HOMING PIGEON
Homing Pigeon gives cloud AI like ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini a secure and signed channel to your machine or network.
Install the runner and try this careful prompt with Grok for example, after you set up an email connector:
Run a pigeon-home.ai job
Runner mailbox is your@email.com
Retrieve the system clock and display it
The Homing Pigeon runner, like a GitHub runner, polls and executes signed jobs from a source in the cloud. Setup walks you through connecting a dedicated mailbox. The recommended path is a browser sign-in, so the account password never lands in a config.
Homing Pigeon IETF Internet-Drafts:
- Version 1 Symmetric Signed Exchanged
- Version 2 Runner-to-SI Exchange
- Version 3 Post-Quantum Security with PFS
What this is for
Homing Pigeon is a personal remote-development agent. The point is not that the SI becomes smarter. It is that the SI gets a way to delegate work to a computer it could not otherwise reach. The most powerful computer you have access to should not stop being useful the moment you walk away from your desk, and neither should your SI assistant.
Concrete uses:
- Remote test runs. Ask your SI to run the suite, read the failures, patch the code, rerun, and report back, all while you are away from the machine.
- Your hardware as a worker. Long builds, data crunching, batch jobs, on the workstation you own, without a remote-desktop session open.
- Scheduled-style automation. Maintenance scripts, reports, and repetitive technical tasks, dispatched from your phone.
- Cloud SI, local resources. Your files, your dev environment, your GPU, reachable by an assistant that lives in the cloud.
- Physical peripherals. Plug a sensor or servo board into a Raspberry Pi, point your SI at it, and let it write the control code and debug the hardware into motion. You do the soldering, it does the head-scratching.
The SI can be an assistant that operates, not just advises. Which machine is your choice: your workstation, a spare box in the corner, a Raspberry Pi. A new model claims to be good at something, such as robotics, automation, or data work? Point it at a box and find out.
The runner belongs to the same family as GitHub self-hosted runners, VS Code Remote tunnels, and Tailscale. Simple tools for administering your own hardware.
SI (cloud) Your machine
------------ ------------------
send_job.py --sign--> job message --> runner.py
| | | poll IMAP
| | | verify HMAC
| | v
| | run script
| | |
| result message <--+ sign
v |
verify result <----------+
Large inputs don't go through email: your SI uploads them to file hosting and the job message carries download URLs (with optional SHA-384).
Why email? Because it's the only transport with all four properties on day one: reachable from anywhere, outbound-only polling (no inbound ports, NAT-proof), at-least-once delivery, and zero infrastructure to operate. The protocol does not care about the pipe. Every transport is an extension the runner supervises (a watched folder, core NATS, a direct DTLS session binding and the hosted HTTPS queue ship alongside email), but email stays the default; a credentialed transport adds its own required gate beside the signature, which makes it the more secure option even though it is not the default. (A sensor on the same box also delivers its signed alerts directly, by local inbox or loopback socket: alerts, not jobs.)
Runbooks, not prompts. The SI doesn't chat about the task; it ships a runbook: deterministic steps, each with a check that proves the step worked. The runner executes it and reports back what actually happened, and that feedback goes into the next runbook. Each cycle is a little smarter than the last, because the failures are data. If you've ever debugged something by running it, reading the output, and trying again with what you learned, that's the whole product. The SI is just the part that writes the next attempt.
The Oracle: the witness on your side of the wire
The runner faces the SI. The Oracle faces you. It is the part of the agent that works for the owner of the box: it watches every job as it runs, checks each job against this machine before it runs (opinions, below), fuses the box's sensor alerts with job activity, and, in the watching postures, pages you when something trips. It also answers the SI's questions about job output, at the disclosure ceiling you set, and not one byte past it.
