the
turn that delegated it, so the delegation tree and the trace tree are one tree.
Logs go out on the same connection.
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT |
the switch; unset means off |
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME |
defaults to percolate-agent-runtime |
P8_OTEL_CONTENT |
prompts and completions in span attributes. Off by default: it walks message bodies out of the database's RLS into whatever you pointed OTLP at. Turn it on for a debugging session, on a backend you trust |
Setting up SigNoz locally, and exporting percolate's own tables as metrics, is in the docs. One gotcha worth repeating here: create the SigNoz org before sending anything, or its collector refuses to register and resets every OTLP connection — which looks exactly like a network fault on your side.
Delegation budgets
A delegation tree spends one budget rather than one per level. The parent sends
what the tree has spent and what it may spend; the child seeds pydantic-ai's
RunUsage with the former and applies UsageLimits from the latter. That is the
over-the-wire form of pydantic-ai's "pass ctx.usage to the delegate agent run",
which an in-process framework gets by sharing an object and we cannot, because a
delegation here is an MCP call into gateway.run_delegated.
Off unless configured — a limit invented here would be a number nobody chose, and the first thing it would do is fail somebody's legitimate long run. A delegated turn runs under the smaller of each limit: the one set here and the one the parent sent. The headers can narrow these limits and never widen them.
P8_TREE_TOTAL_TOKENS_LIMIT |
tokens across the whole tree |
P8_TREE_REQUEST_LIMIT |
model requests across the whole tree |
P8_TREE_TOOL_CALLS_LIMIT |
tool calls across the whole tree |
P8_TREE_COST_LIMIT |
cost, where the provider reports it |
P8_MAX_DELEGATION_DEPTH |
how deep delegation may go (default 3) |
Depth alone was never a budget: three levels with unbounded fan-out per level is
155 turns, and nothing counted them. The accounting is conservative across
concurrent siblings — agentic/runtime/budget.py states that bound rather than
leaving it to be discovered.
Deployment
One image, several entrypoints — they share percolate_core.core, so separate
images would be separate builds of the same base and separate tags to keep in
step. ENTRYPOINT ["percolate"], and the command selects the service:
content: { image: percolationlabs/percolate-core:0.2.14, command: ["content","serve"] }
agent: { image: percolationlabs/percolate-core:0.2.14, command: ["agent","serve"] }
gateway: { image: percolationlabs/percolate-core:0.2.14, command: ["agent","gateway"] }
worker: { image: percolationlabs/percolate-core:0.2.14, command: ["worker","--queue","http"] }
Neither delegation nor scheduled runs need the gateway. agent serve answers
the gateway's MCP route at /mcp, so an agent that delegates references
http://agent:8080/mcp as an ordinary tool_servers row. It also answers POST /internal/run, because a scheduled step posts to {{env.P8_AGENT_URL}} and the
worker sends the run owner's token to that origin only. Give it
P8_WORKER_DSN as well as P8_DSN, so it can complete the task it was
dispatched by. agent gateway serves both routes on its own, for a deployment
that puts delegation on replicas of its own.
For which commit each published version was cut from — and the one tag that is off by one — see RELEASES.md.
Status
core,worker,content— built, and exercised against a live PG19 instance with MinIO.agentic— built and verified under the new namespace:tests/smoke.py(6 checks, no database or credentials) anddev/verify.py(38 assertions against a live model, covering streaming, what is and is not persisted, the delegation and span trees, the reload round trip, mounting, session resume, tenant isolation, and a scheduled run completing its own workflow task).- Still open: no service-surface entries in percolate's
surface.sql, which covers the database's surface and says outright that it does not coverPOST /chator the other service endpoints; and no startup check that the deployed schema is the one this version expects.
Development
. dev/env.sh # DSN, test user, JWT, and the LLM key
./dev/db.sh up # a PG19 cluster of its own, loaded from percolate's specs
./dev/stack.sh up # PostgREST, the retrieval service, the agent gateway
uv run --all-extras python dev/verify.py
dev/db.sh loads specs/*/schema.sql from a checkout of
Percolation-Labs/percolate
beside this one (../percolate) directly — never a copy — so a schema that only
works because a harness did something extra fails here. Set P8_SPECS if your
checkout is elsewhere.
Metadata
Release files for percolate-core 0.2.15
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| percolate_core-0.2.15.tar.gz | 1.8 MB | With provenance | Details for percolate_core-0.2.15.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| percolate_core-0.2.15-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for percolate_core-0.2.15-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 2.4 MB
Release files / percolate_core-0.2.15.tar.gz
| Download URL | percolate_core-0.2.15.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 1.8 MB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
0d2f0ca4c70e22d42c59b08ad89e0e0056065bd526a6a8881a96ea6cc78b27af
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
93d47ea3e5910d08b00d9b094d774d3ae85bd77fa5056ec2422f003df7304023
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 29, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / percolate_core-0.2.15-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | percolate_core-0.2.15-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 598.4 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
d80e26a0c0ced6262c4f964c54e955c42ff4b7d7c35cdc025b3a04ba4ee07e74
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
0b9f4b1ac449034a0085321fe268c19c8cb3ed6e515853889fca7b02493c5ca7
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.16
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 29, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for percolate-core 0.2.15
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
All 2 files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for percolate_core-0.2.15.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 29, 2026.
Transparency logA note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.
To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.