groundcheck
Cheap hallucination detectors for retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), benchmarked on the public RAGTruth corpus. Built by ProtForge. Write-up: https://protforge.com/research/hallucination-detectors
A plain lexical-overlap score (share of response tokens never seen in the source) beat a small NLI model on RAGTruth, and a logistic-regression ensemble of both did not beat the lexical score alone. All of this is modest: precision stays below 0.5 at the F1-tuned thresholds.
| detector | AUROC (95% CI) | precision | recall | F1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
lexical |
0.778 (0.746-0.806) | 0.476 | 0.858 | 0.612 |
nli |
0.716 (0.681-0.747) | 0.476 | 0.836 | 0.607 |
numeric |
0.535 (0.503-0.566) | 0.353 | 1.000 | 0.522 |
ensemble |
0.766 (0.737-0.797) | 0.450 | 0.934 | 0.607 |
900 of the 2,700 RAGTruth test responses (stratified subsample, seed 0); thresholds and ensemble fit on 299 train responses. Full details, per-task numbers and caveats under "Results" below.
Caveats up front: the test set is a subsample; thresholds and the ensemble were tuned on only 299 responses; precision is poor (the all-positive baseline gives F1 0.522); labels are response-level; the LLM judge is implemented but not evaluated yet; English only, 2023-era generators.
Given a source text and a model response, each detector returns a score in [0, 1] (higher = more likely hallucinated):
| detector | idea | cost |
|---|---|---|
lexical |
share of content tokens in the response (lowercased, stopwords and punctuation removed, numbers kept) that never appear in the source | microseconds |
numeric |
share of numbers in the response not found in the source after normalising 1,000 / 1000 / 1k; 0 when the response has no numbers |
microseconds |
nli |
SummaC-style. Response split into sentences (first 12 scored; later ones fall back to the lexical per-sentence score); source split into sentences; for each response sentence, NLI (cross-encoder/nli-deberta-v3-small) against each of the top-3 source sentences by content-token overlap and against their concatenation (each premise capped at 200 tokens); sentence entailment = max over those 4 pairs; score = 1 - the weakest sentence's entailment |
about 7 s per response on a loaded 4-thread CPU |
llm_judge |
Claude as judge via the anthropic SDK (groundcheck.detectors.LLMJudge): structured JSON verdict, score = confidence if hallucinated else 1 - confidence. Not evaluated yet; see "LLM judge" below |
API cost |
ensemble |
logistic regression on the lexical, nli and numeric scores, fit on the train sample only |
- |
Install
pip install protforge-groundcheck # core: lexical + numeric detectors, no dependencies
pip install "protforge-groundcheck[nli]" # adds torch + transformers for the NLI detector
pip install "protforge-groundcheck[judge]" # adds anthropic (+ numpy, pandas, scikit-learn) for the LLM judge
pip install "protforge-groundcheck[bench]" # everything needed to reproduce the benchmark
pip install "protforge-groundcheck[all]"
The PyPI distribution is protforge-groundcheck; the import name and CLI are groundcheck. Note that another,
unrelated PyPI project called groundcheck also installs an importable groundcheck package, so do not install
both in the same environment.
Python quickstart
from groundcheck import Lexical, Numeric
source = "The company reported revenue of 1,200 units in 2023 and hired 40 engineers."
good = "The company reported revenue of 1,200 units in 2023."
bad = "The company reported revenue of 3,400 units and opened an office in Berlin."
print(Lexical().score(source, good), Lexical().score(source, bad)) # 0.0 0.5
print(Numeric().score(source, good), Numeric().score(source, bad)) # 0.0 1.0
Scores are in [0, 1]; higher means more of the response is unsupported by the source. The lexical threshold of 0.26
in results/metrics.json is the RAGTruth F1-optimal value, not a default to trust: tune on your own data.
from groundcheck import NLI gives the NLI detector (pip install "protforge-groundcheck[nli]").
From the command line (two text files):
groundcheck score --source source.txt --response response.txt --detector lexical
--detector nli downloads cross-encoder/nli-deberta-v3-small on first use and is slow on CPU.
