prism-verify 0.4.2

Runtime adjudication service for agent workflows. Family-different, reasoning-stripped, multi-lens verification with replayable receipts.

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prism-verify

Runtime adjudication service for agent workflows. Family-different, reasoning-stripped, multi-lens verification with replayable receipts. Landing page & handbook →

Install

Install the prism CLI (and the HTTP service) on your PATH:

uv tool install prism-verify        # or: pipx install prism-verify

Zero Python? Use the npm launcher (downloads + SHA256-verifies a prebuilt binary):

npx @mcptoolshop/prism-verify verify --artifact @file.py --intent "..." --caller-family openai

Or add it as a library — extras: [anthropic] [openai] [google] [mcp] [http] [all]:

uv add prism-verify
# or
pip install "prism-verify[all]"

Quick start

Prism always verifies with a model family different from the caller's (Lock 1), so configure at least one alternate-family provider. Set a signing secret (or PRISM_DEV=1 for local play) so receipts can be written:

export PRISM_SIGNING_SECRET="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY="sk-ant-..."   # alt-family verifier for an OpenAI-family caller

prism verify \
  --artifact @myfile.py \
  --intent "Sort a list in O(n log n)" \
  --caller-family openai \
  --provider anthropic

Architecture

Prism enforces four architectural locks at the API contract:

1. Family-different — caller's model family is always excluded from verification
2. Reasoning-stripped — producer CoT is stripped before crossing the family boundary
3. Multi-lens — at least 3 independent lenses run in parallel
4. Submodularity-aware — refuses if lenses agree too much (collapsed signal)

HTTP service

Run prism as an HTTP service (needs the [http] extra):

prism serve --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000      # OpenAPI docs at /docs

Endpoint	What it does
POST /verify	Verify an artifact (same contract as the CLI). Blocks within the budget; Prefer: respond-async + a webhook URL → 202, verdict delivered to the (signed) webhook.
GET /replay/{receipt_id}	The signed receipt + signature_valid.
POST /verify-receipt	Verify a standalone receipt (cross-tool).
GET /healthz	Liveness + configured verifier families (no auth).

Set API keys (hashed at rest) — prism is fail-closed, so /verify is refused until keys are configured or you opt into local no-auth:

export PRISM_API_KEYS="<sha256(key1)>,<sha256(key2)>"   # callers send: Authorization: Bearer <key>
export PRISM_WEBHOOK_SECRET="<random>"                  # to sign async/escalate webhook deliveries
# local dev only:
export PRISM_HTTP_ALLOW_NO_AUTH=1

Errors are RFC 9457 application/problem+json; POST /verify honours an Idempotency-Key header and a per-key rate limit (429 + Retry-After). Async/escalate webhooks are Standard-Webhooks-signed, SSRF-guarded (no internal/metadata targets), retried, and carry a named cancel-event compensator.

Receipts & signing (Ed25519, verifiable by anyone)

Every verification produces a signed, replayable receipt in ~/.prism/receipts.db. v0.4 signs new receipts with Ed25519 (RFC 8032) by default, so a different tool can verify a prism receipt with prism's public key — no shared secret:

prism keygen --out ~/.prism/signing_key.pem    # generate an Ed25519 keypair
export PRISM_SIGNING_KEY=~/.prism/signing_key.pem
prism pubkey                                    # publish this public key + kid to consumers

# a consumer (e.g. role-os) verifies a receipt with ONLY the public key:
prism verify-receipt receipt.json --public-key prism-pub.pem

The signature covers the verdict, the pre/post-strip artifact hashes, the verifier model, the submodularity matrix, the per-lens prompt hashes (byte-for-byte replayable), the citation retrieval pins, and the signing alg/kid. Legacy HMAC receipts still verify (set PRISM_SIGNING_SECRET); PRISM_DEV=1 mints a dev key for local play. Prism refuses to start the verify / replay / serve / MCP paths if no key is configured, rather than silently signing with a publicly known key.

Manage stored receipts with the compensator commands:

prism receipt delete <receipt_id>
prism receipt prune --older-than 90d --yes

Security & privacy

• Threat model. Prism reads the artifact + intent you pass and the verifier models' responses, and writes signed receipts to a local SQLite DB. It does not read your source tree, environment, or credentials beyond the provider API keys you supply via environment variables. Receipt signatures give third-party verifiability (Ed25519: a consumer verifies with the public key, no shared secret) but are not tamper-proof against a local-root attacker who can read the on-disk private key — that's the same ceiling as the HMAC secret. For genuine tamper-resistance, hold the key in an HSM and anchor receipts in a transparency log (the named hardening path).
• HTTP surface. prism serve binds loopback by default, is fail-closed (no /verify without API keys), hashes keys at rest, and SSRF-guards caller-supplied webhook URLs (no internal/link-local/metadata targets). It runs caller-supplied artifacts through a model; an artifact may attempt prompt injection but cannot change the verdict schema or exfiltrate prism's provider keys.
• No telemetry. Prism sends requests only to the model providers you configure (Anthropic / OpenAI / Google / local Ollama). Nothing else.
• Full policy: SECURITY.md.

License

MIT