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PermissionDiff

Prove your code didn't just hand the wrong person the keys.

CI PyPI Python License Ruff Typed

PermissionDiff is a CI-native tool that shows exactly how a code change alters effective authorization. It answers: “Did this pull request accidentally give a user, tenant, role, or service access it did not have before?”

PermissionDiff generates meaningful authorization cases from subjects, resources, actions, and context values you declare. It checks explicit invariants and records baseline cases so a candidate authorizer evaluates the same exact corpus. Security verdicts are deterministic Python decisions—never LLM judgments.

CRITICAL — Cross-tenant access must be denied
support(acme) → read_invoice → invoice(globex)
actual: ALLOW
repro: .permissiondiff/failures/PD-0001.json

PermissionDiff is at v0/alpha maturity. The core workflow is tested and usable, but public interfaces may evolve before 1.0. It supports Python 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 and is licensed under Apache-2.0.

Install

Add the published package to an existing uv project:

uv add permissiondiff
uv run permissiondiff --help

For a standalone CLI, install it with uv:

uv tool install permissiondiff

Or install it in an active virtual environment with pip:

python -m pip install permissiondiff

Five-minute quickstart

After standalone CLI installation (or use uv run permissiondiff inside a uv project):

permissiondiff init demo
cd demo
permissiondiff test

init creates a runnable config and a deliberately vulnerable authorizer. The test reports a minimized cross-tenant reproduction under .permissiondiff/failures/ and exits 1 because the tenant-isolation invariant fails.

Authorizer interface

Point PermissionDiff at one ordinary decision function:

from permissiondiff import Action, Context, Decision, Resource, Subject


def authorize(
    subject: Subject,
    action: Action,
    resource: Resource,
    context: Context,
) -> Decision:
    if subject.tenant != resource.tenant:
        return Decision.DENY
    if action.name == "read_invoice" and subject.role in {"support", "admin"}:
        return Decision.ALLOW
    return Decision.DENY

The result must be exactly Decision.ALLOW or Decision.DENY. Crashes, hangs, and invalid return values are explicit evaluation errors and exit 3; PermissionDiff never fails open.

Configuration

The YAML describes real entities rather than asking a fuzzer to invent arbitrary application objects:

authorizer: auth:authorize

subjects:
  - {id: alice, tenant: acme, role: support}
  - {id: bob, tenant: globex, role: support}

resources:
  - {id: invoice-acme, type: invoice, tenant: acme, owner_id: alice}
  - {id: invoice-globex, type: invoice, tenant: globex, owner_id: bob}

actions: [read_invoice, refund]
contexts:
  amounts: {min: 0, max: 1000, boundaries: [499, 500, 501]}

invariants:
  - tenant_isolation
  - role_boundary: {action: refund, allowed_roles: [admin]}
  - ownership: {actions: [read_invoice]}

fail_on:
  invariant_violation: true
  newly_allowed: true
  newly_denied: false

generation: {max_examples: 64}
execution: {timeout_seconds: 2}

Hypothesis combines declared entities and explores numeric boundaries. With the same PermissionDiff and Python versions, configuration, seed, exact corpus, and deterministic authorizer, findings are semantically reproducible. Canonical JSON, stable case fingerprints, stable finding ordering, and fixed IDs make review practical. A nondeterministic authorizer remains nondeterministic; PermissionDiff does not conceal that.

Test and invariant workflow

uv run permissiondiff test --config permissiondiff.yaml --seed 42
uv run permissiondiff explain PD-0001

Built-in invariants cover tenant isolation, action-specific role boundaries, and ownership. A custom deterministic invariant can be declared as:

invariants:
  - custom: {name: refund_limit, callable: invariants:refund_limit}

The callable receives (AuthorizationCase, Decision) and returns bool or InvariantResult.

