PQC Side-Channel Scanner

The first open-source, automated, pip-installable timing side-channel scanner for all four NIST post-quantum cryptography standards — FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), and FIPS 206 (FN-DSA/FALCON). Scans both liboqs 0.15.0 and OpenSSL+oqs-provider using TVLA statistical methodology at nanosecond precision.

Built by Disha P, Technical Director at Collective Qubits.

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Why This Exists

NIST finalized the post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024. Banks, cloud providers, and government agencies are actively deploying ML-KEM, ML-DSA, FALCON, and SLH-DSA to protect against future quantum attacks. But timing side-channel vulnerabilities in cryptographic implementations can leak secret key material even when the underlying algorithm is mathematically secure.

Existing tools like dudect require manual C-level integration, have no PQC-specific targets, and predate the NIST standards. No automated scanner existed for the full NIST PQC suite.

This tool fills that gap.

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What It Found

Finding 1 — ML-KEM Encapsulation (RNG-induced), liboqs 0.15.0

Algorithm	Operation	t-statistic (WSL2)	t-statistic (bare metal)	Verdict
ML-KEM-512	Encapsulation	-4.9	-8.37	CRITICAL
ML-KEM-512	Decapsulation	0.5	1.15	PASS
ML-KEM-768	Encapsulation	75.5	-13.68	CRITICAL
ML-KEM-768	Decapsulation	-3.2	-0.09	PASS
ML-KEM-1024	Encapsulation	-12.6	-51.99	CRITICAL
ML-KEM-1024	Decapsulation	-0.4	3.88	PASS

Root cause confirmed: OQS_randombytes() inside OQS_KEM_encaps() has variable timing. Derand confirmation — bypassing RNG with encaps_derand() drops both portable C (t=0.66) and AVX2 (t=0.93) to PASS. The cryptographic core is clean. Fix: use OQS_KEM_encaps_derand() with a pre-seeded DRBG.

Note: This finding disappears through OpenSSL+oqs-provider, which uses OpenSSL's RAND_bytes instead of OQS_randombytes. Enterprises using oqs-provider are not affected by this specific issue.

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Finding 2 — FALCON Verify (Algorithmic), liboqs 0.15.0 + OpenSSL+oqs-provider

Algorithm	Operation	t (liboqs bare metal)	t (OpenSSL bare metal)	Verdict
FALCON-512	Sign	6.38	—	PASS
FALCON-512	Verify	-217.58	-192.33	CRITICAL
FALCON-1024	Sign	0.77	—	PASS
FALCON-1024	Verify	-303.05	-343.24	CRITICAL
FALCON-padded-512	Verify	-168.63	-255.66	CRITICAL
FALCON-padded-1024	Verify	-187.19	-292.10	CRITICAL

Root cause: Golomb-Rice signature decompression in comp_decode() (codec.c). The inner unary decoding loop iterates a variable number of times proportional to coefficient magnitude — producing signature-content dependent timing. Confirmed across both library targets. No existing fix — a constant-time comp_decode() is required.

Root cause investigation:

• Same message, different signatures → still CRITICAL (t=-53.86) — not message-dependent
• Padded variants with fixed-length signatures → still CRITICAL — not length-dependent
• Verify has no RNG call — cannot be RNG-induced
• No open issue on liboqs GitHub for this finding (as of April 2026)

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Finding 3 — ML-DSA Verify (Weak signal), bare metal only

Algorithm	Operation	t (liboqs bare metal)	t (OpenSSL bare metal)	Verdict
ML-DSA-44	Verify	-5.41	-9.28	CRITICAL
ML-DSA-65	Verify	-5.66	-9.04	CRITICAL
ML-DSA-87	Verify	-4.51	-10.38	CRITICAL
ML-DSA-44/65/87	Sign	all PASS	all PASS	PASS

Note: This signal is weak (t ≈ 5-10) and only detectable on bare metal at 100k traces. Not detected on WSL2. Root cause under investigation.

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FIPS 205 — SLH-DSA (all parameter sets)

SLH-DSA verify shows variable timing consistent with the inherently variable-time Merkle tree traversal in hash-based signatures. Expected behavior by design — not an implementation vulnerability.

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OpenSSL+oqs-provider Summary (bare metal, 100k traces)

Algorithm	Operation	t-statistic	Verdict
ML-KEM-512/768/1024	Encapsulation	≈ 2-5	PASS
FALCON-512	Verify	-192.33	CRITICAL
FALCON-1024	Verify	-343.24	CRITICAL
FALCON-padded-512	Verify	-255.66	CRITICAL
FALCON-padded-1024	Verify	-292.10	CRITICAL
ML-DSA-44/65/87	Verify	-9 to -10	CRITICAL

C-level noise floor (AES-128): 11.7ns. FALCON verify finding is 500× above noise floor.

