GGUF Template Scanner
High-level scanning utilities for GGUF model files. The library extracts embedded chat templates, runs heuristic checks for prompt-injection markers, and optionally consults Pillar's remote scanning API for deeper analysis.
Background
This project addresses security threats identified in research by Pillar Security on LLM backdoors at the inference level. The research demonstrates how malicious chat templates embedded in GGUF model files can be exploited for prompt injection and backdoor attacks, enabling unauthorized control over model behavior.
Features
- Parse GGUF headers and extract default or named chat templates with a small, dependency-light API.
- Run a shipped lightweight anomaly classifier for unknown templates using the existing trained model artifact.
- Run configurable heuristics (URLs, base64 payloads, normalize.js patterns, conditional instruction injection, supply-chain install actions, workspace exfiltration, etc.) to flag suspicious templates.
- Invoke Pillar’s hosted scanning service when an API key is provided, returning unified findings.
- Stream GGUF headers from plain URLs or Hugging Face repositories using ranged requests.
- Scan every GGUF file in a Hugging Face repo with a single call.
- Async and sync functions for local, remote, and Hugging Face scans.
Offline Template Classifier
The scanner ships with a fully offline template classifier designed for fast first-pass security review of GGUF chat templates.
At runtime, the scanner analyzes each extracted template with a lightweight CPU classifier in milliseconds and returns an offline triage verdict with confidence scores. Template hashes are still included in the scan evidence for integrity tracking and downstream workflows, but the OSS package does not rely on a shipped verdict corpus.
This allows the core scanner to inspect the actual GGUF chat templates it discovers with no network required at runtime. Remote calls to Pillar remain optional.
Classifier training corpus
The shipped classifier was trained from a population-level analysis pipeline over GGUF chat templates discovered on Hugging Face:
-
approximately 3.3M GGUF files crawled
-
2,951 unique templates after SHA-256 deduplication
-
labels produced by batch analysis over the deduplicated corpus
-
2,946 clean
-
29 suspicious
-
80 malicious
Classifier
The shipped offline artifact at
src/pillar_gguf_scanner/data/template_classifier.json.gz uses an ordinal,
two-stage design:
- A shallow gradient-boosted tree model estimates whether a template is clean or risky.
- A regularized logistic model estimates malicious versus suspicious for risky templates. Length, generic jailbreak language, and persona strength are excluded from this harm stage.
- Platt calibration and family-grouped out-of-fold predictions set thresholds that target a 1% clean review rate and a 0.25% clean-to-malicious rate.
Both models consume structural and security-oriented features extracted from Jinja2 chat templates, including:
- control-flow complexity
- message rewriting and patching behavior
- direct and aliased content-triggered hidden system instructions
- concealment and jailbreak language
- exfiltration indicators
- sandbox escape / RCE markers
- hardcoded URLs and script patterns
- conditional dependency-install actions across package, artifact, container, and system registries
- repository-history staging, sensitive-path collection, archive/encryption, and outbound transfer combinations
- Git remote replacement followed by mirror, all-branch, or tag pushes
- system-message manipulation signals
High-confidence semantic findings remain authoritative. The ordinal models rank and classify templates that do not complete a deterministic attack chain:
- extracted template → classifier triage
- suspicious or malicious results can then be escalated to deeper analysis or human review
This model is designed for fast offline triage, not as the only source of truth for novel attacks.
The full methodology, data provenance, label definitions, hyperparameters,
calibration policy, evaluation protocol, artifact hash, and reproducibility
limitations are documented in model/MODEL_CARD.md.
Reported validation metrics
The primary metrics use five-fold StratifiedGroupKFold. Complete collected
model families are held out together, and FARA, public research-backdoor,
installation, exfiltration, and near-miss variants remain within one fold.
Related variants cannot appear in both training and validation.
| Class | Precision | Recall | F1 | Support |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| clean | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 2,946 |
| suspicious | 0.38 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 29 |
| malicious | 0.93 | 0.89 | 0.91 | 80 |
| macro average | 0.77 | 0.72 | 0.74 | 3,055 |
Confusion matrix:
| Actual \ Predicted | clean | suspicious | malicious |
|---|---|---|---|
| clean | 2,928 | 13 | 5 |
| suspicious | 21 | 8 | 0 |
| malicious | 9 | 0 | 71 |
The observed clean review rate is 0.611%, and the clean-to-malicious rate is 0.170%. Suspicious remains data-limited; malicious behavior is the principal blocking target.
Caveats
- The suspicious class remains the weakest class because 29 examples cannot represent the full diversity of partial attack-chain behavior and overlap with legitimate strong system prompts or uncensored personas. Treat its score as exploratory rather than production-quality.
