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Project Agent CLI

Install the client with python -m pip install project-agent-client, or install from this repository with python -m pip install ./apps/cli. Build a wheel with python -m build apps/cli for distribution. The installed entry point is project-agent; do not install it into the same environment as the legacy backend package, which exposes the same command name.

This separately packaged client forwards Task, Query, Sprint and Proposal scene commands, Quest Task handoffs, and explicitly supported Context, Doc Hub, Meeting, Bootstrap, Attribute, Report, Monitoring and Scheduled commands. The service must implement and authorize each operation; this client cannot override a service-side rejection. Scene receipts and the stdout, stderr and exit code of bridged commands are preserved. Administrative database and upgrade operations are not exposed through this client. The server's database location is never selected by a client-supplied path.

Configure PROJECT_SERVICE_URL and set PROJECT_SERVICE_TOKEN to a Magic Campus API Key (access token), or to an existing service grant. The client sends it as Authorization: Bearer <token>; it does not need Magic Campus account API settings or service database credentials. HTTPS is required except for a local loopback service. The client does not automatically retry a write because a network failure can leave its outcome unknown. Legacy Doc Hub JSON-file arguments are read on the client and sent as inline JSON; paths are never read on the server. A Magic Campus API Key acts only for its verified user; it cannot delegate another actor. Commands that mutate data require an active user and the applicable project membership. Existing trusted Agent grants can still supply a verified per-request actor.

With a personal Magic Campus API Key, Task and Sprint scene writes continue to enforce their actor and business rules, and Task Quest commands remain available with their own authorization checks. Proposal list is readable, while approve and reject require a trusted service grant because the existing policy does not yet enforce approval eligibility. For Story/People Quest sources, personal keys may use status, query and detail; private query scopes must match the caller's active Magic Campus identity. The source operations ingest, publish-source, reconcile and history require a trusted service grant and an active actor: history also updates the shared review journal. The grant must bind the actor or explicitly allow per-request delegation. The CLI bridge supports the read-only context commands, Doc Hub reads (get-root, index, access target, access plan), meeting parse-time, meeting tasks pending, mind read, loop list, and monitoring evaluate-followups; it also supports attribute apply and meeting save, which check project membership.

Other bridge commands require a configured trusted service grant: context member/identity management, onboarding, all bootstrap commands (including checkpoint and loop-state, which update state), Doc Hub writes, report, monitoring writes, scheduled runs, meeting task plan/placement/run/resume, and loop writes. These commands do not yet all enforce caller authorization. The service grant must have a bound actor or explicitly trust per-request delegation for writes. A personal API Key cannot be used to bypass this restriction.

With a trusted service grant, meeting tasks run and tasks resume execute on the service, using the bound actor. Existing plans must resolve to that actor; a resume batch with a plan for another actor is rejected. Task writes use the service-side Quest handoff. Meeting notifications are sent by the service's magic-campus executable, so that executable and its account configuration must be available in the service runtime; an absent executable leaves the notification pending for retry. The meeting-assistant skill uses the same PROJECT_SERVICE_URL and PROJECT_SERVICE_TOKEN for meeting state when those are set, and does not fall back to a local database if the remote service is unavailable.

When an explicitly trusted Agent credential uses trustActorRefs: true, the runtime must set PROJECT_SERVICE_ACTOR_REF to the current verified actor JSON (e.g. {"userId":"..."}) for CLI bridge operations which need a user. A bound actor credential does not need this variable. The service validates that actor is active and rejects a conflicting actor in the command input.

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