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How It Works

The scanner implements Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) as defined in ISO/IEC 17825. For each cryptographic operation:

1. Collects timing measurements for a fixed input (same bytes every time)
2. Collects timing measurements for random inputs (different bytes every time)
3. Runs Welch's t-test on the two distributions
4. Flags as leaking if |t| > 4.5 — the ISO 17825 threshold

Two measurement layers:

• Python layer — targets kyber-py and dilithium-py via time.perf_counter_ns(), detects millisecond-level leaks
• C layer — targets liboqs and OpenSSL directly with CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW, detects nanosecond-level leaks

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Installation

Quickstart

pip install pqc-scanner

Docker (no setup required)

docker build -t pqc-scanner .
docker run pqc-scanner python3 cli.py liboqs --traces 50000
docker run pqc-scanner python3 cli.py openssl --algorithm falcon --traces 100000

No liboqs installation, no gcc, no Python setup required. Everything is bundled.

From source (recommended for full C harness support)

Requirements

• Ubuntu 20.04+ or WSL2 (Ubuntu 24.04 tested)
• Python 3.10+
• gcc and clang
• liboqs (instructions below)
• oqs-provider (for OpenSSL target)

1. Clone and set up

git clone https://github.com/Disha23112004/pqc-scanner
cd pqc-scanner
python3 -m venv venv
source venv/bin/activate
pip install -e .
pip install kyber-py dilithium-py scipy numpy click rich reportlab

2. Install liboqs

sudo apt install -y cmake ninja-build libssl-dev clang
git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/liboqs ~/liboqs
cmake -S ~/liboqs -B ~/liboqs/build -DBUILD_SHARED_LIBS=ON -GNinja
cmake --build ~/liboqs/build --parallel 4
sudo cmake --build ~/liboqs/build --target install
sudo ldconfig

3. Install oqs-provider (for OpenSSL target)

git clone --depth=1 https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/oqs-provider ~/oqs-provider
cmake -S ~/oqs-provider -B ~/oqs-provider/build \
    -DOPENSSL_ROOT_DIR=/usr \
    -Dliboqs_DIR=/usr/local/lib/cmake/liboqs -GNinja
cmake --build ~/oqs-provider/build --parallel 4
sudo cmake --build ~/oqs-provider/build --target install

4. Build C harnesses

cd harness
gcc -O2 -o ml_kem_harness ml_kem_harness.c -loqs -lm
gcc -O2 -o ml_dsa_harness ml_dsa_harness.c -loqs -lm
gcc -O2 -o baseline_harness baseline_harness.c -lssl -lcrypto
gcc -O2 -o openssl_kem_harness openssl_kem_harness.c -lssl -lcrypto -lm
gcc -O2 -o openssl_sig_harness openssl_sig_harness.c -lssl -lcrypto -lm
cd ..

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Usage

source venv/bin/activate

liboqs scan (primary target)

# ML-KEM-768 production scan
pqc-scanner liboqs --traces 100000

# RNG root cause isolation
pqc-scanner derand --traces 100000

OpenSSL+oqs-provider scan (second target)

# Scan all algorithms
pqc-scanner openssl --traces 100000

# Scan specific algorithm family
pqc-scanner openssl --algorithm falcon --traces 100000
pqc-scanner openssl --algorithm ml-kem --traces 100000
pqc-scanner openssl --algorithm ml-dsa --traces 100000

Python layer scans

# Scan ML-KEM and ML-DSA Python implementations
pqc-scanner scan --algorithm both --traces 10000

# Side by side comparison
pqc-scanner compare --traces 10000

Noise floor characterization

pqc-scanner baseline      # Python layer (SHA-256)
pqc-scanner c-baseline    # C layer (AES-128)

Compiler sweep

pqc-scanner compiler-sweep --traces 50000 --runs 3

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Output

Every scan automatically generates three output files:

• JSON — structured findings for CI/CD integration (exit code 1 on findings)
• HTML — interactive report with timing distribution histograms
• PDF — professional compliance report for CISO and auditor review

pqc-scanner liboqs --traces 100000
# Generates: liboqs.json, liboqs.html, liboqs.pdf

pqc-scanner openssl --algorithm falcon --traces 100000
# Generates: openssl_scan.json, openssl_scan.pdf

SARIF output (GitHub Advanced Security)

pqc-scanner liboqs --traces 100000 --format sarif --output results

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CI/CD Integration

- name: PQC Timing Scan
  run: pqc-scanner liboqs --traces 50000
  # Pipeline fails automatically if leaks are found

Use --no-exit to suppress exit code in reporting-only mode.

