phala-pay
Phala Pay for Python (3.12+), in the shape of Stripe's SDK: create a
quote, hand its client_secret to the browser checkout (@phala/pay), and fulfil from
the signed deposit.credited webhook.
Install
uv add phala-pay # or: pip install phala-pay
Until the first PyPI release, install from the repository (read access is required):
uv add "phala-pay @ git+https://github.com/Phala-Network/phala-pay#subdirectory=sdk/python"
Some resolvers drop the #subdirectory= fragment (PDM delegating resolution to uv, for example);
install with uv or pip directly, and switch to the PyPI package once it is released.
Quickstart
The operator creates your account and hands your contact its first secret key, ppay_sk_test_…;
roll it on receipt, keep it offline for administration, and create a restricted key
(ppay_rk_…) for your servers.
Create a quote for the signed-in account and return its client secret to the browser:
import os
from phala_pay import PhalaPay
pay = PhalaPay(
api_base="https://pay.example.com",
api_key=os.environ["PHALA_PAY_API_KEY"], # a restricted key, ppay_rk_…
# Your pins, configured here and never read from the service: every quote and deposit address
# is recomputed from them, failing closed (AddressMismatchError); a live key requires all.
account="acct_…",
forwarder=(FACTORY, IMPLEMENTATION), # pinned from the attested deployment
treasuries={11155111: TREASURY}, # your own treasury per chain, as you proved it
)
quote = pay.quotes.create(
client_reference_id="team-42", # your id for the customer; credits are addressed to it
amount=2500, # US cents
chain_id=11155111,
asset="pha",
idempotency_key=order_id, # for 24 hours the same key replays this quote and client secret
)
# The page renders <Checkout clientSecret expectedAddress apiBase /> (@phala/pay).
return {"client_secret": quote.client_secret, "expected_address": quote.address}
Fulfil from the webhook, once per deposit, and answer 2xx after the credit is committed:
from phala_pay import SignatureVerificationError
try:
event = pay.webhooks.construct_event(
raw_body, request.headers, WEBHOOK_PUBLIC_KEY, "acct_…", expected_livemode=False
)
except (SignatureVerificationError, ValueError):
return Response(status_code=400)
if event.type.startswith("deposit."):
# Credit, refund, and reversal alike: per deposit, serially, merge the snapshot and move the
# balance to `amount - amount_refunded - amount_reversed` (0 unless credited or reversed).
apply_deposit(event.deposit)
Events arrive in any order; the snapshot's cumulative amount_refunded and amount_reversed
make the result independent of it (docs/integration.md §2.3; apply_deposit in
sdk/examples/fastapi_app.py).
WEBHOOK_PUBLIC_KEY is your account's webhook key in the mode, pinned from GET /v1/attestation (docs/integration.md §5.3); pass a list of keys while a rotation overlaps.
construct_event fails closed: it checks the Standard Webhooks signature, the timestamp (five
minutes' tolerance), that the body's id is the webhook-id, and that the event's account and
livemode are the expected ones;
event.data.object is the Deposit (a Quote for quote.*, a Refund for refund.*) as it
was when the event happened: it is rendered with the change and never re-rendered, so read the
object again for its current state. *.updated events carry event.data.previous_attributes, and
an event your own request caused names it in event.request (id, idempotency_key).
sdk/examples/fastapi_app.py is a complete FastAPI backend with both routes.
