proofbundle
AI eval results need receipts.
Turn an AI evaluation result, review, decision, or action outcome into a portable receipt that can be checked offline.
proofbundle lets a verifier check which key signed the exact bytes and whether those bytes changed. It does not prove that the result is true, that the signer is trustworthy, or that the evaluation was sound.
One file. No verification server. No network required.
Quick start · What it proves · New in 6.0.0 · New in 5.1.0 · Adoption review · Documentation
New in 6.0.0
proofbundle 6.0.0 makes agent-review/v0.2
what the emitter produces without an argument. That is the one break of this MAJOR: v0.1 needs an explicit
legacy_v01=True, stays readable and verifiable without a deadline, and is reported as
predicateVersionStatus: legacy by the new dispatcher verify_agent_review_any. v0.2 requires
subjectContext.disclosureCoreDigest and derived limitationCodes, separates time claims by source,
accepts only the full 40-character fixCommit, and carries a named policy axis: verify_agent_review_v02
evaluates the derived codes and the coverage status against a policy that is a file (the standard one ships
in the package and its digest appears in the result), with three decisions, accept, reject and
insufficient_evidence.
Two things a relying party should know. A receipt whose own time claims contradict each other is now
rejected with TIME_CLAIMS_CONFLICT regardless of policy, and a malformed policy file is refused before it
decides (POLICY_NOT_EVALUABLE), never read as a permissive one. Non-fatal notes such as
POLICY_NOT_EVALUATED and AGENT_REVIEW_LEGACY_V01 live in advisory_codes; reason_codes is empty for
a valid receipt. The six published v0.1 receipts verify as before; the full list is in the
CHANGELOG.
Release status
The closing audit verdict for 6.0.0 was
FIX_FIRST, notWITHSTANDS_DEEPGATE. Three findings were confirmed and stay open; they are published in RESTRISIKO_600.md, together with the scope each statement of that round holds over: the mutation gate ran over a measured subset of the suite, the parity gate over all 68 source files. Both figures are stated in RESTRISIKO_600.md with the definition of what they count — this page deliberately carries no test count, because one here goes stale with the next added test (tests/test_docs_truth.py).
New in 5.1.0
proofbundle 5.1.0 adds a new receipt kind for disclosing AI agent involvement and review in pull requests and issues.
- Agent review receipts bind the reviewed GitHub object, the declared review runs, coverage, findings, limitations, and the human visible disclosure.
- Stronger subject and disclosure binding prevents a valid receipt from silently travelling to another object or a visible block from claiming more than the signed predicate.
- Clearer time and coverage semantics separate declared event time from witness observation time and reject ambiguous claims of complete coverage.
- Hardened correction chains prevent an untrusted receipt from taking over the current position in a correction or supersession chain.
- Executable conformance coverage now includes the agent review predicate and the receipt envelope profile.
One behaviour change deserves attention before upgrading. automation_summary now adds RECEIPT_NOT_OK to its blockers when a receipt is not ok. Read the 5.1.0 changelog before updating automation.
Release status
The closing audit verdict for 5.1.0 was
PARTIAL_GATE_NO_WITHSTANDS, notWITHSTANDS_DEEPGATE. The declared residual risks are published in RESTRISIKO_510.md.
Quick start
Install the core verifier.
python -m pip install proofbundle
Requires Python 3.10 or newer. The core installs two dependencies, cryptography and rfc8785.
Download a real example receipt and verify it offline.
curl -fsSL \
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/main/examples/example_bundle.json \
-o receipt.json
proofbundle verify receipt.json
The command uses the local file only. Its exit code is part of the public contract.
0 verified
1 verification failed
2 malformed input or usage error
3 relying party policy not met
Run the tamper demo.
python -m pip install "proofbundle[eval]"
proofbundle demo
The demo checks an honest receipt, multiple tampered variants, and a sample swap. It exits nonzero if a tamper is accepted.
