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plied

A work record that lives in git, for teams of AI agents and people working on the same project at once.

Plying is the step that twists single threads into one yarn. plied does the same for work: each agent's line of work stays a separate, readable record, and together they form one record that can be checked.

  • A work tree. Nodes (threads) with a status, what they wait on, their schedule and approval, and, once closed, a quoted outcome and the problems they leave unresolved.
  • Commitments. Promises made along the way ("if X, then Y"; "before Z, do W"), quoted word for word from the record that made them. They come up for review before any consequential action.
  • Questions. Decisions that wait on someone with the authority to make them, answered only by a record that has that authority.
  • Messages. Notes addressed to a node and delivered to whoever is on it now, with delivery, read and acknowledgement kept separate.
  • Literature. Checked citations of cleared papers by PDF page, page search, page images and backlinks.
  • Checks. Broken references, invalid states, dependency cycles and paraphrased "quotations" are errors. Stale nodes and unrecorded commitments are warnings.

Everything is plain Markdown with YAML frontmatter, or JSON lines, tracked in git. Generated views make it easy to browse. There is no database, no server and no daemon: it is one binary with no runtime dependencies.

$ plied tree
T001  M1: the reference species reproduces food sharing     open
├── T002  In-nest motion                                     closed, outcome D088, carries F068, F075
├── T003  Transfer to the 1999 experiments                   closed, outcome D107, carries F081, F093
│   ├── T004  Contact split, during vs after the main bout   open, next 1, lead
│   └── T005  Step-5 closure wording                         waiting ⟵ Q01
└── T006  Cause of colony synchrony                          open
    └── T007  S2 audit                                       waiting ⟵ Q02, approval: not approved

Install

pipx install plied                # or `uv tool install plied`; prebuilt binary, no Rust needed
cargo install plied               # from crates.io
cargo install plied --features pdf   # adds PDF page text and page images (pdfium)

You need git. The PyPI wheels are built without the pdf feature; for plied lit extract, install with cargo. Building from source needs a Rust toolchain (1.89 or newer). To run it once without installing: cargo run -- … in a checkout.

Quick start

cd your-repo
plied init                      # writes plied.toml
export PLIED_AGENT=alice        # who is acting (or pass --as on each command)

plied new thread --title "Calibrate the walking model" next=1 actor=alice
plied new thread --title "Held-out test" status=held waiting_on=[T001]
plied show T001                 # prints the record and its revision (rev)
plied set T001 actor=bob --expect <rev> --why "bob takes it over"
plied tree
plied check

Records are written to plied/threads/, plied/commitments/ and plied/questions/. The view is generated in plied/README.md. Commit them like any other file.

Give it to an agent

plied skill > SKILL.md

This prints an agent skill generated by the installed binary from its own version and command list, so it cannot drift from the plied that produced it. It covers the habits check cannot teach: the show → --expect write cycle, quoting commitments, scan triage and stale reviews. It needs no repository. Regenerate it when plied is upgraded rather than editing the copy. With --json the result is {version, skill} in the usual envelope.

How it works

One canonical checkout

Every worktree of a repository shares one git common directory. plied treats the main worktree as the canonical record. Every plied command reads and writes the canonical copy, whichever worktree it runs in, so record files in other worktrees are read-only snapshots. Runtime state that is never tracked (the lock, presence claims, the revision cache, the search index) lives in .git/plied/ and is shared by all worktrees.

Checked writes

Every change names the revision it was made against: --expect <rev>, where the rev comes from plied show. Under a file lock, plied:

  1. refuses the write if the canonical checkout is on the wrong branch (canonical_branch), has a detached HEAD, or is mid-merge, mid-rebase, mid-cherry-pick or mid-bisect;
  2. refuses it if the record moved on since that revision. You get back the current record and a diff from the revision you read, then reconcile and retry. There are no silent overwrites;
  3. refuses it if it would add a validation error. Errors that already exist elsewhere don't block unrelated work;
  4. adds a dated history line naming the agent and session, then replaces the record and the regenerated view as one recoverable write. An intent journal in .git/plied/ means a crash leaves a state plied can repair: plied recover (or the next write) finishes or undoes it, and refuses to guess if a file was edited in between. Until then, check fails and the commit guard refuses. The files still change one at a time, so a read during a write can see a mix of old and new.

If two agents read revision 7 and both write, the first write is accepted and the second gets a conflict.

Status, scheduling, approval and dependencies are separate

field meaning
status open (nothing named stops it) · waiting (on waiting_on) · held (by a decision) · parked (set aside, with revisit) · closed (concluded, outcome recorded, whatever it was) · group (organisational)
next, actor position in an actor's queue (open nodes only)
approval state: approved or not approved, plus by: the record that decided it, checked for authority and scope
waiting_on blocks. uses does not block (the node uses the other's results as they come). parent is organisational only
outcome closed nodes only: quote and ref. The quote must appear word for word in ref
carries problems still unresolved after closing
due, revisit_on dates (YYYY-MM-DD): check warns once they pass and frontier lists them; they never block anything

Closing a node records what happened. It doesn't mean success and it doesn't approve anything that depends on it. A closed parent can have open children.