Least-privilege review

mine reports the authorizer's effective grant surface — each distinct role × action × resource-type × tenant-relation × ownership pattern it allows — and flags broad grants (those crossing a tenant boundary or reaching a non-owned resource) for tightening:

uv run permissiondiff mine --config permissiondiff.yaml

Policy engines and agents

Wrap an external policy engine as the authorizer with the adapter toolkit in permissiondiff.adapters (from_boolean, from_decision, or http_authorizer for OPA-style endpoints); runnable example adapters for OPA, OpenFGA, Auth0 FGA, Cedar, and SpiceDB live under examples/adapters/. Adapters make read-only decision calls — point them at a non-production policy instance.

For agent / on-behalf-of principals, declare delegated_by: [id, ...] on a subject. PermissionDiff enforces the least-privilege intersection rule: a delegated principal allowed where any delegator is denied (on the identical case) is a critical privilege-escalation finding.

Baseline and diff workflow

Create a baseline on trusted code:

uv run permissiondiff snapshot --config permissiondiff.yaml \
  --output .permissiondiff/main.json --seed 42

The snapshot stores every exact input case, its baseline decision, a stable fingerprint, the corpus seed, and schema/package versions. On candidate code, replay it:

uv run permissiondiff diff --config permissiondiff.yaml \
  --baseline .permissiondiff/main.json

Or skip the snapshot file entirely and diff against a git ref — PermissionDiff evaluates the baseline authorizer as it existed at that ref in a temporary, auto-removed worktree:

uv run permissiondiff diff --config permissiondiff.yaml --git-ref main

Classification is exhaustive:

Baseline Candidate Result
DENY DENY unchanged_denied
ALLOW ALLOW unchanged_allowed
DENY ALLOW newly_allowed
ALLOW DENY newly_denied

A newly allowed path is security-sensitive, not automatically a vulnerability. fail_on decides what blocks CI. Invariants can still catch a vulnerability already present in the baseline.

The complete machine report is .permissiondiff/report.json by default.

CI

name: permissiondiff
on: [pull_request]
jobs:
  authorization:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v6
      - run: uv sync --all-groups
      - run: uv run permissiondiff diff --baseline .permissiondiff/main.json

Exit codes are stable: 0 pass, 1 configured policy/invariant failure, 2 configuration or snapshot error, 3 evaluation/runtime error.

The repository's thin composite action invokes the same CLI without duplicating its logic:

- uses: abishekgiri/permissiondiff@v0
  with:
    config: permissiondiff.yaml
    baseline: .permissiondiff/main.json

Check out the calling repository before this step and make sure the baseline is present in CI. Use @v0.2.0 to pin the latest release; @v0 follows compatible v0 releases. The published-consumer smoke test exercises the PyPI package and the remote action in a fresh workspace without a source checkout.

Security and limitations

Only point PermissionDiff at decision logic with no live side effects. Never use an authorizer that issues refunds, deletes data, sends messages, or contacts production.

Authorizers run in a timeout-controlled subprocess to isolate crashes and hangs from the main CLI. This subprocess is not a security sandbox. Imported Python code has the operating-system permissions of the user running PermissionDiff and may be malicious. Use trusted code and isolated CI environments.

Snapshots and reproductions may contain sensitive identifiers. Treat them accordingly. v0 supports local Python authorizers and explicit domains; it does not include Git worktree orchestration, remote policy engines, live agent/tool interception, a dashboard, or least-privilege mining.

Report vulnerabilities privately as described in the security policy. For bugs and feature requests, use GitHub Issues.

Development

uv sync --all-groups
uv run ruff check .
uv run ruff format --check .
uv run mypy src tests
uv run pytest
uv run pytest --cov=permissiondiff --cov-report=term-missing
uv build

The roadmap is deliberately short: prove authorization diffs are useful, then consider policy-engine adapters, Git-aware orchestration, agent principals/delegation, safe shadow interception, and least-privilege reduction with proof.

See the contribution guide for the contribution workflow and the changelog for release history.

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