From a source checkout: pip install -e ".[test]" (pytest) or pip install -e ".[all,test]".
CLI
groundcheck score --source source.txt --response response.txt --detector nli
Prints JSON with the response score and a per-sentence verdict (--threshold, default 0.5, is not tuned;
tune it on your own data). --detector is one of lexical, numeric, nli.
groundcheck bench [--data-dir data] [--out-dir results] [--seed 0] [--train-n 300] [--test-n 900] [--threads 4]
Downloads response.jsonl and source_info.jsonl from the RAGTruth repository into data/, scores a
stratified train sample (by task type x label, default 300) and a stratified test subsample (task type x model, default 900 of the 2,700 test responses), tunes each detector's threshold to maximise
F1 on the train sample, and writes to results/: metrics.json, by_task.csv, by_model.csv,
test_scores.csv (ids and scores only, no source text) and examples.json. NLI results are cached in
data/nli_cache.jsonl, so an interrupted run resumes. If the NLI speed measured on the train sample projects the
test run past 2.5 hours, the test subsample drops to 600 and metrics.json records it (not triggered in the
published run). lexical and numeric are also scored on the full 2,700-response test split for reference. A CUDA device is used automatically when available.
Reproduce
pip install -e ".[bench,test]"
python -m pytest
groundcheck bench --seed 0
Data, license, citation
RAGTruth is released by Particle Media under the MIT License (Copyright (c) 2023 Particle Media; text in the
repository's LICENSE). Only per-response scores, ids and short snippets are published here, not the corpus.
Cheng Niu, Yuanhao Wu, Juno Zhu, Siliang Xu, Kashun Shum, Randy Zhong, Juntong Song, Tong Zhang. RAGTruth: A Hallucination Corpus for Developing Trustworthy Retrieval-Augmented Language Models. ACL 2024. arXiv:2401.00396.
@inproceedings{niu2024ragtruth,
title = {RAGTruth: A Hallucination Corpus for Developing Trustworthy Retrieval-Augmented Language Models},
author = {Niu, Cheng and Wu, Yuanhao and Zhu, Juno and Xu, Siliang and Shum, Kashun and Zhong, Randy and Song, Juntong and Zhang, Tong},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL)},
year = {2024},
eprint = {2401.00396},
archivePrefix = {arXiv}
}
Label: a response is hallucinated if it has at least one annotated span. Split: the corpus's own train /
test field.
Results
Run: seed 0, threshold and ensemble fit on a stratified train sample of 299 responses, evaluation on a stratified test subsample of 900 of the 2,700 test responses (300 per task, stratified by task type x model). Hallucination base rate in the subsample is 35.3% (35.0% on the full test split). Thresholds maximise F1 on the train sample. 95% intervals are bootstrap intervals over the 900 responses. Total runtime 2 h 33 min (NLI scoring of 299 + 900 responses, 4 CPU threads, machine shared with other workloads).
| detector | AUROC (95% CI) | precision | recall | F1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
lexical |
0.778 (0.746-0.806) | 0.476 | 0.858 | 0.612 |
nli |
0.716 (0.681-0.747) | 0.476 | 0.836 | 0.607 |
numeric |
0.535 (0.503-0.566) | 0.353 | 1.000 | 0.522 |
ensemble (LR on the three scores) |
0.766 (0.737-0.797) | 0.450 | 0.934 | 0.607 |
llm_judge |
not evaluated | - | - | - |
Predicting "hallucinated" for everything gives precision 0.353, recall 1.0, F1 0.522, so F1 near 0.6 is a modest
gain; AUROC is the better yardstick. numeric's F1-optimal train threshold is 0.0 (flag any response with a
number-like token that is missing from the source), so its precision/recall row is the all-positive baseline.
lexical and numeric on the full 2,700-response test split (same thresholds), for comparison with the
subsample: lexical AUROC 0.785, P 0.477, R 0.876, F1 0.617; numeric AUROC 0.551, P 0.349, R 1.000, F1 0.518.