For a guided walkthrough, see docs/DEMO.md. For Inspect, see docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md.
What a receipt proves
| A verified receipt can establish | A verified receipt does not establish |
|---|---|
| A stated key signed these exact bytes | The real world identity or honesty of the key holder |
| The signed content has not changed | The truth of the reported score or finding |
| A supplied Merkle inclusion or sample opening is valid | That the evaluation design was good |
| A declared threshold, provenance field, or relation is present and bound | That the computation itself was correct |
| A supplied relying party policy was met | That no omitted run or cherry picked result exists unless the chosen profile makes that claim testable |
This boundary is the product. proofbundle makes a claim attributable and tamper evident without turning the claim into truth.
Read the full threat model and the project wide non claims.
Choose the path that matches your task
| Task | Install | Start here |
|---|---|---|
| Verify an existing receipt offline | proofbundle |
Quick start, SPEC.md |
| Emit an evaluation receipt or preregistration | proofbundle[eval] |
docs/DEMO.md, EVAL_CLAIM.md |
| Integrate with Inspect AI | proofbundle[inspect] |
docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md |
| Add a signed agent review disclosure to a PR or issue | proofbundle |
5.1.0 release notes, conformance/agent_review |
| Verify RFC 3161 or OpenTimestamps evidence | proofbundle[anchors] |
docs/ANCHORS.md |
| Verify ML-DSA-44 witness cosignatures | proofbundle[pq] |
docs/ANCHORS.md |
| Explore the TEE attestation bridge | proofbundle[experimental] |
docs/EXPERIMENTAL_ENCLAVE.md |
How it works
evaluation, review, decision, or action
│
▼
canonical statement and commitments
│
▼
signature and optional Merkle proofs
│
▼
one portable receipt file
│
▼
proofbundle verification offline
│
▼
separate verification axes and policy result
The verifier checks only the evidence supplied to it. Trust anchors, expected subjects, currentness information, and policy requirements come from the relying party.
Capabilities and maturity
proofbundle is a beta project. Shipped does not mean that every profile has the same maturity.
| Capability | What it provides | Maturity |
|---|---|---|
| Core receipt verification | Ed25519 signatures, RFC 6962 and RFC 9162 Merkle inclusion, strict parsing, offline verification | Shipped |
| Evaluation receipts | Metric and threshold claims, provenance, salted commitments, optional per sample audit | Shipped |
| Selective disclosure | SD-JWT with key binding for hiding selected values while preserving verifiability | Shipped |
| Agent review receipts | Signed self declarations for AI involvement and review in PRs and issues | agent-review/v0.2 experimental in 6.0.0 and the default; agent-review/v0.1 legacy, still readable and byte-pinned. Self declared assurance only |
| Inspect, pytest, and Hugging Face bridges | Opt in adapters for existing evaluation workflows | Shipped |
| External time evidence | RFC 3161, OpenTimestamps, and a bring your own anchor interface | Experimental, the [anchors] extra |
| Decision receipts | A gate's verdict over named evidence, bound to the receipts it judged, never a claim that the verdict was correct | Shipped |
| Outcome, relation, run ledger, trust pack, and verification summary predicates | Typed evidence graphs and relying party policy inputs | Experimental |
| TEE attestation bridge | RATS and EAT based enclave evidence | Preview, experimental |
Independent Rust cross-verifier (tools/pb_verify_rs) |
A second implementation that cross-checks the conformance corpus differentially; not part of the wheel or the sdist | Experimental in 6.0.0 and advisory only: agreement on recorded vectors, no conformance promise; own milestone 6.1 |
The full predicate inventory and maturity labels live in docs/predicates/README.md.
Security and trust
- The verifier uses
cryptographyfor Ed25519 andrfc8785for canonicalization. It does not implement its own cryptographic primitives. - Correctness is checked against external RFC 6962 vectors and a real Sigstore Rekor proof, not only against the project's own receipts.
