Poor Man's Handshake

Securely exchange symmetric encryption keys over insecure channels using a Noise-framework handshake or the legacy password / RSA handshakes. This library provides the cryptographic bootstrap primitive for the HiveMind distributed mesh — nodes use it to establish a shared session secret before raising an encrypted channel.

Which handshake should I use? The Noise handshake (NoiseHandShake) is the recommended path: it adds forward secrecy, PAKE-grade password authentication (no offline-crackable image on the wire), replay resistance, and downgrade protection that the password and RSA handshakes lack. The legacy handshakes remain for interoperability with existing deployments. See docs/security.md for the full analysis of why.

Features

• Noise handshake (NoiseHandShake): A Noise Protocol Framework authenticated key exchange (Noise_XXpsk2 / Noise_KKpsk0 over X25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 + SHA-256). The shared password enters as the Noise PSK — never as an on-wire image — and session keys come from an ephemeral X25519 exchange, giving forward secrecy, PAKE-grade password authentication, per-message replay resistance, and prologue-bound downgrade protection. Static keys are learned during XX for trust-on-first-use pinning. This is HiveMind protocol v3.
• Password-based key exchange (PasswordHandShake): Derive a shared symmetric key from a pre-shared password without ever transmitting the password. Each party generates a random IV, hashes it with the password, and XORs the IVs to form a common salt. The final key is derived via PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256. Note: the on-wire verifier is an offline-crackable image of the password (safe only with a high-entropy secret) — prefer NoiseHandShake.
• RSA public-key exchange (HandShake): Mutual RSA key agreement where both parties contribute a random secret. The secrets are XORed to form the final shared key, ensuring both contributions are needed.
• Asymmetric exchange (HalfHandShake): One-way key agreement for asymmetric trust scenarios (only one party's secret is used).
• Hybrid RSA+AES-GCM encryption: Arbitrary-length plaintext support via RSA-encrypted AES keys.
• Key file management: Automatic PEM key export/import with .bak recovery and regeneration on corruption.

Installation

pip install poorman_handshake

Requires Python 3.10+, pycryptodomex >= 3.19.1, noiseprotocol >= 0.3.1, and argon2-cffi >= 21.3.0 (all installed automatically).

Quick Start

Noise handshake (recommended)

Both peers share a site password; the connecting node initiates. The default XXpsk2 pattern needs no prior knowledge of the peer's static key — each side learns and can pin it during the exchange.

from poorman_handshake.noise import NoiseHandShake

# alice = connecting node (initiator); bob = server (responder).
# node_id is the server's id, used as the PSK derivation salt.
alice = NoiseHandShake(initiator=True, password="site-password", node_id="server-01")
bob = NoiseHandShake(initiator=False, password="site-password", node_id="server-01")

# XXpsk2 is three messages, exchanged over any insecure channel (no TLS needed):
bob.read_message(alice.write_message())    # msg 1: e
alice.read_message(bob.write_message())    # msg 2: e, ee, s, es, psk
bob.read_message(alice.write_message())    # msg 3: s, se

assert alice.handshake_finished and bob.handshake_finished
assert alice.remote_pubkey == bob.pubkey_bytes   # learned static key — pin it (TOFU)

# Encrypted session: per-message counter nonces make replays fail to decrypt.
ciphertext = alice.encrypt(b"hello over the mesh")
assert bob.decrypt(ciphertext) == b"hello over the mesh"

Pre-provisioned peers (both static keys known in advance) select the two-message KKpsk0 pattern automatically by passing remote_pubkey=. See examples/noise_kk.py.

Password-based handshake

Both parties share a pre-arranged password and derive an identical symmetric key:

from poorman_handshake import PasswordHandShake
from secrets import compare_digest

password = "Super Secret Pass Phrase"
bob = PasswordHandShake(password)
alice = PasswordHandShake(password)

# Generate handshake messages (exchange these over any insecure channel)
alice_shake = alice.generate_handshake()
bob_shake = bob.generate_handshake()

# Receive and verify each other's handshake
if not alice.receive_and_verify(bob_shake):
    raise ValueError("Failed to verify handshake")
if not bob.receive_and_verify(alice_shake):
    raise ValueError("Failed to verify handshake")

# Both now hold the same symmetric key
assert compare_digest(alice.secret, bob.secret)

RSA public-key handshake

Mutual key agreement using RSA public keys (with signature verification):

from poorman_handshake import HandShake
from secrets import compare_digest

bob = HandShake()
alice = HandShake()