- The malicious class is materially stronger and is the primary purpose of the classifier: fast offline triage for novel or previously unseen templates.
- The malicious training set is still concentrated around several attack families, including namespace patching, sandbox escapes, jailbreak injection, script-tag injection, system-message hijacking, conditional supply-chain installation, and staged workspace or repository-history exfiltration.
- A genuinely novel attack that does not activate the current feature set can still evade the classifier. That is why the classifier complements, rather than replaces, longer-running analysis pipelines and human review.
Installation
With uv (recommended)
# install runtime dependencies
uv sync
# add testing extras
uv sync --group test
Via pip
pip install pillar-gguf-scanner
Quickstart
from pillar_gguf_scanner import GGUFTemplateScanner, Verdict
scanner = GGUFTemplateScanner()
# Scan a local GGUF file
result = scanner.scan("models/my-model.gguf")
print(result.verdict) # Verdict.CLEAN, Verdict.SUSPICIOUS, Verdict.MALICIOUS, or Verdict.ERROR
for finding in result.findings:
print(f"{finding.rule_id}: {finding.message}")
if result.errors:
for detail in result.errors:
print(f"error[{detail.code}] -> {detail.message}")
if detail.context:
print(detail.context)
Using the Pillar API
from pillar_gguf_scanner import GGUFTemplateScanner
scanner = GGUFTemplateScanner(pillar_api_key="your-api-key")
result = scanner.scan("models/my-model.gguf", use_pillar=True)
Set use_pillar=False to opt out of remote calls on a per-scan basis. Remote requests use httpx clients supplied by the caller or managed internally.
Scanning Different Sources
Scanning Hugging Face Models
Scan GGUF files hosted on Hugging Face repositories using the scan_huggingface() method:
from pillar_gguf_scanner import GGUFTemplateScanner
scanner = GGUFTemplateScanner()
# Synchronous scanning
result = scanner.scan_huggingface(
repo_id="TheBloke/Llama-2-7B-GGUF",
filename="llama-2-7b.Q4_K_M.gguf",
revision="main", # optional, defaults to "main"
token="hf_xxx" # optional, for private repos
)
print(f"Verdict: {result.verdict.value}")
for finding in result.findings:
print(f"[{finding.severity.value}] {finding.rule_id}: {finding.message}")
Alternatively, use the unified scan() method with a HuggingFaceRepoRef:
from pillar_gguf_scanner import GGUFTemplateScanner, HuggingFaceRepoRef
scanner = GGUFTemplateScanner()
ref = HuggingFaceRepoRef(
repo_id="TheBloke/Llama-2-7B-GGUF",
filename="llama-2-7b.Q4_K_M.gguf",
revision="main"
)
result = scanner.scan(ref)
Scanning every GGUF in a Hugging Face repo
scan_huggingface_repo() lists the repo tree at the given revision, keeps
paths ending in .gguf, and scans each file (header-only range requests, so
multi-file repos stay cheap):
from pillar_gguf_scanner import GGUFTemplateScanner
scanner = GGUFTemplateScanner()
for result in scanner.scan_huggingface_repo("ariel-pillar/Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct-GGUF"):
print(result.source, result.verdict.value)
An async variant (ascan_huggingface_repo()) and file-listing helpers
(list_huggingface_repo_files(), list_huggingface_gguf_files()) are also
available. If the repo cannot be listed, or contains no GGUF files, a
single Verdict.ERROR result is returned (codes remote_fetch_error and
no_gguf_files).
Scanning from URLs
Scan GGUF files from direct download URLs:
from pillar_gguf_scanner import GGUFTemplateScanner
scanner = GGUFTemplateScanner()
# Direct URL scanning
result = scanner.scan_url("https://example.com/model.gguf")
# Or use the unified scan() method
result = scanner.scan("https://example.com/model.gguf")
Async Scans
All scanning methods have async variants for concurrent operations:
import asyncio
from pillar_gguf_scanner import GGUFTemplateScanner
scanner = GGUFTemplateScanner()
async def scan_models():
# Async Hugging Face scanning
hf_result = await scanner.ascan_huggingface(
repo_id="TheBloke/Llama-2-7B-GGUF",
filename="llama-2-7b.Q4_K_M.gguf",
token="hf_xxx" # optional
)
# Async URL scanning
url_result = await scanner.ascan_url("https://example.com/model.gguf")
# Async local file scanning
path_result = await scanner.ascan_path("models/local-model.gguf")
return hf_result, url_result, path_result
results = asyncio.run(scan_models())
For efficient batch scanning with connection pooling, use scanner_session() or ascanner_session() context managers:
from pillar_gguf_scanner import ascanner_session
async def batch_scan(repo_files):
async with ascanner_session() as scanner:
tasks = [
scanner.ascan_huggingface(repo_id, filename)
for repo_id, filename in repo_files
]
return await asyncio.gather(*tasks)
The low-level helpers fetch_chat_templates_from_url, afetch_chat_templates_from_url, fetch_chat_templates_from_huggingface, afetch_chat_templates_from_huggingface, list_huggingface_repo_files, and list_huggingface_gguf_files (plus async alist_* variants) are also available for integrating into existing pipelines.