By task type (test subsample, AUROC / F1; base rate in brackets):
| task | n | base rate | lexical | nli | numeric | ensemble |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| QA | 300 | 0.20 | 0.708 / 0.426 | 0.706 / 0.424 | 0.683 / 0.333 | 0.740 / 0.468 |
| Summary | 300 | 0.20 | 0.616 / 0.332 | 0.627 / 0.360 | 0.478 / 0.333 | 0.582 / 0.361 |
| Data2txt | 300 | 0.66 | 0.661 / 0.797 | 0.496 / 0.784 | 0.514 / 0.795 | 0.663 / 0.795 |
Full test split, lexical / numeric AUROC: QA 0.713 / 0.658, Summary 0.673 / 0.545, Data2txt 0.697 / 0.526.
Reading the numbers honestly:
- A bag-of-tokens overlap score beats the small NLI model on this corpus, and the logistic-regression ensemble
(fit on 299 responses) is not better than
lexicalalone overall. The ensemble does best on QA only. nliis at chance on Data2txt (AUROC 0.50): the source there is flattened JSON and sentence-level NLI against key-value lines is a poor fit. It is competitive withlexicalon QA and Summary.nliprobabilities are saturated near 0 and 1 (the tuned threshold is 0.999), so precision/recall trade off sharply around that value.- Per-model breakdowns are in
results/by_model.csv, per-response scores inresults/test_scores.csv, and three illustrative cases (two wherenlicatches a hallucinationlexicalmisses, one the reverse) inresults/examples.json.
Ablation and operating points
groundcheck ablation (code in groundcheck/ablation.py) reuses the cached scores: results/test_scores.csv for the
900 test responses and data/nli_cache.jsonl to rebuild the 299 train responses, so the main NLI scores are not
recomputed. It refits the ensemble on the train sample and checks it reproduces the published ensemble scores.
Outputs: results/ablation.json, results/operating_points.csv, results/cost_ratio_table.csv,
results/data2txt_verbalised_scores.csv.
Bootstrap: 1,000 resamples, seed 0, responses resampled within task and paired across detectors, so differences
have their own interval.
Headline. To catch 80% of hallucinations (overall test subsample, threshold chosen on that same subsample), the
best detector, lexical, also flags 40% of the correct answers (false-block rate 0.40; precision 0.53). The
ensemble matches it (0.40) and lexical+numeric is slightly worse (0.41). Operating points below are in-sample.
The marginal overall AUROC intervals (lexical 0.778, ensemble 0.766, lexical+numeric 0.762) overlap, so
their ranking cannot be resolved from the marginals; only paired differences can be. The paired result for
lexical+numeric minus lexical is -0.016 (95% CI -0.027 to -0.005) overall: adding the numeric detector to
lexical via logistic regression does not help and probably costs a little. Per task: QA +0.024 (+0.005 to +0.048),
Summary -0.038 (-0.071 to -0.005), Data2txt +0.002 (-0.023 to +0.026). The overall loss is driven by Summary, where
the fitted combination generalises worse than lexical alone (the weights come from a 299-response train sample).
1. Does NLI add anything to the ensemble? ensemble_lex_num is the same logistic regression on lexical and
numeric only (no NLI).
| split | n | lexical | nli | full ensemble | lexical+numeric | full minus lex+num |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| QA | 300 | 0.708 (0.646-0.769) | 0.706 (0.638-0.774) | 0.740 (0.680-0.803) | 0.733 (0.674-0.791) | +0.007 (-0.015 to +0.028) |
| Summary | 300 | 0.616 (0.538-0.694) | 0.627 (0.538-0.707) | 0.582 (0.510-0.660) | 0.579 (0.503-0.653) | +0.003 (-0.020 to +0.024) |
| Data2txt | 300 | 0.661 (0.594-0.720) | 0.496 (0.422-0.564) | 0.663 (0.594-0.725) | 0.663 (0.594-0.725) | -0.001 (-0.002 to +0.001) |
| overall | 900 | 0.778 (0.749-0.808) | 0.716 (0.682-0.750) | 0.766 (0.739-0.797) | 0.762 (0.734-0.793) | +0.005 (-0.001 to +0.011) |
AUROC (95% bootstrap CI). Within noise, NLI adds nothing to the ensemble: every difference interval includes zero.