Reference
| Call | API |
|---|---|
pay.account.retrieve() / .update(confirmation_policies=) / .pause_quotes() / .resume_quotes() / .roll_webhook_key(expires_in=) |
GET|POST /v1/account, POST /v1/account/pause|resume, POST /v1/account/webhook_keys/roll |
pay.quotes.create(client_reference_id=, amount=, chain_id=, asset=, idempotency_key=, metadata=) |
POST /v1/quotes |
pay.quotes.retrieve(id) / .list(client_reference_id=, status=) / .cancel(id) |
GET /v1/quotes[/{id}], POST /v1/quotes/{id}/cancel |
pay.quotes.update(id, metadata=) |
POST /v1/quotes/{id} |
pay.deposit_addresses.create(client_reference_id=, metadata=) |
POST /v1/deposit_addresses: the customer's active address, one for every supported token and network (networks), its recent payments, and a client_secret for <DepositAddress> |
pay.deposit_addresses.retrieve(id) / .list(client_reference_id=, status=) / .rotate(id) / .update(id, metadata=) |
GET /v1/deposit_addresses[/{id}], POST /v1/deposit_addresses/{id}/rotate, POST /v1/deposit_addresses/{id} |
pay.deposits.list(client_reference_id=, quote=, deposit_address=, status=, tx_hash=, created_gt=, created_gte=, created_lt=, created_lte=) |
GET /v1/deposits, every page; status is pending, credited, rejected, or reversed |
pay.deposits.retrieve(id) / .update(id, metadata=) |
GET /v1/deposits/{id}, POST /v1/deposits/{id} |
pay.refunds.create(deposit=, destination_address=, amount_atomic=, metadata=) / .mark_paid(id, transaction_hash=, receipt_log_index=) / .cancel(id) / .retrieve(id) / .update(id, metadata=) |
POST /v1/refunds, POST /v1/refunds/{id}/mark_paid, POST /v1/refunds/{id}/cancel, GET /v1/refunds/{id}, POST /v1/refunds/{id} |
pay.refunds.list(deposit=, status=) |
GET /v1/refunds, every page |
pay.config.retrieve() |
GET /v1/config |
pay.balance.retrieve() / pay.sweeps.list(chain_id=, forwarder=, token=) / pay.forwarders.list(chain_id=, sweepable=) |
GET /v1/balance, GET /v1/sweeps, GET /v1/forwarders |
pay.treasuries.challenge(chain_id=, address=) / .create(chain_id=, message=, signature=) / .set_eoa(chain_id=, address=, private_key=) / .list() / .retrieve(id) / .cancel(id) / .pause(id) / .resume(id) |
POST /v1/treasuries/challenge, GET|POST /v1/treasuries, POST /v1/treasuries/{id}/cancel|pause|resume |
pay.api_keys.create(name=, permissions=) / .list() / .retrieve(id) / .roll(id, expires_in=) / .revoke(id) |
/v1/api_keys |
pay.webhook_endpoints.create(url=, enabled_events=) / .list() / .retrieve(id) / .update(id, …) / .delete(id) / .test(id) |
/v1/webhook_endpoints |
pay.events.list(type=, types=, delivery_success=, created_gt=, …) / .retrieve(id) / .resend(id, webhook_endpoint=) |
/v1/events |
pay.export_account(directory) |
every list, written as JSON files |
pay.webhooks.construct_event(payload, headers, public_key, expected_account, expected_livemode=) (also phala_pay.Webhook, no client needed) |
verifies a webhook delivery |
Every request sends the API key as Authorization: Bearer …: a restricted key, ppay_rk_…, for
production servers (pay.api_keys.create(permissions=[...]), which never manages keys,
treasuries, webhook endpoints, webhook keys, or account settings), or a secret key, ppay_sk_…,
kept offline for administration. Transport errors, 429
(after its Retry-After), 5xx, and 409 idempotency_key_in_use are retried with backoff,
reusing one Idempotency-Key per POST; a response the service saved for the key, even a 500,
comes back marked Idempotent-Replayed and is raised as it is, since the request already ran.