# Exchange public keys out-of-band (e.g., over a secure channel or pre-distributed)
bob.load_public(alice.pubkey)
alice.load_public(bob.pubkey)

# Generate signed, encrypted handshake messages
alice_shake = alice.generate_handshake()
bob_shake = bob.generate_handshake()

# Receive, verify, and decrypt each other's handshakes
bob.receive_and_verify(alice_shake)
alice.receive_and_verify(bob_shake)

# Both now hold an identical shared secret
assert compare_digest(bob.secret, alice.secret)
print(f"Shared secret: {alice.secret.hex()}")

One-way handshake (asymmetric trust)

HalfHandShake derives the secret directly without XOR, for scenarios where only one party's contribution matters. The sender chooses the secret and encrypts it with the receiver's public key; the receiver authenticates the sender and decrypts the secret. Only the receiver needs the sender's public key in advance:

from poorman_handshake import HalfHandShake
from secrets import compare_digest

sender = HalfHandShake()
receiver = HalfHandShake()

# The receiver holds the sender's public key (exchanged securely beforehand)
receiver.load_public(sender.pubkey)

# The sender encrypts its secret with the receiver's public key
sender_shake = sender.generate_handshake(receiver.pubkey)

# The receiver verifies the sender's signature and decrypts the secret
receiver.receive_and_verify(sender_shake)

# Both hold the same key (chosen by the sender)
assert compare_digest(receiver.secret, sender.secret)

API Reference

NoiseHandShake

Noise-framework authenticated key exchange (HiveMind protocol v3). Recommended.

Constructor:

NoiseHandShake(
    initiator: bool,
    path: str = None,
    password: str | bytes = None,
    node_id: str | bytes = None,
    psk: bytes = None,
    remote_pubkey: str | bytes = None,
    prologue: bytes = b"",
    pattern: bytes = None,
)

• initiator: True for the connecting side, False for the responder.
• path: Optional file to load/persist the static X25519 key (generated if absent).
• password / node_id: Shared password, stretched into the 32-byte PSK with argon2id salted by SHA-256(node_id). Provide either this pair or psk.
• psk: A pre-derived 32-byte pre-shared key (alternative to password).
• remote_pubkey: Peer static public key (hex or 32 raw bytes). Supplying it selects KKpsk0; omitting it uses XXpsk2 (learn-and-pin).
• prologue: Bytes bound into the handshake hash for downgrade protection; both sides must supply identical bytes. Encode the negotiated protocol version and cipher/encoding lists here.
• pattern: Override the Noise protocol name (defaults per remote_pubkey).

Methods:

• write_message(payload: bytes = b"") -> bytes: Produce the next handshake message (or, once finished, a transport message).
• read_message(data: bytes) -> bytes: Consume the peer's next message.
• split() -> (send, recv): The two transport CipherStates after the handshake.
• encrypt(data: bytes) -> bytes / decrypt(data: bytes) -> bytes: Transport encryption using the split CipherStates (per-message counter nonces → replay resistant).
• load_private(path) / export_private_key(path): Static-key persistence.

Properties:

• handshake_finished: bool: Whether the handshake is complete.
• pubkey: str / pubkey_bytes: bytes: This node's static public key.
• remote_pubkey: bytes | None: The peer's static public key (learned during XX); pin it for TOFU.
• handshake_hash: bytes | None: Shared transcript fingerprint for channel binding.

derive_psk(password, node_id=None, salt=None) -> bytes

Derive a 32-byte Noise PSK from a password using argon2id. The salt defaults to SHA-256(node_id) (per HIVEMIND-CRYPTO-1) when node_id is given. Both peers must derive with identical inputs.

PasswordHandShake

Password-based key agreement. Not a PAKE — the handshake transmits a salted-hash verifier of the password, which a passive observer can attack offline; it is safe only with a high-entropy shared secret. For a low-entropy password, use NoiseHandShake instead (see docs/security.md).

Constructor:

PasswordHandShake(password: str)

• password: Pre-shared password string.

Methods:

• generate_handshake() -> str: Generate a hex-encoded handshake message (hsub).
• receive_handshake(shake: str) -> None: Process a peer's handshake and compute salt.
• verify(shake: str) -> bool: Check if a handshake matches the password.
• receive_and_verify(shake: str) -> bool: Verify and receive in one step.

Properties:

• secret: bytes: Derived symmetric key (bytes). Only valid after successful receive_handshake.

