IKI-Gov Assessment Tool — operationalises the Integrated KI-Governance Reference Model for AI use-case governance.
Project description
presidio-hardened-ikigov-assess
IKI-Gov Assessment Tool — operationalises the IKI-Gov-Referenzmodell (Integrated KI-Governance Reference Model) as a practical CLI tool for assessing AI use cases against a structured governance framework.
The IKI-Gov framework structures AI governance along a central lifecycle (Kontext → Konzeption → Entwicklung → Freigabe → Betrieb → Anpassung → Außerbetriebnahme) surrounded by six domains and measured across six dimensions (M1–M6) with six quality gates (G0–G5).
Reference: Stantchev, V. IKI-Gov-Referenzmodell — Integrated KI-Governance Reference Model.
The book
This tool implements the IKI-Gov reference model, introduced in the forthcoming Springer monograph by Vladimir Stantchev — published in two editions:
- AI and IT-Governance (English)
- KI und IT-Governance (German)
The book works from classical IT governance (COBIT, ITIL, ISO/IEC 38500) toward AI governance across ethics, law, risk, and data, then assembles IKI-Gov: the lifecycle, six domains, six measurement dimensions (M1–M6), and six quality gates (G0–G5). The 25 checklist items scored here are drawn from the book's framework chapter and its workshop/approval-gate appendix; the ISO/IEC 42001 and EU AI Act mappings follow its orientation tables.
The book presents the model as a reasoned synthesis and a working heuristic for
orientation — not legal advice and not a conformity assessment. This tool holds the same
line (see the disclaimers on the euaiact-gap and iso-gap commands). Publication
details (ISBN, dates, Springer link) are finalised at the publisher and will be added
here once they are public.
Installation
pip install presidio-hardened-ikigov-assess
# With dependency CVE checking
pip install "presidio-hardened-ikigov-assess[audit]"
# With Ed25519 public-key evidence verification
pip install "presidio-hardened-ikigov-assess[crypto]"
Quick Start
# Parameter-driven assessment
iga assess --use-case "fraud-scoring" --risk-class high --lang en \
--affirm S1,S2,S3,D1,D2,T1,T4,O1,I1
# Interactive wizard (step-by-step)
iga assess --interactive --lang de --risk-class high --use-case "kredit-scoring"
# Gate readiness check
iga gate --gate G2 --risk-class high \
--affirm S1,S2,S3,D1,D2,T1,T4,O1,I1 --lang en
# CI pipeline gate assertion (exit 0 OPEN / 2 PARTIAL / 3 BLOCKED)
iga gate --gate G1 --risk-class high --affirm S1,S2,D1,D2 --assert-gate G1
# Strict mode: skipped gate-critical items count as blocking
iga gate --gate G2 --risk-class high --affirm S1,S2 --skip D3 --strict --assert-gate G2
# Machine-readable JSON (scriptable, no progress bars)
iga assess --affirm S1,S2,S3 --quiet
iga gate --gate G0 --affirm S1,S2 --skip S3 --quiet
# Export report to Markdown (stdout)
iga report --use-case "fraud-scoring" --risk-class high \
--affirm S1,S2,S3,D1,D2,T1 --format markdown
# Export report to JSON
iga report --use-case "fraud-scoring" --affirm S1,S2 --format json
# Write the report to a file (Markdown or JSON)
iga report --use-case "fraud-scoring" --affirm S1,S2,T4 --output audit/fraud-scoring.md
iga report --use-case "fraud-scoring" --affirm S1,S2 -f json -o fraud-scoring.json
# ISO/IEC 42001 clause-level coverage gap analysis
iga iso-gap --use-case "fraud-scoring" --risk-class high --affirm S1,S2,S3,I1,I2
iga iso-gap --affirm S2,S3,I1,I2 --quiet # machine-readable JSON
# EU AI Act high-risk obligations (Art. 9–17) — high-risk systems only
iga euaiact-gap --use-case "fraud-scoring" --affirm S1,S2,S3,S4,S5,D1,D5
iga euaiact-gap --affirm S1,S2 --quiet
# Persist assessments and view the portfolio (SQLite at ~/.iga/assessments.db)
iga assess --use-case "fraud-scoring" --risk-class high --affirm S1,S2,S3 --save