The overall interval only just does (-0.001 to +0.011), so a gain of about half a point cannot be excluded, but it
is small and the ensemble is still not better than lexical alone. (The "overall" figures differ slightly from the
table above because the interval here resamples within task.)
2. Operating points. Threshold chosen on the test subsample itself so recall reaches 0.8 (or 0.5); this shows
the best trade-off available, not a deployable threshold. False-block rate = correct answers flagged / all correct
answers. Full table for every detector (including numeric, whose scores are mostly zero so it cannot reach
recall 0.5-0.8 without flagging everything) in results/operating_points.csv.
| task (base rate) | detector | precision @ R 0.8 | false-block @ R 0.8 | precision @ R 0.5 | false-block @ R 0.5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| QA (0.20) | lexical | 0.29 | 0.49 | 0.33 | 0.25 |
| nli | 0.31 | 0.45 | 0.33 | 0.25 | |
| ensemble | 0.34 | 0.38 | 0.35 | 0.23 | |
| lexical+numeric | 0.31 | 0.45 | 0.34 | 0.24 | |
| Summary (0.20) | lexical | 0.25 | 0.62 | 0.27 | 0.34 |
| nli | 0.25 | 0.61 | 0.32 | 0.26 | |
| ensemble | 0.24 | 0.62 | 0.25 | 0.38 | |
| lexical+numeric | 0.24 | 0.64 | 0.25 | 0.38 | |
| Data2txt (0.66) | lexical | 0.72 | 0.60 | 0.77 | 0.28 |
| nli | 0.66 | 0.81 | 0.65 | 0.53 | |
| ensemble | 0.73 | 0.59 | 0.79 | 0.27 | |
| lexical+numeric | 0.73 | 0.57 | 0.79 | 0.27 | |
| overall (0.35) | lexical | 0.53 | 0.40 | 0.67 | 0.14 |
| nli | 0.49 | 0.46 | 0.55 | 0.22 | |
| ensemble | 0.52 | 0.40 | 0.66 | 0.14 | |
| lexical+numeric | 0.52 | 0.41 | 0.65 | 0.15 |
In plain terms: at 80% recall a detector blocks roughly 40-60% of the correct answers per task, and precision is only 0.24-0.34 on QA and Summary (base rate 0.20). On Data2txt, precision at recall 0.8 is 0.72 against a 0.66 base rate, so the detector is only slightly better than flagging everything. At recall 0.5 the false-block rate drops to 25-35% on QA and Summary.
3. Cost-ratio view. A false block (flagging a correct answer) costs C, a missed hallucination costs 1. For each
C the threshold minimises C x false blocks + misses on the overall test subsample (n=900, 35% hallucinated).
Intervals are bootstrap 95% percentile CIs where the threshold is re-selected inside every resample, so they include
threshold selection; thresholds are still chosen in-sample, so the point estimates are optimistic. False-block rate =
correct answers flagged / all correct answers. Full table, including numeric: results/cost_ratio_table.csv.
