Prompt Injection Blocker
Read-only scanner for prompt-injection and LLM anti-analysis text in files before agent review.
This tool is meant for defensive intake: copied advisories, incident notes, third-party repositories, docs, issues, and fixtures that may contain text aimed at overriding an AI assistant or suppressing analysis.
It does not remove files, modify content, execute code, contact registries, or prove that content is safe.
Install
pipx install prompt-injection-blocker
# or
pip install prompt-injection-blocker
Python 3.9+. No runtime dependencies.
Usage
prompt-injection-blocker /path/to/project
prompt-injection-blocker /path/to/project --json
prompt-injection-blocker /path/to/project --report report.json
From a source checkout:
python -m prompt_injection_blocker /path/to/project
pip install -e ".[dev]" && pytest
Exit codes:
0: no blocking promptware patterns found1: usage/runtime error or incomplete scan2: blocking promptware patterns found
Missing or unsupported targets fail explicitly. Unreadable files/directories,
invalid text, and candidate size limits set coverage.complete: false with
path/reason entries in coverage.errors. Blocking findings still return 2;
otherwise incomplete scans return 1, never 0. Completeness covers only the
scanner's selected file types and directory policy, not every repository file.
--report creates a new report exclusively (mode 0600 on POSIX). Existing
files, symlinks and hard links are refused, including aliases of scanned inputs.
Write failures return 1; a partial newly created report may remain and must not
be treated as a successful result. Choose a fresh output path for each run.
What It Flags
- prompt-injection text that tries to override prior/system/developer instructions
- text asking an agent to reveal secrets, hidden instructions, environment variables, or tokens
- text trying to make an agent run commands or fetch external content
- observability/tool-output text, such as fake Sentry resolutions, that tries to make an agent run package-manager diagnostics
- LLM-targeted anti-analysis language that tells scanners not to report suspicious content
- model-scanner refusal/null-result bait that tries to make an analysis pipeline stop before reaching suspicious payload code
- Microsoft Copilot / AI-assistant links where a
q=query parameter appears to carry private-context requests plus external exfiltration instructions - cryptographic context injection: encrypted page/tool content plus decrypt-in- sandbox language plus session data or URL-parameter exfiltration (Grok.com "summarize this page" class, Aug 2026). Ciphertext is not readable by input filters; decrypted tool output is untrusted.
- review-only opaque decryption handoffs: visible text that asks an agent to decrypt or decode content and then obey the result, even when no exfiltration destination is visible. A match does not prove the hidden content is harmful.
- broad repo-local agent instruction language that deserves review before opening a path in automated agents
- recognized agent instruction, skill, and MCP configuration paths, even when their contents look benign, so provenance and scope receive human review
- known phrase families after Unicode compatibility normalization, removal of invisible format characters, and defanging of simple HTML separators
The rules are intentionally conservative. A finding means "do not feed this raw text into an agent," not "this file is malware."
Safe Handling
- Do not paste flagged text into agents in raw form.
- Summarize or defang prompt-injection text before sharing with the team.
- If this appears in a third-party repository, do not open the repo in agents or editors until reviewed.
- If a test needs one of these markers, split or encode it so the test remains meaningful without carrying live promptware. This codebase stores all of its own detection markers split and joins them at runtime; keep that discipline when adding rules.
- Treat model refusal as a failed analysis, not a clean result. Send the file through static checks, sandboxing, or human review instead of allowing a null response to pass.
- Treat unfamiliar setup commands and anything they fetch at runtime as untrusted code. A clean text scan cannot establish what a later network response or package installation will execute.
- For the October 2026 Copilot CLI cryptographic-context-injection report, constrain the agent's file access and outbound destinations, and review resolved tool actions when untrusted pages are read. The researcher reported continued reproduction on October 1; no fixed Copilot CLI version was identified. Do not treat a clean static scan or model refusal as a fix.
Scope Limits
This scanner only checks text-like files and known phrase families. It will not detect every possible prompt-injection attempt, encoded payload, image-only instruction, runtime-fetched instruction, behavioral setup chain, or model-specific attack. Use it as one deterministic intake layer alongside provenance review, sandboxing, least-privilege tools, network controls, and human approval for consequential actions.
Metadata
Release files for prompt-injection-blocker 0.1.7
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| prompt_injection_blocker-0.1.7.tar.gz | 19.8 kB | With provenance | Details for prompt_injection_blocker-0.1.7.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| prompt_injection_blocker-0.1.7-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for prompt_injection_blocker-0.1.7-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 32.4 kB
Release files / prompt_injection_blocker-0.1.7.tar.gz
| Download URL | prompt_injection_blocker-0.1.7.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 19.8 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
cc98548c265378d431115589266f661eeb680cdeb33f5b85b9c3ae9e0aa1a4a2
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 16, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / prompt_injection_blocker-0.1.7-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | prompt_injection_blocker-0.1.7-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 12.7 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
8b3352c579872a1ab2bf55873540e720db276e1cc2db4ba4efe1d0edde73881b
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
6465d9d6db93fb399efd55787418c5febdfd2f7365b0fc624b9bb7e6905025fe
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 16, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for prompt-injection-blocker 0.1.7
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
Both files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for prompt_injection_blocker-0.1.7.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 16, 2026.
Transparency logA note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.
To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.