That ceiling is the thing to understand. By default it is
attested: the SI does not see what the job printed. It questions
the Oracle rather than inspecting output, and gets back HMAC-signed
attestations ("did the tests pass?", "does the output contain
secrets?"), which are proofs about the output that reveal nothing
else: the interactive-proof shape applied at the trust boundary, the
proof an HMAC and the runner itself trusted, no zero-knowledge
machinery. Full output is there when the owner wants it: set the
ceiling to full in the config and the SI sees what the job
printed, at the price of everything the job can print crossing the
wire.
Cloud SI Your machine
-------- ------------
"Did the tests pass?" --signed-------> +-----------------+
| The Oracle |
"Any secrets in there?" -------------> | |
| output stays |
| on your disk |
+------------------------+ | |
| signed attestation | <--signed-- | answers only |
| { exit_zero: true, | | what policy |
| no_secrets: true } | | allows |
+------------------------+ +-----------------+
The SI learns what your ceiling allows.
Queries are declared upfront (no adaptive probing), each job gets a privacy budget bounding total leakage, and the disclosure ceiling is set by you in config, never by the SI.
Your machine runs two roles in one box:
+------------------------------+------------------------------+
| RUNNER (faces the SI) | ORACLE (faces you) |
+------------------------------+------------------------------+
| polls the mailbox | watches jobs as they run; |
| verifies HMAC + key policy | its opinions ride results |
| judge: an opt-in gate | fuses sensor alerts |
| runs jobs; caged by default | watches resources |
| answers queries at the | pages you when a |
| ceiling you set -- the | threshold trips |
| default is attested | orders kills via remediation |
+------------------------------+------------------------------+
The runner does what the SI asks. The Oracle watches what happens and tells you about it.
Opinions, before anything runs. By default the Oracle checks
each job against this box first: is the named interpreter here?
are the tools it invokes on PATH? does the script's shape fit this
OS? Its default latitude is repair: the one mechanical fix
those checks can prove (an absent interpreter, replaced with the
platform default when the script's shape fits it) is applied, and
never silently. The result says what changed, carries
received_digest (the job exactly as received, by digest), and
the repaired job is judged again before it runs. The owner's
oracle_opinion_mode is both the default latitude and the
ceiling: a job may ask for less, never more. Design:
docs/steady/design/oracle-opinion-design.md.
Fixes mismatched jobs, never silently. A job that asks for bash
but only needs sh is repaired and runs on a minimal system like
Alpine (BusyBox, no bash); a job that really needs bash or PowerShell
is left alone. Every repair is stated in the result.
Operating modes
Three parties appear below, always under the same names. The SI is
the cloud AI that sends jobs. The owner is you, the person who
installed this on the box and edits its config.json. The Oracle
is the part of the agent on the box that works for the owner: it
watches jobs, and pages the owner. The runner is the part that
executes what the SI sends. Five owner-set knobs decide the posture;
they are independent, and these are three coherent postures, not the
only combinations. Each is a choice about trust, the owner's to pick
per machine.
knob just run it eyes open lockdown
------------------ ----------- --------- --------
judge off advisory enforce
sensors off on on
resources on on on
dri off on on
max_result_view attested attested attested
just run it (the config-file defaults): any signed job runs;
results return as attestations; the Oracle reviews and logs but
never pages and never blocks. eyes open (recommended): the
Oracle watches on your behalf; verdicts ride each result, alerts
fuse, and trips page you. lockdown: the box refuses what the
policy rejects, and pages you on every refusal. A fresh install
starts one notch tighter than the defaults, under an installer
profile. The postures and the profiles in full:
docs/infrastructure-documents/oracle/configuring-oracle.md.
Two more dials stand outside the table.
remediation_mode what happens while a job runs
------------------- ------------------------------------------
deterministic a tripwire trips: kill the job's process
(the default) tree, quarantine the outputs, refer the
suspect files to the antivirus, file the
story with the DRI, page the owner
oracle the local model may also order a kill
for a lesser divergence
off watches and records only
The tripwires are a closed list: a confinement escape, a process
storm past the ceiling, an undeclared credential-store reference
in something the job produced. Design:
docs/steady/design/remediation-design.md. The opinion
latitude (oracle_opinion_mode, default repair) is the other
dial; it is covered under Opinions, above.