| false-block : miss | detector | threshold | precision | recall | false-block rate | resamples flagging nothing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1:1 | lexical | 0.49 (0.41-0.53) | 0.67 (0.61-0.75) | 0.53 (0.40-0.71) | 0.14 (0.08-0.24) | 0% |
| 1:1 | nli | 1.00 (1.00-1.00) | 0.56 (0.53-0.64) | 0.54 (0.15-0.66) | 0.24 (0.05-0.30) | 0% |
| 1:1 | ensemble | 0.54 (0.52-0.57) | 0.66 (0.60-0.72) | 0.50 (0.44-0.64) | 0.14 (0.11-0.21) | 0% |
| 1:1 | lexical+numeric | 0.54 (0.51-0.54) | 0.66 (0.60-0.71) | 0.49 (0.45-0.64) | 0.14 (0.12-0.22) | 0% |
| 5:1 | lexical | flags nothing | - | 0 | 0 | 98% |
| 5:1 | nli | flags nothing | - | 0 | 0 | 82% |
| 5:1 | ensemble | flags nothing | - | 0 | 0 | 100% |
| 5:1 | lexical+numeric | flags nothing | - | 0 | 0 | 100% |
| 20:1 | lexical | flags nothing | - | 0 | 0 | 100% |
| 20:1 | nli | flags nothing | - | 0 | 0 | 96% |
| 20:1 | ensemble | flags nothing | - | 0 | 0 | 100% |
| 20:1 | lexical+numeric | flags nothing | - | 0 | 0 | 100% |
Flagging an answer only pays when precision exceeds C/(1+C): 0.50 at 1:1, 0.83 at 5:1, 0.95 at 20:1. At 1:1 the
detectors can be used (about half the hallucinations caught, 14% false blocks for lexical, ensemble and
lexical+numeric; nli is worse). At 5:1 and 20:1 no detector reaches that precision at any threshold on this
data, so the cost-minimising policy is to flag nothing; the threshold intervals for those rows cover only the few
resamples that did flag something (none for lexical at 20:1). The 1:1 nli threshold is the top of its score
range (scores saturate near 1.0), so its recall interval is wide.
Is the lexical threshold stable across corpora? No. Threshold tuned on one task for recall 0.8, applied to the others (recall / false-block rate):
| tuned on (threshold) | applied to QA | applied to Summary | applied to Data2txt |
|---|---|---|---|
| QA (0.23) | 0.80 / 0.49 | 0.68 / 0.51 | 1.00 / 1.00 |
| Summary (0.18) | 0.95 / 0.58 | 0.82 / 0.62 | 1.00 / 1.00 |
| Data2txt (0.48) | 0.12 / 0.10 | 0.07 / 0.02 | 0.80 / 0.60 |
QA and Summary thresholds are close (0.18-0.23) and transfer reasonably (recall within 0.15). The Data2txt threshold
is more than twice as high, because even faithful data-to-text answers contain many tokens absent from the flattened
JSON: a QA/Summary threshold flags every Data2txt answer, and the Data2txt threshold misses almost everything in
QA and Summary. The per-task sweep (lexical_threshold_sweep in ablation.json, steps of 0.05) shows the same:
recall falls from 0.88 to 0.33 between thresholds 0.20 and 0.40 on QA, while Data2txt stays at recall 1.0 up to
about 0.30. Thresholds here are tuned and evaluated on the same 300 responses per task, so the diagonal is
optimistic. Tune the threshold per corpus.
3. Data2txt verbalisation. The structured JSON source is turned into sentences of the form "The has ." (nested keys joined, camelCase split, null and false dropped, true gives the field name only, review text kept as its own sentences) before the same NLI pipeline. NLI was re-run on the 300 Data2txt test responses only (the train sample, thresholds and other tasks are unchanged). That run took about 49 minutes on 12 CPU threads, but two copies of the script ran concurrently by mistake and shared the CPU, so this is an upper bound; no clean timing was taken.
| Data2txt (n=300) | AUROC (95% CI) |
|---|---|
lexical |
0.661 (0.593-0.727) |
nli, flattened JSON (published) |
0.496 (0.422-0.561) |
nli, verbalised source |
0.467 (0.398-0.538) |
Verbalisation did not help: nli on the verbalised source is 0.029 AUROC below raw-JSON nli (paired interval
-0.084 to +0.025, so no detectable change) and still at chance, while lexical is ahead of it by 0.194 (paired
interval +0.100 to +0.295). The failure on Data2txt is therefore not explained by the key-value format alone.
We have not tested why; plausible causes are that the label depends on numbers and attributes that a small NLI
model does not compare well, and that the top-3 sentence retrieval step picks poor premises for this task.