iga list # table of saved assessments
iga portfolio # aggregated M1–M6 + blocked gates
iga trend --use-case "fraud-scoring" # delta vs the previous saved run
iga delete --use-case "fraud-scoring" # hard-delete
# List saved assessments (persistence in v0.6.0)
iga list
Example output
IKI-Gov Assessment — fraud-scoring [risk: HIGH]
Measurement Dimensions
M1 Strategie & Ownership ████████░░ 80.0 %
M2 Data Quality & Lineage ██████░░░░ 60.0 %
M3 Validation & Fairness ████░░░░░░ 40.0 %
M4 Security & Robustness █████████░ 90.0 %
M5 Compliance Evidence ███░░░░░░░ 30.0 %
M6 Operations, Drift & Incidents ██████░░░░ 60.0 %
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Overall maturity 60.0 %
Gate Readiness
G0 OPEN
G1 OPEN
G2 PARTIAL [skipped: D3]
G3 BLOCKED — blocking: T5 (A security review of the model pipeline…)
G4 BLOCKED
G5 BLOCKED
Checklist
25 items derived from the five appendix sections of the IKI-Gov framework:
| Prefix | Section | M-Dimension |
|---|---|---|
| S1–S5 | Strategie & Geschäftsfall | M1 Strategie & Ownership |
| D1–D5 | Daten, Recht & Ethik | M2 Datenqualität & Lineage |
| T1–T3 | Modell, Sicherheit & Technik | M3 Validierung & Fairness |
| T4–T5 | Modell, Sicherheit & Technik | M4 Sicherheit & Robustheit |
| O1–O5 | Betrieb, Monitoring & Aufsicht | M6 Betrieb, Drift & Vorfälle |
| I1–I5 | ISO/IEC 42001 Abgleich | M5 Compliance-Nachweise |
Scoring
score_m(dim) = sum(weight_i for affirmed items in dim)
/ sum(weight_i for non-skipped items in dim) × 100
overall = arithmetic mean(M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6)
Risk-class multipliers: low = 1.0 · medium = 1.5 · high = 2.0.
Skipped items are excluded from both numerator and denominator (conservative).
Gates
| Gate | Lifecycle transition |
|---|---|
| G0 | Kontext → Konzeption |
| G1 | Konzeption → Entwicklung |
| G2 | Entwicklung → Freigabe |
| G3 | Freigabe → Betrieb |
| G4 | Betrieb → Anpassung |
| G5 | Anpassung → Außerbetriebnahme |
Status: OPEN (all affirmed) · PARTIAL (some skipped, none denied) · BLOCKED (≥1 denied)
Risk-class-aware thresholds (v0.3.0)
How skips are treated depends on the active risk class:
| Risk class | Skipped gate-critical items |
|---|---|
low |
forgiven — a gate with skips but no denials is OPEN |
medium |
tolerated — the gate is PARTIAL until they are affirmed |
high |
not permitted — skips BLOCK the gate (strict by default) |
--strict forces high-risk behaviour at any risk class. When a skip blocks a gate,
it is reported separately (blocking_skips) so the reason for a BLOCKED-not-PARTIAL
gate is explicit.
CI exit codes
--assert-gate Gn exits with a status-specific code so pipelines can branch without
parsing output:
| Exit code | Meaning |
|---|---|
0 |
gate OPEN |
2 |
gate PARTIAL |
3 |
gate BLOCKED |
1 |
general error (invalid input, gate mismatch) |
--quiet (-q) on assess and gate emits machine-readable JSON only.
Regulatory-Content Packs (v0.16.0)
The ISO/IEC 42001 and EU AI Act mappings are versioned content packs behind a generic coverage engine, so new frameworks are added as data:
iga content-list # built-in + external packs (versions, hashes)
iga framework-gap --framework iso42001 --affirm S1,S2,D1
iga framework-gap --framework euaiact --risk-class high --affirm S1,S2,D5 --quiet
iga framework-gap --framework nist-ai-rmf --affirm S1,S2,S3 # NIST AI RMF (Govern/Map/Measure/Manage)
A pack maps each target (clause/article) to the checklist items or gates that evidence it.
Drop a JSON pack into IGA_CONTENT_PATH (or ~/.iga/content/) to add or override a
framework; an external pack with the same framework_id overrides the built-in. The
legacy iso-gap / euaiact-gap commands are unchanged.