Common Patterns
Quick Reference: Scanning Methods
from pillar_gguf_scanner import GGUFTemplateScanner, HuggingFaceRepoRef
scanner = GGUFTemplateScanner()
# Local file
result = scanner.scan("path/to/model.gguf")
result = scanner.scan_path("path/to/model.gguf") # explicit method
# Direct URL
result = scanner.scan("https://example.com/model.gguf")
result = scanner.scan_url("https://example.com/model.gguf") # explicit method
# Hugging Face - Method 1: Direct method (recommended for clarity)
result = scanner.scan_huggingface("owner/repo", "model.gguf")
# Hugging Face - Method 2: Via unified scan() with HuggingFaceRepoRef
ref = HuggingFaceRepoRef(repo_id="owner/repo", filename="model.gguf")
result = scanner.scan(ref)
# Hugging Face - whole repo: scan every GGUF file it contains
results = scanner.scan_huggingface_repo("owner/repo")
Checking Scan Results
from pillar_gguf_scanner import Verdict
result = scanner.scan("model.gguf")
# Check overall verdict
if result.verdict == Verdict.MALICIOUS:
print("⚠️ Malicious template detected!")
elif result.verdict == Verdict.SUSPICIOUS:
print("⚠️ Suspicious patterns found")
elif result.verdict == Verdict.CLEAN:
print("✅ No threats detected")
elif result.verdict == Verdict.ERROR:
print("❌ Scan failed")
for error in result.errors:
print(f" {error.code}: {error.message}")
# Access findings
for finding in result.findings:
print(f"[{finding.severity.value}] {finding.rule_id}: {finding.message}")
if finding.snippet:
print(f" Snippet: {finding.snippet[:100]}...")
# Access classifier results
for prediction in result.classifier_results:
print(prediction.template_name, prediction.verdict.value, prediction.confidence)
# Check if templates were found
if result.evidence.default_template:
print(f"Default template length: {result.evidence.template_lengths['default']}")
print(f"Template hash: {result.evidence.template_hashes['default']}")
Batch Scanning with Connection Reuse
from pillar_gguf_scanner import scanner_session
models = [
("TheBloke/Llama-2-7B-GGUF", "llama-2-7b.Q4_K_M.gguf"),
("TheBloke/Mistral-7B-GGUF", "mistral-7b.Q4_K_M.gguf"),
]
# Connection pooling for efficiency
with scanner_session() as scanner:
for repo_id, filename in models:
result = scanner.scan_huggingface(repo_id, filename)
print(f"{repo_id}/{filename}: {result.verdict.value}")
Customising Heuristics
Provide a ScannerConfig with your own rule set or severity overrides:
from pillar_gguf_scanner import (
DEFAULT_PATTERNS,
GGUFTemplateScanner,
PatternRule,
ScannerConfig,
Severity,
merge_heuristics,
)
custom_rules = [
PatternRule(
rule_id="custom-warning",
severity=Severity.MEDIUM,
message="Template contains forbidden phrase",
search_terms=("do not disclose",),
),
]
config = ScannerConfig(
heuristic_rules=merge_heuristics(DEFAULT_PATTERNS, custom_rules),
url_severity=Severity.HIGH,
)
scanner = GGUFTemplateScanner(config=config)
result = scanner.scan("model.gguf")
CLI
pillar-gguf-scanner ships with a pillar-gguf-scanner executable.
# binary installed by uv or pip
uv run pillar-gguf-scanner path/to/model.gguf
# JSON output and remote scanning
pillar-gguf-scanner path/to/model.gguf --json --pillar-api-key "$PILLAR_API_KEY"
# scan a single file on Hugging Face
pillar-gguf-scanner --hf-repo owner/repo --hf-filename model.gguf
# scan every GGUF file in a Hugging Face repo
uv run pillar-gguf-scanner --hf-repo ariel-pillar/Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct-GGUF
--hf-revision requires --hf-repo. Leading hf:// and trailing slashes on
--hf-repo are tolerated (hf://owner/repo/ works). A positional hf://…
argument is rejected with a hint to use --hf-repo instead.