HandShake

Mutual RSA key agreement with signature verification.

Constructor:

HandShake(path: str = None, key_size: int = 2048)

• path: Optional file path to load/save the private key (PEM format).
• key_size: RSA key size in bits (default 2048).

Methods:

• generate_handshake(pub: Union[str, bytes, RSA.RsaKey] = None) -> str: Generate a signed, encrypted handshake message.
• load_public(pub: Union[str, bytes, RSA.RsaKey]) -> None: Load the peer's public key.
• load_private(path: str) -> None: Load the private key from a file.
• export_private_key(path: str) -> None: Save the private key to a file (PEM format).
• verify(shake: str, pub: Union[str, bytes, RSA.RsaKey]) -> bool: Verify a handshake signature.
• receive_handshake(shake: str) -> None: Decrypt a handshake and XOR with locally generated secret.
• receive_and_verify(shake: str, pub: Union[str, bytes, RSA.RsaKey] = None) -> None: Verify signature, then receive.

Properties:

• pubkey: str: PEM-encoded public key.
• secret: bytes: Shared symmetric key (derived from XOR of both secrets).

HalfHandShake

Extends HandShake for one-way key agreement. Same API, but receive_handshake assigns the decrypted secret directly instead of XORing.

Asymmetric Path (RSA Utilities)

Low-level RSA operations in poorman_handshake.asymmetric.utils:

• encrypt_RSA(public_key, plaintext) -> bytes: RSA-OAEP encryption.
• decrypt_RSA(secret_key, ciphertext) -> bytes: RSA-OAEP decryption.
• sign_RSA(secret_key, message) -> bytes: RSA-PSS signature.
• verify_RSA(public_key, message, signature) -> bool: Verify RSA-PSS signature.
• hybrid_encrypt_RSA(public_key, plaintext) -> bytes: RSA + AES-GCM for arbitrary-length payloads.
• hybrid_decrypt_RSA(secret_key, ciphertext) -> bytes: Decrypt hybrid ciphertext.
• load_RSA_key(path) -> RSA.RsaKey: Load PEM key from file.
• export_RSA_key(key, path) -> None: Save PEM key to file.

Symmetric Path (Password Utilities)

Low-level PAKE operations in poorman_handshake.symmetric.utils:

• generate_iv(key_length=8) -> bytes: Generate a random 64-bit IV.
• create_hsub(text, iv=None, hsublen=48) -> str: Create a hex-encoded hashed subject (hsub) from the shared secret text.
• match_hsub(hsub, subject) -> bool: Verify an hsub against the shared secret subject.
• iv_from_hsub(hsub, digits=16) -> bytes: Extract the IV from an hsub.

Examples

See the examples folder for additional use cases:

• noise_handshake.py: Noise XXpsk2 password handshake with TOFU key learning (recommended).
• noise_kk.py: Noise KKpsk0 handshake with pre-provisioned static keys.
• simple_handshake.py: Basic RSA handshake.
• static_handshake.py: Persistent key file handshake.
• tofu_handshake.py: Trust-on-first-use (TOFU) key pinning.
• half_handshake.py: One-way key agreement.
• poor_pake.py: Password-based key exchange.
• *_mitm.py demos: Man-in-the-middle attack illustrations.

Deeper reference

docs/protocol.md walks through how each variant derives its shared secret, the TOFU and pre-distributed-key trust models, the low-level RSA helpers, and where the handshake fits in the HiveMind connection flow.

docs/security.md is the threat-model analysis: what each construction protects against and what it does not, why the password and RSA handshakes are safe in their origin but weak as a standalone live-link exchange, and how the Noise handshake supplies the missing properties (offline-attack resistance, forward secrecy, MITM resistance, transcript binding).

Security Notes

The Noise handshake (NoiseHandShake) is the recommended path and provides forward secrecy, PAKE-grade password authentication, replay resistance, and downgrade protection out of the box. The legacy password and RSA handshakes remain for interoperability; when using them in security-critical applications:

• Prefer a high-entropy shared secret — the password verifier is offline-crackable (see docs/security.md).
• Ensure channel integrity after handshake (the derived secret should be used with authenticated encryption like AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305).
• Validate out-of-band public key distribution (TOFU, PKI, or other models).
• The RSA path has no forward secrecy — a later key compromise decrypts past sessions; use NoiseHandShake where that matters.

License

Apache License 2.0 — see LICENSE.md.