PQC Scanner

Open-source CLI that scans a local repository for cryptography vulnerable to quantum computing (RSA, ECC, ...) and produces an exposure report with concrete post-quantum migration targets.

You can't migrate what you can't see. PQC Scanner is the inventory/visibility step of a post-quantum migration: it finds where quantum-vulnerable cryptography lives in your code and dependencies, and tells you what to move it to.

Status: v1, Python only. AST detection engine, dependency-manifest complement, rule base, CycloneDX CBOM output and CLI are in place.

What it detects

Four static detectors feed one report:

• Source code (AST) — high signal. Parses Python with the standard ast module and reports real uses of vulnerable primitives (a crypto import plus a matching call), so comments or variable names never trigger a finding. Extracts detail: RSA/DSA/DH key size, EC curve (normalized across libraries — SECP256R1/P-256/prime256v1 → P-256), AES key length, PQC scheme.
• Dependency manifests — complement. Parses requirements.txt, pyproject.toml (PEP 621 + Poetry), poetry.lock and Pipfile.lock and flags declared cryptographic libraries with their version. Low signal on its own (it says a library is present, not that a primitive is used), but it seeds the CBOM.
• Config / infrastructure — anchored patterns. Scans config/infra files (Dockerfiles, SSH configs and authorized_keys, .pem/.key, .conf, shell and CI files) for crypto that lives as strings the AST can't see: PEM private keys (BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY), SSH public keys (ssh-rsa/ssh-ed25519/…), and key-generation commands (openssl genrsa, ssh-keygen -t ecdsa). Every pattern is anchored on real structure (a PEM header, the AAAA SSH wire format, a command's algorithm flag), so a stray mention of "RSA" in prose is never a hit.
• Encrypted artifacts (data at rest) — header inspection. Reads the format headers of encrypted files without decrypting or asking for keys — OpenPGP (.gpg/.pgp/.asc) and age (.age) — to name the asymmetric key wrapping that protects them (RSA/ECDH/X25519/…). This is the other half of "harvest now, decrypt later": files recorded today, broken later. The nuance that keeps it quiet: Shor breaks the asymmetric layer, so a passphrase/AES-256 file is not flagged — only the quantum-vulnerable recipient/key-transport is.

Each finding carries: location, algorithm, usage context, quantum classification (Shor / Grover / already-PQC), severity, origin (code location | package+version), a suggested PQC migration target (key exchange → ML-KEM, signatures → ML-DSA) and a regulatory deadline (NIST IR 8547 / CNSA 2.0: deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035).

Already-post-quantum cryptography is reported as INFO (correct use, nothing to migrate), not as a gap — this includes the NIST PQC standards (ML-KEM/ML-DSA/ SLH-DSA) and fully homomorphic encryption libraries (TenSEAL, Pyfhel, OpenFHE, Concrete), whose lattice-based schemes are Shor-resistant.

Installation

With pipx for an isolated CLI:

pipx install pqc-audit

Or from a local clone:

git clone https://github.com/rauleteee/pqc-scanner
cd pqc-scanner
pipx install .                  # isolated, adds the `pqc-audit` command

Or for development:

python -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"

Usage

pqc-audit [PATH]              # colored terminal summary (default PATH: .)
pqc-audit [PATH] --json       # CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM to stdout
pqc-audit [PATH] --markdown   # shareable Markdown report to stdout
pqc-audit [PATH] --html       # self-contained HTML report to stdout
python -m pqc_scanner [PATH]  # equivalent, without installing

Running it against the bundled examples/ (Python source + a requirements.txt):

pqc-audit 0.4.1  ·  scanned examples
CRITICAL: 9  MEDIUM: 1  INFO: 1
┏━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━┓
┃ Severity ┃ Algorithm          ┃ Usage          ┃ Location               ┃ Migrate to             ┃ Deadline    ┃
┡━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━━━━━┩
│ CRITICAL │ RSA-2048           │ configuration  │ infra/Dockerfile:4     │ ML-KEM / ML-DSA        │ 2030 → 2035 │
│ CRITICAL │ ECDSA              │ configuration  │ infra/Dockerfile:5     │ ML-DSA                 │ 2030 → 2035 │
│ CRITICAL │ RSA                │ configuration  │ infra/authorized_keys… │ ML-KEM / ML-DSA        │ 2030 → 2035 │
│ CRITICAL │ X25519             │ data_at_rest   │ infra/secret.age:1     │ ML-KEM                 │ 2030 → 2035 │
│ CRITICAL │ RSA/ECC/DH/Ed25519 │ dependency     │ examples/requirements  │ ML-KEM / ML-DSA        │ 2030 → 2035 │
│ CRITICAL │ RSA/ECC (OpenSSL)  │ dependency     │ examples/requirements  │ ML-KEM / ML-DSA        │ 2030 → 2035 │
│ CRITICAL │ RSA/ECDSA (SSH)    │ dependency     │ examples/requirements  │ ML-KEM / ML-DSA        │ 2030 → 2035 │
│ CRITICAL │ RSA-2048           │ key_generation │ examples/vulnerable_…  │ ML-KEM / ML-DSA        │ 2030 → 2035 │
│ CRITICAL │ ECC-P-256          │ key_generation │ examples/vulnerable_…  │ ML-KEM (ECDH) / ML-DSA │ 2030 → 2035 │
│ MEDIUM   │ AES                │ encryption     │ examples/vulnerable_…  │ AES-256                │ —           │
│ INFO     │ ML-KEM/ML-DSA      │ dependency     │ examples/requirements  │ already post-quantum   │ compliant   │
└──────────┴────────────────────┴────────────────┴────────────────────────┴────────────────────────┴─────────────┘
Verdict: quantum-critical cryptography in use — migration needed.