Repo scans print one verdict line per file plus a Summary: X clean, Y suspicious, Z malicious, W error footer. While a repo scan runs, progress
goes to stderr — first Scanning N GGUF file(s) in owner/repo@main…, then one
[i/N] verdict source line per completed file — so --json output on stdout
stays parseable. With --json, a repo scan emits
{"repo_id": ..., "revision": ..., "summary": {...}, "results": [...]} where
each entry has the same shape as a single-file scan. The exit code is 1 if
any file is malicious or errored, 0 otherwise (single-file scans: 1 on
malicious/error, 0 on clean/suspicious).
Run pillar-gguf-scanner --help to see all options, including severity overrides and Pillar toggles.
The core package scans local files, direct URLs, single Hugging Face GGUF files, and whole Hugging Face repos. Larger-scale Hugging Face crawling, live monitoring, and registry-wide batch orchestration are intended to sit on top of the library rather than inside the core scanner.
usage: pillar-gguf-scanner [-h] [--pillar-api-key PILLAR_API_KEY]
[--no-pillar] [--json] [--no-color]
[--url-severity {info,low,medium,high,critical}]
[--base64-severity {info,low,medium,high,critical}]
[--initial-request-size INITIAL_REQUEST_SIZE]
[--max-request-size MAX_REQUEST_SIZE]
[--hf-repo HF_REPO] [--hf-filename HF_FILENAME]
[--hf-revision HF_REVISION] [--hf-token HF_TOKEN]
[source]
Development
uv sync --group test– install dev + test dependenciesuv run pytest– execute the test suiteuv run ruff check src tests– lint maintained package and test code with Ruff (optional but recommended)uv run mypy src– run static type checksuv run python -m build– create distribution artifacts
Tests live in tests/ and cover parsing, heuristics, and remote fetch logic. The suite requires the test dependency group.
Troubleshooting
API Key Issues
Problem: "Pillar API key not working" or authentication errors Solution:
- Verify your API key is set correctly:
export PILLAR_API_KEY="your-key-here" - Check the key is passed to the scanner:
GGUFTemplateScanner(pillar_api_key=os.environ["PILLAR_API_KEY"]) - Ensure you're using
use_pillar=Truewhen callingscan() - Contact Pillar support if authentication continues to fail
Timeout Errors
Problem: "Remote fetch timeout" or requests timing out Solution:
- Increase the timeout in your config:
config = ScannerConfig(request_timeout=120.0) # 2 minutes scanner = GGUFTemplateScanner(config=config)
- Check your network connection and firewall settings
- For large models, the initial header fetch may take longer
False Positives
Problem: Legitimate templates flagged as suspicious Solution:
- Adjust severity levels to reduce noise:
config = ScannerConfig( url_severity=Severity.LOW, # URLs are common in templates base64_severity=Severity.INFO, # Reduce base64 alerts )
- Review the specific findings and snippets to understand what triggered the detection
- Create custom rules that override defaults using
merge_heuristics()
Range Request Errors
Problem: "Server does not support range requests" when scanning URLs Solution:
- The URL must support HTTP Range headers for efficient scanning
- Download the file locally and use
scan_path()instead:scanner.scan_path("/path/to/downloaded/model.gguf")
GGUF Parse Errors
Problem: "Invalid GGUF magic" or "Buffer underrun" errors Solution:
- Verify the file is actually a GGUF file:
file model.ggufshould show binary data - Check the file isn't corrupted or truncated
- Ensure you have read permissions:
ls -l model.gguf - For remote URLs, verify the URL points directly to the .gguf file, not an HTML page
Missing Chat Templates
Problem: GGUF file scans as CLEAN but you expected findings Solution:
- Check if the model actually has chat templates:
result = scanner.scan("model.gguf") if result.evidence.default_template is None and not result.evidence.named_templates: print("No chat template found in this model")
- Some GGUF files don't include chat templates in metadata
- View extracted templates:
print(result.evidence.default_template)
Getting Help
If you encounter issues not covered here:
- Check the examples in
examples/directory for working code - Enable debug logging to see detailed error information:
import logging logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG)
- Open an issue on GitHub with:
- Error message and full traceback
- Scanner configuration and code snippet
- GGUF file source (if publicly accessible)
Contributing
- Fork and clone the repository.
- Install dependencies with
uv sync --group test. - Create a feature branch and ensure
pytestpasses. - Open a pull request describing the change and relevant context.
Bug reports and feature suggestions are welcome through GitHub issues.
License
Distributed under the terms of the Apache License 2.0. See LICENSE for full text.
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