ISO/IEC 42001 Coverage
iga iso-gap maps the assessment to ISO/IEC 42001 clause-level coverage. Each
clause group (clauses 4–10 and Annex A controls) is reported as covered (all
mapped checklist items affirmed), partial, or gap, with the outstanding
items listed per incompletely-covered clause:
ISO/IEC 42001 Coverage Gap Analysis — fraud-scoring [risk: HIGH]
4 Context of the organization PARTIAL (1/2) — Outstanding items: S4
5 Leadership COVERED (4/4)
8 Operation GAP (0/13) — Outstanding items: D1, D2, …
A Annex A (Controls) GAP (0/12) — Outstanding items: …
Skipped and denied items count as not affirmed (no coverage credit). The
item→clause matrix is derived from the IKI-Gov orientation table
(tab:framework-iso42001-matrix) and centralised in checklist.ISO_CLAUSES_BY_ITEM.
Use --quiet for machine-readable JSON.
EU AI Act (High-Risk Systems)
iga euaiact-gap maps gate readiness to the EU AI Act obligations for high-risk
systems (Title III Ch. 2, Articles 9–17). Each article is reported OPEN / PARTIAL /
BLOCKED based on the readiness of the gates that generate its evidence:
EU AI Act High-Risk Compliance Gap — fraud-scoring [risk: HIGH]
Art. 9 Risk management system G0, G1, G2, G4 PARTIAL — G2 BLOCKED, G4 BLOCKED
Art. 10 Data and data governance G1 OPEN
Art. 11 Technical documentation G2, G3, G5 BLOCKED — G2/G3/G5 BLOCKED
The gate→article mapping is transcribed verbatim from the IKI-Gov book
(tab:framework-euaiact-gates) and lives in euaiact.EU_AI_ACT_ARTICLE_GATES.
The command is for high-risk systems only (exits with a warning for low/medium
risk); --quiet emits JSON.
This tool does not constitute legal advice or a conformity assessment.
Persistence & Portfolio
iga assess --save persists an assessment to a local SQLite database at
~/.iga/assessments.db (override with the IGA_DB_PATH env var). The portfolio
commands then work across saved use cases:
| Command | Purpose |
|---|---|
iga list |
Table of all saved assessments (use case, risk, overall, timestamp) |
iga portfolio |
Mean M1–M6 and overall maturity across the latest assessment per use case, plus a count of use cases with each gate BLOCKED |
iga trend --use-case X |
Per-dimension delta (▲/▼/=), overall maturity change, and gate transitions between two saved runs (latest vs previous, or a --from/--to window) |
iga delete --use-case X |
Hard-delete all saved assessments for a use case |
list and portfolio support --quiet for JSON. Only what you provide is stored
(use-case name, risk class, language, answers/scores/gates); the database file is
created with 0600 permissions and the ~/.iga directory with 0700. delete is
a hard delete; no soft-delete log is retained.
External Evidence
Affirmations can be backed by signed evidence emitted by peer presidio-hardened-*
controls (first producer: presidio-hardened-ai), upgrading an item from self-attested
to evidence-backed — or cryptographically verified against a local trust store.
Verification is fail-closed: a missing, malformed, or wrong signature never counts as verified.
# Affirm items from an evidence document, verifying signatures against a trust store
iga assess --use-case "fraud-scoring" --risk-class high \
--evidence evidence.json --trust trust.json
# Fail-closed: only references that verify against --trust affirm their item
iga assess --use-case "fraud-scoring" --risk-class high \
--evidence evidence.json --trust trust.json --require-evidence
# Verify a document on its own (exit 0 only if every reference verifies)
iga verify-evidence --evidence evidence.json --trust trust.json
An evidence document is the producer's EvidenceRef JSON:
{
"schema": "presidio-hardened/evidence-ref@1",
"use_case": "fraud-scoring",
"evidence": [
{
"item_id": "D1",
"source": "presidio-hardened-ai",
"source_version": "0.2.0",
"ledger_ref": "pai-ledger:seq/0",
"content_hash": "abc123def456",
"signer": "presidio-hardened-ai",
"signature": "2e7af6d2…",
"claimed_at": "2026-06-08T00:00:00+00:00"
}
]
}
A trust store maps each signer to its key. An entry is either a bare HMAC secret (back-compat) or an object declaring the algorithm and key material:
{
"presidio-hardened-ai": "shared-hmac-secret",
"peer-control": { "alg": "ed25519", "public_key": "<64-hex-char public key>" }
}
For key rotation, public_key (or key for HMAC) may be a list — a signature
verifies if it matches any listed key, so a new key can run alongside the old one during an
overlap window; revoke by removing the key from the store:
{
"peer-control": { "alg": "ed25519", "public_key": ["<new public key>", "<retiring key>"] }
}
Ed25519 (RFC 8032) public-key verification lets a verifier hold only public keys (no
shared secret with the producer) and requires the [crypto] extra. Signatures are over the
canonical {content_hash, signer} message; signer keys are resolved from the local trust
store only (no network). Evidence references carry hashes and opaque ledger URIs, never PII.
