proximo-proxmox 0.7.4

The Proxmox MCP you can hand the keys — REST management + the in-container exec the API can't reach, on one clean surface: every dangerous op planned, undoable, and audited.

Proximo

The Proxmox MCP you can hand the keys.

The others make you choose: a read-only inspector that's safe because it can't touch anything — or a loaded gun aimed at a cluster you care about. Proximo refuses the trade. Every dangerous move is planned (see the blast radius first) and proven (a tamper-evident record of every move), and undoable wherever the platform can snapshot (it snapshots before it acts) — trust built into the substrate, not bolted on after. Hand an AI agent the keys; keep the receipts.

Named for Proximo, the lanista of Gladiator — the man who armed the fighter with exactly what he needed, never more, and answered for every move in the arena. That is the whole design: give the operator — human or agent — the reach to act, never the run of the house, accountable for all of it.

"Win the crowd and you will win your freedom."

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Why Proximo exists

Proxmox VE has a full REST API and a terse, powerful CLI — but the MCP landscape around it is split, and neither half is whole:

• API-based MCP servers give rich management (nodes, VMs, storage) but cannot run a command inside an LXC — that's a structural gap: the Proxmox REST API has no container-exec endpoint (it lives in lxc-attach, kernel namespaces, no REST surface).
• SSH-based MCP servers can exec in containers, but lean on broad shell access with little scoping.

Few build the principled one — both halves, on one clean surface, least-privilege, audited, trustworthy enough to point at a hypervisor you care about. That's the bar Proximo aims at. Proximo's specific bet is trust by construction across the whole control plane.

There is no official Proxmox MCP (and likely won't be soon — Proxmox ships the API+CLI and leaves integrations to the community, the same way there's no official Terraform provider). Proximo is a community project, standing on its own.

What it does

Ask, in plain English, "why is ct 105 thrashing?" — and an AI agent pulls node and guest status, tails the logs, and runs a diagnostic inside the container to find out. If there's a fix, it shows you the plan before it touches anything, snapshots first, applies, and hands you a signed receipt of exactly what changed.

That's the product: a hypervisor an AI can operate without being able to wreck it. Read-only by default. No mutation without a plan first, and the plan refuses destructive ops. It snapshots before any state change, wherever the platform can snapshot. A tamper-evident receipt for every change. The comparison isn't Proximo vs. the GUI — it's Proximo vs. handing an LLM your root token and hoping.

Underneath, two backends behind one tool surface:

Backend	Mechanism	For
Management	Proxmox REST API + scoped token	node status, list/inspect guests, lifecycle (start/stop/reboot)
Exec	ssh → pct exec	run-command-in-container, psql convenience, log tailing — the things the API structurally can't do

Those two backends are deliberately boring — anyone can call them. The product is the trust layer over them.

The trust layer — what makes Proximo different

Safe-exec for Proxmox already exists elsewhere. Proximo's distinct angle is the trust layer for AI-driven infrastructure — four pillars:

Pillar	What it does	Status
PLAN	Dry-run by default: every mutation first returns a preview — the exact change, the guest's live state, blast radius, and an honest (advisory, heuristic) risk rating — recorded to the ledger. A mutation can't run without its plan being built and recorded first. (It's a recorded preview, not a separate human approval step: one confirm=true call records the plan and performs the change — so in an agent loop, review the preview yourself.)	✅ built + redteamed
PROVE	Hash-chained audit ledger; plans and confirmations both land in it. audit_verify is tamper-evident — it catches edits, reordering, and insertion. The ledger is keyed (HMAC-SHA256) by default (PROXIMO_AUDIT_KEYED; opt out with off). Catching tail truncation / forged append / full wipe requires an off-box head anchor: pin audit_verify's "head" value somewhere the box can't rewrite it and pass it as expected_head (or set PROXIMO_AUDIT_EXPECTED_HEAD) — that is the strong guarantee. See the honesty note below.	✅ built + redteamed
UNDO	Heterogeneous by plane, fail-closed where present: opt-in auto-snapshot before a risky ct_exec/ct_psql (waited-on, fail-closed if storage can't snapshot); config-revert for guest config; pve_rollback + full snapshot lifecycle for guests. Not every PVE plane is snapshottable — firewall/SDN/ACL/token have no rollback primitive — so UNDO covers the snapshottable surface, not every mutation. Undo points aren't auto-pruned — delete with pve_snapshot_delete. (Snapshot/rollback are async — poll with pve_task_status.)	✅ built + redteamed
DIAGNOSE	Read-only evidence battery (failed units, disk, errors, memory, listening ports) + node health (storage/tasks) → advisory flags. Flags surface incompleteness too, so an empty list never reads as a false clean bill.	✅ built + redteamed