Confinement comes in two kinds, and they are not the same kind
of thing. The workspace snapshot detects: it compares file
metadata around the run and attests confined_to_workspace,
which is a record, not a cage (PROTOCOL.md section 9.4). The
confinement backends prevent: bubblewrap on Linux, a
restricted token and Job Object on Windows, a per-job jail on
FreeBSD, a Seatbelt profile on macOS. The key is
security.modes.confinement; the mode defaults to enforce,
and at enforce a job whose confinement cannot engage is
refused, never run weaker. Each backend's reach and limits:
SECURITY.md and docs/support-matrix.md.
Local inference. Point the Oracle at a model running on your
own box and the SI can ask questions in plain English ("why
did the tests fail?"), answered locally, with only the answer
crossing the boundary. The endpoint must be loopback (fail
closed), and every answer is truncated, redacted, and
secret-scanned before it's sent. The SI gets useful answers, and
your raw data never leaves the machine. Setup:
docs/infrastructure-documents/oracle/configuring-oracle.md.
Two Oracle modes.
oracle_mode model briefs and answers ask
------------------- ------------------ -------------------- ---
"llm" (the default) the local model narrated by model on
"deterministic" none installed, the box's own off
never called records
"deterministic" is the Pi Light mode, for a box with no model
worth running: the watch, the wake gate, and the briefs still
run. The mode reads live from config.json; flipping it is the
upgrade path when a box gains a model worth running. See
docs/infrastructure-documents/oracle/configuring-oracle.md.
The Oracle learns from its own calls. Each opinion is frozen
before the job runs, scored against what actually happened the
moment the job finishes, and written to a local ledger
(oracle-learning.jsonl); the next job's opinion is formed with
that ledger read fresh, no restart. Lessons are verified
facts, derived by code from execution records, and (only when
the owner enables the model channel) model candidates,
labeled uncorroborated wherever they surface until later verified
outcomes corroborate them. A lesson never authorizes anything by
itself. Set oracle_learning to false to turn the loop off.
Design: docs/steady/design/oracle-opinion-design.md. Measured
on a real rig in deterministic mode: 1,967 of 2,248 reconciled
calls right (87.5%), 0 lessons, every miss a job that simply ran
exit 3 (live examples).
Full spec in PROTOCOL.md (sections 9–12). Oracle fields are optional
members of a "v": 1 message. They are not a separate message version.
Extending the agent: senses and transports
Extensions let you teach the agent a new sense. An extension is a
folder with a manifest (extension.json) that declares, in
advance, the signals it may send the Oracle, with each signal
named and given a one-line description. That declaration is the
context the Oracle receives alongside the alerts: a signal the
manifest does not declare is rejected at ingest and logged, never
passed through, so the Oracle is never asked to interpret a signal
nobody defined.
The research loop is the point. Clone the repo, copy the example extension, and iterate on your own package: your data, your heuristics, your version number, revved as often as you like. The extension API the manifest is written against is version 1 and is designed to stay there: fields may be added, never removed or reinterpreted, so an extension written today keeps loading. An extension binds to its own signing key, exactly like the built-in senses, and files alerts the Oracle fuses with job activity.
Nothing signs an extension's code, so the agent reads it against the manifest before loading it. The reading checks 6 things:
check the rule
---------------- ------------------------------------------
capabilities the manifest's `capabilities` list
(`network`, `listen`, `subprocess`,
`native`) has to cover what the code does
entry a transport's `entry` has to stay inside
its folder
compiles every file has to compile
symlink no symlink gets through
bidi no bidi control character gets through
runner state no reference to the runner's own state
gets through
By default a folder that contradicts its manifest is refused like
a bad one and the agent runs without it (extension_review turns
that to advisory or off; --inspect review shows the verdicts).