How this fits the wider suite: ikigov-assess is the governance spine that consumes evidence from peer
presidio-hardened-*controls. For the cross-repo overview (how the family interlocks and an end-to-end demo), see presidio-hardened-* Suite Architecture (inpresidio-hardened-ai).
MCP Server
The assessment engine is also available as a Model Context Protocol server, so MCP-capable LLM agents and clients can run IKI-Gov assessments as tools.
# Install with the MCP extra (requires Python 3.10+)
pip install "presidio-hardened-ikigov-assess[mcp]"
# Run the server over stdio
iga-mcp
Register it with an MCP client (e.g. Claude Desktop) by adding to the client's config:
{
"mcpServers": {
"iki-gov-assess": {
"command": "iga-mcp"
}
}
}
Tools
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
iga_framework_info |
Describe the model: lifecycle phases, dimensions M1–M6, gates G0–G5, sections, risk classes (de/en) |
iga_list_checklist |
Return all 25 checklist items with IDs, text, dimension, gates, and section |
iga_assess |
Score a use case from affirmed/skipped item IDs → M1–M6 scores, overall maturity, gate readiness |
iga_assess_with_evidence |
Score a use case from signed EvidenceRef documents, verifying signatures against a trust store (HMAC or Ed25519) |
iga_check_gate |
Evaluate readiness for a single gate G0–G5 with blocking/skipped items |
iga_iso_gap |
Map affirmed items to ISO/IEC 42001 clause coverage (covered / partial / gap) |
iga_euaiact_gap |
Map to EU AI Act high-risk obligations Art. 9–17 (OPEN / PARTIAL / BLOCKED) |
All tools share the CLI's input validation and output sanitisation, return the same
structured JSON schema as iga report --format json, and respect the per-session
abuse guard (returning a tool error rather than terminating the server when exceeded).
Evidence-Pack Export (v0.15.0)
Export a signed, audit-ready bundle of an assessment and verify it later:
# Write report.md + report.json + manifest.json (sha256 of each artifact + framework hash).
# Seal the manifest with an HMAC key read from a file (kept off argv / shell history).
iga export --use-case fraud-scoring --risk-class high --affirm S1,S2,D1 \
--bundle audit/fraud-scoring/ --sign-key-file ~/.iga/seal.key
# Re-hash artifacts against the manifest (and check the optional HMAC seal).
iga verify-bundle --bundle audit/fraud-scoring/ --sign-key-file ~/.iga/seal.key
The manifest.json content-hashes every artifact and records a framework_content_hash
pinning the checklist + ISO/EU AI Act mappings that produced the assessment, so any later
edit is detected by verify-bundle. Use --zip to emit a .zip. (PDF rendering and a
public-key manifest signature are deferred; the hash manifest + optional HMAC seal are the
integrity baseline.)
The seal key is resolved from --sign-key-file <path> (preferred), then --sign-key <key>
(inline; avoid — visible in shell history and the process list), then the $IGA_SIGN_KEY
environment variable. Use the same source for export and verify-bundle.
Classificator Bridge (eai-classification/v1)
v0.20.0 — producer-agnostic interchange layer between the Enterprise AI Classification Framework and the IKI-Gov assessment engine.
The bridge accepts documents from any producer that conforms to the
eai-classification/v1 schema — the research eai-classificator tool, partner
survey tooling, or hand-crafted JSON. The schema is keyed to the
model (6×6 matrix: types T1–T6 × autonomy levels L1–L6), not to any one
tool's output format.