Honesty note (load-bearing): PLAN's risk ratings are an advisory heuristic, not a sandbox. LOW means "does not change state," not "safe" — a read can still exfiltrate. The absence of a HIGH flag is not a safety signal; the destructive-pattern signatures are curated, not exhaustive. Review every change yourself.

Principles (the mantra, baked in — not bolted on)

• Ethical — least-privilege posture (exec off by default; bounded by the token you scope), every action audited, mutations confirm-gated, the PVE token read only at call time, never logged or persisted.
• Solid — real tests (unit + a live smoke against a throwaway CTID), typed, documented, no silent failures.
• Strong — does the hard thing (container exec) cleanly and least-privileged (fail-closed CTID allowlist, opt-in). (Container exec isn't unique — the field leader has it too; the differentiator is the trust layer below, not the exec.)
• Passion + craft — redteamed and linted before it's called done; shipped proud — docs, license, community-ready.

Install & run

🧭 New to Proximo? Start with SETUP.md — a beginner-proof, token-first walkthrough: create a least-privilege (read-only) token, verify what it can/can't do with proximo doctor, then grant scoped write only when you're ready. The token is the floor your keys never leave.

📦 0.7.4 — published. On PyPI (proximo-proxmox), GitHub (CI green), and GHCR (signed multi-arch image) — all three live. New in 0.7.4: a security-hardening pass — private vulnerability reporting + SECURITY.md, plus supply-chain scanning (pip-audit, Trivy, OpenSSF Scorecard, scoped CodeQL) — and an 8-dimension adversarial trust-spine audit whose fixes landed here. Breaking: the API backend now refuses unverified TLS — see the CHANGELOG.

Proximo runs on your machine (wherever your MCP client lives), on demand — like every other Proxmox MCP.

The pip package is proximo-proxmox (PyPI's bare proximo is reserved); the command and import stay proximo. With the [a2a] extra you also get the proximo-a2a server.

Install:

uvx proximo-proxmox          # zero-install run, on demand
# or: pip install proximo-proxmox        (adds the `proximo` + `proximo-a2a` commands)
# or: pip install "proximo-proxmox[a2a]" (also installs the optional A2A face)

Wire it into your MCP client (Claude Desktop/Code, Cursor, …) as the command proximo (or python -m proximo), with the PROXIMO_* env vars — see packaging/proximo.env.example.

From source:

git clone https://github.com/john-broadway/proximo.git && cd proximo
uv pip install -e .          # or: pip install -e .

Docker (GHCR): docker run -i --rm … ghcr.io/john-broadway/proximo:latest runs the stdio MCP server on demand — no daemon, no open port. Multi-arch (amd64 + arm64), shipped with an SBOM and a sigstore-signed build-provenance attestation (gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/john-broadway/proximo --owner john-broadway).

Safe by default: Proximo is API-only out of the box. The in-container exec edge is opt-in (PROXIMO_ENABLE_EXEC=1) and tells you plainly that it grants near-root on the host.

The default path never touches the hypervisor host — management goes over the Proxmox API (scoped token). The opt-in exec edge is the one exception: it uses your existing ssh to PVE to run pct exec as root on the host. That's exactly why it's off by default and says so loudly.