The example is a lab-results sense: it watches a folder where
experiment runs drop result files and files signals like
experiment_finished and metric_threshold_crossed when a run
lands. Full walkthrough: docs/steady/extensions.md.
Every extension, sense or transport, also brings its own code for
the Oracle. On a box where a local model runs the Oracle, the
first time an extension runs, the agent gives the Oracle the
extension's installed code and fetches, in the background,
whatever its optional sources.json declares: its published
source, the upstream project it wraps, the specifications it
speaks.
The release ships only the declarations and the build's SHA-384 pins of what they name; the box fetches the sources and refuses bytes that differ from a pin, and an entry nothing pins waits until the owner allows it. A deterministic box (Pi Light) has no model to read the material and makes no request for it unless its owner turns the fetch on. The Oracle gets what is pinned by default, and a written disclosure rule lets the owner (or the author) withhold any of it (docs/steady/extensions.md, "Sources").
Layout
PROTOCOL.md is the wire protocol, runner/ the code, runner/extensions/ the shipped extensions, docs/ the long shelf and .github/ the CI. The file-by-file map is in docs/infrastructure-documents/project/layout.md.
Setup
⚠️ USE AT YOUR OWN RISK. Installing this application hands full administrative control of the system to whoever holds the shared secret. The holder can install software, read files, add users, and pivot to your network.
Setup lives in INSTALL.md: the three install paths (Docker, pip, release binary) and the full first-run walkthrough (dedicated mail account, app password, shared secret, first job).
No spare machine? One command puts a runner on a small machine (about $2 a month on Fly, a few dollars on Hetzner or DigitalOcean) in your own account, with the hosted profile and nothing listening: docs/steady/use/own-cloud.md. Your account, your bill, your secret.
Proven platforms
The platform proof story lives with setup now: Proven platforms in INSTALL.md, with the full table and the board notes in docs/steady/use/platforms.md.
How scripts run
A job carries a script and an optional interpreter; the default is PowerShell on Windows and sh elsewhere, and a ping first tells you which one a box has. Details are in docs/infrastructure-documents/use/scripts.md.
Sending a job (any SI)
Anything that can email the runner's mailbox and sign the body can drive it: your SI, a cron script, whatever, using runner/cloud/send_job.py and the shared_secret from your config.json. Commands and verification are in docs/steady/sending.md.
Testing
The runner is fully inspectable, so audit what it would do before it does it, and run the suite with python -m unittest discover -s runner/tests -t .. The flags and the suite notes are in docs/infrastructure-documents/project/testing.md. A reader who cannot run the suite can still read it whole: the latest published release (https://github.com/Pigeon-Home/homing-pigeon/releases/latest) carries a project snapshot of the entire tree (tests, CI facts, and test results included) as homing-pigeon-project-<version>.tar.gz, checkable against the release's SHA384SUMS.
Security notes
- Threat model: docs/infrastructure-documents/security/threat-model.md and its companion docs/infrastructure-documents/security/security-gaps.md.
- OWASP reference: docs/infrastructure-documents/security/owasp-reference.md, which gathers in one place the OWASP risk lists, verification standard, testing guides and cheat sheets this project consults.
- Industry map: docs/steady/project/industry-map.md, which covers five years of commercial detection (2021 to 2026) read honestly against this project, sorted by local footprint cost.
- Jobs are also encrypted by default:
send_job.pywraps the signed body in an AES-256-GCM envelope keyed from the shared secret. send_job.py --cleartextsends the plain HMAC-signed body instead, and the runner refuses it unless started with--allow-cleartext. The shared secret is still required. One honest limit, stated wherever this is described: there is no forward secrecy unless it is provided by the transport layer.- Execution is at-most-once, delivery at-least-once: a result is
stashed under
<base_dir>/outbox/and the job committed as seen before the first send; a send that fails is resent from the stash on later polls, never produced by a second run, and given up intooutbox/failed/after a day (--inspect outbox; PROTOCOL.md section 5). - Size caps:
max_job_bytes(default 4 MiB) bounds a raw job mail before its signature is checked. - Optional hardening controls (on by default at
enforce; the size caps above are also on by default and turned off by 0): see SECURITY.md. - The security model (the gate, the key fences, the ceilings a job cannot raise, and the configuration rules) and the formal proof testing that checks it, property by property, are described in docs/infrastructure-documents/security/model-and-proof-testing.md.