Example classification document
{
"schema": "eai-classification/v1",
"producer": {"tool": "eai-classificator", "version": "1.0.0"},
"use_cases": [
{
"id": "fraud-scoring",
"type": "T1",
"level": "L4",
"name": {"de": "Betrugserkennung", "en": "Fraud Scoring"},
"confidence": 0.92,
"tags": ["finance", "high-risk"]
},
{
"id": "customer-chat",
"type": "T4",
"level": "L3",
"ecosystem": true
}
]
}
L6 / ecosystem regime: level L6 is the non-ordinal ecosystem/multi-system
coordination overlay. Set "ecosystem": true on any L1–L5 use case to indicate
it participates in a multi-system coordination regime — the parser normalises the
effective cell level to L6 and retains base_level for the record.
level=L6 combined with ecosystem=false is a contradiction and is rejected.
Ingest a classification document
# Human table: use case, cell, risk presumption, strict, obligations, note
iga classify ingest --file classification.json --lang de
# Machine JSON: includes pack content_hash and producer echo
iga classify ingest --file classification.json --quiet
Run a profiled assessment from a classification document
# Resolve the selected use case's profile, then run the full assess pipeline
iga classify assess \
--file classification.json \
--select fraud-scoring \
--affirm S1,S2,D1,D2,T1 \
--lang de \
--quiet \
--save
# The profile's risk_class and strict flag are pre-set from the classification
# pack. --strict may further tighten; profile strict=true cannot be loosened.
The classify assess command reuses the full existing pipeline
(compute_scores, evaluate_all_gates, render_json, store.save_assessment,
log_security_event) and logs a iga-classify-assess security event including
the cell id and the profile pack content_hash.
Classification-profile pack override
The built-in pack (eai-classification-default, DRAFT semantics) is
automatically loaded. To override it, drop a JSON file with
"pack_kind": "classification-profile" into IGA_CONTENT_PATH
(default ~/.iga/content/). The file must cover all 36 cells; a pack with the
same framework_id overrides the built-in.
{
"pack_kind": "classification-profile",
"framework_id": "eai-classification-default",
"version": "my-org-1.0",
"profiles": {
"T1.L1": {"risk_presumption": "low", "strict": false,
"obligations": ["iso42001", "euaiact"],
"notes": {"en": "Minimal oversight required."}},
"T1.L2": { "..." : "..." }
}
}
ContentPacks (regulatory framework gap mappings) and ProfilePacks coexist in the
same directory; the loader discriminates by pack_kind.
JSON Schema for external producers
schemas/eai-classification.v1.schema.json (repo root) provides a JSON Schema
draft/2020-12 definition that partner producers can use for
pre-publication validation. The Python parser in classification.py is the
authoritative source; jsonschema is not a declared project dependency.
Workshop Mode (T-B3)
iga workshop run is the live customer-workshop tool: run it on a laptop
connected to a projector, point it at a classification document, and it renders
each use case in large-format, high-contrast rich output while simultaneously
writing a signed leave-behind artifact (the "Übergabeunterlage") per use case to
disk. The whole cycle (projector rendering plus artifact generation) targets
under 2 minutes per use case.
Offline-capable
Workshop mode is designed for air-gapped customer sites. It explicitly
bypasses the startup CVE / dependency check (pip-audit requires network access;
on an air-gapped site it would hang, time out, and emit a noisy "inconclusive"
warning). The dep-check bypass is automatic when the workshop subcommand is
detected; no --no-dep-check flag required. Security posture is maintained by
running pip-audit on the founder's machine before the session.
Example
# Generate signed leave-behind artifacts for all use cases in a classification
# document, in German (default), writing to ./workshop-out/<date>/.
iga workshop run \
--file classification.json \
--sign-key ~/.iga/workshop.key \
--signer "Presidio Group" \
--lang de
# Generate for selected use cases only.
iga workshop run \
--file medical.json \
--select infusion-pump-dosing \
--select surgical-robotics \
--sign-key ~/.iga/workshop.key \
--out /tmp/workshop-2026/
# Pre-populate answers (assessor filled a form earlier).
iga workshop run \
--file classification.json \
--answers answers.json \
--sign-key ~/.iga/workshop.key
# Quiet: write artifacts only, no projector output.
iga workshop run --file classification.json --quiet
The answers.json format is:
{
"fraud-scoring": {
"affirm": ["S1", "S2", "S3", "D1", "D2"],
"skip": ["I4", "I5"]
}
}
Artifact layout per use case
workshop-out/<date>/<use_case_id>/
report.de.md Markdown leave-behind (localised)
report.json Full assessment JSON + classification provenance block
manifest.json Content-hashed manifest (presidio-hardened/workshop-leavebehind@1)
manifest.sig Ed25519 detached signature (UNSIGNED marker if no key provided)
manifest.json records: tool version, cell id, risk class, language, profile-pack
content hash, SHA-256 of every artifact, and whether the artifact is signed.