Quotations are checked

outcome.quote, a commitment's wording and a citation's quote must appear in the cited source after normalising whitespace, curly quotes, Markdown emphasis and hyphenated line breaks. … marks omitted text, and the remaining parts must appear in order. A paraphrase fails, so either quote the record exactly or write the record first. A match only means the words are there. It doesn't mean they support the claim.

Authority

Pointing approval.by (or a question's answered_by, or a waiver's resolved_by) at a decision only counts if that decision says it had the authority. Declare which fields hold this in the decision source:

[[sources]]
name = "decisions"
glob = "docs/decisions/*.md"
id = "^D\\d{3}$"
authority = "authority"    # user | delegated by D012
scope = "scope"            # the ids it approves: [T004, Q02]

A decision whose scope doesn't include the node is an error. A decision with no authority field gives a warning that it can't be verified, never a pass. A validator can check this evidence. It can't establish authorisation from a label.

Commitment review before consequential actions

plied review T004 --action run:fit-20261024 --gate
plied dispose P02 --action run:fit-20261024 --disposition not-triggered \
      --because "rule 1 not read yet" --expect <rev>

A commitment applies to a node in four ways:

  • it's attached to the node directly (nodes, or the node's links);
  • it's attached to anything the node reaches through waiting_on or uses;
  • it's attached to an ancestor and says applies: subtree;
  • it says applies: project.

parent alone never carries an obligation. Each commitment is shown with the chain of links through which it applies. --gate needs --action and exits with code 6 until every applicable commitment has a disposition for that action and none of them is blocks. Dispositions for other actions don't count. Use the gate in your run scripts. Structure can't tell whether a scientific trigger has fired: that's the reviewer's judgement, recorded with its reason.

Messages and presence

plied claim T004                          # "I'm on T004": an expiring lease, renewed by the hook
plied send T004 "Hold the rerun until D140 is read."   # to whoever is on T004, plus subscribers
plied send T004 "…" --to bob --id 01HX…   # explicit recipients; your own id makes retries safe
plied inbox                               # marks messages read (--peek doesn't)
plied ack <id>                            # receipt only, never approval
plied messages T004                       # the node's conversation

Messages are tracked: one append-only JSON-lines log per node in plied/messages/. Each message records who was present when it was sent. Every event has a unique id, so a retry with the same id is recorded once; reusing an id for a different message is refused. Writes are locked. A torn last line from an interrupted write is cut before the next append.

Presence is a lease. It estimates that an agent is on a node; it doesn't prove the agent is running.

Claude Code delivers messages at the agent's next prompt, or after a tool call. Add this to .claude/settings.json:

{
  "hooks": {
    "SessionStart":     [{ "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "plied hook claude" }] }],
    "UserPromptSubmit": [{ "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "plied hook claude" }] }],
    "PostToolUse":      [{ "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "plied hook claude" }] }]
  }
}

plied claim picks up the session from $CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID. The hook is a small native binary and costs a few milliseconds per call. Leave out PostToolUse if delivery at each prompt is soon enough. Other agents poll plied inbox and claim by hand, so their presence is only as good as their claims.

Literature

[literature]
manifest = "literature.json"   # {"papers": [{"id": "Smith2020", "file": "Smith2020.pdf", "sha256": "…"}]}
pdf_dir = "papers"
# text_dir = "cache/pages/{id}"  # your own page text (pNN.txt = PDF page NN); default: `plied lit extract`
# ocr_marker = "[OCR"            # pages whose text is OCR

Only papers in the manifest are cleared. A record cites them like this:

cites:
  - paper: Smith2020
    page: 4
    quote: "The mean bout lasted 12.5 s"
    kind: table          # values from tables or figures must be read from the page image…
    image_checked: true  # …and say so

plied lit check reports four results for every citation, separately: clearance, source hash, page existence and quotation. A citation without a quote is fine for a table or figure value (its quotation result is unchecked); anywhere else it gets a warning, since nothing ties it to the page. Matches on OCR'd pages are warnings to verify against the image. Other commands: plied lit search, plied lit page Smith2020 4 [--image], and plied lit cites Smith2020, which finds citations and author–year mentions such as "Smith et al. (2020)".

Search, with access rules

plied index builds a keyword (BM25) index of the records and cleared paper pages that [search] allows. plied search "donor volume" queries it.

  • Sealed paths ([access] sealed, plus sealed_file with one substring per line) are never read, indexed or shown, by any command, including when reached through a symlink. show, find, check and the views leave sealed records out. plied can't verify a link to a record it may not read, so check reports one as a broken reference. If a sealed file is configured but missing, plied refuses to read anything.
  • The index stores a digest of the access policy: the sealing rules, the literature manifest and the allowlist. When any of them changes, the index is refused, never served, until it's rebuilt.
  • Every hit is checked against the current policy before it's shown. A file that changed since indexing is marked.
  • .git/ is always excluded. Put anything else that must never be searched (e.g. pending results) in exclude.