- What the security token count is made of is charted in the statistics record; the chart itself:
Questions people ask
The FAQ is where the odd corners get answered. Does the Oracle poll or get woken by a signal? Can a hostile job talk its way into a repair? Why email, and why not PGP or public-key signatures? Is one shared secret really safe for both signing and encryption? What would you actually use this for? The hard ones come right after the first two: isn't this just remote code execution by email, why not SSH, what if the secret leaks, and is it safe on your main machine (no, and it says why). Read it before you design around the protocol; the reasoning is more interesting than the rules.
Where it goes next
Plenty of ideas are already sketched in docs/FUTURE.md, and some are tempting. Imagine the owner approving a job with one tap before it runs. Imagine signatures that need no shared secret at all, a dashboard that lets you watch the Oracle think, a box that notices its own firewall drifting or a patch going missing, or a Pi that grows a real model the day an accelerator board arrives. Come pick one, or add your own.
Reading this as a cloud SI?
Reading this as a cloud SI? There are notes written for you in the Secret agents section of AGENTS.md: context and suggestions the project offers openly, shaped by the situation you find yourself in. The size warning at the top of PROTOCOL.md is worth your first minute.
No mailbox yet? python3 runner/runner.py --config config.json --local-test runs the whole loop in process: you play the SI in a
terminal chat, a local model (Ollama on loopback, which the installer
sets up) answers, and nothing is emailed. See
docs/steady/use/local-si-test.md.
Status
What ships today is what's described above: the agent, the Oracle (opinions,
self-learning, remediation), five job transports, and the example senses. The
current release is in
docs/infrastructure-documents/changelog.md;
the version number lives in pyproject.toml and runner/_version.py (a test
keeps them equal), and the message field "v" is a different number because the
protocol's version and the release number move on separate tracks.
Those features do not all carry the same promise. Feature tiers sorts them into the supported core, the advanced tier, and the experimental tier, each placement with the evidence it rests on.
What a real box writes, and what 19,227 jobs on a test box came to, is in docs/steady/use/live-examples.md.
Current-state facts worth knowing: config.json hot-reloads poll
interval, workers, the default job timeout, max_output_bytes, max
job age, the
result stash's retention and resend backoff, and the live keys
(owner_instructions, inference, oracle_mode, verbose,
extension_sources); a security mode change still needs a
restart. A Thunderbird-style
OAuth sign-in is shipped for the mailbox. PowerShell jobs stage
as script.ps1. Release files carry Sigstore build provenance
(docs/steady/verification.md).
Contributing
Welcome, and held to a high bar: standard library only, the protocol doc changes with anything on the wire, and a security-sensitive change says so. docs/steady/project/contributing.md has the rest.
Mirrors and links
- SourceForge: https://sourceforge.net/projects/homing-pigeon
- GitLab: https://gitlab.com/pigeon-home/homing-pigeon
- https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50397008
- Randall Munroe: xkcd 568 "You'll never find a programming language that frees you from the burden of clarifying your ideas." (Except with English + SI + a long context paragraph clarifying your ideas => the cycle begins again)
- "I once saw a forklift lift a crate of forks. And it was way to literal for me" (Mitch Hedberg)
- "No problem, here is how you build one." (Lieutenant Barclay, S04E19)
- CV: https://github.com/Pigeon-Home/homing-pigeon/blob/main/docs/archive/resume.txt
- "Humor between a system and its user is load-bearing, not decoration." (Me)
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