provenance-gate 2.0.1

Gate agent actions by evidence quality tier with structural governance and actor lineage

provenance-gate

Gate autonomous-agent actions by evidence quality tier — with actor identity, session hierarchy, structural governance, and honest threat modeling.

provenance-gate turns "trust me, I built/tested it" into a machine-checked invariant: only T1 (real, executed, captured) evidence can authorize BUILD, VERIFY, or COMMIT. Lower tiers (literature, inference, hypothesis, belief) can plan and reason, but cannot drive a high-assurance action.

• Core package: provenance-gate (MIT, Python ≥3.10)
• Signing extension: provenance-gate-signer (out-of-process Ed25519 T1 signing)

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Why it exists

An autonomous coding agent can assert "I built/tested/deployed it" with zero proof. That is a hallucination vector at the exact moment power is exercised (writing code, signing, shipping). provenance-gate closes that gap by requiring tiered, signed, auditable evidence before any such action runs.

Install

pip install provenance-gate
pip install provenance-gate-signer   # optional: out-of-process Ed25519 signing

From source (editable, with dev/test tooling):

git clone <repo> && cd provenance-gate
python -m pip install -e ".[dev]"
cd extensions/provenance_gate_signer && python -m pip install -e ".[dev]"

The evidence tiers (T1–T5)

Tier	Name	Can authorize	Meaning
T1	VERIFIED	yes	Real executed + captured evidence
T2	LITERATURE	no	Cited docs / prior art
T3	INFERENCE	no	Logical inference from evidence
T4	HYPOTHESIS	no	Proposed, untested
T5	BELIEF	no	Assertion without evidence

Only T1 can drive BUILD, VERIFY, COMMIT.

Step → minimum tier

Every pipeline transition is gated by RuleSet.validate(step, tier, ...):

SPEC→T5, PLAN→T4, TEST→T4, CAPTURE→T3, REVIEW→T2,
BUILD→T1, VERIFY→T1, COMMIT→T1

VERIFY additionally requires verify_source ∈ {test_output, build_output, runtime_capture}. Any unknown tier/step, or a tier below the step's minimum, is rejected with a specific RuleViolation code (INVALID_TIER, INVALID_STEP, INVALID_VERIFY_SOURCE, TIER_INSUFFICIENT_FOR_STEP).

Quickstart

from provenance_gate import RuleSet, Tier, PipelineStep

rules = RuleSet()
# A belief-level claim cannot authorize a build:
result = rules.validate(PipelineStep.BUILD, Tier.T5)
assert not result.ok          # TIER_INSUFFICIENT_FOR_STEP

# T1 evidence can:
result = rules.validate(PipelineStep.BUILD, Tier.T1,
                        verify_source="build_output")
assert result.ok

Capturing real (T1) evidence

from provenance_gate import TerminalCapture

cap = TerminalCapture(command="pytest -q", workdir=".")
result = cap.run()                 # runs, captures stdout/stderr/exit code
assert result.is_valid             # HMAC-signed in-process
print(result.signature, result.pubkey)

Out-of-process signing (recommended for untrusted agents)

# privileged signing process:
from provenance_gate_signer import run_service
svc = run_service("./signer.sock")     # holds Ed25519 key; agent never sees it

# agent process:
from provenance_gate_signer import CaptureClient, AttestedCapture
client = CaptureClient("./signer.sock")
ev = client.capture(command="pytest -q", workdir=".")
assert ev.is_valid                    # signed by the service, not the agent
artifact = ev.to_t1_artifact()        # drops into guard_verify / pipeline

Architecture

• tiers.py — Tier enum (T1–T5) and TIER_AUTHORIZES truth table.
• rules.py — RuleSet.validate, the central gate logic.
• evidence.py / capture.py — EvidenceArtifact, TerminalCapture, SignedEvidence (HMAC-verified captures).
• ledger.py — AppendOnlyLedger with hash chaining + nonce replay guard.
• pipeline.py — PipelineState step machine with structural governance.
• guards.py — hallucination-defense guards (guard_verify, guard_step, check_hallucination_defense).
• session.py / actors.py — session scopes with actor lineage.
• governance.py — requires_authority / governed_step structural decorators.
• authority.py — AuthorityModel (who may authorize what).

Signer extension (provenance-gate-signer):

• keys.py — pure-Python Ed25519 (RFC 8032) with projective arithmetic.
• service.py — SigningService (holds the private key in a separate process).
• client.py — CaptureClient / AttestedCapture / ServiceVerifier.

Quality bar (this is what "high grade" means here)

• 100% test coverage on both packages (core 475 stmts, signer 288 stmts).
• Strict mypy (strict = true) — clean on all source files.
• SAST: Bandit clean; Semgrep (via CI) + a portable AST invariant scanner (scripts/sast_invariant_scan.py) enforce four hard invariants locally.
• Property/fuzz tests: Ed25519 roundtrip + tamper + forgery rejection; RuleSet governance invariant fuzzed over 500 random + exhaustive combos.
• Build + twine: wheel/sdist build clean; twine check passes.
• Local gate: bash scripts/sast_gate.sh runs Bandit + the invariant scanner; CI adds the multi-OS matrix + Semgrep.

Run the local gate before pushing:

bash scripts/sast_gate.sh
python -m pytest -q

Documentation

• SECURITY.md — threat model + coordinated disclosure.
• CONTRIBUTING.md — how to contribute and the verification gate.
• CHANGELOG.md — release history.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.