Key generation (founder setup)
Generate a dedicated Ed25519 keypair for workshop use. Keep the private key
at mode 0600; distribute only the public key to customers for verification:
# Python one-liner — generates a 32-byte private key and the matching public key
python3 - <<'EOF'
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
sk = Ed25519PrivateKey.generate()
priv = sk.private_bytes_raw().hex()
pub = sk.public_key().public_bytes_raw().hex()
print("private (keep secret, chmod 600):", priv)
print("public (share with customers): ", pub)
EOF
# Write the private key to a file and lock it.
echo "<private-hex>" > ~/.iga/workshop.key
chmod 600 ~/.iga/workshop.key
Key can also be provided via $IGA_WORKSHOP_SIGN_KEY to keep it out of the
process list entirely:
export IGA_WORKSHOP_SIGN_KEY="<private-hex>"
iga workshop run --file classification.json
Verify a leave-behind (customer side)
The customer can verify the artifact using the public key the founder provided:
# Verify the artifact in the infusion-pump-dosing/ directory.
iga workshop verify \
--dir workshop-out/2026-06-11/infusion-pump-dosing/ \
--pubkey <64-hex-char-public-key>
# Machine-readable JSON result.
iga workshop verify \
--dir workshop-out/2026-06-11/infusion-pump-dosing/ \
--pubkey <public-key> \
--quiet
Exit 0 if all artifact hashes and the signature verify; exit 1 otherwise (fail-closed).
Security
See SECURITY.md for the full security policy.
Security controls built into the tool:
- Input validation for all CLI parameters (type, bounds, allow-list)
- HTML-escaping of all user-supplied strings in report output
- Structured security event log at
~/.iga/security.log(no content logged, structural metadata only) - On-startup CVE check via
pip-audit(suppress with--no-dep-check) - Session rate limiting (default: 100 assessments; override via
IGA_MAX_ASSESSMENTS)
Roadmap
| Version | Theme | Status |
|---|---|---|
| v0.1.0 | MVP — interactive + parameter-driven assessment, M1–M6 scoring, bilingual | Released |
| v0.2.0 | MCP server — agent-accessible assessment engine (iga-mcp) |
Released |
| v0.3.0 | Gate readiness refinement, CI exit codes 0/2/3, --strict flag |
Released |
| v0.4.0 | Report export to file (--output) with per-item answers |
Released |
| v0.5.0 | ISO/IEC 42001 clause-level gap mapping (iga iso-gap) |
Released |
| v0.6.0 | Portfolio mode: persistence, list, portfolio, delete |
Released |
| v0.7.0 | Maturity trending: delta between saved runs (iga trend) |
Released |
| v0.8.0 | EU AI Act gate→article mapping for high-risk systems (iga euaiact-gap) |
Released |
| v0.13.0 | External evidence-backed affirmation: iga assess --evidence / verify-evidence + iga_assess_with_evidence (first producer: presidio-hardened-ai) |
Released |
| v0.14.0 | Public-key (Ed25519) evidence verification: trust-store {alg, public_key} entries + verify_ref dispatch ([crypto] extra) |
Released |
| v0.20.0 | Classificator bridge (eai-classification/v1), 36-cell profile pack, iga classify |
Released |
| v0.21.0 T-B3 | iga workshop — offline customer-workshop tool, Ed25519 signed leave-behind artifacts, workshop verify |
Released |
| v0.21.0 T1.4 | Full German localisation sweep: all runtime output through t(), no English-only sentinels under --lang de |
Released |
Full version deliberation log: PRESIDIO-REQ.md
Development
# Install in editable mode with dev dependencies
pip install -e ".[dev]"
# Run tests
pytest
# Lint and format
ruff format .
ruff check . --fix
License
MIT. See LICENSE.
SDLC
This repository is developed under the Presidio hardened-family SDLC: https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-docs/blob/main/sdlc/sdlc-report.md.
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