The header count (CRITICAL: 5 MEDIUM: 1 INFO: 1) is the at-a-glance verdict. The Deadline column maps each finding to its regulatory timeline (NIST IR 8547 / CNSA 2.0: quantum-critical crypto deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035).

JSON / CBOM output

--json emits a CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM (Cryptography Bill of Materials), validated against the official schema. Code findings become cryptographic-asset components; dependency findings become library components (with purl and version). The scanner's assessment (severity, quantum classification, migration target) rides along as namespaced properties.

pqc-audit path/to/repo --json > cbom.json

Shareable report (Markdown / HTML)

--markdown and --html render the same scan as a human-facing report — the verdict headline followed by the actionable table (location + migration target). The HTML is a single self-contained page (no external assets), light/dark aware, ready to open in a browser or attach to a report.

pqc-audit path/to/repo --markdown > pqc-report.md
pqc-audit path/to/repo --html > pqc-report.html

MCP server (for AI agents)

The same engine is exposed over the Model Context Protocol, so any MCP-capable agent (Claude, Cursor, …) can scan a local repo conversationally.

pip install ".[mcp]"     # installs the optional MCP SDK
pqc-audit-mcp            # runs the server over stdio

Register it with Claude Code:

claude mcp add pqc-audit -- pqc-audit-mcp

Or add it to a client config (e.g. Claude Desktop claude_desktop_config.json):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "pqc-audit": { "command": "pqc-audit-mcp" }
  }
}

It exposes two tools:

• scan_repository(path) — an at-a-glance verdict, severity counts, and the findings, each with its location and suggested post-quantum migration target.
• generate_cbom(path) — the full CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM.

Skill (for Claude Code)

A Claude Skill wraps the same engine so an agent audits a repo the moment you ask — "is this repo post-quantum ready?" — without you remembering the command. It lives in skill/pqc-audit/.

Install it for your user:

mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills
cp -r skill/pqc-audit ~/.claude/skills/

The skill installs pqc-audit on demand, runs it, and presents the verdict plus actionable migration targets. Like the CLI and MCP server, it holds no detection logic — it's a third thin surface over the one engine.

Architecture

The engine is a library; the interfaces are thin wrappers. All detection logic lives in the pqc_scanner core, exposed through a small public API:

from pqc_scanner import scan, to_cbom
findings = scan(path)          # list[Finding]  (code + dependency findings)
cbom = to_cbom(findings)       # CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM dict

The CLI and the MCP server are just thin faces of the same engine (a skill is next).

Tests

pytest

Security

CI runs a set of security pipelines (GitHub Actions) on every push and pull request, plus a weekly schedule:

• CodeQL (codeql.yml) — static security analysis (security-extended query suite), results in the repository's Security tab.
• bandit (security.yml) — Python SAST over src/, medium severity and above.
• pip-audit (security.yml) — flags known CVEs in the installed dependencies.
• CycloneDX SBOM (security.yml) — a dependency SBOM is generated and uploaded as a build artifact.
• gitleaks (security.yml) — secret scan across the full git history.
• Dependency review (dependency-review.yml) — blocks high-severity or disallowed-license dependencies introduced in a pull request.

Release publishing to PyPI uses OIDC Trusted Publishing (publish.yml), so no long-lived API token is stored in the repository.

v1 scope

• Python ecosystem only (for source code; the config detector is language-agnostic since it matches file patterns, not Python calls).
• Static analysis of local files: source code (AST) + dependency manifests + config/infra files + encrypted-artifact headers (no decryption).
• Outputs: colored terminal summary + JSON aligned with CycloneDX CBOM.

Known limit (by design): the AST engine detects direct, statically-resolvable use; strong indirection (dependency injection, factories, dynamic getattr) is out of scope until a future data-flow/taint layer. The dependency complement is a presence lookup, not proof a primitive is used.

See CLAUDE.md for the full design and build plan.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.