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Out-of-process Ed25519 signing extension that closes provenance-gate's in-process adversary gap

Project description

provenance-gate-signer

Out-of-process Ed25519 signing extension that closes the in-process adversary gap in provenance-gate without modifying the core package.

The problem it solves

Core provenance-gate signs captured evidence with a process-local HMAC key (see capture.py / SECURITY.md). Any code running inside the same process can read that key and forge T1 evidence. provenance-gate-signer moves signing to a separate privileged process that holds an Ed25519 private key the agent process never sees.

How it works

 agent process                 signing service (separate, privileged)
 --------------                ---------------------------------------
 CaptureClient  --request-->  SigningService
   (pubkey only)  <--signed--   runs cmd, signs with PRIVATE key
                 real output
  • The signing service is the only place the private key exists.
  • The agent can only request capture; it cannot mint a valid signature.
  • Verification uses the service's public key (ServiceVerifier), so verifiers never need the private key.

Usage

# terminal A — run the privileged signing service (key never leaves here)
from provenance_gate_signer import run_service
run_service("/tmp/sign.sock")   # generates + holds Ed25519 key

# terminal B — agent side (public key only)
from provenance_gate_signer import CaptureClient, ServiceVerifier
client = CaptureClient(sock_path="/tmp/sign.sock")
cap = client.capture(["pytest", "-q"])          # runs in the service, signed
assert ServiceVerifier(cap.pubkey).verify(cap)  # True

# drop into core's governance unchanged:
artifact = cap.to_t1_artifact()                 # core EvidenceArtifact(T1)

A compromised agent process holding only the client + public key cannot forge a passing T1 capture: it lacks the private key (see tests/test_signer.py::test_inprocess_adversary_cannot_forge).

Status

v0.1.0 — functional sketch, fully tested. Core provenance-gate is not modified; this is a composable extension.

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