pickle-sentry
Scan code and dataset files for unsafe pickle deserialization — including the
Hugging Face datasets pandas builder RCE, CVE-2026-57845 (CVSS 8.8).
Pickle is code, not data. Any file, checkpoint, or dataset that passes through
a pickle loader executes whatever its author put in it. pickle-sentry finds
those paths in your code, and inspects pickle files by disassembly only —
it never executes the files it inspects (its test suite proves this with a
canary payload).
Why now
CVE-2026-57845 (published 23 Oct 2026): Hugging Face datasets through 5.1.0 —
the latest release — routes load_dataset("pandas", data_files=...) to
pandas.read_pickle(). A crafted pickle runs arbitrary Python with the
victim's privileges the moment the dataset loads. The upstream fix
(huggingface/datasets#8879) disables the pandas builder, but no patched
release exists yet. Until one ships, the mitigation is: find every place you
load pickle-backed data, and migrate to Parquet / CSV / JSON / Arrow.
Install
pip install -e .
Zero dependencies. Python 3.9+.
Use
pickle-sentry scan-path/ # text report, exit 1 on high+
pickle-sentry . --format json --output report.json
pickle-sentry . --format sarif --output report.sarif # for GitHub code scanning
pickle-sentry . --fail-on critical # CI: only fail on critical
pickle-sentry . --exclude /tests/ # production surface only
Scan a Hugging Face Hub repo (new in 0.2.0)
pickle-sentry hub stanfordnlp/imdb # a dataset
pickle-sentry hub hf-internal-testing/tiny-random-bert --repo-type model
pickle-sentry hub user/repo --max-size-mb 16 --format json
Lists the repo's files via the Hub API, downloads pickle-family files
(.pkl, .pickle, .joblib, .pt, .pth, and classic pytorch_model.bin)
and inspects them by disassembly — including the pickle stream inside torch
zip archives — and AST-scans any Python files in the repo. Files over the
size cap are flagged, not downloaded. Set HF_TOKEN for private repos.
Nothing downloaded is ever executed.
What it catches
In Python code (AST scan — parses, never imports your code):
| Rule | Severity | What |
|---|---|---|
HF-DATASETS-PANDAS-BUILDER |
critical | load_dataset("pandas", ...) — CVE-2026-57845 |
UNSAFE-DESERIALIZATION |
high | pickle.load/loads, dill, cloudpickle, marshal, shelve, joblib.load |
PANDAS-READ-PICKLE |
high | pandas.read_pickle(...) |
TORCH-LOAD-WEIGHTS-ONLY-FALSE |
high | torch.load(..., weights_only=False) |
TORCH-LOAD-NO-WEIGHTS-ONLY |
medium | torch.load(...) with no explicit weights_only=True |
YAML-UNSAFE-LOAD |
medium | yaml.load(...) without a SafeLoader |
NUMPY-ALLOW-PICKLE |
high | numpy.load(..., allow_pickle=True) |
In data files (disassembly via pickletools, never unpickled):
| Rule | Severity | What |
|---|---|---|
PICKLE-DANGEROUS-REDUCE |
critical | Pickle calls os.system, subprocess.*, eval, exec, etc. via REDUCE |
PICKLE-REDUCE-CALLABLE |
high | Pickle invokes a non-standard callable via REDUCE (the CVE PoC payload's shape) |
PICKLE-DANGEROUS-GLOBAL / PICKLE-SUSPICIOUS-MODULE |
high/medium | Dangerous globals referenced without a reduce |
PICKLE-FILE-PRESENT |
medium | Any other .pkl / .pickle / .joblib file, and pickle streams inside torch .pt/.pth zip archives |
Real-life use case
docs/USE-CASE.md walks through a real one end to end:
scanning the actual published CVE-2026-57845 PoC repository before
touching it. pickle-sentry flags the vulnerable loader (run_poc.py:139,
critical) and disassembles the live payload (attacker-controlled.pkl,
high) — and the PoC's own marker.txt proves the payload never executed
during the scan.
Live examples
Scanned two real codebases on 9 Nov 2026 — full results, methodology, and honest limits in docs/LIVE-EXAMPLES.md:
- huggingface/datasets: 258 files, 24 findings — and exactly one in
production source: the CVE sink itself,
pd.read_pickle(f)atpackaged_modules/pandas/pandas.py:56. - scikit-learn: 1,037 files, 73 findings — 16 outside tests, concentrated
in
sklearn/datasets/loaders unpickling cached copies of remotely fetched datasets.
Also included: a composite GitHub Action (action.yml, use it as
uses: Sun-Wukhan/pickle-sentry@main) and a pre-commit hook
(.pre-commit-hooks.yaml). Use --exclude /tests/ to cut test-fixture noise.
Demo
pickle-sentry examples/vulnerable # flags the CVE pattern + every sink, exit 1
pickle-sentry examples/safe # clean, exit 0
pickle-sentry examples/hf-datasets-pandas.py
# ^ the actual upstream datasets pandas builder (verbatim from
# huggingface/datasets main): flags pd.read_pickle(f) at line 56 —
# the exact sink behind CVE-2026-57845.
Migrate off pickle
- Datasets:
load_dataset("parquet" | "csv" | "json" | "arrow", ...) - Your own DataFrame:
Dataset.from_pandas(df)instead of a pickle file - DataFrames on disk:
df.to_parquet(...)/pd.read_parquet(...) - Torch:
torch.load(path, weights_only=True)
Tests
pip install pytest
pytest
The inspector tests build a real malicious pickle (__reduce__ → os.system)
and assert two things: it is flagged critical, and the payload's canary file
never appears — i.e. inspection did not execute it.
Licence
MIT
Metadata
Release files for pickle-sentry 0.2.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| pickle_sentry-0.2.0.tar.gz | 17.5 kB | With provenance | Details for pickle_sentry-0.2.0.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| pickle_sentry-0.2.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for pickle_sentry-0.2.0-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 33.0 kB
Release files / pickle_sentry-0.2.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | pickle_sentry-0.2.0.tar.gz |
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| Size | 17.5 kB |
| Tags | Source |
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SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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