(A Debian package is deferred/optional — the MCP world installs via uvx/pip/Docker, not apt.)

Status — the arena record

🩸 0.7.4 — published on PyPI (pip install proximo-proxmox), GitHub, and GHCR (signed multi-arch image). (0.1.1 "Spaniard" was the first public cut, 2026-06-10.) All four trust pillars (PLAN · PROVE · UNDO · DIAGNOSE) built and redteamed. 145 MCP tools. 2,600+ tests, 0 skipped, ruff + pyright clean — these are mock/in-process (no socket); CI runs them on GitHub's runners. The real-PVE proofs below are a separate, by-hand live-smoke harness — not in that count, not in CI. (the computed blast-radius engine covers the destructive tool surface — eleven op-classes that name the specific guests, nodes, ACL principals, or disks a dangerous op would harm, so nothing falls back to a bare confirm. Atop 0.5.0's signed A2A cards + native async-task wait.)

Proven against real Proxmox (not mocks):

• The trust spine end-to-end, the core provisioning/config mutate cycle, and PBS read shapes.
• The governance/dangerous plane — identity (roles/groups/users/ACLs), storage, SDN pending objects (zone/vnet/subnet create→read→delete), realm create (LDAP/AD/OpenID via an options dict) — full create→read→delete cycles against a real PVE 9.2 API, PROVE ledger verified throughout. (SDN/network apply — the host-network reload — is deliberately never fired live; it carries unrecoverable risk.)
• The 0.2.0 object planes — firewall objects (aliases/IP-sets/security-groups/options), HA rules (the PVE 9 replacement for HA groups), and SDN zones/VNets/subnets (pending, pre-apply) — create→read→delete live-proven against a real PVE 9.2 node; TFA admin reads proven (TFA mutation is ticket-gated by PVE, not token-accessible).
• Offline guest migration (including local-disk) and the HA-config lifecycle on a 3-node PVE 9.2 test cluster.
• Both protocol faces driven by real clients end-to-end: MCP over stdio, and A2A by the official a2a-sdk.

Not yet proven — said plainly: most of the 145-tool surface still runs against mocks; real HA fencing (needs a hardware watchdog), online live-migration (needs shared storage), and behavior at production scale.

The A2A face (experimental, opt-in): pip install 'proximo-proxmox[a2a]', then proximo-a2a — a curated 16-skill slice over Agent2Agent that routes through the same trust core (PLAN/PROVE/UNDO inherited; there is no second code path to bypass). Fail-closed perimeter: non-localhost binds are refused without a bearer token (PROXIMO_A2A_TOKEN_FILE); Host-header allowlist defends against DNS rebinding. Ledger note: the ledger is keyed (HMAC-SHA256) by default (PROXIMO_AUDIT_KEYED, opt out with off) — tamper-evident, not tamper-proof — and an off-box head() anchor (PROXIMO_AUDIT_EXPECTED_HEAD) is the strong guarantee for tail attacks. ct_psql records the SQL body and ct_exec the command argv it runs (the operator's own input) for a complete audit trail; set PROXIMO_LEDGER_REDACT=1 to record a fingerprint (sha256 + kind + length) instead, when the SQL/command may carry secrets/PII. The PVE API token is never written to the ledger.

What's next

• Live smoke of the remaining lifecycle surface (PBS-mutate); HA fencing + online migration once the hardware exists
• PBS certificate-fingerprint wire-enforcement
• (optional) Debian package for the Debian-native crowd

The full build history — every pillar, every redteam, every fix — lives in CHANGELOG.md.

License

Apache-2.0 — chosen for the patent grant that suits infrastructure tooling. Full text in LICENSE.

Credits

Built by John Broadway with Claude and Maude — a human–AI partnership, and the first thing we made on this box to give away to the world.

Claude's contribution spans eras, credited honestly: Claude Opus 4.8 built the trust pillars and the tool surface (2026-06-07 → 06-09); Claude Fable 5 ran the 101-agent release audit and the publish (2026-06-10). Every commit carries its co-author trailer.

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