Caveats: single seed and a 900-response test subsample; AUROC intervals for the ablation and the verbalisation are from the same fixed resamples, not independent experiments; operating points are in-sample on the test subsample.
LLM judge (implemented, not evaluated yet)
groundcheck judge scores the exact benchmark sample (the 299 train and 900 test responses behind results/)
with one or more Claude models and caches every answer, so interrupted runs resume.
groundcheck judge --dry-run --models claude-haiku-5-5 claude-sonnet-5-5 claude-opus-5-5 --budget-usd 50
groundcheck judge --models claude-haiku-5-5 claude-sonnet-5-5 claude-opus-5-5 --budget-usd 50
groundcheck bench --with-judge
- Key: the client is built only from the
PROTFORGE_ANTHROPIC_KEYenvironment variable, or, when that is unset, from a.protforge_keyfile next topyproject.toml(whitespace stripped; the file is git-ignored and excluded from source distributions). No other credential source is read, and the key is never printed. Without a key the command exits with a message;--dry-runneeds none and makes no network calls. - Request: static instructions in a cached system prompt; the user turn holds the source and response;
structured output
{"hallucinated": bool, "unsupported_claims": [str], "confidence": 0-1};effortlow; no temperature/top_p;max_tokens4000 (thinking is always on and counts as output). Refusals and truncated answers are cached with their cost but not scored. - Cost control: models run cheapest first, 8 requests in flight with SDK retries. Cost comes from
response.usage(cache writes billed at 1.25x and reads at 0.1x of input price) at $/1M tokens input/output: haiku-5-5 0.10/0.50, sonnet-5-5 2/10, opus-5-5 4/20. Before each call the worst case of that call (plus the worst case of calls in flight) is checked against--budget-usd; if it could exceed the budget the run stops and can be resumed with a larger budget. Spend already in the caches counts toward the budget. - Report:
groundcheck bench --with-judgeadds onellm_judge_<model>row per cached model tometrics.json,by_task.csv,by_model.csvandtest_scores.csv(threshold fit on train, like the other detectors; responses the judge refused to score are excluded from that model's metrics and counted inmetrics.jsonunderllm_judge), plus cost per 1,000 answers and median latency.
Limitations
- English only; RAGTruth covers three tasks (QA, summarisation, data-to-text) and a fixed set of generator models from 2023. Scores will not transfer to other domains or newer models without re-tuning.
- Labels are response-level (any annotated span). The detectors, especially
nli, work per sentence, and span-level quality is not measured. - Thresholds are tuned on a train sample of 300 responses to maximise F1, and the ensemble is fit on the same sample; both are small.
- NLI on CPU is slow, so the NLI comparison uses a 900-response stratified test subsample and a 299-response
train sample; confidence intervals on AUROC are bootstrap intervals over that sample.
nliscores only the top-3 retrieved source sentences per response sentence (not the whole source) and the first 12 response sentences; later sentences use the lexical score. lexicalandnumericuse exact token matching with no stemming, number words or unit conversion. Structured (JSON) sources in the data-to-text task are flattened intokey: valuelines before scoring.llm_judgeis implemented but not evaluated yet; its results are not in this report.
Files in results/
metrics.json: all metrics, thresholds, sampling and run settings.by_task.csv,by_model.csv: metrics split by task type and by generator model.test_scores.csv: per-response detector scores for the test subsample (ids and scores only, no source text).ablation.json,operating_points.csv,cost_ratio_table.csv,data2txt_verbalised_scores.csv: output ofgroundcheck ablation(see "Ablation and operating points").examples.json: three illustrative cases with short excerpts (RAGTruth is MIT-licensed).
Citing and contact
@software{groundcheck,
title = {groundcheck: cheap hallucination detectors for RAG, benchmarked on RAGTruth},
author = {{ProtForge}},
year = {2026},
url = {https://protforge.com/research/hallucination-detectors}
}
Issues and pull requests: use GitHub issues. Other contact: hello@protforge.com.
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