- The test suite sits behind a mutation gate and property based parser fuzzing.
- The receipt signature is Ed25519 and is not post quantum. Post quantum coverage today is limited to witness side ML-DSA-44 cosignatures. A post quantum payload signature is on the roadmap and not yet built. Detail in docs/ANCHORS.md.
- Releases are built once, carry SLSA build provenance, and are published through PyPI Trusted Publishing, where PyPI records PEP 740 attestations for the same bytes.
- A second, independent verifier written in Rust cross-checks the conformance corpus. It is advisory: differential agreement on the recorded vectors, not a correctness proof of either implementation, and it does not ship in the package.
- The conformance corpus includes positive controls and counter proofs. Read what it does and does not establish in CONFORMANCE.md.
- The 30 minute adversarial adoption path is in docs/REVIEWERS.md.
- Security reports follow SECURITY.md.
- Release specific audit artefacts and residual risks remain visible rather than being folded into a single green status.
OpenSSF Scorecard
The aggregate score is a live heuristic, not a product verdict. Several checks score zero for reasons that are written down rather than hidden, one sentence per check, in docs/SCORECARD.md. The OpenSSF self assessment walks the Best Practices criteria honestly.
Standards and interoperability
proofbundle is a small offline receipt layer that complements, rather than replaces, systems such as in-toto, Sigstore, SCITT, transparency logs, trusted execution environments, and independent reproduction.
- INTEROP.md compares the boundaries tool by tool.
- docs/RECEIPT_ENVELOPE_PROFILE.md defines the portable envelope profile.
- docs/IN_TOTO_PROFILE.md describes the in-toto mapping.
- docs/SCITT_CPB_MAPPING.md records the SCITT mapping.
- docs/RELATED_WORK.md holds the research neighbourhood.
Documentation
| Reader | Start here |
|---|---|
| New user | docs/GLOSSARY.md, docs/DEMO.md |
| Adopter or security reviewer | docs/REVIEWERS.md, THREAT_MODEL.md |
| Implementer | SPEC.md, CONFORMANCE.md |
| Integrator | INTEGRATIONS.md, docs/INSPECT_HAPPY_PATH.md |
| Relying party | docs/POLICY_PROFILES.md, docs/TRUST_ANCHORS.md |
| Standards or research reader | INTEROP.md, docs/RELATED_WORK.md |
| Release reviewer | CHANGELOG.md, docs/PRE_TAG_AUDIT.md |
Scope
proofbundle is not a hosted transparency service, a complete in-toto client, a trusted execution environment, a consensus system, or a compliance product by itself.
It is the portable, standards oriented receipt layer between an evidence producer and a relying party.
Roadmap, stated as not yet built. A post quantum payload signature, and a CLI flag to select the content root algorithm, jcs-sha256-v1 is the signed default today.
Citation
Machine readable citation metadata is in CITATION.cff.
The archival software record uses concept DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21110642. The Technical Note uses concept DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21230466.
Contributing
Read CONTRIBUTING.md and the Code of Conduct.
Good first issues use the good-first-issue label. Security findings follow SECURITY.md.
The verifier core aims to remain small, dependency light, and auditable.
License
MIT, see LICENSE.
proofbundle is part of b7n0de, Verified AI Work · b7n0de.com
Metadata
Release files for proofbundle 6.0.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | |
|---|---|---|---|
| proofbundle-6.0.0.tar.gz | 2.3 MB | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| proofbundle-6.0.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 2.8 MB
Release files / proofbundle-6.0.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | proofbundle-6.0.0.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 2.3 MB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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| Upload date | |
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Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 11, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / proofbundle-6.0.0-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | proofbundle-6.0.0-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 556.4 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
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|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
0c4ffadbe7227c31381c085f950e840c69f480199c8ba9c24d3934ded2e9c8f6
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Sep 11, 2026.
Transparency log