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Methodology

TVLA (Test Vector Leakage Assessment)

Documented in ISO/IEC 17825. Core principle: a constant-time implementation's execution time must be statistically independent of its input.

Welch's t-test

Used instead of Student's t-test because it does not assume equal variance. Threshold: |t| > 4.5 indicates statistically significant timing leakage at p < 0.001.

Derandomization (derand) technique

A novel root-cause isolation method introduced in this tool. By calling encaps_derand() directly with a fixed seed, bypassing OQS_randombytes() entirely, RNG-induced timing variation is eliminated. Comparing standard TVLA against derand results distinguishes algorithmic from RNG-induced leakage — not present in any prior published tooling.

Measurement precision

• Python layer — time.perf_counter_ns(), noise floor ~100–130ns on WSL2
• C layer — CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW, noise floor ~10–12ns on WSL2, lower on bare metal

Noise reduction

• 500-trace warmup — stabilizes CPU cache, branch predictor, and TLB state
• 5% outlier trimming — removes OS interrupt spikes and context switches
• CPU affinity — pins process to core 0 via sched_setaffinity
• Pre-generated test vectors — all random inputs generated before the timed window

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Project Structure

pqc-scanner/
├── cli.py
├── src/pqc_scanner/
│   ├── scanner/
│   │   ├── timing.py           ← TVLA engine, Welch's t-test
│   │   ├── report.py           ← JSON and HTML generation
│   │   ├── pdf_report.py       ← PDF compliance report generation
│   │   └── sarif.py            ← SARIF 2.1.0 output
│   └── targets/
│       ├── ml_kem_target.py    ← ML-KEM Python harness
│       ├── ml_dsa_target.py    ← ML-DSA Python harness
│       ├── baseline_target.py  ← SHA-256 control
│       └── liboqs_target.py    ← liboqs subprocess interface
└── harness/
    ├── ml_kem_harness.c            ← ML-KEM 512/768/1024
    ├── ml_dsa_harness.c            ← ML-DSA + FALCON + SLH-DSA
    ├── ml_kem_harness_derand.c     ← RNG root cause isolation
    ├── baseline_harness.c          ← AES-128 noise floor
    ├── openssl_kem_harness.c       ← OpenSSL EVP KEM harness
    └── openssl_sig_harness.c       ← OpenSSL EVP signature harness

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Comparison With Existing Tools

Capability	dudect	Riscure	pqc-scanner
Full NIST PQC suite (FIPS 203-206)	✗	✗	✓
liboqs integration	✗	✗	✓
OpenSSL+oqs-provider target	✗	✗	✓
Derand root-cause isolation	✗	✗	✓
PDF compliance reports	✗	✓ (hardware)	✓
CI/CD exit codes + SARIF	✗	✗	✓
Docker support	✗	✗	✓
No hardware required	✓	✗	✓
pip installable	✗	✗	✓
Open source	✓	✗	✓

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Related Work

• dudect — Reparaz et al. (2016). General-purpose constant-time testing library. No PQC targets.
• KyberSlash — Bernstein et al. (2024). Manual timing analysis of Kyber implementations.
• TVLA — Cryptography Research Inc. (2011). Leakage assessment methodology, standardized in ISO/IEC 17825.
• liboqs — Open Quantum Safe project. C library for post-quantum cryptographic algorithms.

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Responsible Disclosure

• ML-KEM finding — Disclosed to Open Quantum Safe project (security@openquantumsafe.org), April 2026
• FALCON verify finding — Disclosed to PQShield (security@pqshield.com), April 2026

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Limitations

• WSL2 hypervisor adds noise. Sub-50ns findings require bare metal Linux for confirmation.
• kyber-py and dilithium-py are non-constant-time reference implementations. Python layer findings are expected and not novel.
• A PASS result does not prove constant-time behavior — it means no significant signal was detected at the given trace count and threshold.
• TVLA detects first-order leakage. Higher-order leakage in masked implementations requires higher-order TVLA extensions not yet implemented.

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License

MIT License. See LICENSE for details.

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Citation

If you use this tool in research, please cite:

Disha P, "PQC Side-Channel Scanner: Automated TVLA-based timing analysis for
NIST post-quantum cryptography standards," 2026.
https://github.com/Disha23112004/pqc-scanner