Failures raise ApiError with the service's stable code, error_type, param, doc_url,
request_id (the response's Request-Id), and retry_after. Business-state failures, such as
deposit_not_final or quote_unexpected_state, are 400; only idempotency_key_in_use is
409. Status arguments have Literal hints, and EventType names every event (phala_pay.QuoteStatus,
DepositStatus, RefundStatus, TreasuryStatus, EventType, …); the generated models keep
statuses as str, so a value added later still parses.
forwarder=(factory, implementation), pinned from the attested deployment, treasuries={chain_id: treasury}, your own treasury per chain as you proved it, and account= (acct_…) are the pins
every open quote and every network of an active deposit address is recomputed from, never the
response's treasury: a compromised service could return an attacker's treasury with its valid
address. An address you cannot derive, or one naming another treasury than your pinned one of its
chain, raises AddressMismatchError. A live key requires all three pins and fails closed without
them; in test mode account is read once from GET /v1/account, and an unpinned treasury falls
back to the response's with an UnpinnedTreasuryWarning. topup_sdk.deposit_address(factory, implementation, treasury, account=, livemode=, client_reference_id=, version=) recomputes any deposit address offline; pass the treasury of the
network, since a chain whose treasury differs has its own address.
Sweeping. Funds stay in the forwarders until you sweep them, with your own wallet or Safe:
from topup_sdk import flush_transactions, safe_batch, write_safe_batch
forwarders = list(pay.forwarders.list(chain_id=1, sweepable=PHA)) # never a sanctioned one
calls = flush_transactions(forwarders, PHA) # offline: one factory.flush per treasury
write_safe_batch("sweep.json", safe_batch(1, TREASURY_SAFE, calls)) # for the Transaction Builder
flush_transaction(factory, treasury, salts, token) encodes one call offline from exported
forwarders (pay.export_account writes them all), so funds stay sweepable without the service;
safe_batch writes the Safe Transaction Builder's BatchFile JSON with its checksum.
Treasuries. An EOA proves itself with pay.treasuries.set_eoa(chain_id=, address=, private_key=) (install phala-pay[eoa]); a Safe's owners sign the challenge's message as a Safe
message with the Safe{Core} SDK and submit it with pay.treasuries.create (docs/integration.md
§1.6, "Safe treasuries").
metadata follows Stripe's: up to 50 string key/value
pairs, keys of up to 40 characters without square brackets, values of up to 500 characters. An
update merges: a key set to "" is unset, and metadata="" unsets every key. A deposit starts
with a copy of its quote's metadata, so an order id set on the quote arrives in the
deposit.credited webhook's data.object.metadata. Do not store sensitive information in it.
Lower-level modules: topup_sdk (webhook and admin request signatures, address derivation,
attestation, TopupClient) and topup_client (generated from crates/topup/openapi.json; do not
edit). uv run topup-sdk send-test-event --url … --seed-file test.seed --client-reference-id … sends a
signed test event, a duplicate, and a forged copy to a webhook receiver whose test instance pins
that seed's public key. See docs/integration.md for the integration guide and the versioning
and deprecation policy, deploy/product/reference_product for a complete product, and
deploy/sandbox/README.md for the sandbox.
Development
make sync # install the locked environment
make check # ruff, mypy --strict, pytest, and the regeneration no-op check
A tag sdk-py-v<version> matching pyproject.toml publishes to PyPI from the Release SDKs workflow
(environment pypi) with trusted publishing.
Metadata
Release files for phala-pay 0.2.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | |
|---|---|---|---|
| phala_pay-0.2.0.tar.gz | 309.3 kB | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phala_pay-0.2.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 559.5 kB
Release files / phala_pay-0.2.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | phala_pay-0.2.0.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 309.3 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
9649273001c73467bb87b5a8e7bf762a103b75fc9ec2c19226948527fda6f258
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
a4189f99b209e2928942bb692791e4fdf65fc8485e762c4ee73eaa4b7e08ec13
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 29, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / phala_pay-0.2.0-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | phala_pay-0.2.0-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 250.1 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
6f665d573db67f8c5d909c5718731e384c2c68604d55f78b81d9aa0fd199f133
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
58003285053beb356efa6c83e37119c3f1fc11be19e1383d962867de38f41a18
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 29, 2026.
Transparency log