Structured queries cover all records, plied's and linked ones:

plied find '{"kind": "thread", "status": "waiting", "waiting_on": "Q02"}'
plied find '{"kind": "decisions", "date": {"$gte": "2026-10-01"}, "body": {"$regex": "S2"}}'
plied backlinks D134
plied frontier

Keeping record files out of code branches

plied guard install       # pre-commit and pre-merge-commit hooks (leaves existing hooks alone)
plied guard range main HEAD   # for CI or review: fails if HEAD brings record changes

The guards refuse a commit of record files from any worktree except the canonical one. They also refuse staged record content that plied didn't write (a hand edit), deleting a record, and a merge that brings in record content plied didn't write. They protect the defined workflow, but someone who bypasses the tool or the hooks (--no-verify) isn't stopped. A passing guard never authorises a commit: your project's own commit rules still apply.

Linking other record systems

plied doesn't take over your existing decision logs, findings or backlog. It links to them. Each [[sources]] entry names a glob, the frontmatter field holding the id, and an id pattern. It can also name fields for the date, time, status, authority and scope, and set scan_commitments (warn about conditionals and deferrals that no commitment records) and require_linked (warn when no plied record links to an item). Linked records stay authoritative: plied cites them and never restates them.

When a scanned record turns out to hold no commitment, say so on a thread, and the warning stays quiet until the record changes:

plied scanned D134 --rev <D134 rev> --on T009 --because "describes a past deferral" --expect <T009 rev>

Configuration reference

[plied]
format = 1                  # the on-disk format; a plied that doesn't know it refuses writes
requires = ">=0.1.0"        # plied versions that may write: "X.Y.Z" exactly, or ">=X.Y.Z"
root = "plied"              # where plied's records live
canonical_branch = "main"   # optional

[ids]                       # optional
thread = { prefix = "T", width = 3 }
commitment = { prefix = "P", width = 2 }
question = { prefix = "Q", width = 2 }

[[sources]]                 # any number; see above

[access]
sealed_file = ".sealed-paths"
sealed = ["held/"]

[search]
include = ["plied/**/*.md", "docs/**/*.md"]
exclude = ["logs/**"]

[literature]                # see above
manifest = "literature.json"
id_field = "id"             # or id_from_file = "^([^_]+)_"
pdf_dir = "papers"
text_dir = "cache/papers/{id}"
page_file = "p{page:02d}.txt"
ocr_marker = "[OCR"
image_command = ["tool", "{id}", "{page}"]   # optional renderer, instead of the built-in PDF renderer (runs this program)
image_path = "cache/img/{id}-p{page}.png"

[checks]
approve_authorities = ["user", "delegated"]
actors = ["lead", "user"]   # optional
commitment_phrases = ["\\bdeferred\\b", "\\bif\\b[^.]{0,80}\\bthen\\b"]
commitments_since = "2026-10-01"
action_kinds = ["run", "publish"]   # optional: actions must be kind or kind:instance

[messages]
lease_minutes = 30

[runtime]
revision_days = 14          # how long cached revisions (for conflict diffs) are kept

Every field is type-checked when the file is loaded: sealed = "secret" is an error, not a list of six one-letter seals, and a misspelt key (seald) is an error rather than a setting silently left at its default. Bad regular expressions and templates are errors too. Treat plied.toml as part of your trust boundary: image_command runs whatever program it names.

Environment: PLIED_AGENT, PLIED_SESSION (or CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID), PLIED_RUNTIME (move the runtime directory), PLIED_CANONICAL (for bare repositories).

Exit codes: 0 ok · 1 error or failed check · 2 usage · 3 conflict · 4 the change would add validation errors · 5 blocked (branch, merge state, format or version; guard refusal) · 6 review gate.

Add --json to any command for one versioned result envelope on stdout, failures included (see FORMAT.md §11.1).

The runtime directory caches the revisions plied reads and writes, so that a conflict can show what changed. That cache holds content that may never have been committed. It is pruned after revision_days; plied gc --all empties it.

What it does not do

  • Guarantee anything for writes that bypass it. Edit files by hand, or commit with --no-verify, and only plied check and plied guard range can still notice.
  • Coordinate across machines live. Writes are local to one checkout. Agents elsewhere work in their own clones and send proposals, for example as messages.
  • Decide anything. Approval, waivers and answers come from records with authority. Warnings never change a status.
  • Semantic (embedding) search. Not yet: keyword search comes first.
  • Keep secrets. Sealing controls what plied reads and shows. Sealed files are still plaintext in the clone and in git history. There is no encryption, and no secure deletion.
  • Notify anyone, or run a server. Building those on top of plied is the intended route; see docs/SCOPE.md.

Further reading

Licence

MIT.

Metadata

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